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Auguste Blanqui (1805-81) is arguably at once the most important and most 
overlooked revolutionary of the nineteenth century. This thesis aims to shed new light 
on Blanqui’s thought by examining his unpublished manuscripts and recent 
anthologies of his writings that have yet to receive sustained critical engagement. I 
contend that politics is the central category through which to read and interpret 
Blanqui’s entire project. To this end, I reconstruct what I take to be the fundamental 
elements of Blanqui’s politics, arguing that it remains rooted at every moment in his 
concept of ‘pensée-volonté’, or conscious volition. This groundwork provides a 
platform from which I advance my own readings as well as engaging with previous 
interpretations that, though stimulating and useful, nonetheless often remain limited 
because of their incomplete view of Blanqui’s overall body of work. More than 
previous studies, I seek to resituate Blanqui within the wider revolutionary tradition 
from which he has hitherto been largely excluded that begins with Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and continues through Karl Marx to Che Guevara, showing the extent to 
which Blanqui advanced and developed the political assumptions of those who 
preceded him on the one hand, and anticipated the politics of those who succeeded 
him on the other. Unlike all previous studies, I read Blanqui with and through more 
recent political thought as a means to both better critically assess Blanqui and to 
explore in turn how he can contribute to contemporary theoretical discussions. I 
suggest that despite his limitations with regard to questions of popular consciousness 
and the contexts and conditions of political struggles, in many crucial respects 
Blanqui lucidly outlines some of the basic elements of collective political action in his 
time and our own, from the subjective requirements of political actors to the rejection 
of historical necessity. 
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Introduction: Blanqui rediscovered 
‘It really must be stressed that it is precisely the first elements, the most elementary 
things, which are the first to be forgotten. However, if they are repeated innumerable 
times, they become the pillars of politics and of any collective action whatsoever.’1 
 
 
Auguste Blanqui is a singular figure. Described as the link between Babeuf and 
Bolshevism,2 Blanqui occupies a unique position in the history of revolutionary 
politics: neither ‘utopian’ socialist nor Marxist, insofar as his project unifies many of 
the most salient features of Rousseau’s philosophy and the radical politics of the 
French Revolution with various strands of nineteenth-century social theory, he is 
perhaps best understood as a neo-Jacobin communist, a resolute political militant of 
absolute social equality.3 In wrestling with issues of power and agency, choice and 
commitment, Blanqui’s enterprise poses some of the most fundamental and 
inescapable questions in politics: How and when can revolutionary change occur, and, 
conversely, through which strategies and mechanisms is it suppressed? What is the 
role of consciousness in the construction of both an individual and a collective 
political subject? What does it mean and what does it take to be a militant and a 
revolutionary, to sustain a commitment and pursue an ideal? How should one 
understand and react to obstacles and difficulties, to defeat and failure? Blanqui’s 
responses to such questions are not always satisfactory - as with any other political 
theory Blanqui’s has its shortcomings and limitations; perhaps more than many other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Antonio Gramsci, ‘The Modern Prince’, in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowel Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p. 144. 
2 Edward S. Mason, ‘Blanqui and Communism’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Dec. 
1929), p. 498; Maurice Dommanget, Auguste Blanqui à Belle-Île (Paris: Librarie du Travail, 1935), p. 
7. 
3 See Alan B. Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1957), pp. 3, 111-112. The term neo-Jacobin communism is an amalgamation of 
Spitzer’s evocation of a ‘Jacobin Communism’ and Peter Hallward’s usage of ‘neo-Jacobin’. See Peter 
Hallward, ‘The Will of the People: Notes Towards a Dialectical Voluntarism’, Radical Philosophy, 155 
(May-June 2009), pp. 17-29; Peter Hallward, ‘Defiance or emancipation?’, Radical Philosophy, 183 
(Jan.-Feb. 2014), pp. 21-32.  
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political theories Blanqui’s lacks rigorous exposition. Even when Blanqui’s ideas are 
under-developed or inadequate, what nonetheless remains in his basic questions and 
concerns is possibly the most significant theory of militant, revolutionary politics of 
the nineteenth century, and one which continued to find echoes across the twentieth 
century. Lenin and Luxemburg, Gramsci and Guevara, Badiou and Bensaïd – in their 
own times and in their own ways, all stand on the shoulders of Blanqui.  
The broad outlines of Blanqui’s thought might be resumed as follows. Blanqui 
insists that all fields and facets of any given established order, from social relations 
and economic production to popular morality, are subordinate to the primacy of 
politics. Politics is, first and foremost, the real battle - whether clearly stated or 
concealed and denied – of the ideas that determine social arrangements and the 
exercise of power. Thought and intellectual consciousness have a foundational role in 
Blanqui’s thought; to be human is to think. Human beings’ capacity for thought, and 
the extent to which is it freely exercised or suppressed, forms the basis of Blanqui’s 
socio-politics. Blanqui’s notions of justice and equality, conviction and faith on the 
one hand, and of domination and exploitation, deceit and duplicity, manipulation and 
opportunism on the other, are all built on his concept of intellectual consciousness. 
Between enlightened reason and reactionary ignorance lies the struggle between 
emancipation and oppression. Blanqui seeks to continue and extend the 
Enlightenment project of realising justice through reason. ‘L’expérience des siècles 
démontre que le seul agent du progrès est l’instruction, que la lumière jaillit (presque) 
uniquement de l’échange (et du choc) des pensées humaines, que par conséquent tout 
ce qui favorise et multiplie cet échange est le bien, que tout ce qui supprime ou 
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l’entrave est le mal.’4 Since human thought dictates humanity’s material relations so 
follows Blanqui’s most basic political assumption: ‘Plus d’ignorance, plus 
d’oppression !’5 Thought, knowledge and reason alone are powerless to influence or 
change society, however. Thought must be exercised as an act. The sphere of human 
relations is at every stage an expression of ‘une intelligence unie à une volonté’, of 
humanity’s capacity for ‘pensée-volonté’.6 Across his life Blanqui assumes that the 
social is determined above all not by economics but by politics as pensée-volonté; 
social conflict is primarily the result of political, not economic, antagonisms.  
Politics begins, then, with conscious volition. Politics is an actual project 
collectively undertaken by conscious individuals. The practical imperatives for the 
realisation of social transformation thus forever remain the primary domain of 
Blanqui’s thought. Blanqui never waivers from the conviction that any conception of 
emancipatory politics worthy of the name is a matter of ‘les moyens pratiques qui, en 
définitive, sont toute la révolution.’ But, as he immediately adds, ‘les moyens 
pratiques se déduisent des principes et dépendent aussi de l’appréciation des hommes 
et des choses.’7 Since politics begins with conscious volition it follows that thought 
and practice are strictly indivisible. ‘On peut faire de la politique sérieuse par la 
plume et par l’action’, Blanqui insists. ‘Si c’est par la plume, qu’elle soit puissante, 
dominatrice, qu’elle entraine. Si c’est par l’action, qu’on organise le peuple pour le !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 64 [n.d.]. All citations from Blanqui’s manuscripts (Bibliothèque Nationale 
de France, Papiers philosophiques d’Auguste Blanqui, Nouvelles acquisitions françaises 9578-9598) 
follow this format, with known dates provided. For the most frequently cited anthologies I have used 
the following abbreviations: MA for Maintenant, il faut des armes, ed. Dominique Le Nuz (Paris: La 
fabrique éditions, 2007); OI for Œuvres I: Des origines à la Révolution de 1848, ed. Dominique Le 
Nuz (Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1993); and NDNM for Ni Dieu, Ni Maître, preface 
Maurice Dommanget (Brussels: Editions Aden, 2009). For Critique Sociale: 2 vols (Paris: Félix Alcan, 
1885), CSI and CSII respectively refer to the first and second volumes. Texts from all of these 
anthologies and published volumes will include a date (if known) upon first citation in each chapter.  
5 Blanqui, ‘Le comunisme, avenir de la société’, 1869-70, CSI, p. 190. See also the asserion that 
‘l’ignorance générale’ is the ‘rempart de l'inégalite. Seule, la diffusion des lumières aura raison des 
résistances et fera une réalité de ce qui semble aujourd’hui une chimère’ (Blanqui, ‘Le luxe’, n.d., 
CSI, p. 96).  
6 Blanqui MSS 9592(3) fo. 53-54 [15 April 1868]; emphasis in original.   
7 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, 6 June 1852, MA, p. 172. 
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conduire au combat. Dans les deux cas, il y a un but visible, un résultat positif. Mais 
on fait de la politique ridicule, en matière de publicité, avec des écrits vulgaires ; en 
fait d’action, avec des intrigues et des tripotages sans portée.’8!Blanqui’s politics is as 
much an intellectual conception of the world as it is a form of decisive action to 
change that world in line with the principled convictions born of that very intellectual 
consciousness. A revolutionary is ‘guidé par la raison et dominé par l’idée de 
justice’.9 Revolutionary politics works to ‘renverser ce qui existe non point au hasard 
ni au profit des intrigues, mais en vertu de principes bien arrêtés avec la ferme 
résolution de construire l’avenir sur les nouvelles bases que fournira le socialisme 
éclairé, développé et fixé par les événements.’10 Blanqui’s writings are an effort to 
formulate an account of the decisive factors common to any given concrete political 
situation. Blanqui’s entire project revolves around that most principal of political 
questions: Que faire ?11 Blanqui’s enterprise is one of maintaining intellectual and 
moral principles as the guide to conscious and determined practical action; of 
insisting on principled engagement and resolute commitment over compromise and 
concession; of understanding humanity and society in the present as the prerequisite 
for its transformation in the future; of comprehending and confronting power – 
particularly state power – as the central site of political struggle; of aligning political 
and social change in a ‘socialisme pratique’.12 As such Blanqui should be read, I 
contend, as a theorist of militant politics.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 357 [18 April 1866]. Or as Blanqui summarises elsewhere: ‘Les paroles, 
sans actes pour les appuyer, ne sont qu’un vain soupir. Les actes, sans paroles pour les justifier, ne sont 
que des crimes. Ne laissons jamais l’un sans l’autre ces deux éléments de la justice’ (Blanqui MSS 
9588(2), fo. 455 [n.d.]).  
9 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 243 [n.d.].  
10 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, MA, pp. 185-186. 
11 Though Lenin is obviously first to come to mind when evoking this question, it is in fact one that 
Blanqui poses himself on several occasions. For example, see Blanqui, ‘Pourquoi il n’y a plus 
d’émeutes’, 2 February 1834, OI, p. 270; Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 203; 
Blanqui MSS 9587, fo. 378 [n.d.]; 9590(1), fo. 112 [n.d.]; 9590(2), fo. 355 [18 April 1866].    
12 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, MA, p. 185. 
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This thesis seeks to establish and analyse the basic constituent factors of 
Blanqui’s conception of politics. It should immediately be made clear that by 
Blanqui’s political theory I do not mean strategies for street fighting, the 
organisational intricacies of the secret society, the plans for a Parisian dictatorship 
over France, and so on, about which Blanqui has also a great deal to say. Rather, I 
mean the fundamental assumptions from which these practices are derived. I will lay 
out what I consider to be the basic elements of what we might call Blanqui’s system, 
in the sense that all its defining components are closely linked, to the point of 
overlapping in many respects. The key concepts in Blanqui’s political thought 
therefore provide the five chapter headings: Thought, Ideas and Education; Making 
choices and taking sides; The People and the Proletariat; Voluntarism and Will; 
History and Progress. My aim is to trace Blanqui’s move from assigning a 
determinant social role to ideas and philosophy to advocating a sustained struggle for 
progress through the means of principled conviction and popular empowerment while, 
at all times, maintaining politics and the political as his foremost concern.  
The need to reconstruct Blanqui’s political thought as a precondition of its 
analysis is the result of two main factors. First, while his thought is widely 
misunderstood for reasons we shall contemplate below, the fragmentary nature of his 
writings does not facilitate reappraisal. The return to Blanqui, to coin a phrase once 
applied to Marx that could in fact just as easily characterise our present moment, is 
not simply a case of picking up the classic treatise and working from the obvious 
point of departure. The core of Blanqui’s political thought can be systematically 
presented, yet this was certainly not the concern of Blanqui himself. He never 
produced a comprehensive treatise on politics. Analysis of Blanqui’s politics first 
demands a certain amount of groundwork in order to locate and extract its most 
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consistent underlying assumptions. The task of piecing together fragments and 
attempting to reconstruct a whole is not to suggest, however, that one should paper 
over the cracks and present coherence where it may not always be found. Though this 
is a potential pitfall of the study of any thinker, the point is that a great deal of 
consistency is found in Blanqui’s thought, and it is only in recognising its common, 
principal features that we can be sure of both its strengths and shortcomings. Second, 
of the two sustained studies of Blanqui’s thought to have appeared,13 neither proposes 
to solely and systematically read Blanqui as a political theorist, outlining the 
foundational elements upon which his politics is built; hence the task remains to be 
undertaken. Moreover, if one considers the historical moments when such previous 
studies were conceived, with their radically differing political and intellectual 
contexts, assumptions and priorities to those of today, the necessity of a renewed 
reading of Blanqui’s politics in light of contemporary historical, political and 
intellectual developments seems all the more necessary. 
A reconstruction of Blanqui’s thought through the lens of politics is therefore 
the aim of this study. I propose to read Blanqui’s writings as a whole - such is their 
overall consistency - whilst nonetheless acknowledging that at certain points a 
distinction between his early and late thought can be made, and that developments 
and shifts do occur. I do not claim to provide an exhaustive exploration of Blanqui’s 
thought, nor of his life for that matter. In the case of the latter, biographical details 
will certainly feature but only where deemed necessary to the understanding of the 
thought. The decision to not engage at length with economics and religion – Blanqui’s 
two other major intellectual concerns – is more substantive, however. Blanqui never 
departs from his primarily political position, and where he does so it is only to clarify !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Maurice Dommanget, Les idées politiques et sociales d’Auguste Blanqui (Paris: Marcel Rivière, 
1957); Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui. 
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his political approach. I will thus look at the economic and theological aspects of his 
thought only insofar as they are relevant to the political. Indeed, to expand on the 
initial observations on Blanqui’s thought outlined above, for Blanqui society is 
ultimately determined not by ‘objective’ economic or religious forces but by our own 
conscious choices and actions, which are political choices and actions. By the same 
token, ignorance is the precondition of exploitation in all its forms because it 
suppresses humanity’s capacity for conscious volition and with it the collective 
capacity for socio-political self-determination. Both economic injustice and religious 
domination are symptoms of popular ignorance that can only be ended through 
popular enlightenment. The struggle for enlightened instruction, the source of 
emancipation, therefore remains a primarily political struggle on the part of those 
capable at present of collectively exercising conscious volition (namely les déclassés 
middle class intellectuals and the atheist workers of Paris), a struggle whose triumph 
will enable all to exercise this capacity as the basis of a truly free and just society. In 
this sense, as Blanqui makes clear in a manuscript note entitled ‘Un programme bref’, 
politics unifies and actualizes all aspects of his project: 
 
Dans l’ordre intellectuel, point d’autre domination que celle de la science, 
seule bienfaitrice de l’humanité.  
Dans l’ordre moral, point d’autre principe que celui de la justice, c’est-à-dire, 
de l’égalité et de la solidarité.  
Dans l’ordre social, point d’autres droits que ceux du travail.  
Dans l’ordre politique, point d’autre but que le triomphe à tout prix des trois 
grandes lois de la société, la science, la justice, le travail.14  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Blanqui MSS, 9590(1), fo. 274 [n.d.].  
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And it is precisely this final point – how can politics serve and ensure the enduring 
triumph of enlightened reason and social justice? – that dominates Blanqui’s thinking. 
Politics, in short, infuses and animates all of Blanqui’s intellectual preoccupations. 
From his interventions during the Trois Glorieuses of July 1830 to the ‘hypothèse 
astronomique’ of L’Éternité par les astres written while imprisoned in 1871, politics 
remains the central category through which to understand Blanqui’s thought.    
 
Not everyone has shared this view of Blanqui’s historico-political importance. To 
speak of Blanqui is, for many, to speak of political temerity and little else, and to view 
him as a major figure in the development of modern revolutionary political thought 
would certainly be contentious. An appreciation of Blanqui’s unique life and legacy is 
therefore also to understand why he has been marginalised from a tradition for which 
he is crucial.  
 
Rebel without a pause 
 
Revolutionary combatant, self-professed proletarian, militant atheist and 
insurrectionary strategist; exiled agitator, cosmic speculator, voracious reader and 
perpetual prisoner; forceful orator, newspaper founder, organiser and leader – 
Blanqui’s life was that of arguably the most significant revolutionary of the 
nineteenth century.  
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Without giving a blow-by-blow account of Blanqui’s life,15 some key themes 
and events are worth highlighting. ‘[I]n the imagination of a worker generation,’ 
Jacques Rancière observes, July 1830 ‘plays exactly the same role as May 1968. It is 
the moment when they decided that “nothing would be as before.”’16 July 1830 
changed everything for Blanqui, too. Born in 1805 in Puget-Théniers in the Alpes-
Maritimes region of south-east France, at the age of 12 Blanqui enrolled at the Lycée 
Charlemagne in Paris where he gained a reputation as a brilliant student. He began to 
study for a degree in Law in 1826. Increasingly politically active as the 1820s 
progressed – a decade which saw a series of milestones in Blanqui’s political genesis, 
from witnessing the execution of the four sergeants from La Rochelle at Paris’s Place 
de Grève in September 182217 to participating in the Parisian revolts of 1827 that left 
him injured on three occasions18 - in Blanqui’s life July 1830 and its aftermath 
eclipsed all that went before and remained the point of departure for all that followed. 
Thereafter the highly formative period from 1830 to 1834 cemented organised 
political action and political thought as the two constants of his existence. 
Engagement in Parisian street fighting in July 1830, January 1831, April 1834 and a 
leading role in the radical republican organisation the Société des Amis du Peuple 
accompanied journalistic work, widely-circulated speeches (notably the 1832 Défense 
du Citoyen Louis Auguste Blanqui) and founding the radical newspaper, Le !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 For the most complete biographical studies in French see Maurice Dommanget’s multi-volume series 
(see bibliography for details) which cover the course of Blanqui’s life. In English see Samuel 
Bernstein, Auguste Blanqui and the Art of Insurrection (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971). "#!Jacques Rancière cited in Donald Reid, ‘Introduction’, in Proletarian Nights: The Workers’ Dream 
in Nineteenth-Century France, trans. John Drury (London: Verso, 2012), p. xiii. !
17 The sergeants were condemned to death for their involvement in the Carbonari. Reflecting on the 
event, Blanqui later wrote of himself: ‘il jura de venger ces martyrs de la Liberté’ (Blanqui, ‘Premier 
texte autobiographique’, 1849-1852, OI, p. 40). Cf. Alan B. Spitzer, Old Hatreds and Young Hopes: 
The French Carbonari against the Bourbon Restoration (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1971). 
18 See Blanqui’s rather self-aggrandising ‘Premier texte autobiographique’, OI, pp. 40-41. Blanqui later 
interestingly described the barricades of November 1827 as ‘les premières barricades du grand 
mouvement révolutionnaire du XIXe siècle’ (Blanqui, ‘Notes de Blanqui sur un texte de Nougès’, 
1849, OI, p. 472).  
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Libérateur, in which Blanqui refined and consolidated his early thinking on the 
meaning and role of politics while presenting, in turn, his conception of thought, 
equality and property. The writings between 1832 and 1834 together form the major 
intellectual statement of his early years, outlining many of the fundamental contours 
of his political project as it would remain thereafter. It can be no coincidence that 
Blanqui’s rise to prominence began during a period that became known as le temps 
des émeutes, in which popular mobilisations, particularly in Paris and Lyon, 
continued to challenge the nascent Orléanist order. The course of Blanqui’s life was at 
every step so intimately bound up with every attempt to overthrow the established 
order in France that the epithet of ‘l’enfant du siècle’ one biographer attributes to him 
would find few serious challengers.19 Yet if history made Blanqui, Blanqui also 
sought to make history. Blanqui saw possibilities and worked to harness them; he saw 
pitfalls and worked to overcome them. After all the immense promise of 1830, Louis-
Philippe’s ascension to the throne and the shoring up of his initially vulnerable 
Orléanist monarchy’s power marked a major defeat in Blanqui’s eyes, providing an 
event that to an arguably greater degree than any other during his lifetime exercised 
the most enduring influence on his political project. ‘Il est honorable d’être dupe,’ he 
suggested in 1846 when looking back on 1830, ‘pourvu qu’on ne le soit pas deux 
fois.’20 In defeat lessons were learned, resolutions were made. The unmaking of a 
revolution was the making of a revolutionary.21  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 ‘Ecrire la vie de Blanqui’, Decaux goes on to note, ‘c’est retracer l’histoire des révolutions du XIXe 
siècle. … Blanqui est né sous Napoléon, il est mort sous Jules Grévy. Entre ces deux pôles, le 
biographe découvre une existence hors de la banalité, l’historien apprend ce que fut l’histoire d’un 
siècle : une aventure démesurée’ (Alain Decaux, Blanqui l’Insurgé [Paris: Librarie Académique Perrin, 
1976], pp. 12, 15). See also Arno Münster, ‘Introduction’, in Louis Augsute Blanqui, Ecrits sur la 
Révolution: Œuvres complètes 1 textes politiques et lettres de prison, ed. Arno Münster (Paris: La 
Galilée, 1977), p. 28. 
20 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Ferdinand Flocon’, 18 August 1846, OI, p. 498. 
21 I owe this formulation to Jonathan Beecher, who coined it with regard to Proudhon and 1848.  
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Following imprisonment in 1832-33 and again in 1836-37, Blanqui’s political 
organisation and action resumed with no less vigour in the late 1830s, culminating in 
the May 1839 coup attempt of the Société des Saisons, for which he was returned to 
prison, where he would remain until 1848. As Paris shook Europe once again the 
course of Blanqui’s year mirrored the gravity of the unfolding events: February saw 
him establish a leading radical political club, the Société Républicaine Centrale; 
March brought the accusation contained in the ‘document Taschereau’ of betraying 
former fellow leaders of his secret societies; and May witnessed, following pressure 
from his followers, the leading of the march on the Assemblée nationale, for which he 
was arrested and imprisoned only weeks before the irruption of the June Days.22 This 
seemingly perpetual cycle of engagement-imprisonment-liberation established during 
the first half of Blanqui’s life continued until his death in 1881. But it was a cycle in 
which engagement remained one of both word and deed. Hence while exiled in 
Brussels in the late 1860s and cut off from Paris, the capital of revolution in Blanqui’s 
eyes, his theoretical reflections continued, taking the form of Instructions pour une 
prise d’armes (1868), much of the writing posthumously published as the Critique 
Sociale (1885) and the numerous political and philosophical notebooks that comprise 
many of the Blanqui manuscripts today housed at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris.  
Having spent in total nearly half of his seventy-six years incarcerated, 
imprisonment may appear as the defining theme of Blanqui’s life, the invariable, 
bleak background from which only failed political endeavours provide punctuation. 
L’Enfermé, as Gustave Geffroy entitled his 1887 biography, seems an apt epithet for a 
man imprisoned by all the post-Restoration regimes of the century (July Monarchy, 
Second Republic, Second Empire, Third Republic). But to foreground imprisonment !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 On Blanqui’s activities in 1848, see Suzanne Wassermann, Les Clubs de Barbès et de Blanqui en 
1848 (Genève: Mégariotis Reprints, 1978). 
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should not obscure its essential meaning. Imprisonment was itself political 
engagement. Although it began as the consequence of a determined, uncompromising 
commitment to radical social change, it also became the extension of this 
commitment. Anticipating the stoic resistance of the twentieth-century’s most 
celebrated political prisoners, from Antonio Gramsci to Nelson Mandela, 
imprisonment did not extinguish Blanqui’s political struggle. Deprived of the freedom 
to act and organise, Blanqui’s struggle continued – health permitting – through the 
written word, with L’Éternité par les astres (1872), the remarkable meditation on man 
and the universe, as the most striking, and perhaps therefore the best-known, example 
of Blanqui’s reflections from behind bars. Prison was thus subject to the same strict 
moral code Blanqui invoked and applied throughout his life, as seen in his refusal of 
an amnesty in 1844: ‘Non seulement je ne veux ni n’accepte de grâce, mais j’aime 
mieux, tout cruellement malade que je suis, être sur-le-champ replongé dans un 
cachot que de redevenir libre sans mes amis.’23 Revolutionary thought, practice and 
principle characterized Blanqui’s life. The commitment to equality through revolution 
produced a conceptual unity across times, places, activities and experiences, a fluidity 
between different platforms of the same struggle. 
In his own lifetime Blanqui was a symbol of hope and fear, inspiring both 
respect and revulsion in equal measure. For the Marx of the first three sections of The 
Class Struggles in France, while ‘utopia, doctrinaire Socialism’ is the socialism of 
the petty bourgeoisie, ‘the proletariat rallies more and more round revolutionary 
socialism, round Communism, for which the bourgeoisie has itself invented the name 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 He continued: ‘Dites au Ministre, dites-lui bien que je revendique toute solidarité avec mes 
complices. Croirait-on par hasard l’avoir détruite par la violence des tortures, cette solidarité saint ? 
Jamais ! C’est elle qui nous a soutenus dans nos terribles épreuves, c’est elle seule qui fait notre force, 
et c’est parce qu’il essayait de la briser que l’acte isolé, dont j’étais menacé, m’a arraché un cri de 
désespoir’ (Blanqui, ‘Réponse d’Auguste Blanqui au Maire de Tours’, 26 December 1844, OI, p. 496).  
On this event, and why Blanqui would refuse the amnesty, see Le Nuz, ‘Introduction’, OI, pp. 483-484. 
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of Blanqui. This socialism’, Marx enthusiastically continues, ‘is the declaration of the 
permanence of the revolution, the class dictatorship of the proletariat as the necessary 
transit point to the abolition of class distinctions generally, to the abolition of all the 
relations of production on which they rest, to the abolition of all the social relations 
that correspond to these relations of production, to the revolutionizing of all the ideas 
that result from these social relations.’24 In 1879 the ultimately successful campaign 
to elect Blanqui as député for Bordeaux in his absence (Blanqui had remained 
imprisoned since his arrest on the eve of the 1871 Paris Commune) received the 
support of the great Italian patriot Giuseppe Garibaldi, who wrote to ‘mes frères de la 
démocratie de Bordeaux’ offering his endorsement of ‘Blanqui, le martyr héroïque de 
la liberté humaine.’25 Eugène de Mirecourt, meanwhile, writing in 1857, describes his 
subject, as ‘[l]e plus cynique des démoniaques conjurés pour la perte de la société 
moderne’, ‘la bête fauve qui a soif de sang’.26 Conceding Blanqui’s ‘talent 
organisateur’ and ‘son esprit merveilleusement cultivé’ - though only to argue that 
these traits, as well as ‘sa ruse profonde et son audace sans bornes’, enabled him to 
dominate his followers27 - Mirecourt pours scorn and vitriol over this Machiavellian 
fanatic, ‘le redoubtable démagogue’.28 More considered contemporary accounts were 
likewise compelled to highlight ‘l’espèce de terreur qui s’attache au nom de M. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France 1848 to 1850 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), p. 
117; emphasis in original.!The final section of the book, written later in 1850 after Marx had spent the 
summer in the British Library, reveals a loss of revolutionary enthusiasm and a more economistic, if 
not deterministic, outlook: ‘A new revolution is possible only in consequence of a new crisis. It is, 
however, just as certain as this crisis’ (ibid, p. 126; emphasis in original). Marx reiterates this point 
more explicitly in the ‘Speech on the Anniversary of the People’s Paper’ of 1856: ‘Steam, electricity, 
and the self-acting mule were revolutionists of a rather more dangerous character than even citizens 
Barbès, Raspail, and Blanqui’ (Karl Marx, ‘Speech on the Anniversary of the People’s Paper’, in Karl 
Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], p. 368). !
25 Blanqui MSS 9588(1), fo. 205, 209 [n.d.]. 
26 Eugène de Mirecourt, Blanqui (Paris: Chez L’Auteur, 1857), pp. 7-8  
27 Ibid., p. 39. 
28 See Ibid., pp. 10-12, 18, 26, 59, 61.!
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Auguste Blanqui. … Son nom est une hache’, Hippolyte Castille noted.29 It seems the 
spectre of Blanqui truly haunted nineteenth-century France; it is not without good 
reason that Walter Benjamin later saw in Blanqui ‘the most dreaded adversary’ of 
nineteenth-century French society.30 
If that was the life, what of the legacy? Accounting for the rise in scholarly 
interest in the life and work of Blanqui, Edward Mason noted in 1929 that 
 
each generation writes anew its history, re-selecting the facts and altering the 
emphasis, in accordance with changing interests and ends. This is as true in 
the history of socialism as elsewhere. Since the Russian Revolution we have 
seen the increase in magnitude of certain supposedly obscure nineteenth-
century revolutionaries and the decrease of others. The historical importance 
of no one of them, probably, has changed more than that of L.A. Blanqui. In 
France and in Russia a long list of books has been written during the last ten 
years, discovering in Blanqui a thinker of considerable importance.31  
 
These historiographical observations are no less true today, albeit in a directly 
inverted sense. On the one hand, for the disciples of our so-called ‘post-ideological’ 
and ‘consensual’ politics, to be confronted with the belief in communism as the 
‘avenir de la société’ undoubtedly leads most to pass over Blanqui as a monstrous 
harbinger of the catastrophes of the twentieth century, a relic of another age to be cast 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Hippolyte Castille, L.A. Blanqui (Paris: F. Sartorius, 1857), pp. 56-57.!
30 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin 
McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 15. On Blanqui as spectre see 
Daniel Bensaïd and Michael Löwy, ‘Auguste Blanqui, heretical communist’, Radical Philosophy, 185 
(May-June 2014), p. 27; Quelques agents du Parti imaginaire, ‘Préface: A un ami’, MA, pp. 9-10. 
31 Mason, ‘Blanqui and Communism’, p. 498. 
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back into obscurity as appropriate.32 On the other hand, just as in 1940 Benjamin took 
aim at the Social Democrats who ‘managed virtually to erase the name of Blanqui, the 
rallying sound that had reverberated through the preceding century’,33 this sound 
continued to fall on deaf ears on the left thereafter. ‘Blanqui, « l’Enfermé » de la 
société capitaliste’, writes Maurice Dommanget, Blanqui’s foremost biographer, ‘est 
aussi « l’Oublié » du socialisme.’34 Despite Mason’s own contention that Blanqui 
deserves recognition as an intellectually and historically important figure, on the 
whole the radical left has not merely overlooked and neglected Blanqui but turned 
him into an object of derision, a by-word for theoretical misconception and practical 
misadventure. It would be little exaggeration to suggest that no other figure in the 
revolutionary tradition could claim such a distance between their historico-political 
importance and their historico-political marginalisation as can Blanqui. So how did 
such a displacement occur? The reasons for Blanqui’s shift from lauded revolutionary 
to political pariah are at once theoretical and practical.  
 
‘Blanqui’ as pejorative signifier 
 
Many have been - and perhaps forever will be - quick to point out political economy 
as the major lacuna of Blanqui’s thought.35 It is, in fact, characteristic of what might 
be called the orthodox Marxist or Marxist-Leninist critique of Blanqui. Here was an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Here I am partially paraphrasing Slavoj !i"ek’s observations on the incongruity of Robespierre’s 
‘politics of Truth’ in our contemporary political conjuncture. See Slavoj !i"ek, In Defense of Lost 
Causes (London: Verso, 2009), p. 159.  
33 Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. 
Harry Zorn (London: Pimlico, 1999), pp. 251-252. 
34 Dommanget, Les idées politiques et sociales d’Auguste Blanqui, p. 67. Le Nuz reiterates this point: 
‘Mais enfermé, Blanqui l’est aussi dans l’oubli que le XXème siècle lui a creusé comme une deuxième 
tombe’ (Dominique Le Nuz, ‘Introduction’, MA, p. 29). 
35 As we shall see, Blanqui was emphatic in his rejection of political economy on the grounds that it 
takes no consideration of justice and morality. From its first pages the Critique Sociale, for example, 
speaks of ‘l’abîme qui sépare le socialisme de l’économie politique. Ce sont deux conceptions de la 
société, diamétralement contraires’ (Blanqui, ‘L’usure: Origine et marche d’usure’, n.d., CSI, p. 11). 
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idealist pre-Marxist communist who, though deserving of attention and great 
admiration for his determined, courageous and unwavering fidelity to the cause of 
revolution and for grasping the basic nature of class struggle – socialism, contrary to 
the claims of the ‘utopians’, could not be created through co-operation between rich 
and poor - was nonetheless ultimately flawed in his inability to understand and adopt 
the ‘scientific’ theory of socialism.36 As such, Blanqui, so the critique goes, occupies 
his own distinct place in the history and development of modern socialist thought: 
able to lay claim to a more ‘advanced’ understanding of politics and society than the 
‘utopian’ socialists, Blanqui nonetheless lacked Marx’s ‘scientific’ knowledge of 
capitalism, as well as the later organisational innovations of Lenin.37 The orthodox 
Marxist interpretation of Blanqui (espoused by Marx himself as he reflected on the 
failure of 1848, and even more so by Engels)38 was perhaps best summarised by 
Stalin: ‘L’histoire connaît des chefs prolétariens, chefs de temps d’orage, chefs du 
travail pratique, pleins d’abnégation et d’audace, mais faibles en théorie.’39 Sylvain 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 V.P. Volguine, ‘Les idées politiques et sociales de Blanqui’, in Auguste Blanqui: Textes choisis. ed. 
V.P Volguine (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1955), pp. 7-9, 47; Neil Stewart, Blanqui (London: Gollancz, 
1939), p. 42. 
37 See Stewart, Blanqui, pp. 40-42.  
38 ‘Blanqui is essentially a political revolutionist. He is a socialist only through sentiment, through his 
sympathy with the sufferings of the people, but he has neither a socialist theory nor any definite 
practical suggestions for social remedies. In his political activity he was mainly a “man of action”, 
believing that a small and well organized minority, who would attempt a political stroke of force at the 
opportune moment, could carry the mass of the people with them by a few successes at the start and 
thus make a victorious revolution. Of course, he could organize such a group under Louis Philippe's 
reign only as a secret society. Then the thing, which generally happens in the case of conspiracies, 
naturally took place. His men, tired of being held off all the time by the empty promises that the 
outbreak should soon begin, finally lost all patience, became rebellious, and only the alternative 
remained of either letting the conspiracy fall to pieces or of breaking loose without any apparent 
provocation. They made a revolution on May 12th, 1839, and were promptly squelched.... From 
Blanqui's assumption, that any revolution may be made by the outbreak of a small revolutionary 
minority, follows of itself the necessity of a dictatorship after the success of the venture. This is, of 
course, a dictatorship, not of the entire revolutionary class, the proletariat, but of the small minority that 
has made the revolution, and who are themselves previously organized under the dictatorship of one or 
several individuals. We see, then, that Blanqui is a revolutionary of the preceding generation’ 
(Frederick Engels, ‘The Program of the Blanquist Fugitives from the Paris Commune’, 26 June 1874, 
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1874/06/26.htm>). 
39 Cited in Volguine, ‘Les idées politiques et sociales de Blanqui’, p. 47. It should be made clear that in 
attributing the essence of this position to Stalin in no way implies a backhanded denunciation of all 
those who shared this view. !
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Molinier interestingly proposes Blanqui himself as partially responsible for this 
myth,40 which is certainly what he suggested in an interview with The Times in 1879. 
‘I have no theories. I am not a professor of politics or socialism’, Blanqui told the 
British newspaper, ‘I am a man of action. What exists is bad, something else must 
take its place and gradually things will come to what they ought to be.’41 Even during 
his lifetime ‘[s]ome of Blanqui’s greatest admirers’, including Georges Clemenceau, 
Spitzer notes, ‘denied that Blanqui exhibited any theoretical capacity whatsoever.’42 
Widely regarded as the nineteenth century’s ‘living symbol of revolutionary action’,43 
many nonetheless characterise Blanqui as a ‘mindless’ revolutionist whose singular 
belief in the immediate conquest of political power displayed a total ignorance of 
wider socio-economic forces.44 Theory, we are told, marks the insurmountable 
limitation of this ‘man of action’; the absence of ‘scientific’ socialism explains 
Blanqui’s practical errors and misjudgments.45  
In order to understand the repudiation of Blanqui’s practice it is instructive to 
return to Mason, whose central concern is to consider ‘the position of Blanqui as a 
forerunner and representative of what is now called communism’ and to establish ‘the 
relation between the revolutionary thought and method of Blanqui and that of 
Bolshevism.’46 This reveals a crucial point: the Bolshevik lens through which Blanqui 
is examined is neither coincidental nor innocent. In many respects, the history of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Sylvain Molinier, Blanqui (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), p. 18. 
41 ‘A Visit to Blanqui’, The Times, Monday April 28 1879 cited in Stewart, Blanqui, pp. 318-320. 
42 Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 20. 
43 Gustave Geffroy, L’Enfermé II (Paris: Les Editions G. Crès et et Cie, 1926), pp. 39-41 cited in 
Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 157. 
44 See Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 135; Dommanget, Les idées 
politiques et sociales d’Auguste Blanqui, pp. 67-71.!
45 Volguine, ‘Les idées politiques et sociales de Blanqui’, p. 47. In this respect, Bernstein’s critique is 
amongst the most emphatic: ‘Blanqui contributed little or nothing to the development of socialist 
theory. … [H]e worked out a strategy of revolution which, far more than his socialist theory earned 
him a place among the supreme revolutionaries in history’ (Bernstein, Auguste Blanqui and the Art of 
Insurrection, p. 205). For the most forthright critiques of Blanqui’s life and thought see Maurice Paz, 
Un révolutionnaire professionel, Auguste Blanqui (Paris: Fayard, 1984). 
46 Mason, ‘Blanqui and Communism’, pp. 499, 501 
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studies of Blanqui is the history of Marxism-Leninism. In the wake of the October 
Revolution, as Mason notes, many looked back to the nineteenth century to seek out 
the political forebears of Bolshevism. And as the twentieth century unfolded and 
communism became a global movement of peoples and ideas, Blanqui did generate a 
certain, albeit relatively minor, level of interest. But many works on Blanqui from this 
period consistently evaluate their subject relative to the practical ‘success’ – that is, to 
establish nominally socialist states - of Marxism-Leninism. In a lifetime of political 
failures, Blanqui, by contrast, did not discover the formula for successfully seizing 
power or realising social revolution. Owing to its organisational and tactical form – a 
secret conspiratorial vanguard divorced from the masses that seizes power through a 
coup and imposes revolution from above – Blanqui’s ‘putchism’, as it is often 
labelled, was futile from its inception. Leninism could be seen as offering practical 
confirmation of Blanquism’s errors. In turn, given that Lenin was himself at pains to 
establish clear daylight between Bolshevism and Blanquism so as to counter 
numerous accusations to the contrary, not least from Rosa Luxembourg,47 it follows 
that all thinkers and movements claiming to descend from the Bolshevik leader were 
compelled to follow suit, repudiating any association with Blanqui as a matter of 
course. As a result, even those thinkers and movements who were in fact politically 
very close to Blanqui never self-identified with him. Here lies another feature of 
Blanqui’s idiosyncratic status: if the likes of Lenin, Gramsci, Castro and Guevara do 
indeed stand on the shoulders of Blanqui then they do so with uniform 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 See Rosa Luxembourg, ‘In Memory of the Proletarian Party’, 1903 
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1903/02/proletariat-party.htm> and ‘Organisational 
Questions of the Russian Social Democracy’, 1904 
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1904/questions-rsd/>; Lenin, The State and Revolution, 
1917, ch. 6 <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev/> and ‘Marxism and 
Insurrection’, September 1917 <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/sep/13.htm> 
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unconsciousness, to not say conscious unwillingness.48 And if Blanqui’s political 
enterprise was dismissed and overlooked precisely because of its ‘unscientific’, ‘wild 
voluntarism’, the intellectual landscape of Western Europe over the past fifty years 
has only served to reinforce this trend. Structuralism and Althusserian Marxism in 
particular explicitly rejected notions that distinguish Blanqui’s thought – a militant 
subject, an anti-determinist refutation of any historical laws, humanity as the agent of 
its own history – as ‘ideology’, asserting instead the primacy of economic structures 
and objective historical processes.49 So if 1917 did indeed lift Blanqui out of 
obscurity it was merely to justify his previous marginalisation and exclusion, to where 
he would be returned in good time. To read Blanqui in the twentieth century was 
simply a means to greater, more worthy ends: understanding Marx the scientist of 
history, the prophesier of revolution, and Lenin the strategist, the organiser. To evoke 
Blanqui in political terms was not an unavoidable ideological label or historical 
marker like any other but an insult, a pejorative signifier for a sort of a-theoretical, 
impatient adventurism. The name ‘Blanqui’ and its derivations (‘Blanquist’, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Trotsky is the notable exception to this rule. Chapter 43 of The History of the Russian Revolution, 
entitled ‘The Art of Insurrection’, reflects at length on the link between conspiracy and popular 
insurrection. Trotsky dismisses the view that ‘popular insurrection and conspiracy are in all 
circumstances mutually exclusive. An element of conspiracy almost always enters to some degree into 
any insurrection. Being historically conditioned by a certain stage in the growth of a revolution, a mass 
insurrection is never purely spontaneous. … But a mass insurrection can be foreseen and prepared. It 
can be organised in advance. In this case the conspiracy is subordinate to the insurrection, serves it, 
smoothes its path, hastens its victory.’  This leads Trotsky to describe Blanquism as ‘the revolutionary 
essence of Marxism’. As he explains: ‘Insurrection is an art, and like all arts it has its laws. The rules of 
Blanqui were the demands of a military revolutionary realism. Blanqui’s mistake lay not in his direct 
but his inverse theorem. From the fact that tactful weakness condemns an insurrection to defeat, 
Blanqui inferred that an observance of the rules of insurrectionary tactics would itself guarantee the 
victory. Only from this point on is it legitimate to contrast Blanquism with Marxism. Conspiracy does 
not take the place of insurrection. An active minority of the proletariat, no matter how well organised, 
cannot seize the power regardless of the general conditions of the country. In this point history has 
condemned Blanquism. But only in this. His affirmative theorem retains all its force. In order to 
conquer the power, the proletariat needs more than a spontaneous insurrection. It needs a suitable 
organisation, it needs a plan: it needs a conspiracy. Such is the Leninist view of this question’ (Trotsky, 
‘The History of the Russian Revolution. Volume Three: The Triumph of the Soviets’, 1930, ch. 43 
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1930/hrr/ch43.htm>) 
49 For an overview of the manner in which voluntarist politics and the primacy of political will are 
dismissed not only by structuralist-inspired philosophy but by the entire field of recent European 
philosophy and critical theory more generally, see Hallward, ‘The Will of the People’, pp. 19-20. 
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‘Blanquism’) spelled naivety at best, at worst outright ignorance. Though a handful of 
studies problematised and challenged such interpretations,50 this is the prevailing 
mode of thinking according to which Blanqui has been remembered to this day.  
But with the fall of the Berlin Wall a whole set of historiographical and 
political orthodoxies and presuppositions came crashing down, too. In the ruins of 
Soviet communism the importance of Leninism cannot and certainly should not be 
downplayed, much less ignored. Its innovations and perversions, insights and 
contradictions must still be addressed with all the requisite vigour and candour. But it 
is also time to broaden and extend our historical and intellectual horizons in search of 
new ‘moments’ in the history of emancipation, ‘moments’ in which an exploration of 
radical equality, ‘an effective reframing of what the “common” means, a 
reconfiguration of the universe of the possible’ warrant interest and engagement, 
however seemingly ephemeral or ‘obscure’.51 Just as we can now rediscover Marx as 
a thinker in his own right, our post-Soviet times provide an intellectual opening, 
exhilarating in potential, limitless in scope, in which to liberate Blanqui as well as 
other hitherto marginalised movements and actors from the constraints of any 
formerly dominant ‘official’ history with its purported canon, interpretations and 
hierarchies.52 It is in this sense that recently Alain Badiou instructively aligned 
Blanqui alongside the likes of Spartacus, Thomas Münzer, Robespierre, Toussaint-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 See in particular Dommanget, Les idées politiques et sociales d’Auguste Blanqui; Spitzer, The 
Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui; and more recently, Le Nuz, ‘Introduction’ in 
Maintenant, il faut des armes; Jacques Rancière, ‘The Radical Gap: A preface to Auguste Blanqui, 
Eternity by the Stars’, Radical Philosophy, 185 (May-June 2014), pp. 19-25; Bensaïd and Löwy, 
‘Auguste Blanqui, heretical communist’, pp. 26-35; Peter Hallward, ‘Blanqui’s Bifurcations’, Radical 
Philosophy, 185 (May-June 2014), pp. 36-44. 
51 Jacques Rancière, ‘Communists Without Communism?’, in The Idea of Communism, eds. Costas 
Douzinas and Slavoj !i"ek (London: Verso, 2010), p. 173. 
52 Of course, the vocation of rediscovering those consigned to the dustbin of history is not a new one. 
Edward Thompson’s preface to The Making of the English Working Class remains the unsurpassed 
articulation of how and why we should continually give voice to history’s voiceless. ‘Only the 
successful (in the sense of those whose aspirations anticipated subsequent evolution) are remembered’, 
Thompson writes. ‘The blind alleys, the lost causes, and the losers themselves are forgotten’ (E.P. 
Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class [London: Penguin, 1991], pp. 11-12). 
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L’Ouverture, Marx, Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Mao and Che Guevara as individuals 
whose proper names historically define and symbolise the various sequences of 
revolutionary politics.53 All these figures and the historical moments they represent 
can contribute to an understanding of the notions of equality and emancipation. To 
paraphrase Mason, today we must write anew the history of communism and the 
revolutionary tradition, in accordance with necessarily changing interests and ends, 
and without ‘success’ as the sole qualification for entry. Edward Thompson once 
contended that history’s supposed failures and ‘lost causes’ may in fact provide 
‘insights into social evils which we have yet to cure’.54  
 
The primacy of politics 
 
Today we should rediscover in Blanqui not only a man of action but also a man of 
ideas. Blanqui did not produce an elaborate or general theory of politics - nor did he 
strive to. Blanqui did, however, formulate ideas and concepts that distinguish him as a 
political thinker of enduring import. Although Blanqui’s writings often seem to focus 
on immediate and local political exigencies, appearing as products of specific 
historical conjunctures55 (the most striking example of this being the articles produced 
for the newspaper he founded during the Franco-Prussian war, La Patrie en Danger), 
they need not be reduced and confined to these specific historico-political 
conjunctures and can be read as the point of departure for more general political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Alain Badiou, ‘The Idea of Communism’, in The Idea of Communism, pp. 9-10. 
54 Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, p. 12.!
55 Two recent texts insist on this point: the Quelques agents du Parti imaginaire describe Blanqui’s 
writings as ‘circonstanciés … chargés des conditions dans lesquelles et contre lesquelles ils sont 
écrits…. D’où l’inexistence de l’œuvre de Blanqui, au sens de ce qui recueille en soi le tout d’un 
trésor’ (Quelques agents du Parti imaginaire, ‘Préface: A un ami’, MA, p. 25). In the same volume Le 
Nuz likewise asserts that ‘il s’est attaché à régler les urgences et à satisfaire les besoins immédiats, sans 
jamais laisser la théorie prendre le pas sur l’action. Cette autolimitation a certainement nui à sa 
postérité’ (Le Nuz, ‘Introduction’, MA, p. 44).!
! 28!
reflection on the nature of, amongst other things, power, history and education. Even 
a text conceived in a moment of clear strategic urgency such as Un Dernier Mot, for 
instance, published as the Prussians neared the gates of the French capital and 
summarizing much of Blanqui’s writing in La Patrie en Danger, nevertheless begins 
by bringing Blanqui’s views on fatalism to bear on the political situation.56 A work 
like Instructions pour une prise d’armes is not simply a tactical manual for barricade 
fighting in nineteenth-century Paris; it elucidates the role of popular forces, 
organisation and leadership, commitment and conscious purpose that inform and 
ultimately determine any revolutionary process. Conceptually limited, frustratingly 
aphoristic, occasionally contradictory and frequently overstated, a theory of politics 
Blanqui’s work nonetheless remains, rich in insight, lucid in expression, prescient in 
outlook.  
Blanqui’s politics unites humanism, communism and voluntarism. Like 
Rousseau, Marx, Lenin and many others, all facets of Blanqui’s political project 
ascribe political primacy to conscious human activity. ‘Machiavelli wrote books of 
“immediate political action”, and not utopias’, Gramsci notes, in a passage that 
applies, mutatis mutandis, to Blanqui. ‘In his treatment, in his critique of the present, 
he expressed general concepts – presented, however, in aphoristic rather than in 
systematic form – and an original conception of the world. This conception of the 
world too could be called “philosophy of praxis”, or “neo-humanism”, in as much as 
it does not recognise transcendent or immanent (in the metaphysical sense) elements, 
but bases itself entirely on the concrete action of man, who … works and transforms 
reality.’57 Blanqui’s politics is defined by direct writing so as to produce direct action; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 The concept of fatalism had pervaded Blanqui’s thought during the preceding decade. 
57 Gramsci, ‘State and Civil Society’, in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pp. 248-249. On 
Blanqui’s interest in Machiavelli, see Gustave Geffroy, L’Enfermé (Paris: Bibliothèque Charpentier, 
1919), pp. 244-245. 
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it is a politics of courage and determination, of conviction and faith; it is a politics that 
forecloses compromise and presupposes conflict; it is a politics of the everyday plight 
of the oppressed, rendering visible and audible the otherwise overlooked and unheard; 
it is a politics that seizes and retains power as the necessary condition for the 
transformation of both man and society; it is a politics born of defeat and 
disappointment that seeks to learn from failure, to begin again, to create, to continue. 
It is, above all, a politics of autonomous human activity over positivism, determinism 
and fatalism; of autonomous human activity over the necessary forward march of 
history or the inevitability of progress; of autonomous human activity over any form 
of objective political, social or economic laws as the agent of historical change. 
Finally, in all such respects, for Blanqui politics is indivisible from the course of our 
finite human existence. Both individually and collectively, the lives we lead, the 
conscious choices we make and the voluntary actions we take ultimately determine 
our collective social arrangements. And like Che Guevara after him, Blanqui’s 
singularity resides in the extent to which he unified in his life, in himself, the 
revolutionary ideas, the revolutionary action and the revolutionary subjectivity or 
‘virtues’ that form the three pillars of his political project.58 For both Blanqui and 
Guevara alike it is this conception of politics as a determined and enduring personal, 
indeed moral commitment to the point of self-sacrifice that accounts for the 
widespread devotion and following they inspired, particularly amongst the young, 
becoming themselves revolutionary symbols in their own respective times. Blanqui’s 
life was not a substitute for a doctrine, nor can his actions be reduced to mere 
stylistic-symbolic deed, performance, gesture (as some sympathisers contend) or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 As Mason observes: ‘There is an extraordinary unity in the life of Blanqui: a blending of thought and 
action, a singleness of purpose and a monotony of experience which makes of him a figure clear-cut in 
its significance’ (Mason, ‘Blanqui and Communism’, p. 501).  
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affectation (as some detractors suggest).59 Rather, the life was the forceful expression 
and actualization of the doctrine, the subjectivation of the idea in a ‘pure singularity 
of body and thought’.60 To foreground subjectivity should not obscure the idea, for 
both were one and the same, combining in a ‘practical idealism’, to adopt a formula 
recently proposed by Étienne Balibar, in which individual and collective subjects are 
at once ‘dreaming of another world and ready to sacrifice much of their lives, 
sometimes all of it, for their conviction’.61 In revolutions and insurrections, writings 
and speeches, trials and imprisonment, illness and solitude, Blanqui’s militant politics 
is his militant life, and vice versa.   
In foregrounding the revolutionary humanism and voluntarism of Blanqui’s 
communist politics my return to Blanqui posits that the very reasons for his neglect, 
marginalisation and being the object of derision are precisely why he should now be 
rediscovered. Alan Spitzer noted in the late 1950s how some of the central tenets of 
Blanqui’s theory were ‘taken for granted as theoretical foundations’ of revolutionary 
socialism to the point of becoming ‘commonplace and so directly related to action 
that they are not usually dignified with the label of “theory”’.62 Can the same really be 
said today? Has Blanqui’s humanist-voluntarist conception of politics not been widely 
forgotten, if not entirely discredited, in the intervening decades? Is conscious volition 
still maintained as ultimately determinant of political action and the ensuing social 
arrangements? Is the seizure of power at present ‘the primary strategic objective’, as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Geffroy contends that ‘his life … is itself a creation and his only doctrine’ (cited in Spitzer, The 
Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 17; see also Decaux, Blanqui l’Insurgé, p.634 for 
the same conclusion), while the ‘Quelques agents du Parti imaginaire’ describe ‘l’absence … d’une 
doctrine blanquiste, comme il y a une métaphysique marxiste’ highlighting instead ‘un style blanquiste’ 
in which passion is a fundamental trait (Quelques agents du Parti imaginaire, ‘Préface: A un ami’, in 
MA, p. 25). For a similar view of the importance of style in Blanquism, see Patrick H. Hutton, The Cult 
of the Revolutionary Tradition: The Blanquists in French Politics, 1864-1893 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1981), ch. 8.  
60 Badiou, ‘The Idea of Communism’, p. 10. 
61 Étienne Balibar, ‘Communism as Commitment, Imagination and Politics’, in The Idea of 
Communism Volume 2, ed. Slavoj !i"ek (London: Verso, 2013), p. 15.!
62 Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, pp. 27, 181-182. 
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Guevara insisted after Blanqui?63 Is the need for forms of political organisation and 
leadership indisputable today? Is principled conviction, to the exclusion of 
compromise and concession, now held as the basic condition of any political 
engagement worthy of the name? As Gramsci observes in the citation that serves as 
the epigraph for this introduction, it is precisely the most basic assumptions that are 
the most rapidly neglected as the basis of collective political action. In rediscovering 
Blanqui’s militant politics we are forced to reflect on the theoretical assumptions of 
his time as of our own. 
To advance the utility and relevance of aspects of Blanqui’s account of 
emancipatory politics is not to deny its manifest limitations, however. I will suggest 
two main problems with Blanqui’s project. First, Blanqui’s conception of conscious 
volition too often overstates the gap between knowledge and ignorance, between who 
has and who lacks at present the intellectual capacities that decisive voluntary action 
demands. This leaves him unable to formulate a convincing account of politics as self-
emancipation on the one hand, often pushing him towards substitionist organisational 
forms and practices on the other. Second, while Blanqui’s politics serves as an 
important antidote to a certain form of Marxian economic determinism, it fails to 
offer a sustained account of the objective socio-economic forces and conditions on 
which subjective political forces appear and act, although it does take some 
consideration, albeit limited, of such factors. In other words, political subjectivities 
are over-privileged to the point of often largely eroding away the historical grounds 
from which they are produced. While the principal strength of Blanqui’s politics 
resides in its forceful conception of revolutionary subjectivity, it should be aligned 
with more objective considerations without having its fundamental importance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 Che Guevara, ‘Guerrilla Warfare: A method’, in Che Guevara Reader: Writings on Politics and 
Revolution, ed. David Deutschmann (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2004), p. 77. 
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diminished. As Marx asserts: ‘communism is at once real and directly bent towards 
action’.64 Or as Peter Hallward has proposed more recently, the task is to work 
towards a ‘dialectical voluntarism’ that ‘in connecting both objective and subjective 
forms of determination, is oriented by the primacy of the latter.’65 Overall, then, 
Blanqui’s intellectual insights can serve to supplement the limitations of others, just 
as its own internal flaws and shortcomings can be corrected from external sources.66  
 
Forerunners, contemporaries, descendents 
 
Blanqui has not been sufficiently well known to claim explicit disciples and 
descendents, and what little that has been and remains known often does not go 
beyond a picture of an adventurist conspirator, commanding no followers as such. An 
aim of the present study is therefore to show that Blanqui’s politics, when properly 
understood, can claim more forerunners, implicit contemporary fellow travellers and 
descendents than we have hitherto been led to think. This will allow us to situate 
Blanqui within a wider political tradition, understanding and appreciating his position 
in a broader history. Some of the basic considerations behind this approach should be 
highlighted here.  
As already noted, in many ways Rousseau stands as Blanqui’s clearest 
intellectual forerunner. Property and the origins of social inequality, the relativism of 
law, the necessity of enlightened leadership and popular education in the construction 
a new social body, the people as a national and political construction, an active 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, in Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and 
Gregor Benton (London: Penguin, 1975), p. 349. 
65 Hallward, ‘The Will of the People’, p. 17. 
66 Münster suggests in a particularly measured manner that Blanqui is ‘un des leaders révolutionnaires 
les plus brillants, les plus perspicaces, les plus conséquents non seulement dans ses convictions, mais 
aussi dans ses erreurs’ (Münster, ‘Introduction’, in Ecrits sur la Révolution, p. 58). 
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general will as the basis of a truly free and equal society – on many crucial points 
Blanqui’s position is extremely close to that of Rousseau.67 Yet given their multiple 
political affinities, comparison of the two figures has been surprisingly absent, with 
many of Blanqui’s readers focusing instead – and not without good reason - on the 
lineage from Babeuf through Buonarrotti or from the Hébertistes.68 The manner in 
which Blanqui continues and develops Rousseau’s project in the context of 
nineteenth-century France is therefore an important consideration. 
It will have become apparent from this introduction that one figure looms 
larger over Blanqui than most, for to speak of nineteenth-century revolutionary 
politics is to enter into dialogue with Marx as a matter of course.69 How, then, will the 
latter be addressed hereafter? Reference to and engagement with Marx will serve two 
primary functions. First, and quite simply, Marx’s insights serve to increase our 
understanding of Blanqui, stimulating by virtue of its divergences and developments. 
The most fundamental demarcation is worth reiterating: Blanqui is not a Marxist. His 
commitment to radical equality, to communism, does not emanate from a critique of 
political economy or the dialectical-materialist conception of history. It does not 
follow, however, that my invocation of Marx or Marxism necessarily implies a 
‘correct’ position or idea, as opposed to an ‘incorrect’ reading on the part of Blanqui, 
as is largely characteristic of Marxist-authored accounts of Blanqui. When and where 
such judgments of Blanqui’s work do occur will be made explicit. Elsewhere, 
however - and this brings me to the second function of my use of Marx - I shall !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Rousseau’s work was indeed very familiar to Blanqui. ‘Vous pouvez bien penser que j’ai lu Voltaire, 
Rousseau, Helvétius, Courrier, La Fontaine, Don Quichotte’, he once explained. ‘Ce sont des livres 
qu’on sait à peu près par coeur’ (Blanqui, ‘T140’, 8 July 1841, OI, p. 624). Blanqui would, however, 
later write of – and thus criticize – ‘J.J. Rousseau, le Déiste’ (Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 75 [1869]). 
Blanqui likewise denounces Robespierre for his attempt, precisely in line with Rousseau’s proposals 
for a civil religion, to create the Cult of the Supreme Being.  
68 Dommanget and Spitzer both only mention Rousseau once in passing in their respective studies of 
Blanqui’s thought.  
69 On Blanqui and Marx, see Dommanget, Les idées politiques et sociales d’Auguste Blanqui, ch. 7.  
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attempt to show that in many respects Blanqui and Marx can in fact be read in 
conjunction and without contradiction. Against successive attempts to distance Marx 
‘the scientist’ and Blanqui ‘the activist’, it is time to rethink the relationship between 
the two, with Marx’s early work but also his more emphatically political writings 
particularly around 1848 and the Paris Commune perhaps unsurprisingly providing 
the most fertile grounds for reappraisal.  
Finally, in assessing Blanqui’s politics this thesis aims to engage with and 
speak to our actualité. Insofar as Blanqui’s politics incorporates some of the key 
concerns of contemporary political thought – notions of equality or communism; 
(re)defining the subject; voluntarism and political will – where possible it seems 
timely to bring together the two. For not only is Blanqui largely absent from current 
debates to which he can offer important contributions, but also these debates can grant 
us in turn a better understanding of Blanqui himself.  
 
Blanqui in print 
 
New editions of some of Blanqui’s writings help in the task of analysing Blanqui’s 
politics. In fact there have been a surprising number of primary texts published 
relatively recently in French.70 Dominique Le Nuz’s work is of particular significance 
in this respect. Building on the smaller, earlier anthologies edited by Volguine (1955), 
Abensour and Pelosse (1973, 2000), and Münster (1977) respectively, Le Nuz 
oversaw the publication of Œuvres I: Des Origines à la revolution de 1848 (1993), 
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70 Auguste Blanqui, L’Eternité par les astres, preface Jacques Rancière (Paris: Les Impressions 
nouvelles, 2002); Auguste Blanqui, Le communisme, avenir de la société, preface Roger Martelli 
(Paris: Le Passager Clandestin, 2008); Auguste Blanqui, Ni Dieu, Ni Maître, preface Maurice 
Dommanget (Brussels: Editions Aden, 2009); Auguste Blanqui, Instructions pour une prise d’armes, 
préface Elsa Guillalot (Grenoble: Editions cent pages, 2009); Auguste Blanqui, Critique Sociale: 
Fragments et Notes, preface Gérald Dittmar and Éric Dussert (Paris: éditions Dittmar, 2012).   
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which offers a comprehensive collection of Blanqui’s work from his early life until 
1848, including major statements such as the Défense du Citoyen Louis Auguste 
Blanqui and the Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple (both 1832), the texts 
written during the short life of Le Libérateur, as well as hitherto unpublished personal 
correspondence. Some of these texts were reproduced in a later anthology, 
Maintenant, il faut des armes (2006), alongside key texts from the post-1848 period, 
including Lettre à Maillard (1852), Instructions pour une prise d’armes (1868), 
extracts from the Critique Sociale (1867-70) and L’Éternité par les astres (1872). 
Despite this important work, much of Blanqui’s writings remain unpublished. 
Attempting a systematic reading thus requires consultation of the Blanqui manuscripts 
(Nouvelles acquisitions françaises 9578-9598), a disorderly collection of articles, 
speeches, notes, correspondence and newspaper clippings bound into some thirty 
volumes and housed at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris.  
I describe the appearance of these anthologies as ‘surprising’ because, as yet, 
analysis in the form of secondary literature has not kept pace – far from it. Some 
important contributions have no doubt occurred. In French, the essays of Miguel 
Abensour and Valentin Pelosse have been republished.71 The texts by Jacques 
Rancière and Daniel Bensaïd and Michael Löwy were also recently translated into 
English, to comprise, along with a further article by Peter Hallward, a dossier entitled 
‘Blanqui’s Eternal Gap’ that appeared in the journal Radical Philosophy.72 These are 
encouraging developments. Nonetheless, the seeming appetite, in France at least, to 
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71 Miguel Abensour, Les Passages Blanqui: Walter Benjamin entre mélancolie et révolution (Paris: 
Sens&Tonka, 2013) (originally published in Walter Benjamin et Paris, ed. Heinz Wismann [Paris: 
Editions du Cerf, 1986]); Miguel Abensour and Valentin Pelosse, Libérer l’Enfermé (Paris: 
Sens&Tonka, 2014) (originally published as the postface of their edited anthology, Auguste Blanqui, 
Instructions pour une prise d’armes, L’Eternité par les astres et autres texts, eds. Miguel Abensour et 
Valentin Pelosse (Paris: Editions de la Tête de Feuille, 1973, which was itself also republished under 
the same title by Sens&Tonka in 2000). Hereafter I shall refer to the new editions. 
72 Radical Philosophy, 185 (May-June 2014). See above for full references of the three articles.  
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republish Blanqui’s writings has not been accompanied by a re-engagement with their 
content in a sustained manner, and the general under-appreciation of Blanqui and his 
writings continues largely uncorrected, particularly in the Anglophone world where, 
aside from two translations of L’Éternité par les astres and the selection of translated 
texts on the Marxists Internet Archive, no anthology comparable to those in French 
exists.73 One has to go back to Samuel Bernstein’s Auguste Blanqui and the Art of 
Insurrection (1971) for the last book-length treatment of the subject, thought this 
volume, along with Spizter’s before it, is now out of print. French secondary literature 
does not fare much better. Maurice Paz’s Un révolutionnaire professionel, Auguste 
Blanqui (1984), a curious volume that does not hold back in its criticisms but 
ultimately fails to offer any convincing new perspectives, remains the most recent 
monograph. 
This, then, is the first monograph or doctoral thesis on Blanqui to appear in 
English for over forty years. As well as drawing on Blanqui’s unpublished 
manuscripts, it is also the first such study, in either English or French, to make use of 
the material in the Œuvres I collection since its publication over twenty years ago as 
well as the more recent anthologies. 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 establishes the foundational role of 
thought, ideas and education in Blanqui’s thought. Blanqui’s entire project can only 
be understood in light of his basic assumptions regarding enlightened thought and the 
political consciousness it confers. Although Blanqui is no doubt correct to insist on 
enlightened thought, ideas and consciousness as vital factors in any political process, I 
suggest that he often overstates the division between knowledge and ignorance, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Auguste Blanqui, ‘Eternity According to the Stars’, New Centennial Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 
2009), pp. 3–60; Auguste Blanqui, Eternity by the Stars, trans. Frank Chouraqui (New York: Contra 
Mundum Press, 2013); <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/blanqui/>  
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thereby elevating the requisite level of intellectual consciousness to the point of 
rejecting ordinary people’s capacity for collective action. It would nonetheless be 
wrong to suggest this as representative of Blanqui’s thought as a whole, and the issue 
is in fact quite ambiguous, particularly when one compares Blanqui’s early and late 
thought.  
Having outlined the importance of enlightened thought, Chapter 2 considers 
Blanqui’s conception of politics as making a choice and taking a side. I explore the 
manner in which Blanqui’s analysis of property, the state and contemporary politics 
informs his view of politics as inherently and invariably conflictual, as a civil war. 
Together with his uncompromising insistence on the principled commitment to an 
ideal, this leads Blanqui to uphold a politics of partisan conviction. On this point 
Blanqui’s thought is particularly instructive; he lucidly outlines an essential condition 
of any militant politics worthy of the name, then as now.  
Chapter 3 explores perhaps the most significant consequence of the preceding 
chapter, namely a conception of the people or the proletariat which serves a politics of 
conflict and commitment. By contrast with the interpretations of previous analysts, I 
argue that for Blanqui the people or the proletariat is primarily a subjective, formal 
position; it both presupposes and articulates a political choice, a political principle. 
Hitherto the majority of Blanqui’s readers have overlooked this crucial point, 
overlooking the political logic at work in the use of these terms.  
At this point we will be able to begin to bring together some of the ideas 
discussed in the preceding chapters in order to attain a more complete picture of 
Blanqui’s conception of politics. 
Voluntarism is in many ways the unifying category of Blanqui’s militant 
politics. Chapter 4 outlines the role of political will in Blanqui’s understanding of 
! 38!
how a political process begins, how it continues when confronted by obstacles and 
resistance and the subjective resources these sequences demand. Many of Blanqui’s 
insights on these issues remain crucial to any serious reflection on the question of 
popular empowerment, deserving as such far greater interest than previously accorded 
to them. Developing some of the initial observations outlined in chapter one, I then 
return to what seems to me as a major problem and limitation of Blanqui’s politics: 
the over-privileging of enlightened consciousness as a precondition of volition. 
Insofar as those deemed unconscious and unenlightened are by extension incapable of 
genuine voluntary action, Blanqui displays a certain lack of confidence in the mass of 
the people as voluntary political actors, I suggest, as illustrated in the vital question of 
revolutionary transition.  
Chapter 5 examines Blanqui’s understanding of history and the possibility of 
human progress, reconstructing the relationship between philosophical and historical 
change. For Blanqui, history is the account of human thought and human activity. 
Humans therefore have the capacity, if not the duty and the obligation, to create their 
own history, to politically struggle for social progress. I also address the extent to 
which Blanqui nonetheless fails to take sufficient account of non-political, non-
subjective factors that shape the context and circumstances of political and historical 
change.  
Considering the anti-determinism that pervades Blanqui’s thought, I show the 
extent to which all his writings, including - and contrary to the claims of Walter 
Benjamin’s influential reading - L’Éternité par les astres, are rooted throughout in the 




Chapter 1 – Thought, Ideas and Education 






Blanqui establishes the foundational role of enlightened thought and consciousness 
within his project from his very first writings. A short text from 1831, for instance, 
suggests that while the university of the Middle Ages was like ‘une oasis de liberté, 
réservée à la civilisation, au milieu de ces déserts de barbarie et d’esclavage’ it had 
since become, particularly under Napoleon, an ‘instrument de despotisme’. Blanqui 
therefore demands the destruction of the ‘monopole le plus odieux et le plus funeste 
au pays … celui qui tarit la civilisation dans sa source et qui est l’outrage le plus cruel 
infligé à l’intelligence humaine’. The anthropological and political assumptions 
behind this position are then clearly expressed: ‘Nous sommes las de cet exécrable 
impôt qui frappe ce qu’il y a de plus saint et de plus sacré, ce qui fait l’homme et le 
citoyen : l’instruction.’75 Although across his writings Blanqui often reflects on how 
material conditions and concerns (hunger, poverty) determine political choices and on 
the extent to which the coercive mechanisms of the state (the repression of popular 
revolts, Haussmann’s reconstruction of Paris during the Second Empire) are deployed 
to control and oppress the population, throughout his life he nonetheless maintains the 
basic belief expressed in 1831 that on the part of an unjust regime ‘il est plus facile de 
nous tromper que de nous abattre’.76 Human thought and consciousness, for Blanqui, 
are ultimately determinant of socio-political arrangements. Education and the - 
politically decisive – thought and reason it alone confers thus form crucial !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Blanqui MSS 9582, fo. 75 [1 September 1852]; Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 368 [6 September 1852]. 
75 Blanqui, ‘Déclaration du Comité provisoire des Ecoles’, 22 January 1831, MA, pp. 58-59.  
76 Ibid., p. 58. 
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components of Blanqui’s system. Blanqui’s voluntarism is conceived in the strictest 
terms as conscious volition. Political subjectivity presupposes intellectual 
consciousness. The collective consciousness of individuals is the essential 
precondition of both collective voluntary action and sustained, collective political 
power. The implications this has for Blanqui’s wider project and for its 
reconsideration today remain, however, somewhat unexplored in recent engagements 
with his thought.77  
In this first chapter, then, we must go to the heart of Blanqui’s thought, 
establishing the role and meaning assigned to thought, knowledge and instruction, and 
the manner in which they underpin Blanqui’s conception of politics. Although this 
will inevitably anticipate and touch on some subsequent discussions, particularly 
those of Chapters 4 and 5, through reconstructing this core element of Blanqui’s 
thinking the chapter aims to provide a basis from which to later analyse in greater 








77 Of the three texts featured in the ‘Blanqui’s Eternal Gap’ dossier in Radical Philosophy, for instance, 
Rancière (‘The Radical Gap’) sidesteps issues of intelligence and consciousness, perhaps 
unsurprisingly given that his own ‘presumption of equality’ is completely at odds with the basis of 
Blanqui’s entire project. Bensaïd and Löwy (‘Auguste Blanqui, heretical communist’), meanwhile, do 
acknowledge the question of enlightened intelligence and highlight the impasse it presents for Blanqui 
but do not pursue the issue further. Finally, although Hallward (‘Blanqui’s bifurcations’) rightly places 
cognitive capacity at the core of Blanqui’s conception of humanity and society, in outlining the ‘three 
basic principles’ of Blanqui’s politics the intellectual consciousness presupposed in Blanqui’s 
conception of political volition and of Paris as the country’s leading revolutionary actor nonetheless 
remains largely absent.  
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Revolution of the intellect 
 
Blanqui’s dualism 
Blanqui’s thought is broadly underpinned by a dualism according to which nature and 
its governing laws are strictly separate from human thought, activity and volition.78 A 
note from 1868 under the title ‘La loi, mot inapplicable aux choses humaines’ 
succinctly sets out the basic position upon which L’Éternité par les astres most 
notably would later expand. ‘Le mot loi n’a de sens que dans la nature’, writes 
Blanqui, in direct opposition to the ‘utopian’ socialism of Saint-Simon and Fourier 
and its conflation of natural and human laws. ‘Qui dit loi, dit règle invariable, 
immanente, fatale, incompatible avec l’intelligence et la volonté.’ There is no such 
thing as political, social or economic laws, for in the human realm there is only ‘de 
caprice et d’arbitraire … des expédients, phénomènes qui varient au gré des fantaisies 
et des passions humaines.’79 Unlike nature, in the human realm there is no successive 
development and perpetual evolution; unlike nature, in the human realm all is 
contingent and undetermined, all is open to movement and change, to reason and 
volition.80 So crucial is this dualism that elsewhere it is condensed and accorded 
Blanqui’s characteristic aphoristic treatment:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 Other readers to comment on Blanqui’s dualism include Mason, ‘Blanqui and Communism’, p. 511, 
Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 41, and Hallward, ‘Blanqui’s 
bifurcations’, p. 37.  
79 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 278 [n.d.]; 9592(3), fo. 146 [27 April 1868]. Cf. Blanqui, ‘L’Éternité par 
les astres’, 1872, MA, pp. 370-71. 
80 As Blanqui explains at length in one note: ‘Dans la nature, il n’y a point rapport de cause à effet, 
mais développement successif, évolution perpétuelle … cause et effet sont là des mots vides de sens, 
car ils impliquent accident ou volonté, choses tout-à-fait étrangères aux phénomènes organiques, où 
elle n’interviennent qu’à titre de perturbation. Qu’un arbre meure debout ou tombe abattu, soit par le 
vent, soit par la hache, le résultat définitif reste le même. Les molécules constitutives de cet arbre 
retournent à la circulation générale, mais en suivant des voies différentes, déterminées alors par ce 
qu’on appelle une cause, simple incident toujours en dehors de l’évolution régulière elle-même. 
L’arbre tombé pourrit sur place, et ses principes entrent dans de nouvelles combinaisons. Si on l’a jeté 
bas pour un but d’utilité, ce n’est qu’une/cette destination n’est qu’éphémère. Le fagot brule, se réduit 
en gaz et en sols, matériaux disponibles pour une métamorphose subséquente. (La planche et la poutre), 
par un plus long circuit, la planche et la poutre arrivent néanmoins à la dissolution finale qui on dégage 
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Prétendue fatalité des lois économiques qui régissent la société. Pure 
impertinence. Rien de plus arbitraire et de plus irrégulier que la marche des 
choses humaines qui varient au gré de milliards de caprices. Rien de moins 
semblable à l’ordre immuable et fatal des choses de la nature.’81  
 
Blanqui’s dualism excludes absolutely any conflation of man and nature, of human 
affairs and natural processes. After Rousseau, Blanqui conceives society as in no way 
conforming to any form of natural authority or historical tendency.82 Humans are 
therefore not subject to the will of a libre arbitre or greater design; Blanqui 
unreservedly rejects any philosophical system in which, like under God, ‘les hommes 
ne sont que les instruments aveugles/involontaires de ses desseins. Seul, il inspire 
tout, dirige tout, manipule tout.’83 Conceptions of power or history within the human 
realm that appeal to any form of ‘force aveugle et fatale’ are opposed in the strongest 
possible terms.84 For Blanqui, by contrast, any given established social order is, by 
definition, in no way unconsciously or inevitably arrived at but, rather, consciously 
forged and organised in accordance with its dominant ideals and interests. (These 
issues will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 5.) How, then, are we to 
understand the open and contingent realm of mankind with its constituent battle of 
wills, interests and ideas as distinct from the immutable realm of nature and natural 
laws? How, by extension, does this inform Blanqui’s conception of political action 
and social change?  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
les éléments divers et les restitue à la loi des transformations successives. Toute l’activité humaine 
tourne dans ce cercle misérable’ (Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 49 [17 April 1868]). 
81 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 274 [n.d.]. 
82 See, for example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Christopher Betts (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), Book I, Chapters i-iv. 
83 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 181 [n.d.]. 
84 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 50 [17 April 1868]; emphasis in original. !
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Man is thought 
‘La pensée, c’est l’homme’, Blanqui affirms.85 Mankind is, for Blanqui, defined first 
and foremost by its cerebral, not manual, capacities. The physical capacity and 
manual dexterity to build and craft is, to be sure, shared by man and animals alike. 
Blanqui notes how the masterly skill, geometric precision and exacting calculations of 
birds’ nests, bees’ honeycomb and spiders’ webs emulate if not surpass man’s ability 
to manipulate material. But thought and ideas alone are what make mankind.86 At a 
social level Blanqui takes this point of departure to its logical conclusion, in a move 
that has profound implications for his conception of politics as a whole. ‘C’est la 
Philosophie qui gouverne le monde. … Aucune société n’a vécu sur la terre, sans être 
régie par une Philosophie.’87 Social change occurs, then, through philosophical 
change. In direct contrast to the basic tenets of Marxism, Blanqui believes that the 
‘vie du peuple n’est pas dans les œuvres de ses mains ; elle est dans sa pensée. La vie 
intellectuelle et morale est tout ; la vie matérielle une simple dépendance et un 
reflet.’88 Rather than anticipating or following Marx’s inversion of Hegel, Blanqui 
maintains with the latter the primacy of ideas and consciousness as determining 
material socio-economic and political reality, and not vice versa. Ideas and thought, 
Blanqui contends, condition political institutions, economic relations and the overall 
social existence of man.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 284 [16 April 1868]. See also: ‘Le cerveau seul fait l’homme, sa dignité, 
sa grandeur. Il est l’organe roi, siège et source de l’intelligence’ (Blanqui, ‘Athéisme et spiritualism’, 
13 December 1880, NDNM, pp. 23-24). 
86 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, 1869-70, CSI, pp. 214-215. 
87 Blanqui adds: ‘Toutes les autres sciences n’interviennent dans la direction sociale qu’en modifiant on 
réformer la Philosophie. … C’est la différence des Philosophies qui fait la différance des organisations 
sociales’ (Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 384 [n.d.]).  
88 Blanqui MSS 9586, fo 402 [n.d.]. See also Blanqui, ‘Candide’, 3 May 1865, MA, p. 248. On the 
comparison with Marx’s assumption that ‘[i]t is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
being, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness’, see also Spitzer, 
The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 46. 
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With these assumptions we begin to uncover some of the fundamental 
limitations of Blanqui’s thinking. Insofar as humanity and society are defined by their 
cognitive capacities and collective consciousness, the failure therein to adequately 
account for the material conditions, productive forces and social relations that 
underpin the established order will prevent Blanqui from fully comprehending the 
objective realities that, while not ultimately determinant, certainly shape the processes 
and circumstances of political action and social transformation. It will leave Blanqui 
unable to explain historical change outside the realm of ideas, unable to formulate a 
militant political project properly grounded in specific historical conditions. ‘Men 
make their own history, but they do not make it as they please’ Marx was right to 
assert; ‘they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances existing already’.89 Although, as we shall see in the following chapters, 
Blanqui’s essential strength indeed lies in his account of how men make their own 
history, not least thanks to the absence of a form of historical determinism that 
appears in some of Marx’s own writings, his major shortcoming nonetheless remains 
the failure to sufficiently analyse, explain and consider the existing historical 
conditions through which this activity takes place.  
 
Instruction, transformation, volition 
Within Blanqui’s dualism human thought and the mind are, however, far from 
immaterial in any form of spiritualist sense (spiritualism is of course for Blanqui, after 
‘les athées du 18ème siècle, Diderot, Helvétius, d’Holbach, Lamettrie [sic]’, the target 
of his atheist materialism).90 Reflecting on the relationship between thought and 
matter, Blanqui reasons that thought is itself a product of matter: the brain. Human !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 Karl Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’, in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, p. 329; 
translation modified. 
90 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 75 [1869].  
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thought is ‘une fonction de la substance nerveuse’, Blanqui writes. This leads him to 
dismiss as ‘[une] hypothèse ridicule’ the suggestion that human intelligence ‘pourrait 
exister en dehors de la matière, une intelligence infinie’ creating the material world; it 
disproves ‘la toute-puissance d’une intelligence divine’91 and the belief in ‘un être 
chimérique … indépendant de la substance nerveuse’.92 Thought, as produced by the 
material organism of the brain, ‘n’existe que par la matière, ne se manifeste que par la 
matière, ne se conserve que par la matière’, Blanqui emphatically insists.93  
To this Blanqui importantly adds that thought’s material source, the brain, can 
in fact also be developed and perfected by thought itself.94 Humans have the capacity 
to actively develop the brain through the practice of thinking. ‘Agir par l’instruction 
sur les centres nerveux, désarmer les penchants mauvais, développer et accentuer les 
bons, obtenir ainsi un homme renouvelé par la transformation de son organisme, une 
telle méthode réunit à la fois la prudence et l’efficacité’95 The political implication 
Blanqui derives from the basic assumption that it is ‘[l’]idée seule qui fait l’homme’ 
is thus significant: ‘L’instrument de la délivrance n’est point le bras, mais le cerveau, 
et le cerveau ne vit que par instruction.’96 Therein resides the fundamental process by 
which humanity can advance and progress, creating and shaping its own history by 
means of the conscious political subjectivity produced by intellectual development. 
While Blanqui, as we have seen, defines humanity primarily by its capacity for 
thought, he equally maintains that humanity’s capacity to change, to be perfected, is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 53 [15 April 1868]. 
92 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 267 [n.d.].  
93 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 287 [n.d.] 
94 ‘L’homme tient de la matière un cerveau perfectible par la réaction de la pensée’ (Blanqui MSS 
9590(1), fo. 267 [n.d.]). !
95 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 217 [n.d.]. !
96 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, pp. 214-215. In 1880 Blanqui offered a 
striking restatement of this basic primacy of enlightened thought and ideas within emancipatory 
politics: ‘Rien … n’égale cette pensée claire et profonde du matin qui sent s’élargir indéfiniment sa 
puissance et s’empare victorieusement de l’espace. Toutes les barrières tombent, toutes les obscurités 
se dissipent devant la lucidité pénétrante et ce déploiement de force ne fait que donner à l’organe une 
nouvelle énergie’ (Blanqui, ‘Athéisme et spiritualisme’, NDNM, p. 24).  
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its foremost quality, and the progress of humanity can indeed only occur through the 
change in humans themselves.97 Working directly from the Enlightenment tradition of 
the perfectibility of man, Blanqui contends that enlightened thinking itself conceives 
and communicates the ideas and morals capable of bringing about social change and 
progress.98 All humans must therefore devote their lives to developing and expanding 
their intellect and critical faculties.99 Blanqui often appears to present this as the 
realisation of humanity’s true essence. Thought and the consciousness it confers 
constitute the defining characteristics of humanity, comprising the – otherwise 
uncultivated or repressed - essence of man as cognitive, rational, empowered and 
unmanipulated, and providing it with the capacity for its own transformation and 
progress.100 To insist on the existing state of humanity, its current thought and 
morality, to dismiss not only the possibility but the necessity of humanity’s further 
progress, is nothing other than a justification of the status quo in all its injustice, 
inequality and irrationality. Humans beings’ dynamism and capacity for 
transformation are thus fundamental in the realisation of principled social change.101 
Again, we might note that unlike classical Marxism Blanqui’s conception of 
consciousness and the political subjectivity it confers does not arise from the 
conditions inflicted upon the working class in the process of capitalist development – !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 Blanqui MSS 9590(1) fo. 262 [25 August 1868]. 
98 See, for example, Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, 2 February 1834, MA, pp. 111-112. In this 
text Blanqui claims that human intelligence discovered the principle of equality, this ‘révélation 
sublime’ and ‘effort sublime de l’intelligence humaine’ (ibid., pp. 110, 113). 
99 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 156 [8 March 1869].  
100 Blanqui wrote in 1834 that enlightened thought and work are the exclusive ‘sources de la richesse 
sociale’; ‘l’âme et la vie de l’humanité’, together forming the banner of equality, contrasted with 
‘oisiveté et exploitation’ of privilege. With thought and work society breathes, grows and progresses; 
without them society is doomed to collapse, disintegration and death. Thought and work represent 
‘l’homme exalté par la pensée, ennobli par l’exercice se da puissance, l’homme dominant en maître 
toute la création’; idleness, meanwhile, stands for ‘l’homme inerte, n’exerçant plus ses facultés, 
dégradé jusqu’à l’état de brute, l’homme enfin cessant d’être homme !’(Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est 
l’égalité’, MA, pp.  111-112, 115-116; Blanqui, ‘Qui fait la soupe doit la manger’, March 1834, OI, p. 
291).  
101 See, for example, the note entitled ‘La mobilité, Force principale de la France’, which 
states: ‘Changer par intérêt personnel est d’un coquin. Changer par conviction est d’un honnête homme 
et d’un sage’ (Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 227 [n.d.]).   
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even an ‘advanced’ worker can remain ‘une dupe aveugle’102 - but from enlightened 
instruction and thought alone. And again here we anticipate some of the basic 
ambiguities and tensions of Blanqui’s project. Who is and who is not capable of 
emancipatory action? How and when is this capacity realised? What is the possibility 
of self-emancipation? To these questions we shall return.  
For Blanqui the inherent power of enlightened reason can only be realised in 
service of the oppressed multitude. As he already insisted in 1834: ‘l’intelligence … 
n’a de puissance réelle qu’à la condition d’être morale, c’est-à-dire utile aux masses’. 
Human intellect, Blanqui continues, ‘dans sa plus haute expression, ne peut pas être 
égoïste, car elle n’aperçoit de tendance salutaire que celle qui mène à l’égalité’.103 
Enlightened thinking is bound first and foremost to egalitarianism and the protection 
of the weak and vulnerable. ‘La pensée’, Blanqui repeats, ‘agit en faveur de la 
faiblesse.’104 But as this last statement makes clear, only through its practical 
intervention within the material world, through its actual exercise, can this principled 
philosophical engagement become politically decisive, as indeed it must. ‘Dès que la 
pensée, en se déclarant immatérielle, cesse de s’appuyer sur sa mère,’ Blanqui warns 
on the other hand, ‘elle perd pied et se perd dans le vide’. Only in remaining firmly 
linked to materialism and material concerns, the ‘source qui seule alimente’,105 could 
thought fulfil its preeminent role: for humanity to make its own history.  
In more practical terms how, then, can human thought serve human action as 
the basis of human emancipation? ‘Il s’agit de savoir’, Blanqui claims, ‘si les actions 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 214.  !
103 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, 2 February 1834, MA, pp. 112-113. Cf. Blanqui, ‘Le 
communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 212.  
104 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 251-252 [n.d.].  
105 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 266-267 [n.d.]. ‘The exercise of actual thinking,’ Hallward resumes, ‘is 
both a material, cerebral process and a socialized capacity that can be more or less educated or trained, 
and thus more or less stifled by repression and ideological manipulation’ (‘Blanqui’s bifurcations’, p. 
37). 
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de l’homme dépendent de son organisme ou de sa volonté et si la volonté n’est pas 
elle-même un résultat de l’organisme.’106 Human volition is produced and conditioned 
by human knowledge. Just as every effect has a cause, every will has a ‘motif’. 
Blanqui’s dualism and his privileging of humanity’s cognitive capacities thus open 
the door to his principled voluntarism. ‘La volonté est un produit de la substance 
nerveuse, et elle est déterminée par des motifs qui sont une émanation d’autres 
éléments nerveux’;107 ‘à toute minute de la vie,’ Blanqui reaffirms, ‘ce qu’on appelle 
volonté est la manifestation externe de l’encéphale en activité.’108 For Blanqui 
thought precedes volition. What we think and know determines what we do; our 
action within any situation is subject to our understanding of it. Were it otherwise, 
Blanqui reasons, in any given circumstance ‘toutes les manières de sentir, de juger, de 
vouloir’ would be identical for every person, which is of course anything but true.109 
But by equal measure Blanqui seems to resist any form of pure rationalism. In one 
note the empiricist credo of Locke, nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in 
sensu (nothing in the intellect which was not first in the senses) as well as Leibnitz’s 
rationalist amendment, nisi intellectus ipse  (except intelligence itself), are dismissed 
as nonsense. Like Kant, Blanqui’s epistemology appears to argue that human reason, 
the capacity to construct and organise knowledge, begins through and is dependent on 
experience and sensation. ‘L’intellectus, l’entendement, la faculté de penser’, Blanqui 
speculates, ‘réside dans la substance grise et n’est mise en action que par les 
sensations venues de l’extérieur. Sans l’intermédiaire des sens, point de faculté de 
penser, point d’intellectus.’110 Just as humans’ cognitive capacities condition and 
shape knowledge and intellect, the knowledge and intellect that stimulate and form !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 177 [22 June 1868]. 
107 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 220 [n.d.].  
108 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 78 [1869]. 
109 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 220 [n.d.]. 
110 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 229 [July 1868]. 
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the content of the mind come solely from experience and the senses, from the 
phenomenal realm as Kant would say. ‘Le matérialisme procède par la méthode 
expérimentale et non par des hypothèses a priori’, Blanqui accordingly affirms.111 It 
follows from this insistence on the materiality of the brain, on the actively willed 
development towards intellectual enlightenment in both man and society, that Blanqui 
renounces any utopian aspect to his conception of communism as an a priori 
hypothesis imposed upon a people.112  
These speculations regarding free will have profound implications for 
Blanqui’s entire political project. Indeed, it is in these claims that we discover the 
primary movement from thought to practice, from knowledge to action, from 
consciousness to volition that underpins his most basic political assumptions 
thereafter. We might note that here Rousseau anticipates many of Blanqui’s concerns. 
Rousseau assumes that ‘in order to will, it is necessary to be free’, and that true 
freedom is the freedom to consciously think and decide for oneself as an enlightened 
and informed individual. This ‘confluence of enlightenment and good will’ must then 
be collectively exercised in order ‘to achieve success’.113 ‘Every free act has two 
causes,’ The Social Contract summarises, ‘which cooperate in order to produce it. 
The one, which is moral, is the will that decides on the act, and the other, which is 
physical, is the force that carries it out.’114 Blanqui shares Rousseau’s highly 
moralistic conception of politics. ‘Notre champ d’action, notre activité à nous,’ 
Blanqui explains, ‘est d’ordre moral. La pensée est toute d’ordre moral.’115 A moral 
imperative must therefore underpin all cerebral activity as it does all social 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 217 [n.d.]. 
112 See Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, pp. 189-190, 198-201. 
113 Rousseau, ‘Discourse on Political Economy’, in The Social Contract, p. 10; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
Discourse on Inequality, trans. Franklin Philip (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 16.!
114 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 91. 
115 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 251 [n.d.]. See also Blanqui MSS, 9592(3), fo. 253 [n.d.]). 
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arrangements.116 Blanqui indeed places great emphasis on the intellectual prerequisite 
for voluntary action. ‘[I]ntelligence’, as the Critique Sociale declares in no uncertain 
terms, is the ‘source première de toute activité.’117 For Blanqui only the truly 
enlightened consciousness of reasoned cognition can produce genuine free will. For 
Blanqui as for Rousseau, ‘no man has a natural authority over his fellow’ and 
‘strength does not confer any right’. ‘Let us agree then’, Rousseau suggests, ‘that 
might is not right, and that we are obliged to obey only legitimate powers.’118 Blanqui 
agrees: only genuine free will, that is to say a resolutely moral act of principled 
conviction, can be considered politically legitimate, to be obeyed as such. Blanqui 
therefore decries the belief that existing laws or an established power should be 
respected by mere virtue of their present existence and establishment.119 When it 
comes to the law - a notion which, when applied to the human realm, is neither an 
inevitable nor immutable norm but only ever ‘l’expression de la volonté du plus fort’ 
- it is ‘possible’, Blanqui states, that the will it expresses may occasionally ‘conforme 
au droit et à la justice. Tant mieux alors,’ he adds, ‘mais ce n’est là qu’un hasard 
heureux. Du jour au lendemain la volonté peut devenir la formule de l’iniquité et de la 
violence.’120 Blanqui takes the practical consequences of this criterion of free will to 
the end, without equivocation. ‘De quoi droit faire violence à leur opinion, leur 
volonté ?’, he writes of his adversaries and their (unconscious) agents. ‘Parce que leur 
opinion est sans base, leur volonté sans lumière. Parce que leur opinion et volonté ne !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116 As one note makes clear: ‘Point de société sans morale, point de morale sans philosophie. Sans 
philosophie, point de morale, et sans morale, point de société. Sans morale point de société, et sans 
philosophie point de morale’ (Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 155 [n.d.]).  
117 Blanqui, ‘Projet de discours’, August 1867, CSII, p. 153.  
118 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 49. 
119 History ‘est pleine de lois (aussi) exécrables comme leurs auteurs’, Blanqui writes. ‘Ceux qui les 
détruits sont considérés comme des bienfaiteurs de l’humanité.’ The same inconsistency applies to the 
reverence for established power: ‘il faut respecter la force tant qu’elle est la force, et punir le lendemain 
comme violence (ce qu’on adorais comme la force la veille) le lendemain du jour où elle ne l’est plus’ 
(Blanqui MSS 9586, fo. 402-403 [n.d.]. Cf. Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, pp. 107-108). 
120 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 278 [n.d.].  
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sont point l’expression/le résultat d’un choix libre mais le produit (le résultat) de la 
contrainte et de la fraude.’121 Involuntary action or unconscious volition certainly can 
be exercised, Blanqui maintains. Between involuntary, unconscious will and 
voluntary, conscious will, then, lies justice. Many divergent opinions can find 
expression; anyone can be forced to will a course of action. But not all opinions and 
actions are, for Blanqui, the product of conscious volition, strictly understood, and are 
not of equal legitimacy as such. The principle of justice, as developed through rational 
cognition, is the sole gauge of truly free political action and of truly free socio-
political arrangements in turn. Justice, in short, is ‘le seul critérium vrai dans 
l’application des choses humaines.’122  
Blanqui’s work can be read as a sustained reflection on what it means to be a 
conscious human capable of reasoned thought and, therefore, of voluntary action. Just 
as Rousseau recognises the fundamental link between volition and freedom, such that 
‘if my will can be constrained I am no longer free’,123 Blanqui sees this capacity for 
conscious volition as the primary characteristic of free human beings. Those who 
remain the captive, unconscious agents of ignorance, those who are deliberately 
prevented from exercising their capacity for thought, and by extension their capacity 
for collective volition, are thus deprived of their very humanity. ‘L’ignorant est à 
peine un homme,’ Blanqui suggests with striking frankness, ‘et on peut le mener 
comme un cheval, avec la bride et l’éperon.’124 Rather than a form of contempt for the 
masses, these lines serve as an indictment of the oppressive social order directly 
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121 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 307 [n.d.]. 
122 Blanqui, ‘L’économie politique sans morale’, March 1870, CSII, p. 58.!!
123 Rousseau, ‘Discourse on Political Economy’, p. 10. The Discourse on Inequality similarly asserts: 
‘since freedom is the noblest of man’s faculties, we degrade our nature by lowering ourselves to the 
level of beasts enslaved by instinct … . By giving up freedom, a man debases his being’ (Rousseau, 
Discourse on Inequality, pp. 74-75). 
124 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 217. See also Blanqui, ‘Les articles 415 et 
416 contre les coalitions’, 1849, CSII, p. 177. 
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responsible for this deplorable state of affairs. In the eyes of the oppressor, to be sure, 
‘[l]’ignorance et la docilité du cheval, tel est l’idéal que leur égoïsme rêve pour 
l’ouvrier.’125 This is precisely why, in the case of the Church, it wages ‘une guerre 
implacable au dévouement, à l’intelligence, à tout ce qui est grand et généreux dans 
l’homme. Ses favoris ont toujours été la bassesse, le crétinisme, la dégradation ; ni 
cœur, ni tête, ni esprit, telle est pour elle la perfection.’126 The suppression of the 
human capacity for conscious volition is therefore, in Blanqui’s eyes, the most 
contemptible of acts. Any attempt to curtail instruction, and therefore the 
development of the people’s thought, knowledge and cognitive faculties, is no less 
than ‘une déclaration de guerre à l’espèce humaine.’127 
The young Marx affirms that isolation from the political community is not the 
worker’s worst affliction. ‘The community from which his own labour separates him 
is life itself, physical and spiritual life, human morality, human activity, human 
enjoyment, human nature.’128 Replacing the causal factor of labour with ignorance, a 
move which serves to highlight a key distinction in the priorities of the two thinkers, 
Blanqui nonetheless likewise sees the worker’s prescribed role or position of the 
passive ignoramus as separating him from his human nature as a conscious social 
being. And just as the young Marx goes on to affirm that ‘[h]uman nature is the true 
community of men’,129 Blanqui envisages a social community as the full realisation of 
humanity through the exercise of its natural capacity to consciously will. ‘L’homme 
de la communauté,’ the Critique Sociale asserts, ‘c’est celui qu’on ne trompe, ni ne !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
125 Blanqui, ‘Les articles 415 et 416 contre les coalitions’, CSII, p. 177. Cf. ‘[L]’idéal du prolétaire, 
pour la religion catholique, c’est la crétin’ (Blanqui, ‘L’idéal du prolétaire pour le catholicisme’, April 
1867, NDNM, p. 48). 
126 Blanqui, ‘Malfaisance de l’Église’, April-May 1865, NDNM, p. 61. 
127 Blanqui MSS 9581, fo. 93 [n.d.]. See also: ‘Les plus mortels ennemis de l’humanité sont ceux qui 
entravent l’instruction’ (Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 137 [25 June 1868]). 
128 Marx, ‘Critical Notes on “The King of Prussia and Social Reform”’, Early Writings, p. 418; 
emphasis in original.  
129 Ibid., pp. 418-419; emphasis in original. 
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mène.’130 Since mankind is thought, it is only through the development and exercise 
of this unique cognitive capacity that humanity can truly realise itself. For Marx and 
for Blanqui alike, political struggle, in this sense, forms part of and is ultimately 
driven by a much more fundamental social struggle, a social revolution, to realise the 
true essence of man both individually and collectively. In Blanqui’s eyes the exercise 
of conscious volition is what distinguishes an actor from an instrument, a human from 
an animal or automaton. And with this an emphatically humanist philosophy begins to 
emerge: progress and change are only ever realised through the voluntary actions of 
humanity; humanity is only truly realised through its own voluntary action for 
progress and change.  
 
The individual and the collective  
The enlightened individual at the heart of Blanqui’s thought forms the point of 
departure for his conception of collective interests and collective volition. Conscious 
volition is the essential natural capacity of every individual human, but the extent to 
which this capacity can be exercised as collective political activity still remains tied to 
the consciously willing individual. The cognitive capacity of the individual leads to 
humanity as a collective. ‘Le cerveau, c’est … l’unité dans la multiplicité.’131 Since 
cerebral activity is above all the shared capacity of all humans, to be truly harnessed it 
must be practically exercised as such. Writing about ‘la pensée’ and human beings, 
Blanqui asserts: ‘C’est par elle ils communiquent, par elles ils ne font qu’un seul être. 
Par elle s’établit la solidarité universelle. Par elle, l’intérêt d’un seul devient l’intérêt 
de tous, et cet intérêt de tous se résume dans l’intérêt du plus faible.’132 With thought !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
130 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 178. On this point see also ibid. pp. 191-
192. !
131 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 220 [n.d.]. 
132 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 267 [n.d.].  
! 54!
humans are unified and powerful, with ignorance they are isolated and weak.133 
However determined and tenacious, in the struggle against the rich and powerful, with 
all the power and resources at their disposal, individual volition will inevitably spell 
failure. In order to prevail, humanity ‘repose sur l’association’.134 In this sense, only 
can the full capacities of the individual be realised, but also protected and defended, 
when actively forming part of a greater whole, of a collective political project formed 
on the basis of egalitarian solidarity.135 Individual conscious volition, in other words, 
can only be politically actualized as collective conscious volition.  
Blanqui is nonetheless equally clear that the prioritisation of collective agency 
and interests is not at the expense of the individual as a conscious and voluntary actor 
– far from it. Both in fact have to be thought simultaneously, such that many isolated 
individuals come together as equals to form one unified and organised collective body 
of enlightened individuals. ‘Avec l’instruction individuelle, tout. Sans elle, rien. Le 
soleil ou les ténèbres, la vie ou la mort.’136 Everyone thus has a ‘double vie’, of the 
individual and of the collective, from which emerges a ‘double instinct’, that of 
‘conservation personelle’ and ‘conservation sociale’, the first being the more basic 
and constant, the second being weaker and more open to change and variation 
according to the wider level of enlightenment.137 In the face of oppression and 
domination, just as without collective solidarity the individual is doomed to 
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133 Or as Blanqui writes elsewhere in a highly Rousseauist register: ‘le but des sociétés est précisément 
d’effacer les conséquences de ces inégalités individuelles, de placer toutes les faiblesses sous la 
protection de la force commune, supérieure aux forces isolées et abusives’ (Blanqui, ‘Rapport 
gigantesque de Thiers sur l’assistance publique’, 1850, CSII, p. 247. See also Blanqui, ‘Propriété 
intellectuelle’, 1867, CSII, p. 46). Cf. Rousseau, ‘Discourse on Political Economy’, p. 21.  
134 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 265 [n.d.]. Cf. ‘Se serrer les uns contre les autres par l’association, c’est 
la ressource des hommes. L’isolement est le propre de la force, le faisceau, le recours de la faiblesse. 
La solidarité, le progrès, le perfectionnement par l’association, non par l’individu. Il briserait et serait 
brisé’ (Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 268 [n.d.]). 
135 ‘Le perfectionnement et la grandeur de la race est liée par l’association au perfectionnement des 
individus’ (Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 163, 265 [n.d.]). 
136 Blanqui, ‘Les sectes et la révolution’, October 1866, CSII, p. 116.  
137 Blanqui, ‘Candide’, MA, p. 248. 
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impotence, isolation and defeat, without the conscious volition of the individual the 
conscious volition of the people as the association of these individuals is by its very 
nature impossible, their collective force non-existent, their political failure inevitable.  
 
The politics of (mis)education  
 
The assertion of human thought as constituent of humanity’s capacity for its own 
progress is therefore crucial to Blanqui’s broader conception of society and politics. 
Instruction is accordingly advanced as the essential tool of social progress, mis-
education as that of domination and subjugation:  
 
L’instruction est le seul agent de délivrance et d’organisation sociale. C’est 
l’intelligence qui gouverne le monde et c’est l’instruction qui donne 
l’intelligence. Privilège du petit nombre, elle amène l’oppression monarchique 
ou féodale. Apanage de tous, elle seule pourra créer par l’Egalité, l’ordre, la 
paix, la liberté, le bonheur. Elle est donc le premier besoin, la première 
conquête à poursuivre.138  
 
Education – the ‘unique instrument de salut’, ‘le seul agent du progrès’, the ‘unique 
agent du progrès humain’139 - at both an individual and collective level can therefore 
be seen as a practical response to the problem posed by the privileging of thought and 
ideas as determinate of social relations and social change. Reason through instruction 
is the decisive weapon in the struggle for justice and equality. By the same token, 
however, ignorance through mis-education forms a, if not the, key tool in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 64 [1869]. See also Blanqui MSS 9581, fo. 92-93 [n.d.]. !
139 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 107 [28 April 1870]; 9590(1), fo. 64 [n.d.]; 9590(1), fo. 193 [19 Avril 
1869]. 
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continued existence of all forms of unjust social order, according to Blanqui. Let us 
pursue this point further, particularly in its practical political implications.  
 
Enlightenment as emancipation 
Emancipation, Blanqui maintains throughout his writings, is the product of 
enlightenment, not vice versa; an enlightened society is the precondition of an 
emancipated society. The primacy ascribed to the idea as determinant of social 
relations and political change leads to a causal chain between enlightenment, 
association and communism, as one of many unrevised notes reveals: 
 
Le communisme n’est que le terme (final) dernier de l’association … 
L’association grandit/elle germe, s’étend uniquement par la lumière. Chaque 
pas dans cette voie est la conséquence d’un progrès dans l’instruction. Toute 
victoire de l’ignorance, au contraire, est une atteinte à l’association. … Le 
communisme ne pourra se réaliser que par le triomphe absolu des lumières. Il 
en sera la suite intellectuelle, l’expression sociale et politique.140 
 
The central, decisive conflict between enlightenment and ignorance, and its 
manifestation as a political struggle of emancipatory education over reactionary 
manipulation, becomes clear. (This is one of the essential messages of the Critique 
Sociale.) After the revolutionary seizure of power, community and instruction must 
advance hand in hand so as to avoid the re-emergence of the duplicitous manipulators 
of the people, this work coming to fruition only when, ‘grâce à l’universalité des 
lumières, pas un seul homme ne pourra être la dupe d’un autre. Ce jour-là, nul ne 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
140 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 59 [15 March 1869]. 
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voudra souffrir l’inégalité de fortune.’141 Addressing the objection that equality of 
education would not lead to equality of intellect, while conceding that such a didactic 
process may not redress ‘l’inégalité des cerveaux’ and that the risk of ‘une hiérarchie 
intellectuelle’ would remain, Blanqui nonetheless maintains that even ‘chez le plus 
pauvre cerveau’ a comprehensive education would be sufficient to bring about the 
necessary universal level of critical ‘jugement’ – described as ‘[l]a plus utile des 
facultés humaines, la faculté protectrice par excellence’ - that will guard against the 
manipulation and deceit from which injustice and oppression arise.142  
It follows that the foremost barriers to communism are, for Blanqui, the 
duplicitous institutions (religion, principally Christianity and the Catholic Church) 
and the mechanisms of the status quo (namely work, hunger, repression of revolt and 
the press) which either serve to bind the masses into ignorance and prevent 
enlightened public instruction or indeed actively misinform and mislead the people as 
the precondition of maintaining their power. Religion in particular, as Blanqui affirms 
in his numerous anticlerical polemics, structurally maintains popular ignorance, 
thereby causing continued social injustice. Religion, as the foremost intellectual and 
institutional propagator of unenlightened, reactionary thought, and with it exploitation 
and impoverishment, comprises ‘la pierre angulaire de l’oppression, l’instrument par 
excellence de la tyrannie.’143 And as the Inquisition and Saint Bartholomew 
massacres had shown, Blanqui adds, religion would ultimately not shirk from 
violence where necessary in the enforcement of its doctrines. Moreover, Blanqui 
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141 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, pp. 184-187. 
142 Ibid., pp. 185-186. 
143 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 74 [8 October 1869]. Blanqui succinctly explains elsewhere: ‘La source 
du progrès est dans la communication de la pensée. Donc, le mal est tout a ce qui s’oppose à cette 
communication, le bien tout ce qui la favorise et la multiplie. (A ce titre, la plus grand bienfait pour 
l’humanité est la découverte de l’imprimerie, et le plus grand cruel fléau, le Christianisme.)’ (Blanqui 
MSS 9590(1), fo. 58 [8 April 1869]). On the conflict between the printing press and Christianity, see 
also Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 157 [n.d.].  
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describes how the uneducated masses’ insufferable daily lives and their work – upon 
which they are dependent in order simply to survive - provide no opportunities for 
intellectual emancipation.144 The brutal realities of starvation and the violent 
repression of revolt can certainly teach the ‘hommes simples’ their true enemy, the 
real cause of their suffering.145 But such clear manifestations of the struggle between 
rich and poor are ephemeral, such revelations extraordinary and often localised when 
compared to the masses as a whole.146 The problem therefore remains that the 
majority of the poor still misunderstand the source of ‘leurs maux’; ‘un peuple dans 
les fers est dégradé par la servitude à ce point de ne pas avoir conscience de son 
abjection’.147 Recall Blanqui’s assumption that thought precedes and determines 
volition. Unable to understand their plight and to recognise their oppressor the masses 
are passively complicit to a duplicitous, and therefore exploitative, social order of 
inequality on which their own servitude is dependent.148 In other words, for Blanqui 
the masses’ intellectual poverty perpetuates their material poverty. Poverty certainly 
perpetuates ignorance, but ignorance is the primary cause of poverty. The people lack 
the enlightened political consciousness necessary to recognise their exploitation and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, 2 February 1834, MA, pp. 120-
121. 
145 Ibid., p. 120.!
146 In Lyon, Blanqui argues, the masses only rose up with the necessary ‘imposante unanimité’ because 
the state of conflict between privilege and equality was so ‘manifeste’ that it was impossible for even 
the most ‘stupides’ to clearly see who were the victims and the aggressors. See ibid., pp. 120, 122.  
147 Ibid., p. 120; Blanqui MSS 9584(2), fo. 158 [n.d.]. In this respect Blanqui’s balance sheet of the 
political failings of 1848, of the non-realisation of the possibilities it carried, is particularly insightful. 
‘La chute du drapeau rouge le 26 février 1848, résultat de l’ignorance populaire’, Blanqui bluntly 
concludes. ‘Son éducation populaire était nulle. La presse avait laissé le peuple dans des ténèbres. Point 
d’idées de fond.’ This abandonment of the red flag of the people, Blanqui continues, was a backward 
step from the wave of struggles since 1830. All the republican insurrections against Louis-Philippe 
(June 1832, April 1834, May 1839) were fought ‘sous le drapeau rouge contre le drapeau tricolore’, 
comprising as such the ‘précurseurs’, the ‘prologues’, the ‘premiers actes’ of February 1848. Yet when 
considering the downward spiral of the popular movement from March 1848 to the plebiscite of 
November 1852 by which the Empire was re-established, Blanqui is clear as to its origins and 
consequences: ‘Le peuple est myope, pour ne pas dire aveugle, ou plutôt il ne lit ni de loin, ni de près, 
parce qu’il ne sait pas lire. Il a vu tomber son drapeau avec la plus parfaite indifférence, sans 
comprendre le premier mot de ce drame. Chose étrange dans les masses, si ombrageuses d’ordinaire, si 
susceptibles, si impressionnables … . Chose explicable cependant par l’absence d’éducation politique’ 
(Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 153-155 [6 March 1869]). 
148 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, p. 121.  
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so to resolve to end it. ‘Reconnaître sa misère, c’est sentir le besoin et avoir la volonté 
d’en sortir.’149 In turn, and by an arrestingly simple inversion, Blanqui believes that to 
overcome ignorance is to overcome oppression and exploitation. Indeed, it seems 
logical to Blanqui, though to others cannot but appear analytically facile, that with the 
attainment of absolute enlightenment and the reign of reason and common sense all 
economic problems will be resolved.150    
 
A war of words 
‘Il est fâcheux que l’idée philosophique ne pénètre pas dans les masses’, Blanqui 
confessed in 1866. ‘Elles ne deviendront sérieusement révolutionnaires que par 
l’athéisme.’151 How could this problem be resolved? How could a vanguard – a 
minority upholding and attempting to advance a principled conviction – overcome its 
own isolated and embattled position within society as a whole as it must? This brings 
us to a cornerstone of Blanqui’s praxis: the popular press as the means of educating 
and informing the people so as to raise their political consciousness.  
From his earliest writings Blanqui makes a clear link between the oppressed – 
whether in its successive historical incarnations as ‘serfs’, ‘ouvriers’, ‘artisans’, 
‘prolétaires’ – as forever ‘le souffredouleur de l’aristocratie’, and the imperative, on 
the part of the oppressor, to maintain the people in a state of ‘ignorance éternelle’, as 
seen in early 1830s Orléanist France in the government’s restriction of press !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
149 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 150 [21 April 1868]. See also: ‘L’idée de Dieu, les religions, source et 
maintien de l’ignorance, de l’abrutissement, par conséquent de l’esclavage, de la misère’ (Blanqui, 
‘Dieu, c’est le mal’, n.d., NDNM, p. 44).   
150 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, pp. 190-191, 210-212.!
151 Blanqui continues: ‘On ne peut pas espérer que le peuple raisonne l’athéisme comme un penseur. Il 
n’a pas l’instruction suffisante. Mais s’il acceptait d’instinct sur une donnée brève et générale, il serait 
armé en guerre et irait dès lors au fond des choses. Sans cette base, il ne peut pas comprendre une 
rénovation sociale, un remaniement complet de la société. Il ne se doute pas que l’idée de Dieu est le 
fondement essentiel de celle qui pèse sur lui. La haine des aristocraties contre l’athéisme, leur 
cramponnement aux idées religieuses, devraient le mettre sur la voie. Mais il n’y fait pas attention. De 
plus, on est si peu à mettre en avant cette thèse ! Elle manque absolument d’organes et ne rencontre que 
des ennemis’ (Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 356 [18 April 1866]). 
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freedom.152 Throughout the writings for Le Libérateur Blanqui sustains his attack on 
the government’s severe restrictions on press freedom as part of a wider policy to 
‘anéantir la presse’ and end ‘la liberté de penser et d’écrire.’153 The importance 
Blanqui continually places on newspapers and the public sphere throughout his life is 
symptomatic of a wider insistence on public enlightenment as the precondition for 
emancipation and equality. ‘L’écrivain instruit et transforme l’humanité’, Blanqui 
states.154 In the context of the nineteenth century, newspapers were therefore a key 
means with which the intellectual elite, carrying the ‘arme de la pensée’,155 could 
undertake the work of enlightening the uneducated majority. Were repressive press 
laws to be passed and republican tracts outlawed, then, ‘le peuple ne pourra plus y 
puiser les principes d’une morale pure ; cette source de lumière et de vertu lui sera 
fermée’.156 
Since instruction is the sole force of human progress the power of an idea is 
subject to its clear communication and dissemination. ‘La source de la puissance 
intellectuelle est dans la faculté de communiquer ses idées. L’idée incommunicable 
n’est rien ; elle n’existe pas’, declares Blanqui. The writing of one of Blanqui’s 
principal intellectual bête noirs, Auguste Comte, is dismissed precisely because it is 
‘illisible’.157 It is indeed worth noting the extent to which Blanqui’s own writings are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
152 Blanqui, ‘Loi qui interdit au peuple la faculté de lire’, MA, p. 103. 
153 See Blanqui, ‘Première saisie’, March 1834, OI, pp. 277-279 and Blanqui, ‘Attentat contre le 
peuple’, March 1834, pp. 280-282.  
154 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 244 [n.d.].The role of the written word as a vehicle for popular 
enlightenment explains Blanqui’s celebration of Gutenberg as a force of progress. See Blanqui MSS 
9587, fo. 204 [n.d.]. ‘Gutenberg et Voltaire’, the Critique Sociale likewise states, ‘ont été bien 
autrement utiles à l’humanité que le plus habile artisan’ (Blanqui, CSI, p. 219; Blanqui, ‘Dispositions 
immédiates’, MA, p. 229.)  
155 As early as 1834 he referred to the ‘arme de la pensée’ (see Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, 
MA, p. 114), while a letter from 1879 insists on the establishment of ‘un journal quotidien, l’arme par 
excellence aujourd’hui que nulle ne remplace, et dont l’absence est une faiblesse irrémédiable’ as the 
means by which the ‘lutte’ and ‘guerre’ against the government over the question of the amnesty of 
Communards in New Caledonia should be fought. See Blanqui MSS, 9588(2), fo. 540 [1879]. 
156 Blanqui, ‘Loi qui interdit au peuple la faculté de lire’, MA, p. 102. 
157 Blanqui continues: ‘Quand bien même un homme trouverait/concevrait les plus merveilleuses idées 
(pensées), s’il est impuissant à les communiquer, il n’a rien trouvé. Qu’une autre, long-temps après lui, 
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on the whole characterised by a unity of form and content. For Blanqui how we write 
is as important as what we write. A text’s political power is determined by its 
communicative power. Writings for the people have to speak a language of the 
people. Political language must be direct, concise, lucid. Blanqui’s unpublished 
manuscripts attest to the authorial labour of constantly revising and refining his 
writings, removing tautologies, unnecessary qualifications and any potential 
ambiguities so as to reduce the prose down to its core ideas and render them as clear 
and compelling as possible - hence the proclivity for aphorism and overstatement, 
hence the lack of caveats and qualifications. Style and form likewise feed into the 
importance of ideas and consciousness. As Patrick Hutton notes, the Blanquists’ 
emphasis on collective energy, enthusiasm and creativity led to a notable concern for 
‘aesthetic effect as the leaven of revolutionary agitation.’ ‘Intellectual statement alone 
was insufficient’, Hutton states. ‘The need was to move men to a deeper awareness of 
the meaning of an idea.’158 Writings had to serve the ideal; newspapers, like essays 
and pamphlets, were conceived as political interventions, as weapons in the struggle 
against oppression, as vehicles for the idea. Is there not in this sense a striking 
symmetry between the linguistic style and the doctrine itself? Both were characterised 
by vigour and passion, force and resolve.159 It can be no coincidence that the 
revolutionary tradition to which Blanqui belongs places such a premium on the 
intelligibility and communicative power of its political tracts as a whole, as seen from 
Rousseau’s The Social Contract to Che Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare. Since the 
people, if they are to be capable of decisive collective action, must be informed, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
sache eu faire part au genre humain, il soit l’inventeur légitime. Mal traduire sa pensée, ignorer l’art de 
la transporter vive, nette, précise, dans l’entendement/l’esprit lourde/obscure d’autrui, la laisser vague, 
indécise/flottante comme un nuage nuageuse, c’est à peine l’avoir crée, car elle reste dans les limbes’ 
(Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 244 [n.d.]).  
158 Hutton, The Cult of the Revolutionary Tradition, p. 164. On Blanquist style, see also Quelsques 
agents du Parti imaginaire, ‘À un ami’, in MA, p. 25. 
159 Dommanget, Les idées politiques et sociales d’Auguste Blanqui, p. 53. 
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educated and have reached a certain level of political consciousness, political writings 
worth the name must serve this very purpose.160  
 
A pedagogical prerequisite 
On the essential question of social transformation, without the essential pedagogical 
prerequisite all revolutions will be socially unsustainable and politically at risk of 
hijack, perversion and the return of the irrational ignorance that breeds injustice and 
exploitation. ‘Point de Révolution durable, sans lumière ! Point d’émancipation, sans 
l’intelligence de base ! La liberté, c’est l’instruction ! L’égalité, c’est instruction ! La 
fraternité, c’est l’instruction ! Des institutions, des livres, la lutte moulée, voilà les 
vrais agents révolutionnaires !’161 Failure to transform the individual and create a new 
enlightened human being will inevitably translate into the failure to transform the 
collective and create a new enlightened society. It is in this sense that Blanqui is 
consistently critical of universal suffrage: an election in an unenlightened society, 
where the people are held in a state of ignorance by an oppressive government, will 
merely reflect this ignorance and return the same oppressive government. 
Enfranchisement without enlightenment is meaningless. 
Some structural tensions within Blanqui’s project begin to arise. First, this 
conception of equality or communism as the product of universal instruction and 
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160 An instructive comparison might be made here with Western Marxism. As Perry Anderson argues 
in his classic survey, the language of a whole sequence of major works on Marxism ‘came to acquire 
an increasingly specialized and inaccessible cast. Theory became, for a whole historical period, an 
esoteric discipline whose highly technical idiom measured its distance from politics.’ Unlike the late 
Marx’s concern for the clarity and lucidity of even his most complex thought so as ‘to maximize its 
intelligibility to the working class for which it was designed … the extreme difficulty of language 
characteristic of much of Western Marxism in the twentieth century was never controlled by the 
tension of a direct or active relationship to a proletarian audience’ (Perry Anderson, Considerations on 
Western Marxism [London: New Left Books, 1976], pp. 53-54). 
161 Blanqui MSS 9583, fo. 320 [2 February 1850]. Cf. Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, 
CSI, p. 183. 
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enlightenment could seem to imply a politics of gradualist reformism.162 But Blanqui 
advocates no such thing. Against those ‘héros de l’écritoire’ contemptuous of armed 
struggle, the Instructions pour une prise d’armes describes ‘l’art de la guerre’ as the 
condition of France’s emancipation; ‘la force est la seule garantie de la liberté’, 
Blanqui enjoins, ‘un pays est esclave où les citoyens ignorant le métier des armes’.163 
Yet, as we have just seen, throughout his writings Blanqui equally maintains that 
intellectual analysis and ideas are crucial weapons in the war against inequality and 
injustice. One need only note the description of ‘la guerre de plume’ in Instructions 
pour une prise d’armes itself to appreciate that the realm of the written word is one of 
struggle, and a struggle to be won. The point, then, is that thought divorced from 
practice is impotent and inconsequential. ‘Les bourgeois révolutionnaires et 
socialistes sont rares et le peu qu’il y a ne fait que la guerre de plume’, Blanqui writes, 
explaining his own conception of praxis. ‘Ces messieurs s’imaginent bouleverser le 
monde avec leurs livres et leurs journaux’. Thought alone cannot change the world. 
To reject the sword in favour of ‘la plume, toujours la plume, rien que la plume’ 
should be dismissed as a false dichotomy. ‘Pourquoi donc pas l’une et l’autre, comme 
c’est le devoir d’un républicain ?’164  
Furthermore, in line with this insistence on the primacy of political practice, 
Blanqui forever remains emphatic on the necessity of an initial revolutionary seizure 
of power in opening the way to the complete transformation of social relations. 
Compare, for example, the passage noted above regarding communism emanating 
from enlightenment with the following description of ‘Le rôle de la révolution’:  
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162 See also Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, pp. 55-56. 
163 Blanqui, ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, 1868, MA, pp. 262-263. 
164 Ibid., pp. 262-263. 
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briser d’une main ferme les inégalités révoltantes/scandaleuses qui placent 
d’un cote l’opulence et l’instruction, de l’autre la misère et l’ignorance, et qui 
font ainsi du suffrage universel un odieux (et scandaleux) mensonge, un 
instrument de tyrannie et de servitude ; anéantir les influences oppressives du 
corps et de l’âme ; mettre rapidement tous les membres de la nation, hommes 
et femmes, en mesure de juger d’après leurs propres lumières, non sous la 
dictée ou par/sous la pression d’un voisin, quel qu’il soit … .165  
 
Some problems emerge here. Blanqui appears to arrive at an impasse – also noted by 
other readers166 - of the temporality and sequencing at work in the confluence of two 
seemingly contradictory socio-political processes: popular education as the necessary 
precondition of sustainable and successful revolution, yet an unenlightened, ignorant 
people’s inability to become the revolutionary force necessary to initiate popular 
enlightenment. How does Blanqui square his revolutionary socialism with his 
enlightened socialism?167 How can a new political regime be initiated through which 
ignorance can be overcome? How, and when, does the people become a conscious 
political actor? The convergence of political and social forces, and Blanqui’s 
proposed solutions, brings us to the issue that arguably overshadows his entire 





165 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 159 [n.d.]. 
166 See, for example, Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, pp. 55-56, 138, 
162; Bensaïd and Löwy, ‘Auguste Blanqui, heretical communist’, p. 33. 
167 These terms are evoked side-by-side in Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, 6 June 1852, MA, pp. 174, 185-
186. 
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Leadership, organisation and the role of the masses 
 
How can an initial popular victory over an oppressive ruling power be sustained? In 
Blanqui’s mind this was one of the central questions posed by the events surrounding 
July 1830. With the transformation of victory into defeat issues of leadership and 
organisation - already apparent during the Restoration when the people’s deprivation 
of leaders caused disorganisation and disorientation to go hand in hand168 - came to 
the fore. In July, as Blanqui wrote in 1832, ‘le peuple … a su vaincre, mais n’a pas su 
profiter de sa victoire’; the people ‘s’est montré assez fort pour vaincre … [mais] n’a 
pas su conserver la victoire.’169 For Blanqui the knowledge of how to advance within 
a revolutionary situation in order to preserve an initial popular victory, the question of 
who possesses such knowledge and how it can be disseminated, are key problems 
posed by 1830, when the lack of leadership ultimately proved decisive. Following 
their triumph over Charles X and his loyal troops, the people unconsciously rallied 
around those who – unbeknown to them – were actively working against their own 
interests. As a result they were lured into committing fatal tactical errors, particularly 
the withdrawal from ‘la place publique’ after the street fighting had ended.170 Lacking 
the necessary knowledge of the dynamics and requirements of revolutionary politics, 
the people were an easy target for the duplicitous bourgeoisie to exploit for its own 
ends. While Blanqui insists that naive miscalculation absolves the people of the 
lamentable consequences of July, it also presents itself as a major problem that must 
be resolved. And Blanqui’s proposed solution is clear: the people ‘n’a pas été 
complice de cette indigne usurpation qui ne se fût pas accomplie impunément s’il 
avait trouvé des hommes capables de guider les coups de sa colère et de sa !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
168 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, 2 February 1832, MA, p. 81. 
169 Ibid., pp. 85, 88. 
170 Ibid., p. 86. 
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vengeance.’171 Blanqui expresses his full confidence in the revolutionary force of the 
people. But the force of the masses is not enough; alone it lacks the capacity to 
exercise the sustained power necessary for victory. Alternatively put, force (the 
masses) requires knowledge (intellectuals) to guide it. Blanqui insists that revolution 
needs leadership and organisation to ensure a popular victory is sustained and 
strengthened rather than divided, weakened, manipulated and betrayed by the forces 
of counter-revolution as they inevitably appear. In this sense bourgeois 
revolutionaries are to Blanqui the proletariat’s principle and enduring force. ‘Ils lui 
apportent un contingent de lumières que le peuple malheureusement ne peut encore 
fournir’, Blanqui would later write. ‘Ce sont les bourgeois qui ont levé les premiers le 
drapeau du prolétariat, qui ont formulé les doctrines égalitaires, qui les propagent, qui 
les maintiennent, les relevant après leur chute. Partout, ce sont les bourgeois qui 
conduisent le peuple dans ses batailles contre la bourgeoisie.’172 Popular agency 
requires intellectual and political leadership to anticipate its power, to initiate, 
encourage and then to direct its empowerment. This is for Blanqui the essential 
condition of enduring victory; he never wavered from this conviction. Conceived in 
the wake of 1830, the basic insistence on leadership and organisation endured as the 
century progressed through each subsequent round of revolutionary upheaval.173  
 
Revolutionary vanguards 
How, we should therefore ask, does Blanqui conceive the relationship between the 
intellectual elite and the people? There are two possible answers to this question. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
171 Ibid., p. 87.!
172 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, MA, p. 177. Cf. V.I Lenin, ‘What is to be done?’, 1901-1902, 
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/>. 
173 Accounting for the failings of 1848, Blanqui repeats essentially the same point regarding the 
manipulation of the credulous people by their duplicitous enemies: ‘Le crime est aux traitres que le 
peuple confiant avait acceptés pour guides et qui ont livré le peuple à la reaction’ (Blanqui, ‘Avis au 
peuple’, 25 February 1851, MA, p. 166). 
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First, and perhaps most obviously, Blanqui proposes a conspiratorial group of 
intellectually enlightened and politically dedicated revolutionaries. Emanating 
primarily from the educated bourgeoisie, unlike the ruling class and its supporters this 
group’s knowledge of societal mechanisms serves not the private interests of a 
privileged elite but acts in the name of the common interests of the ordinary people. 
This group of déclassés understands both the existing structures of domination and is 
well versed in the practical exigencies of revolutionary politics, from disciplined 
organisation to the capacity to analyse and exploit political conditions in advancing 
the cause of social emancipation. The problem, however, is that systematic political 
repression renders conditions unfavourable, if not altogether impossible, for the mass 
propaganda through which education and the ensuing support could be achieved. 
Only through clandestine activity could this group ensure its own internal unity and 
conspire to launch the seizure of state power through which its re-education and 
enlightenment of the masses could begin.  
This is the conception of revolutionary organisation for which Blanqui is best 
known and for which he has been most consistently reproached ever since. The 
general contours of Blanqui’s conspiratorial politics are largely familiar, from its 
origins (Philippe Buonarrotti, the Carbonari) and organisations (Société des Familles, 
Société des Saisons) to the failed coup attempts (May 1839, August 1870) and its 
political derivations (Blanquists, Narodniks).174 Rather than going over such issues, 
let us point out how its central features relate to the more basic question of thought 
and consciousness. A useful summary of Blanqui’s schema is found in a note from the 
1860s with regard to religion, though the same logic can be extended to all forms of 
unprincipled and irrational rule, whether a monarchy or conservative republic. ‘Une !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
174 See, for example, Eric Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement 
in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959).  
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minorité instruite et dévouée a qualité suffisante pour détruire une religion, sans et 
même contre l’avis de la majorité’, Blanqui confidently states. ‘Cette majorité est 
incompétente par (le fait [de]) son ignorance, qui est œuvre criminelle or préméditée 
de la religion. L’emploi de la force a précisément pour but et pour résultat la 
délivrance des victimes aveugles.’175 Most of the salient features of Blanqui’s 
conspiratorial politics are present here: an enlightened, forceful minority capable of 
overcoming its numerical inferiority through subjective dedication and determination; 
an ignorant, impotent and inert majority requiring external assistance to liberate it 
from its unconscious servitude; the destruction of all forms of mis-education and 
manipulation. To this we should add a post-revolutionary transitional power 
emanating from the capital, a ‘dictature parisienne’, that represents the nation as a 
whole. With these components Blanqui’s project becomes clear enough: the 
enlightened elite seize power in Paris, where all political and intellectual forces of the 
country are concentrated, and undertake a process of popular education while 
suppressing those agents and institutions in whose interest it is to preserve ignorance 
and so threaten to prevent, undermine or undo the work of enlightenment. Following 
this transitional period, thanks to the general dissemination of enlightened thought, all 
forms of power and conflict will end, giving way to peace, ‘solidarité générale’ and 
allowing for the direct self-rule of the people.176 Blanqui’s conception of post-
revolutionary transition is thus properly dialectical: only through centralised, 
undemocratic rule could centralisation end, power dissolve and true freedom and 
democracy, and a people capable of exercising that freedom and democracy, emerge; 
only the dictatorship of Paris could give way to democracy across France. Until that 
point, only a lack of the strict, disciplined organisation and unity of the vanguard !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
175 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 160 [n.d.]. 
176 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 260 [n.d.]. 
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leading this project could undermine its execution; such was the essential lesson 
Blanqui learned from the failures of his political activity.  
Blanqui’s thoughts in this respect cannot but seem naïve and, contrary to his 
insistence, practically unworkable, certainly in the seemingly straightforward and 
logical manner in which this process is often portrayed. As we shall consider the 
question of transition at greater length in Chapter 4, our present concern is the 
particularly striking distance between the enlightened minority and the ignorant 
majority. The people are here not the active agent but passive object of revolutionary 
politics, empowered only after their compliance to the virtuous few. This is the classic 
image of Blanqui the revolutionary elitist, the adventurist ‘man of action’ completely 
divorced from and imposing an external will on the inert, unthinking masses. In this 
respect Engels’ depiction, and dismissal, of ‘revolutions carried through by small 
conscious minorities at the head of unconscious masses’ is indeed quite accurate.177 
But is it entirely representative of Blanqui’s politics as a whole? Can we add a greater 
degree of nuance to this undoubtedly true yet overstated portrayal?   
 First we should consider the composition of the guides and leaders that 
comprise this revolutionary elite. Who or what is the vanguard leading and organising 
this project? The obvious response is the clandestine group of déclassé intellectuals as 
suggested above. But it is in fact necessary to note that Blanqui’s conception of 
revolutionary leadership operates at two levels: intellectuals as a revolutionary elite in 
Paris and Paris as the revolutionary elite in France. (To which one might then add 
France’s leadership over Europe.) In Blanqui’s lexis déclassé denotes both the 
enlightened bourgeois intellectual and the enlightened Parisian worker.178 As he 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
177 Frederick Engels, ‘Introduction’, in Marx, The Class Struggles in France 1848 to 1850, p. 22. !
178 See, for example, Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, pp. 218-220. Blanqui also 
refers to those from the ‘rangs populaires’ who voluntarily take up arms in the name of an idea as 
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explains in February 1832, in direct contrast to legitimacy, ‘la vieille organisation du 
passé’, the ‘principe de la souveraineté du peuple rallie tous les hommes d’avenir, les 
masses qui, fatiguées d’être exploitées, cherchent à briser les cadres où elles se 
sentent étouffer.’179 Meanwhile, although the vast majority of the middle class fear 
popular power and only pursue egoist material gain - and indeed July 1830 revealed 
that the majority of the middle class was in fact an enemy of the people - the ‘minorité 
de cette classe,’ Blanqui adds, ‘formée des professions intellectuelles et du petit 
nombre de bourgeois qui aiment le drapeau tricolore … prendra parti pour la 
souveraineté du peuple.’180 As the century progressed and the political context 
changed, the dichotomy would of course shift from popular sovereignty and the 
republic against the ancien régime and legitimacy to the people against the rich, 
communism against capitalism, and so on. But if the terms altered the underlying 
logic remained the same, as we shall see in Chapter 2. In the necessary, unavoidable 
choice between two opposing sets of interests and conceptions of society, Blanqui is 
clear where and with whom he stands. The minority of enlightened middle class 
intellectuals and those masses conscious of their plight as the oppressed unite in the 
name of all the oppressed.  
Paris would form the collective body of this revolutionary elite. Like the 
Jacobins, Babeuf and Buonarroti before him, Blanqui’s political project is built on the 
leading role of Paris and Parisians. Given the political history of the period in 
question it may seem self-evident that Blanqui would adopt this position. Paris was a 
crucial revolutionary force from 1789 to 1871; time and time again it was the French 
capital and its inhabitants that played a decisive role in the struggles that would shape !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
‘hommes d’élite’ (Blanqui, ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, MA, pp. 261-262). On this point see 
also Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 164.  
179 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, MA, p. 92. 
180 Ibid., p. 93.!
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both country and continent. Certain socialist thinkers did not share in this view and 
the according political practice, however. ‘In contrast to Cabet, to Fourier, and to the 
roving Saint-Simonian utopians,’ Benjamin is right to note, ‘Blanqui can be imagined 
only in Paris’. Although it is no doubt true, as Benjamin then adds, that Blanqui 
‘represents himself and his work as belonging only in Paris’,181 by the same token the 
consequences of such work must be understood as extending far beyond the French 
capital. Other contemporaries, meanwhile, including Victor Hugo and many notable 
Communards, in many ways did espouse a similar conception of the revolutionary 
importance of Paris to that of Blanqui.182 Within this political and intellectual context 
Blanqui’s concept of Parisian political primacy nonetheless remains unique in at least 
two respects.  
First, Blanqui attempted to conceive from this idea of Paris a general practice 
of revolution, a revolutionary strategy rooted in a specific urban environment. The 
strength of conviction and consistency with which he expressed and held to this 
programme is without comparison. Second, and more significantly, Paris’s political 
supremacy is ultimately attributed to its intellectual supremacy. Paris is, for Blanqui, 
the ‘essence concentrée du pays’; ‘Paris, représentation nationale, fait la puissance de 
la France, en condensant sur un point toutes les forces intellectuelles’.183 Elsewhere in 
Blanqui’s notes the French capital’s intellectual primacy is qualified in a more precise 
sense: ‘Si Paris est la tête du monde, c’est que Paris est athée.’184 Again we see how 
the enlightened consciousness incompatible with religious belief confers intellectual 
and political leadership over those who unconsciously remain under religious 
domination and subject to the resulting social injustice. Blanqui in fact extends this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
181 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, p. 380. 
182 See Dommanget, Les idées politiques et sociales d’Auguste Blanqui, pp. 173-175. !
183 Blanqui MSS 9581, fo. 93 [7 February 1856]; 9590(1), fo. 173 [n.d.]. 
184 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 263 [n.d.]. 
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underlying logic beyond France: in every country and during every historical era, in 
ancient Rome for instance, the metropolis is the brain of the nation, the sole source of 
life; deprived of its brain, a country is reduced to a corpse that, like a human, will 
slowly decompose.185 Unlike the modern federal Italy, however, France still lacks ‘la 
multiplicité des foyers lumineux et l’habitude des autonomies. Paris est seul. Ce 
hasard de l’histoire nous a servis, en nous donnant la Révolution et une redoutable 
force d’ensemble.’ Wherever found, these ‘foyers lumineux et indépendants’ cannot 
be improvised since they are ‘l’œuvre du temps’. Universal public instruction will 
ultimately supersede a city’s present intellectual pre-eminence, but until then only 
these historical bastions of enlightenment can initiate and lead the process of their 
own supersession. As such, Blanqui fiercely renounces any form of decentralization 
before the enlightened city had fulfilled its role in leading the enlightenment of the 
nation.186 It follows that in nineteenth-century France the struggles in Paris determine 
the fate of the country as a whole. The Parisian June Days of 1848 are seen as the 
precursor to the nation’s enslavement and oppression: ‘Frappée au cerveau, la France 
ne sera plus qu’un cadavre’.187 The forces of counter-revolution, Blanqui noted two 
years later in June 1850, were undertaking ‘la destruction de Paris, pour arriver à 
l’asservissement de la nation. La tyrannie ne peut bien s’asseoir que sur les ruines de 
la cité des lumières.’188 Such strategic preoccupations were likewise later at work 
during the Second Empire, when Napoléon III’s government set about pacifying the 
imminent threat posed by the great revolutionary city through Haussmann’s grands 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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186 To decentralise, Blanqui explains, ‘c’est détruire l’influence de Paris, lui enlever son action 
directrice sur la province ; c’est mettre la lumière sous le boisseau et rendre la prépondérance au passé. 
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187 Cited in Dommanget, Les idées politiques et sociales d’Auguste Blanqui, p. 176. 
188 Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 466 [June 1850]. 
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travaux.189 In all cases, since intelligence precedes action in Blanqui’s conception of 
the actor, Parisians, unlike the majority of the French population, are enlightened and 
as such politically conscious, capable of the purposeful, determined action 
revolutionary politics demands. Paris provides the majority of the ‘travailleurs 
dévoués à l’émancipation des masses’.190 Parisians think for, act for, stand for the 
French people as a whole. 
It is this strict insistence on enlightened consciousness as determinant of 
decisive political action, on conscious volition or pensée-volonté at both an individual 
and collective level, that should be added to Peter Hallward’s ‘thee basic principles’ 
of Blanqui’s politics. Writings from 1830-34 in particular, as we shall see below, 
certainly express the belief that ‘when concentrated in a large city like Paris people 
already have all the power they need, if they choose to exercise it, to challenge an 
unjust government and overcome its forces of repression’,191 as Hallward notes. But 
Blanqui’s early work also contains the seeds of a principle that would inform much of 
his later thought: the latent power of the people of Paris fundamentally derives from 
their consciousness of their plight, their understanding that they have the collective 
capacity to end it and their knowledge of what the exercise and eventual triumph of 
that capacity will demand. In other words, the choice to exercise collective power 
presupposes consciousness of the choice itself; choice requires ‘la faculté illimitée du 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
189 See, for example, Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 71 [29 May 1870]. 
190 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 214. 
191 Hallward goes on: ‘the unjust societies in which we live are organized at all levels in such a way as 
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choix’.192 If ‘un peuple est dégradé par la servitude à ce point de ne pas avoir 
conscience de son abjection’,193 the people of Paris, conscious of its present 
oppression and prepared to take arms in the cause of the entire people’s emancipation, 
are the ‘précurseur de l’avenir, le pionnier de l’humanité’, a ‘peuple prophète et 
martyr’.194 Blanqui’s point of departure on this point is the Montagne of 1793. The 
Montagne’s most salient trait, he suggests, is ‘son alliance intime avec les prolétaires 
parisiens, non point qu’elle n’eût d’entrailles que pour les douleurs d’une seule ville ; 
mais parmi tant de populations courbées par la souffrance, elle trouva sous sa main, 
pour la lutte, ce groupe énergique, passionné par la conscience de ses misères, et elle 
en fit l’armée libératrice du genre humain.’195 The task, as Blanqui sees it, is to 
recreate this revolutionary alliance of a dedicated group of leaders and the 
concentrated force of a mobilized city to act not only in the name of all but in spite of 
all since they will be forced to confront and overcome ‘une majorité réactionnaire’ 
unconsciously acting against its own interests.196 The obstacle of mass ignorance can 
therefore be overcome since a sufficient proportion of the population has the 
necessary collective capacity to initiate and then sustain the political process through 
which social change will occur.  
As part of this schema, and to anticipate a factor that will be discussed a 
greater length in Chapters 3 and 4, we must also note Blanqui’s enduring and 
emphatic belief in revolution, above all when conceived in Paris, as a creative force, 
an energy capable of challenging all certainties, of subverting all assumptions, of 
overcoming all barriers. In revolution everything changes. In the passionate !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
192 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 190 [May 1869]). See also Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 399 [n.d.]. 
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194 Blanqui, ‘A la Montagne de 93. Aux socialistes purs, ses véritables héritiers !’, 28 November 1848, 
MA, p. 154. 
195 Ibid., pp. 151-152. See also the assertion that ‘[d]epuis 1789, l’idée seule est la force et le salut des 
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enthusiasm and exuberance of revolution the thinkable and the possible are redefined. 
‘Toutes les puissances de la pensée, toutes les tensions de l’intelligence ne sauraient 
anticiper ce phénomène créateur qui n’éclate qu’a un moment donné.’197 For Blanqui, 
the confluence of this revolutionary creativity with intellectual consciousness makes 
for an invincible political force. When united with their intelligence, the zeal and 
ardor of the people of Paris, voluntarily taking up arms against their oppressors, will 
compensate for their numerical inferiority against the army.198 By contrast, the 
condition of acquiescence and defeat is stagnation, impotence. ‘Il n’y a aucune 
énergie’199 - so Blanqui laments in a letter from January 1880 contemplating the 
growing divisions and impotence of the republican left. Blanqui does not exclusively 
insist on the necessity of insurgent force or revolt as the source of an unforeseen 
political awakening and energy, as his reflections on his election in Bordeaux reveal, 
for instance.200 Nor is the act of revolution conceived as an end so much as the 
beginning of a revolutionary process. But it is certainly with moments of revolt and 
revolution that he most consistently attributed the greatest political potential for 
initiating the process of social change. The task of political leadership and 
organisation is not to stifle these creative forces, then; on the contrary, where latent it 
seeks to awaken them, where active it seeks to harness them. 
So if the people of Paris, conscious of the structures of domination and thus 
capable of exercising the collective force necessary to overcome them, is the key 
collective actor of Blanqui’s political project, what about the non-elite sections of the 
people? Does the primacy accorded to the subjective engagement of an active 
vanguard deny or delay the subjectivity of the unconscious, inert masses? Are they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
197 Blanqui, ‘Sur la révolution’, 1850, MA, p. 163. 
198 Blanqui, ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, MA, pp. 261-262, 263-264. 
199 Blanqui MSS 9588(2), fo. 543 [18 January 1880]. 
200 See the writings in Blanqui MSS 9588(1) and 9588(2). 
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simply an object shaped by an external subject? (Again, this discussion anticipates 
some issues will that be taken up again later.)  
 
Whither the masses?  
On many occasions, most notably in the early writings from 1830-34, Blanqui seems 
to maintain that a form of popular integrity is capable of overcoming the hurdle of the 
people’s own mis-education, particularly when under the initiation of revolutionary 
Paris. Though the masses are the subject of the cruellest excesses of the profoundly 
unjust and deceitful status quo, in Blanqui’s eyes their moral integrity, and with it 
their latent political agency, nonetheless remains uncorrupted and forever capable of 
re-awakening. In sharp contrast to the corrupt, self-serving privileged bourgoeisie 
who ‘professent hautement un dégoûtant matérialisme’ and would sell the country 
down the river for personal gain, the people, so the January 1832 defence speech asks, 
‘[n]’est-ce pas le peuple qui, dans toutes les crises, s’est montrée prêt à sacrifier son 
bien-être et sa vie pour les intérêts moraux?’201 Blanqui defines himself directly 
against the cynics and skeptics who have no belief in the people, professing a faith – 
against the ‘athées politiques’ who insist otherwise - in the people’s moral and 
political convictions.202 He insists that the people did not take to the streets in July 
1830 because of starvation. Rather, ‘ils obéissaient à des sentiments d’une haute 
moralité, le désir de se racheter de la servitude par un grand service rendu au pays, la 
haine des Bourbons surtout !’.203 Similar expressions of the people’s incorruptible and 
principled moral integrity can be found in the Rapport à la Société des Amis du 
peuple of February 1832. Even though the majority of the population, particularly in 
the loyalist peasants of the Midi, the Vendée and Brittany, remain ‘étrangers au !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
201 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, 12 January 1832, MA, p. 74. 
202 Ibid., p. 74. 
203 Ibid., p. 75. 
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mouvement de la civilisation’ as a result of their ardent Catholicism, ‘ces hommes 
simples et croyants’ are nonetheless not ‘accessibles aux séductions’. Blanqui 
explains: ‘le peuple, soit que dans son ignorance il soit enflammé du fanatisme de la 
religion, soit que, plus éclairé, il se laisse emporter par l’enthousiasme de la liberté’, 
the people are ‘toujours grand et généreux ; il n’obéit point à des vils intérêts 
d’argent, mais aux plus nobles passions de l’âme, aux inspirations d’une moralité 
élevée.’204 Mindful that ignorance hitherto often caused the people to mobilise under 
the idea of privilege and not equality, such concerns do not undermine Blanqui’s 
reverence for the people, since they are above all not opportunistic, that greatest of all 
political sins, but committed and principled.205 Two years later Blanqui then concedes 
in an article from Le Libérateur, however, that ‘une ignorance profonde’ is the most 
‘déplorable’ consequence of the masses’ ‘asservissement’ precisely because it ‘les 
rend presque toujours les instruments dociles des passions perverses des privilégiés.’ 
As a result of their manipulation through systematic lying and mis-education, in their 
ignorance the masses ‘sont prêts, sur un signe du maître, à déchirer les hommes de 
dévouement qui essaient de leur montrer une destinée meilleure.’ Only in exceptional 
circumstances do they ‘ouvrent les yeux à la vérité et apprennent à distinguer leurs 
amis d’avec leurs oppresseurs’. A question at the core of the article regarding the 
capacity of a passive and brutally oppressed people to ‘cultiver leur intelligence, 
éclairer leur raison’ reveals a concern for the practical potential for self-
enlightenment.206 An ambiguity regarding the possibility of self-emancipation thereby 
emerges, with Blanqui already seeming to suggest the necessity of an external, 
hegemonic authority in the development of the masses’ intellectual and political 
consciousness. When Blanqui translates these assumptions into the question of post-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
204 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, MA, p. 91. 
205 See ibid., p. 91. 
206 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, p. 120-121. 
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revolutionary social transformation, as we shall discuss in Chapter 4, it would appear 
that this conception of the people’s inability to develop their own consciousness 
internally, through themselves, will ultimately limit his ability to conceive a politics 
of self-emancipatory practice. The result is a structurally flawed conception of socio-
political change in which a gap between knowledge and ignorance – a gap rooted in 
some of Blanqui’s primary philosophical assumptions outlined earlier - will fail to be 
convincingly traversed.   
Meanwhile, in direct contrast to these uncertainties as to whether the people 
themselves could consciously distinguish between their liberator and their oppressor, 
another article from Le Libérateur confidently asserts that ‘le peuple sait bien qu’il 
n’a rien à craindre de l’intelligence et lui obéit avec joie, malgré les efforts des 
privilégiés qui voudraient bien lui faire partager la haine qu’elle leur inspire’.207 It is, 
however, a third text also destined for Le Libérateur that offers perhaps the most 
emphatic statement of Blanqui’s early confidence in the people’s present political 
agency. Considering the question of ‘Pourquoi il n’y a plus d’émeutes’, as the article 
is entitled, Blanqui declares that the bourgeois ‘ne sont capables de défendre qu’un 
pouvoir qui n’est pas sérieusement menacé. Ils sont aussi peu en état de maintenir que 
de renverser un gouvernement contre la volonté du peuple.’ Popular power, when 
exercised, has the capacity to make or break any political order. An unjust regime 
therefore ultimately derives its power from the failure to exercise this capacity: ‘Ce 
qui faisait réellement la sûreté du pouvoir, c’est que le peuple lui-même ne songeait 
pas à le détruire’.208 Hence the government and its supporters were mistaken to think 
the mere absence of riots in Paris, Lyon and elsewhere meant their regime was safe !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
207 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 112. 
208 Blanqui, ‘Pourquoi il n’y a plus d’émeutes’, 2 February 1834, OI, p. 267. Cf. Hallward’s ‘three 
principles’ noted earlier, which follow a conception of popular empowerment exemplified most 
emphatically in this article. 
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and their continued power guaranteed. Workers were coming together to alleviate, 
even if momentarily, their common misery. Even if the idea of destroying the 
monarchical system as a whole had not entered into ‘l’esprit du peuple’ and they 
remained more committed to mere reform of the existing order, this state of 
seemingly perpetual popular unrest revealed a people ‘poussé par de nouvelles 
misères à une nouvelle révolution’. Collective political action and collective political 
consciousness – even if not yet fully realised - were certainly alive, proving their 
capacity to directly challenge structures of domination through their collective will. In 
the face of violent state repression and the resignation it bred, all that was required 
was an ardent and determined force, anticipating this popular power, to re-ignite this 
powder keg. ‘Qu’une étincelle mette le feu aux poudres, et quatre-vingt mille hommes 
paraitront en armes sur la place publique.’209 
From these examples we see that Blanqui has yet to reach a definitive position 
on the political capacities of the masses. Is the role of ‘la force intelligente’210 simply 
to lead the people in a seemingly self-evident political alliance or further still to 
undertake the necessary task of revealing to the people its own leadership? With 
whom will the people side, and on what basis will they do so? Beyond moral 
principles are there not social and material factors determining the people’s capacity 
to consciously understand and actively participate in a political decision or process? Is 
there really a form of fixed, innate and normative popular morality, or are morals a 
mere reflection of a historically contingent social order? To what extent was there a 
division between Paris as enlightened revolutionary vanguard and the provincial 
masses as unenlightened passive instrument of reaction, and how should this be 
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reflected in revolutionary strategy? Blanqui’s early writings begin to pose the 
questions, but the answers remain inconclusive.  
 
Principled convictions or material interests? 
Blanqui’s later writings challenge many of these earlier assertions, above all with the 
development of his reflections on the political impact of material concerns. One 
particularly fascinating letter from 1852 engages with a dilemma that arose in the 
years after 1848 and which confronts all forms of progressive politics: the people 
seeming to opt for the relative material well-being of despotic regimes over a republic 
founded on the principles of justice and equality yet which fails to ameliorate material 
conditions. ‘Le peuple,’ Blanqui concedes, ‘en fin de compte, ne poursuit à travers les 
révolutions que l’allègement de ses souffrances.’211 ‘Si la République les aggrave et si 
la tyrannie les soulage’, Blanqui’s letter continues, ‘« vive César et au diable la 
liberté ! ». … Ce que le peuple demandait aux bouleversements, il le trouve sous le 
régime Russe, et peut-être va-t-il vendre la France pour un morceau de pain.’ Blanqui 
then reaches what is for him the vital causal factor behind this political impasse: 
enlightened thought and political consciousness, or the lack thereof amongst the 
people. The masses ‘ne savent pas que [le pain] est empoisonné.’212 Note how the 
exact same argument Blanqui invokes in 1832 in praise of the masses – its 
unwillingness to relinquish liberty for bread213 – has been inverted and put forward as 
the reactionary bulwark against emancipation. Material interests appear to have 
trumped principled moral convictions as determinant of the masses’ political choices. 
Now they will not relinquish bread for liberty: ‘La multitude travaille, mange et !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
211 Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 367 [6 September 1852]. Blanqui repeats this point to Maillard, again in 
1852: ‘Qu’est-ce que la révolution, si ce n’est l’amélioration du sort des masses ?’ (Blanqui, ‘Lettre à 
Maillard’, MA, p. 184). 
212 Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 367 [6 September 1852].  
213 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, p. 74. 
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s’amuse, habitudes presque perdues depuis trois ans. Que lui faut-il davantage ? La 
liberté ? Nécessaire des âmes d’élite, superflu pour le paysan. Le moindre sou fait 
bien mieux son affaire.’ Unaware of or indeed indifferent towards its own oppression, 
the people risk perpetuating that very oppression because of their – quite 
understandable, Blanqui insists - desire to ameliorate their material conditions.214 
While the early Blanqui may have dismissed such material concerns as unprincipled 
opportunism, he now appears to confront such issues with a greater degree of 
pragmatism. Material interests are, in this sense, another factor, along with mis-
education, that must be considered when seeking to understand the power of the status 
quo, for it is precisely the mechanism through which despotism draws its enduring 
strength against enlightened reason. ‘Ah ! le ventre, le ventre ! c’est la place d’armes 
des tyrans. Jamais le despotisme ne sort que de la victoire des tripes sur le cerveau.’ 
Material seduction is another tool through with which the masses are manipulated, 
another obstacle around which the forces of revolution must manoeuvre. But since 
revolutions ‘doivent être faites dans les esprits avant de s’accomplir dans la rue’, the 
problem of the process and means by which intellectual emancipation can lead to 
social emancipation highlighted earlier returns once again, the answers no less clear. 
‘Où est aujourd’hui l’initiation ?’, Blanqui asks. He later repeats with urgency: ‘Une 
main homicide comprime le cerveau de la nation. Qui le dégagera ?’ And given his 
own outlook – the imminent rise of imperial grandeur that will captivate the masses, 
the confusion and fear that characterises the revolutionary camp, the impossibility of 
using the press, parliament or any democratic channels more generally – the 
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214 Ibid., fo. 368. This expands on a key passage from 1834 in Le Libérateur: ‘Voués à une vie de 
brute, et trop heureux de recevoir comme un bienfait ce qu’on daigne leur laisser des produits de leurs 
propres travaux,’ Blanqui writes, the masses ‘ne voient dans la main qui les exploite que la main qui les 
nourrit’ (Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, p. 121).  
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conclusion is bleak: ‘Tout est morne et muet. … Soumission absolue.’215 Blanqui 
appears to have no definite answer regarding the necessary practical steps to change 
this situation and break the deadlock created in his own theory, and the tone of the 
letter as a whole reads with a degree of uncharacteristic uncertainty and resignation. 
We might note that although it remains clear that any revolutionary impetus, should it 
arise, will necessarily emanate from above and not below since the material 
satisfaction of the masses hinders their intellectual and political enlightenment, these 
reflections also serve to reveal the fallacy of the image of Blanqui as forever calling 
for action with complete disregard for socio-economic or political conditions.  
On the question of material concerns, the letter to Maillard appears to load 
such material interests with a collective political potential, suggesting that the struggle 
for collective material interests is in fact the active expression of and indivisible from 
the politics of principled conviction, in this case the idea of freedom: ‘Les intérêts 
d’un individu ne sont rien, mais les intérêts de tout un peuple s’élèvent à la hauteur 
d’un principe ; ceux de l’humanité entière deviennent une religion. … L’appel à la 
liberté est aussi un appel à l’égoïsme, car la liberté est un bien matériel et la servitude 
une souffrance. Combattre pour le pain, c’est-à-dire pour la vie de ses enfants, est une 
chose plus sainte encore que de combattre pour la liberté. D’ailleurs, les intérêts se 
confondent et n’en font vraiment qu’un seul.’216 As with the defence speech, which 
alludes to the people’s dual struggle for freedom and well-being, Blanqui reaffirms !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
215 Blanqui continues: ‘Voyons, par où et par qui finira cette saturnale Bonapartiste ? Par 
l’insurrection ? Y penser seulement serait folie. Outre le sentiment universel d’impuissance, résultat du 
dernier désastre, il y a dans la reprise des affaires une sorte de véto moral contre toute levée de 
boucliers. Ce serait une violence faite à l’opinion et durement accueillie. Par la presse, le parlement ? 
Morts tout deux. Par l’armée ? Corps inerte, projectile aveugle qui reçoit l’impulsion et ne la donne 
pas. Les boulets courent contre nous. Ils ne se retourneront pas d’eux-mêmes. J’ai beau chercher [sic], 
… point d’issue !’ (Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 368 [6 September 1852]). As he similarly lamented in 
another letter from 1866: ‘Il n’y a pas aujourd’hui d’influences considérables dans le peuple. Tout est 
morcelé, fractionné à l’infini. Personne n’a d’action sérieuse et générale sur les masses. Vous n’agissez 
que sur un tout petit coin, et je ne pense pas qu’il soit facile de l’agrandir par un journal éphémère’ 
(Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 355 [18 April 1866]). 
216 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, MA, p. 184. 
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the unity of material concerns and political, moral principles. In the 1850s, however, 
Blanqui is clearly – and quite wisely – making greater concessions to the political role 
of material concerns, both in terms of explaining the continued existence of unjust 
regimes and in forging a programme for revolution. ‘Une Révolution doit assurer au 
Peuple dans les 24 heures du travail et du pain à tout prix’, he thus wrote in the wake 
of 1848.217 In this regard, one could suggest the dialectical unification of communism 
as a faith or ideal and a materially-bound project.218 Overall, however, compared with 
the assertions of early 1832 that the people are morally principled unlike their egoist 
bourgeois oppressors, might we not suggest a move away from the avowed 
confidence in the people of the early 1830s towards a growing scepticism regarding 
their capacity to both understand and determine their own fate? Does this mark a shift 
in perspective on the non-enlightened masses from morally principled subject to 
unprincipled object, opening the door to Blanqui’s generally dominant tendency 
towards a top-down paradigm of revolution?  
Ambiguity abounds on this point throughout Blanqui’s work, and an acute 
uncertainty over the people’s capacity for self-emancipation emerges. The early 
confidence in the people certainly seems to weaken as the century progressed. In 
1832, for example, Blanqui believed that his ‘devoir est d’appeler les masses à briser 
un joug de misère et d’ignominie’.219 One cannot find therein a form of conspiratorial 
action that substitutes itself for the people. Blanqui and his comrades may do the 
calling, but the masses do the smashing themselves. Revolutionary action cannot be 
taken on behalf of the masses. The movement for equality is described as a ‘coalition 
invincible, formée par le génie qui conçoit et les masses qui exécutent’.220 ‘Just as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
217 Blanqui MSS 9584(2), fo. 108 [1848].    
218 Bensaïd and Löwy, ‘Auguste Blanqui, heretical communist’, p. 30. 
219 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, pp. 67-68. 
220 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 112. 
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philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat,’ Marx similarly wrote, ‘so 
the proletariat finds its intellectual weapons in philosophy; and once the lightning of 
thought has struck deeply into the virgin soil of the people, emancipation will 
transform the Germans into men.’221 Evoking some equally vivid imagery, Blanqui 
describes the role of leadership as that of a ‘fascine’: ‘Quand on a derrière soi un 
grand peuple qui marche à la conquête de son bien-être et de sa liberté, on doit savoir 
se jeter dans les fosses pour servir de fascines et lui faire un chemin.’222 The metaphor 
reveals a voluntarist conviction to create a platform for the people as they march 
towards their own victory, their own self-emancipation.223  
A form of popular integrity may in fact provide a possible underlying premise 
of this discussion from which a general consistency emerges. Across his writings 
Blanqui appears to suggest that political or material deviations and unenlightened 
ignorance should not obscure the fundamental, incorruptible, principled integrity - 
though not the innate or fixed morality, a concept sometimes present in the early 
writings cited above224 yet forcefully rejected later on - of the people. ‘Le peuple n’est 
pas ingrat, il n’est qu’oublieux. L’oubli est une faiblesse de l’intelligence, 
l’ingratitude est un vice du cœur. Loin d’être ingrat, le peuple au contraire pousse la 
reconnaissance jusqu’à l’aveuglement et à la déraison.’225 Blanqui likewise reaffirms 
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221 ‘The head of this emancipation is philosophy,’ Marx continues, ‘its heart the proletariat’ (Marx, ‘A 
Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction’, Early Writings, p. 257; 
emphasis in original).  
222 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, pp. 67-68. 
223 The speech as a whole displays a keen concern to build popular support and mobilise the majority of 
the French people, who Blanqui believes will ultimately side with the republican ideal. Restating that 
the battle of ideas between monarchy and republic will soon come to a head, Blanqui notes, with 
confidence, ‘on verra pour qui est la majorité’ (ibid., p. 74).  
224 Even in his notes for the Procès de Bourges of 1849 Blanqui asserted that: ‘Nous avons tous, de 
nature, la notion du bien et du mal qui est le fondement de la sociabilité humaine’ (Blanqui MSS 
9590(2), fo. 399 [n.d.]). As we shall see, later, however, he emphatically dismisses ‘l’idée d’une 
morale absolue, éternelle, unique, gravée dans le cœur de tous les hommes … écrite dans la 
constitution de chaque individu, innée en un mot’ (Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 162 [n.d.]).  
225 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 165 [n.d.]. !
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elsewhere that the people ‘est sans arrière-pensée’;226 ‘le peuple, simple et loyal, n’a 
pas de défense contre l’astuce, et sa bonne foi en fait une dupe facile.’227 The people 
always retains its internal integrity, in spite of its external ignorance and corruption, 
which causes political mistakes and unprincipled materialism. Blanqui’s project 
stands to correct the unreasoned, unprincipled decadence – both material and 
ideological - that holds sway over France and prevents its enlightened progress.228 
Hence the crucial role accorded to thought and reason as the source of the principled 
leadership of the people. Indeed, this returns us to the dual notion of equality as 
‘intelligence et travail’ outlined in 1834. Blanqui maintains a division between work, 
that is the people, and ‘intelligence’, embodied by ‘les hommes de dévouement’ who 
‘conduisent’ the people.229 The task of emancipatory politics is to turn the people 
from an agent of ignorant reaction into the agent of equality through enlightenment 
and instruction. However this occurs, even if through discussion, persuasion and 
convincing,230 in all cases the decisive role of intellectuals remains. The people 
required a master to obey - it was a case of revealing the correct one, namely those 
men who sought to act in their interest and show them ‘une destinée meilleure’. 
Evoking the example of the eighteenth-century philosophes - ‘ces nobles génies’, who 
successfully fought against aristocracy and clergy in the name of equality, ‘suivis par 
tout un peuple docile à leur voix et sourd aux anathèmes de prêtres égoïstes qui 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
226 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 190. This note does, however, rather 
curiously go on to say that the people ‘ne prend point de fausses enseignes’.!
227 Blanqui, ‘Projet de discours’, CSII, p. 143. 
228 ‘Entrainée par l’opportunisme,’ Blanqui thus maintained in 1879, ‘la France descendait rapidement 
la pente mortelle. Une crise l’arrêt et la ranime. Mais gare les recrudescences ! Le mal n’a pas lâché 
prise et lutte pour ressaisir sa proie. En avant les hommes de bonne volonté !’ (Blanqui MSS 9588(2), 
fo. 459 [14 July 1879]). 
229 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, pp. 112-113. 
230 See Blanqui, ‘Propagande démocratique’, 1835, OI, p. 314. 
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s’irritaient de ne plus être écoutés’231 - the task, as Blanqui conceived it, was to 
recreate this paradigm of intellectual emancipation.  
 
By way of conclusion let us return to Rousseau, who might help shed some light on 
these issues of enlightened thought, consciousness, leadership and popular integrity in 
Blanqui’s project. As I examine the comparison with Rousseau on this point further in 
Chapter 4, I will limit myself here to a few introductory remarks upon which to 
expand later. We have seen that Blanqui’s project begins with the cognitive capacities 
of humanity as the site and source of socio-political struggles; politics is ultimately 
determined by human thought, ideas and consciousness. As such, instruction is 
imperative in the necessary development of the people’s critical faculties and the 
raising of popular consciousness. Blanqui places great importance on the practical 
measures, particularly the popular press, that must be harnessed in order to 
disseminate enlightened thought and fundamentally transform the people as thinking 
beings, without which the fundamental transformation of the social order will prove 
impossible. More generally, then, education and enlightenment emancipate; mis-
education and ignorance enslave. Blanqui evidently shares Rousseau’s fundamental 
insistence on the people being ‘properly informed’ as a prerequisite for the exercise of 
the general will.232 Blanqui likewise often appears to reason that, as The Social 
Contract states, ‘the people can never be corrupted, but it can often be led into error, 
and it is only in this case that is seems to desire the bad.’233 Could Blanqui’s 
preoccupation with enlightened leadership not be seen to follow Rousseau’s attempts 
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231 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 114. 
232 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 66. 
233 Ibid., p. 66. Religion is of course the principal manipulator of the people in Blanqui’s eyes, and he 
often describes it as the foremost emanation of ‘the bad’, to adopt Rousseau’s term. ‘De sa première à 
sa dernière heure,’ so Blanqui writes of religion, ‘elle n’a fait et ne fera que le mal’ (Blanqui MSS 
9590(1), fo. 61 [1 April 1869]).  
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to resolve the decisive question of how to empower and enlightened a ‘blind 
multitude, often ignorant of what it wants, because it seldom knows what is good for 
it’? Rousseau outlines what is at stake: 
 
The people, of itself, always wants the good, but does not, of itself, always see 
it. The general will is always in the right, but the judgment guiding it is not 
always enlightened. The general will needs to be shown things as they are, and 
sometimes as they ought to appear, to be taught which path is the right one for 
it to follow, to be preserved from the seductiveness of particular wills, to have 
comparisons of times and places made for it, and be told of those remote and 
hidden dangers which counterbalance the attractions of visible, present 
advantages.234  
 
To solve this problem of the people’s passage from uninformed, or indeed 
misinformed, passivity to sovereign authority Rousseau proposes ‘the legislator’, as 
we will see at greater length in Chapter 4. For now let us observe that we have seen 
how at times Blanqui goes beyond Rousseau’s prescription of the relation between the 
general will and its guides, advocating and undertaking isolated political action that 
could only impose an external will upon a passive people rather than guiding the 
active mobilisation and direct exercise of the collective will within and through the 
people themselves.235 On other occasions, however, Blanqui seems broadly to follow 
Rousseau, as perhaps most clearly seen in the assertion that the people must follow 
the bearers of enlightened thought on the one hand, and the enlightened guide formed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
234 ‘Individuals can see the good and reject it’, Rousseau continues; ‘the public desires the good and 
cannot see it. All equally need guides. The one side must be obliged to shape their wills to their reason, 
the other must be taught the knowledge of what it wants. It is then that, from public enlightenment, 
comes the union of understanding and will in the social body’ (Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 75). 
235 See Hallward, ‘The Will of the People’, pp. 21-22. 
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of a committed group of men must be devoted to equality and the people on the other. 
With the coalescence of these two mutually-dependent forces a spark is all that is 
required to initiate the exercise of popular power, to seize and then maintain political 
power and the basis of social transformation. Arguably, however, both Rousseau and 
Blanqui are open to the accusation of establishing too great a distance between the 
‘superior intelligence’ of the leaders and the credulous ignorance of the led, a position 
that has the potential to structurally undermine any egalitarian political project from 
the outset. In Blanqui’s case, the insistence on the intellectual consciousness produced 
through enlightened instruction, an insistence that tends to heighten the possibility of 
political engagement, resides at the core of his political thought, often leading him to 
an unduly elitist conception of politics. Blanqui’s evocation of the ‘arme de la pensée’ 
is thus neither throwaway hyperbole nor rhetorical flourish. For Blanqui thought is a 
revolutionary force, a weapon that must be wielded in the cause of equality and the 
oppressed through uncompromising, unyielding intellectual devotion. Indeed, it is to 









Chapter 2 – Making choices, taking sides 
‘Ce qui nous a perdus, c’est le mépris ou l’absence des idées, la substitution de la 
politique d’expédients à la politique de principes.’236 
 
 




Blanqui’s politics is conflictual to the core. For Blanqui politics is divisive; it is 
dispute and disagreement, confrontation and combat. Militant politics means making 
a deliberate choice and remaining resolutely committed to that choice. This 
conviction emanates from two sources, what we might call in classical terms the real 
(an analysis of history and social relations) and the ideal (the realm of political-moral 
principles), both of which inform and reinforce the other.  
‘Il ne faut pas se dissimuler qu’il y a guerre à mort entre les classes qui 
composent la nation’, Blanqui declared in early 1832. Such a diagnosis is not 
hypothetical speculation or individual conjecture but an actual socio-political ‘vérité’, 
‘bien connue’ across France.238 Society comprises not ‘une communauté, mais une 
opposition d’intérêts’ in which ‘il n’existe entre les deux moitiés inégales de la société 
d’autre rapport que celui de la lutte, d’autre besoin que de se faire le plus mal possible 
; c’est, en un mot, la guerre organisée.’ Contrived words of ‘concorde’ and ‘fraternité’ 
may obfuscate uncomfortable social realities, they ‘déguisent une soif insatiable 
d’exploitation’ that may fool some. But facts and events ‘ont aussi leur éloquence, 
beaucoup plus persuasive en définitive, et plus féconde en résultats.’ And the facts 
show that ‘il y a lutte et que dans cette lutte, l’une des parties doit succomber, car il ne !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
236 Blanqui, ‘Réponse à la demande d’un toast pour le banquet des travailleurs’, November 1848, MA, 
p. 149.  
237 Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 357 [18 April 1866]. 
238 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, 2 February 1832, MA, p. 80. 
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saurait y avoir de fusion entre deux principes contraires, entre le bien et le mal.’239 
The insistence on the conflictual dimension of politics is, then, in the first instance, a 
reflection of existing social dynamics. To change society one has to understand and 
thereafter act according to its own internal logic. This has a crucial political 
implication: rather than evading the question of power one has to tackle it head on in 
order to seize and wield it.  
But the insistence on conflict also derives from the principled commitment to 
an ideal. Politics is, for Blanqui, a struggle of opposing, irreconcilable ideas and 
ideals. Like Robespierre, Gramsci and many others in between and since, Blanqui 
forever poses the most basic question in politics: which side are you on? Blanqui 
presents an alternative and compels a choice: equality or inequality, civilization or 
barbarism, commitment or compliance. That Blanqui imposes rigid dichotomies 
between ideals, interests and groups is precisely to allow no room for compromise. It 
implies, indeed demands one take a principled, profoundly moral stand for one side or 
the other. Either you are for the exploited or for the exploiter, an agent of justice or an 
agent of injustice. Between enlightenment and ignorance, progress and reaction, 
revolution and counter-revolution, a choice must be made, a side taken. Purported 
neutrality is the greatest enemy, opportunism the greatest disgrace. One must make a 
choice and fully assume one’s choice to the end. Invoking Saint-Just’s maxim ‘[l]es 
malheureux sont les puissances de la terre’, Blanqui arrives at the most basic guiding 
assumption of his entire project: ‘En un mot, nous sommes toujours et partout avec les 
opprimés contre les oppresseurs’. A struggle of opposing ‘affections’ and ‘efforts’, 
politics ultimately comes down to a simple yet profound choice of idealistic moral 
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239 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, 2 February 1834, MA, p. 123. 
Cf. Blanqui, ‘Qui fait la soupe doit la manger’, March 1834, OI, p. 293. !
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conviction.240 Wherever oppression appears, whomever it afflicts, forever unsettled 
by such injustice Blanqui vows resolute commitment to all those who face suffering. 
Emancipatory political practice thus presupposes principled commitment; it is 
informed and guided by subjective passion, confidence and a courageous 
determination to prevail, to not concede or compromise, whatever the consequences. 
Blanqui extends this logic to all facets of his project. To become all or to remain 
nothing, to take power or to languish in impotence, to achieve victory or to admit 
defeat – for Blanqui there is no third way, no middle ground, no partial success. 
Either one commits oneself to the ideal, or one does not. Either equality and justice 
triumph, or they do not. For both then and now, therein lies one of Blanqui’s foremost 
lessons: principled commitment is the sine qua non of militant politics, the basic 
feature of any political engagement worthy of the name.  
I think it is necessary to accord greater significance to this divisive political 
logic in the understanding of Blanqui’s thought than has previously been the case. 
Without piecing together and foregrounding this issue we cannot fully grasp the 
notions of power, struggle, the people and principled commitment which define and 
animate Blanqui’s entire political project. How, then, do we make sense of what 
Daniel Bensaïd describes as the politics, the culture of conflict Blanqui exemplifies 
and which has been largely suppressed in our own so-called ‘post-ideological’ era 
with its rhetoric of consensus?241 What are the assumptions behind the insistence on 
taking sides as the basic condition of politics? And how could this inform attempts to 
redefine the political today? This chapter will begin by examining the manner in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
240 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, 2 February 1834, MA, pp. 110-111. Blanqui would restate 
the same point in 1848: ‘À l’instar de Jésus, le consolateur des pauvres, l’ennemi des puissants, [la 
Montagne] a aimé ceux qui souffrent et haï ceux qui font souffrir’ (Blanqui, ‘A la Montagne de 93. 
Aux socialistes purs, ses véritables héritiers !’, 28 November 1848, MA, p. 151). 
241 Daniel Bensaïd, ‘Entretien avec Daniel Bensaïd et Éric Hazan sur le recueil de textes d’Auguste 
Blanqui Maintenant il faut des armes’, Emissions Là-bas si j’y suis de Daniel Mermet sur France-Inter, 
12 February 2007 < http://danielbensaid.org/Auguste-Blanqui?lang=fr> 
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which Blanqui conceives society and politics as a civil war, and how this notion is 
rooted in an analysis of property, the state, history and contemporary politics. This 
will be followed by an analysis of Blanqui’s politics of principles, to adopt his own 
term, and its implications for some central aspects of his political project. I will 
largely limit myself in this chapter to a consideration of why making a choice and 
taking sides is necessary in the first instance. Questions of how to practically exercise 
this choice and actually realise these first principles, of the importance of 
commitment, duty, faith and the subjective resources through which one remains 
devoted to and sustains the initial choice, will be examined at greater length in the 




Following Rousseau’s critique of property as outlined in the Discourse on the Origin 
of Inequality (1755), Blanqui contends that, usurping the natural order, individuals 
seized common land ‘par la ruse et la violence’ and established, by law, their right to 
property as ‘la base de la constitution sociale ; c’est-à-dire il dominerait tous les droits 
de l’humanité’. That a small minority owns the right to property directly infringes on 
the ‘droit de vivre que chaque homme apporte en naissant’ to become a ‘droit 
sacrilège’ of the society of privilege.242 With exclusive ownership of the land this 
minority also gained, by logical extension, the ‘produits accumulés du travail, et 
qu’on appelle Capitaux.’243 Since land and capital are sterile in and of themselves, 
requiring labour to fructify, the majority of the population - dispossessed of their 
‘instruments de travail’ and excluded from the possession of the land - was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
242 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, pp. 116-117. 
243 Blanqui, ‘Qui fait la soupe doit la manger’, OI, p. 291 
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transformed into ‘un vil bétail destiné uniquement à labourer et fumer les terres de ces 
monstres.’244 For Blanqui, the people therefore defines, in certain respects, those 
forced to provide for – and those who are thus exploited by - the wealthy, parasitic 
usurpers who own but do not themselves contribute towards production. (We shall 
explore Blanqui’s concept of the people at greater length in the next chapter.) Blanqui 
depicts an order in which ‘les instruments ou les fruits du travail n’appartiennent [pas] 
aux masses qui travaillent, mais à une aristocratie usurpatrice qui consomme et qui ne 
produit pas. … Le miel élaboré par les abeilles est dévoré par les frelons.’245 This 
division between productive workers and idle rich consumers comes straight from 
Saint-Simonian doctrine (Saint-Simon himself had employed the metaphor of bees 
and drones in 1819 to illustrate his conception of social relations).246 Beyond 
Rousseau and Saint-Simon, Blanqui’s analysis of property is also close to Marx’s 
later theory of primitive accumulation.247 Like Marx, Blanqui describes an order 
conceived out of force and conquest, dividing ‘les populations en deux catégories, les 
vainqueurs et les vaincus’,248 in which the servitude and exploitation inflicted on the 
latter (the people) is a product of and thereafter preserved and reproduced through the 
former’s (the privileged) hereditary and oligarchic control of land, capital and 
production.249  
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244 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appertenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, pp. 116-118; Blanqui, ‘Qui 
fait la soupe doit la manger’, OI, p. 291.  
245 Since land should be an ‘instrument … pour entretenir la vie de la société’, Blanqui assumes that ‘le 
sol doit appartenir également à tous les membres de la société qui, de tous leurs efforts combinés, 
exploiteraient les richesses qu’il recèle dans ses entrailles.’ (Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit 
appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, pp. 116-117); Blanqui, ‘Qui fait la soupe doit la manger’, OI, p. 
291.   
246 See ‘The National or Industrial Party Compared to the Anti-National Party’ and ‘On the Quarrel 
between the Bees and the Drones’, in Henri Comte de Saint-Simon, The Political Thought of Saint-
Simon, ed. Ghita Ionescu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 129-137. 
247 See Karl Marx, Capital Volume I, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1992), part viii. 
248 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appertenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, p. 117. For a condensed 
version of much of this analysis, see Blanqui, ‘L’origine des fortunes’, 1850, CSII, p. 65.  
249 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, pp. 118-119. 
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Moreover, if land only acquires value when united with labour, the logical 
consequence, Blanqui suggests, is to own those who work the land.250 Wherever 
property is established enslavement follows. This applies to French society as it does 
the colonies, where the ‘barbarie’ of slavery represents ‘un outrage permanent à 
l’humanité.’251 While acknowledging that the slavery of nineteenth-century France 
certainly does not and could not be slavery in all its ‘nudité brutale’, Blanqui 
nonetheless reasons that between Paris, Martinique and ancient Rome ‘le droit de 
propriété’ - the common origin of all such social orders - ‘n’est ni moins insolent ni 
moins agresseur.’252 Slavery should not be conceptually reduced to apply only to the 
plight of Africans or the followers of Spartacus, Blanqui reaffirms in 1852; one must 
recognise the ‘serfs’ of contemporary French society ‘qui ont les apparences de la 
liberté au milieu des douleurs de la servitude.’ In short, ‘[l]a faim, c’est 
l’esclavage.’253 Hence, for Blanqui, to cite a phrase from 1834 that encapsulates an 
enduring conviction to naming an otherwise unnamed injustice, ‘si [l’esclavage] 
n’existe pas de nom, il existe de fait’.254 As long as a privileged ‘caste’ maintain their 
hereditary control of land and capital, all remaining citizens will remain the slaves of 
this group and their order. ‘C’est par la faim qu’on dompte les oiseaux de proie,’255 
Blanqui claims. In Blanqui’s lexicon servitude is not the mere fact of being owned by 
another man, nor can its origins be traced to an identifiable actor; it is not a contingent 
political issue, nor is it the consequence of a certain form of government. Blanqui’s 
conception of servitude is structural in origin. Servitude means being deprived of the 
‘instruments de travail’ and at the mercy of those who own them. It means, in other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
250 Slavery is ‘la dernière expression du droit personnel, qui est la dernière expression du droit de 
propriété’ (ibid., p. 125). 
251 Ibid., p. 117. 
252 Ibid., pp. 118-119.!
253 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard, 6 June 1852, MA, pp. 184-185. 
254 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, p. 118. 
255 Blanqui MSS 9583, fo. 21 [n.d.].  
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words, wage slavery. The masses’ servitude is therefore inherent to a social and legal 
order built on the usurpation of land, production and capital by the privileged few. 
Property, understood as an enduring, fundamental social structure responsible for an 
equally enduring, fundamental form of social relation, is thus ‘une spoliation 
permanente’ for the masses.256 
After Rousseau, who in accounting for the ills of society – servitude, 
domination, deceit, egoism - held that ‘these evils are the first effects of property and 
the inseparable escort of nascent inequality’,257 overall Blanqui also sees inequality 
and exploitation as products of the individual usurpation of common property. He 
depicts an order preserved through hereditary oligarchic control, the law and 
constitution, duplicity and violence – ‘violence’ denoting the violation of the natural 
right to common ownership of the land, the daily suffering that results from this social 
order and, as we shall see shortly, the actual physical violence should revolt against 
this order of things occur - all of which ensure the continued servitude and suffering, 
generation after generation, of those who work the land, who are deprived of the 
‘instruments’ and fruits of their labour. Blanqui’s critique of property essentially 
restates Rousseau’s belief that the origin of society and of laws ‘put new shackles on 
the weak and gave new powers to the rich … destroyed natural freedom irretrievably, 
laid down for all time the law of property and inequality, made clever usurpation into 
irrevocable right, and henceforth subjected, for the benefit of a few ambitious men, 
the human race to labour, servitude, and misery.’258 Given that Blanqui would 
maintain throughout his lifetime that the revolution must bring about, as he explained 
in 1852, ‘[l]’anéantissement de l’ordre actuel, fondé sur l’inégalité et l’exploitation, la !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
256 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, p. 118.  See also the later 
description of economic relations as a ‘guerre sociale en permanence’ (Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, 
avenir de la société’, 1869-70, CSI, p. 175). 
257 Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, p. 66. 
258 Ibid., p. 69. 
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ruine des oppresseurs, la délivrance du peuple du joug des riches’,259 we can begin to 
see how this understanding of property and the accompanying conception of wider 
society was fundamental to his revolutionary practice. As Marx would likewise later 
insist, the revolution would implement ‘the expropriation of the expropriators’.260 
This Rousseauist analysis of the inequality and injustice of property, of a 
society inherently and invariably opposed to the interests of the working masses, 
forms the basic framework upon which Blanqui builds his concept of conflict and 
taking sides. Before proceeding with how Blanqui sees to this task, let us pause 
momentarily to address one point. It will have become apparent that Blanqui’s 
analytical approach, here as elsewhere, is more concerned with broad historical 
sweeps and general principles than exhaustive analyses based on empirical 
investigation. Indeed, having established in 1834 the position on property outlined 
above, at no point did he return to these issues with a view to challenge, elaborate on 
or refine the basic maxim. Not only did the maxim therefore remain unaltered during 
his lifetime, it also remained just that, a maxim, never to be systematically developed 
or afforded treatise-length treatment - a tendency that applies to Blanqui’s thought as 
a whole. What might we conclude from this? First, it demonstrates not only the 
intellectual importance of the early 1830s as the period in which Blanqui formulated 
the foundations of his political project but also the general consistency of his thinking 
thereafter. In both thought and practice Blanqui remained faithful to his early account 
of the roots of inequality and what was at stake in overcoming structural domination. 
Second, as noted in Chapter 1, we have and will again see here the limits of Blanqui’s 
ability to understand and explain real, existing social conditions and how they 
influence and inform political action. Blanqui’s analysis of history and contemporary !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
259 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, MA, p. 179. 
260 Karl Marx, The Civil War in France (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.), p. 67. 
Cf. Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, MA, p. 186. 
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politics forever returns to thought and ideas, from which arise economic interests and 
moral principles, as the basis of social relations. Although right to assume that politics 
must insert itself within the social field and act according to its own logic, his failure 
to fully comprehend the nature of the latter limits the scope of his insights in this 
regard. Finally, and linking the two previous points, it shows that the critique would 
therefore remain analytically unsubstantiated, thereby detracting from its potential 
intellectual incisiveness. The socio-political logic and consequences of property on 
the whole remain unexplored, then, and one would need to look elsewhere for more 
detailed and developed expositions. Yet it could be said that Blanqui’s aim was, 
rather, to conceive a concise yet generally intuitive account so as to guide political 
engagements - and by this criteria arguably he could claim a certain success. Blanqui 
recognises, and is indeed right to recognise, that any form of militant political struggle 
requires establishing clear principles so as to direct determined action; only through 
declaring and disseminating its basic concepts can a political movement collectively 
work towards their realisation.261 So while the reasoning has a flaw, as is at times, 
though not always, the case with Blanqui’s project, the political ends remain astute. 
 
The state 
To bring this historical analysis of property into the context of nineteenth-century 
French society Blanqui extends this logic to the modern state as property’s 
contemporary institutional and legal expression. This is perhaps best seen in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
261 One could in fact point out that in some of Marx’s political writings the question of property is 
treated with a strikingly similarity in register, in unstated analytical assumptions and in proposed 
political conclusions to those of Blanqui. See, for example, in Marx’s reflection on the Paris 
Commune: ‘The Commune, they exclaim, intends to abolish property, the basis of all civilization! Yes, 
gentlemen, the Commune intended to abolish that class-property which makes the labour of the many 
the wealth of the few. It aimed at the expropriation of the expropriators. It wanted to make individual 
property a truth by transforming the means of production, land and capital, now chiefly the means of 
enslaving and exploiting labour, into mere instruments of free and associated labour’ (Marx, The Civil 
War in France, p. 67).  
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defence speech at the Procès des Quinze in January 1832, a public platform Blanqui 
exploited to launch an all out assault on the nascent July Monarchy, exposing its 
benign, democratic pretentions as the façade behind which a war between rich and 
poor was being fought.262 Addressing the prosecuting lawyer’s accusation that the 
poor were waging war against the rich, Blanqui agrees with the diagnosis of war, only 
to propose an alternative account of its origins and primary aggressor. Echoing 
Babeuf’s belief in a pre-existing civil war between rich and poor, between patricians 
and plebeians,263 Blanqui emphatically rejoins: ‘Oui, messieurs, ceci est la guerre 
entre les riches et les pauvres, les riches l’ont ainsi voulu, car ils sont les 
agresseurs.’264 The war Blanqui speaks of is the perpetual, daily assault on the poor 
by the rich through the socio-political inequality and injustice that he outlines during 
the course of his speech. 
 Blanqui attacks the nascent Orléanist socio-political order and its supporters, 
apologists and profiteers – the rich, in a word – holding them to account on behalf of 
the oppressed. He seeks to reveal the manner in which the social conflict between rich 
and poor has been institutionalised in the rule of government, primarily in the tax 
system and the law. Through a grossly uneven tax system, Blanqui argues, the people 
were propping up a privileged minority.265 Taxes pay for the rich, and are paid for by 
the poor. The July Monarchy facilitates ‘cette inique répartition des charges et des !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
262 Jill Harsin outlines the political dimensions of trials in the early years of the July Monarchy, 
showing how, through statements at the trials themselves (which often brought large audiences to the 
court) and the subsequent pamphlets that reproduced the court proceedings and reprints of offending 
articles in the case of press offenses, the republican defendants fully exploited the events to publicise 
their cause and disseminate their ideas. See Jill Harsin, Barricades: The War on the Streets of 
Revolutionary Paris, 1830-1848 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 52-53. 
263 See R.B. Rose, Gracchus Babeuf: The First Revolutionary Communist (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1978), p. 210; Maurice Dommanget, Auguste Blanqui: Des origines à la revolution 
de 1848 (Paris: Mouton, 1969), p. 103. Blanqui will likewise follow Babeuf in taking this logic to the 
(practical) ends, as seen in Babeuf’s injunction: ‘If you want civil war, you can have it ... You’ve cried 
“To arms”. We’ve said the same to our people’ (cited in Ian Birchall, ‘The Babeuf Bicentenary: 
Conspiracy or Revolutionary Party?’ International Socialism, No. 72, Autumn 1996 
<https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/isj2/index2.html#isj2-072>). 
264 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au process des Quinze’, 12 January 1832, MA, p. 64. 
265 Ibid., p. 66. 
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bénéfices’ that brings greater riches to the few and greater ruin to the many.266 It 
follows that Blanqui espouses a belief, widely held by the radical republican 
movement during this period, as Jill Harsin notes, that ‘in order to understand society, 
one had to comprehend the economic and social relations between classes and the 
manifestation of these relationships in the government.’ It was from this view, Harsin 
continues, that ‘republicans did not see the government as a neutral force, but rather 
as the repressive arm of the financial and commercial bourgeoisie who ruled.’267 
Blanqui’s defence speech is a scathing polemic against oligarchic rule. It depicts a 
country under the sway of a plutocratic, nepotistic government founded on the 
exploitation of the poor by a rich elite.268 Under the rule of a government that 
concedes nothing to the great majority of the people and is arrogantly indifferent to 
injustice, no opportunities or channels exist to break the very monopoly of power that 
merely serves the exigencies of exploitation.269 Blanqui’s central aim is to denounce 
and expose this corrupt, morally bankrupt and democratically illegitimate socio-
political structure as the primary cause of the injustice suffered in its name - the 
injustice present in the gap between the idle, wealthy elites, gorging themselves on 
gold, and the people dying from starvation,270 the injustice of a tax system that is not 
simply unequal or unfair, but deadly: ‘c’est partout que les ouvriers meurent écrasés 
par l’impôt.’271 The speech employs arrestingly violent metaphors to reinforce the 
idea that an order rooted in inequality, exploitation and oppression amounted to 
systematic attack against the French people. Painting a somewhat different picture of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
266 Ibid., p. 64. 
267 Harsin, Barricades, p. 6. 
268 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au process des Quinze’, MA, p. 67.  
269 Ibid., pp. 67, 70.!
270 See, for example, ibid., pp. 67-68, 70, 77. 
271 Ibid., p. 77. 
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the new order than the ‘best of republics’ lauded by his contemporaries,272 Blanqui 
describes the Orléanist state as ‘[une] pompe aspirante et foulante qui foule la matière 
appelée peuple … machine impitoyable qui broie un à un vingt-cinq millions de 
paysans et cinq millions d’ouvriers pour extraire le plus pur de leur sang et le 
transfuser dans les veines des privilégiés.’273 This is the violence of everyday life for 
ordinary people; a society structured solely around serving the aims and interests of 
the idle rich and their exploitation of the poor amounts to the perpetual, dehumanizing 
daily war against the poor that he identifies in response to the prosecuting lawyer. But 
not only was this ‘guerre’ inscribed in the so-called representative order - it was 
‘indispensable’ for facilitating the order’s ‘smooth functioning’.274 ‘Les rouages de 
cette machine, combinés avec un art merveilleux,’ Blanqui declares, ‘atteignent le 
pauvre à tous les instants de la journée, le poursuivent dans les moindres nécessités de 
son humble vie, se mettent de moitié dans son plus petit gain, dans la plus misérable 
de ses jouissances.’275 As Dommanget notes, the marvelously built machine 
exploiting and oppressing the proletariat on behalf of the privileged classes is the 
state. Blanqui’s critique is therefore highly innovative, Dommanget goes on to argue, 
establishing the fundamental basis of the theory of the state later adopted and 
developed by Marx and Lenin.276  
Does Dommanget have a case for such claims? One can undoubtedly discover 
distinctive echoes of Blanqui’s words in certain passages of the Communist 
Manifesto, for example, particularly in the description of proletarians as ‘slaves of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
272 This was Lafayette’s description of the new regime. Cited in Pamela Pilbeam, The 1830 Revolution 
in France (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 84.  
273 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au process des Quinze’, MA, p. 65. 
274 Ibid., pp. 66, 67. Here I evoke Slavoj !i"ek’s identification of a form of ‘systemic’ violence as the 
‘often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems’ 
(Slavoj !i"ek, Violence [London: Profile Books, 2009], p. 1). 
275 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au process des Quinze’, MA, p. 65. 
276 Dommanget, Auguste Blanqui: Des origines à la revolution de 1848, p. 104. See also Dommanget, 
Auguste Blanqui à Belle-Île, pp. 10-12.!
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bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois state; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the 
machine’.277 Blanqui is likewise remarkably close to Lenin’s claims that under the 
capitalist state ‘working people are enslaved’ and ‘democracy is restricted, cramped, 
curtailed, mutilated by all the conditions of wage slavery, and the poverty and misery 
of the people.’278 That said, we might point to the lacunae of Blanqui’s analysis – 
questions such as the state’s historical and political development, the institutional and 
ideological apparatuses of state power or how France compares to other countries 
remain largely unexplored or altogether absent – as grounds to deem Dommanget 
guilty of overstating the prophetic nature of Blanqui’s insights. Analytical limitations 
aside, Dommanget is certainly correct to highlight the political significance of 
Blanqui’s understanding of the inherent link between a burgeoning capitalist system, 
the exigency of continued exploitation and the political mechanisms at work in such 
processes. Blanqui’s depiction of the state as a machine is indeed particularly 
perceptive in this respect. The capitalist state is not a natural and inevitable 
development or neutral arbiter of social affairs but a consciously constructed and 
purposefully wielded instrument, deliberately directed towards specific ends in order 
to meet specific interests. Structural oppression and impoverishment are as such 
neither natural nor unavoidable, Blanqui shows us, but the necessary condition of an 
oligarchic socio-political order in which the few maintain their privilege on the back 
of the exploitation of the many. Since the rich, Blanqui writes in an article for Le 
Libérateur, require work ‘pour nourrir leur dévorante oisiveté des sueurs de ces 
ouvriers … ils consentent à laisser à leurs victimes ce qu’il faut de pain tout juste pour 
qu’ils ne meurent pas, comme on jette quelques gouttes d’huile dans les rouages !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
277 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto: A Modern Edition (London: Verso, 
2012), p. 43.  
278 V.I. Lenin, ‘The State and Revolution’, 1917, ch. 6 
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d’une mécanique pour empêcher que la rouille ne les mette hors de service.’279 Note 
here Blanqui’s description of the workers as a victim, reinforcing the idea of society 
as a perpetual war in which the poor were not only the prime or inevitable but 
necessary causality, the forever vanquished. Likewise, the fear of starvation – for with 
the possession of the ‘instruments de travail’ the idle aristocracy, the capitalists 
(Blanqui floats between these terms, as well as the privileged and the rich, to describe 
those who own production and capital, an issue we will return to in the following 
chapter) also possess the power to starve the population – binds the masses into this 
order and this social conflict in which the privileged invariably have the upper 
hand.280 It would be wrong to suggest, however, that Blanqui conceives state power as 
relying solely on strictly coercive forces. When it does occur the alleviation of the 
masses’ material conditions in particular can serve to generate popular support for a 
despotic regime, as witnessed under the Second Empire. Likewise popular 
miseducation, though depicted by Blanqui as nothing less than a form of violence 
such is the injustice it represents, is nevertheless sustained on an everyday basis 
through state institutions (the Church, schools, the press), generally speaking what we 
might call forms of ‘soft’ power. Whether coercive or seemingly consensual, whether 
exercised through institutions or directly through the state itself, all these forms of 
power are different fronts of the same civil war. 
Overall, then, the suffering of the people is not an unfortunate, disagreeable 
yet overall negligible or contingent consequence of an otherwise humane, largely free 
and equal society. Suffering is at once a product and a component of the state and the 
socio-political order; it is, as Blanqui’s metaphor strikingly conveys, the essential !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
279 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, pp. 118-119. See also the 
assertion that the privileged ‘vivent grassement de la sueur du prolétaire’ (Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste 
Blanqui au process des Quinze’, MA, p. 64). 
280 Ibid., pp. 119-120.!!
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lubricant enabling the machine to function. He thus restates, lest any ambiguities 
remain: ‘Il est d’ailleurs de l’intérêt des riches que les ouvriers puissent perpétuer leur 
misérable chair à mettre au monde les enfants d’esclaves destinés à servir un jour les 
enfants d’oppresseurs, afin de continuer de génération en génération ce double 
héritage parallèle d’opulence et de misère, de jouissances et de douleurs, qui constitue 
notre ordre social.’281 One sees here, as with arguably all the passages cited above, the 
humanism that pervades Blanqui’s politics. All his reflections on conflict, injustice, 
inequality and exploitation hinge, above all, on their human impact, on the manner in 
which the suffering and dehumanization of poverty are the essence of a social order 
structured around wealth, property and privilege, of ‘un matérialisme ignoble et 
brutal’.282 To understand human conditions is to understand the society in which they 
are produced: it is the misery, pain, harm and destruction caused by inequality and 
exploitation that leads Blanqui to assert the invariably conflictual nature of such a 
society. 
 
Revolution and repression in perspective 
Blanqui’s concept of civil war is informed by two principal concerns. On the one 
hand Blanqui explores struggle and conflict at a structural level. As we have seen, 
great emphasis is placed on the unseen violence, cruelty and general injustice of the 
everyday life of the poor, what Johan Galtung has since called structural violence.283 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
281 Ibid., p. 119.   
282 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au process des Quinze’, MA, p. 67. Similarly, Marx later 
argues that ‘even in the state of society most favourable to him, the inevitable consequence for the 
worker is overwork and early death, reduction to a mere machine, enslavement to capital’. In capitalist 
society, Marx continues, ‘all passions and all activity are lost in greed. The worker is only permitted to 
have enough for him to live, and he is only permitted to live in order to have’ (Marx, ‘Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts’, Early Writings, pp. 285, 361).  
283 For Galtung, structural violence denotes the harm and suffering built into a social structure that 
cannot be directly traced to an actor or subject and may be inflicted through conditions of work and the 
uneven distribution of resources within a society where this is objectively avoidable. See Johan 
Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’, in Journal of Peace Research (Vol. 6, No. 3, 1969). 
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To depict a latent social war is to recognise the opposition of interests residing at the 
heart of the established order.284 On the other hand lies a conception of civil war as 
the actual, and often extremely violent, manifestation of opposing socio-political 
interests in the form of revolutions, revolts and riots, street fighting and state 
repression. In these episodic moments of upheaval, of popular uprising and 
reactionary repression alike, the true nature of politics and society could be witnessed, 
understood and above all learned from, Blanqui contends.  
 ‘La guerre contre les arbres de liberté ne pourrait pas passer sans conflits. La 
campagne contres les arbres de liberté ne pourrait pas s’accomplir sans lutte.’ So 
declared Blanqui in February 1850, noting how the ‘journaux réactionnaires 
enregistraient en triomphe chaque matin, les bulletin de victoire sur les pauvres 
peupliers immolés.’285 It can be no coincidence that such statements were made in the 
wake of 1848: after two decades punctuated by a series of major – and, from 
Blanqui’s perspective, defeated - revolts in France it seemed clear that the trees of 
liberty would continue to be felled by all means necessary. The repressive violence 
upholding the status quo is indeed an issue that reappears throughout Blanqui’s 
writings. From witnessing la Terreur blanche during the Restoration286 to hearing of 
the mass bloodshed in Paris in 1871, the series of state repressions that span the 
nineteenth century had a profound effect on Blanqui, providing grounds for critical 
reflection as both actor and onlooker. All informed, challenged or reinforced his 
political practice. All provided evidence, Blanqui concluded, of the war of rich 
against poor, of the conflict in which the blood of the workers was forever on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
284 As the defence speech affirms: ‘cet ordre de choses n’est institué qu’en vue de l’exploitation du 
pauvre par le riche’ (Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au process des Quinze’, MA, p. 67). 
285 Blanqui MSS 9583, fo. 93 [5 February 1850]. 
286 ‘Nous n’étions pas nés en 93. Les plus vieux d’entre nous datent du siècle – il n’y a pas de sang sur 
nos mains. Les vôtres en sont rouges. Vous avez fait la terreur blanche : j’au vu tomber les têtes que 
vous avez coupées – j’avais 17 ans. Ce n’est pas votre seul exploit. Vous en avez bien d’autres à votre 
dossier’ (Blanqui MSS 9583, fo. 114 [9 February 1850]). 
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hands of the forces of counter-revolution.287 For just as Blanqui conceives revolution 
as an ongoing movement and struggle, so too is counter-revolution. 1848, to take but 
one example, reconfirmed that the political clash of old had far from exhausted itself. 
In fact, ‘la lutte de 93 vient de recommencer’ Blanqui declared in November 1848, 
assuming the same battlefield and pitting the same forces against each other as more 
than half-a-century earlier.288 This struggle had already become clear earlier in the 
year as Rouen witnessed major clashes following the 23 April elections. ‘Les 
massacres de Rouen’, as the text produced by the Société Républicaine Centrale 
(which Blanqui led) is entitled, should be placed within a much longer history. In 
witnessing the full, uncompromising brutality of counter-revolution once again, in 
this new ‘terreur royaliste’ certain eternal truths came to light. Not only is the counter-
revolution reliant on violence to maintain its power - it relishes bloodshed: ‘Ils avaient 
soif d’une sanglante revanche, ces sicaires de la dynastie déchue !’ Hence ‘ces lâches 
adorateurs de la force’, whose repression in Rouen, as the text declares, surpassed the 
infamous April 1834 rue Transnonain massacre in Paris, embodied the bloody spectre 
of counter-revolution that haunted all popular uprisings. Events in Rouen marked the 
latest episode in a continual conflict between eternal adversaries: ‘Ce sont bien les 
mêmes bourreaux et les mêmes victimes ! D’un côté, des bourgeois forcenés, 
poussant par derrière au carnage des soldats imbéciles qu’ils ont gorges de vin et de 
haine ; de l’autre, de malheureux ouvriers sans défense sous la balle et la baïonnette 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
287 See ‘Pour le drapeau rouge’ from February 1848, in which Blanqui argues that the tricolore flag was 
no longer that of the Republic but of Louis-Philippe and the monarchy: ‘C’est le drapeau tricolore qui 
présidait aux massacres de la rue Transnonain, du faubourg de Vaise, de Saint-Etienne. Il s’est baigné 
vingt fois dans le sang des ouvriers’ (Blanqui, ‘Pour le drapeau rouge’, 26 February 1848, MA, p. 135). 
Blanqui later described this document as ‘mon premier acte d’hostilité contre le gouvernement 
provisoire’ (Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 457 [May 1862]). 
288 Blanqui, ‘A la Montagne de 93. Aux socialistes purs, ses véritables héritiers !’, MA, p. 152. See also 
Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, MA, pp. 178-179. 
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des assassins !’289 And yet despite the forces of counter-revolution’s consistent 
recourse to violent repression it is still the Terror of 1793 that provokes the most 
outrage. For Blanqui the record must be set straight. ‘L’histoire de la Révolution, 
comme toutes les autres, est l’histoire de vos crimes, mêlée cette fois de vos 
délires.’290 ‘Qui a versé le premier sang de la Révolution ? Vous ! Qui a versé le 
dernier ? Vous ! … Vous aviez ouvert la scène du carnage, vous l’avez fermée.’291 
The people and its enemies are locked in an ongoing battle for supremacy, Blanqui 
believes; and the enemy will use all means necessary to maintain its power. 
 What is particularly striking in Blanqui’s thought is the manner in which these 
forms of state and revolutionary violence are both explicitly linked with the social 
order they seek to uphold and overthrow respectively. So while in the upheaval of 
1848 the force of reaction ‘n’a fait que son métier en égorgeant la démocratie’,292 one 
should nonetheless recall that counter-revolution, as with its ideological-institutional 
manifestations, always advances through the same means, ‘la brutalité, la violence’,293 
no matter what the political climate. When Blanqui speaks of tyranny and reaction, it 
denotes not only the repression necessary to enforce and maintain such an order but 
also the broader conflict of opposing social interests within that order. It is in this 
sense that the war between rich and poor depicted in the 1832 defence speech should 
be read: Blanqui turns the dominant conception of (active) aggressor and (passive) 
victim on its head. If the poor break out in violent revolt it is in fact the ostensibly 
inactive rich who are the aggressors. And yet despite this the rich still have the 
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289 Blanqui, ‘Les massacres de Rouen. La Société républicaine centrale au gouvernement provisoire’, 2 
May 1848, MA, p. 143. 
290 Blanqui MSS 9583, fo. 86 [n.d.]. As Blanqui likewise wrote in 1831: ‘Combien de massacres sous 
toutes les formes depuis 1805, au profit du despotisme ! Eh bien on ne parle jamais que de 93 et de la 
guillotine’ (Blanqui, ‘Lettre à (Adélaïde de Montgolfier)?’, 19 or 29 September 1831, OI, p. 585).  
291 Blanqui MSS 9581, fo. 37-38. [15 January 1859] 
292 Blanqui, ‘Avis au peuple’, 25 February 1851, MA, p. 166.!
293 Blanqui MSS 9582, fo. 231-232 [26 February 1848]. 
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audacity to blame their victims.294 ‘Chose étrange’, Blanqui again wrote in 1836, ‘que 
ceux qui font souffrir accusent de barbarie ceux qui souffrent !’295 Violent revolt is 
symptomatic of a much wider phenomenon, forming a clear manifestation of 
resistance to the injustice of society. ‘Evidemment,’ Blanqui declares, ‘les violences 
poussent le peuple à des violences en sens contraire’.296 To adopt the analysis 
proposed by Slavoj !i"ek, Blanqui in effect invites us to locate ‘the background 
which generates such violence’.297 He seeks to ‘redefine the nature of violence’, 
recasting the roles of victims and aggressors in order to show that, amongst other 
injustices, ‘a government that allowed its citizens to starve was itself committing a 
violent act.’298 The suffering inflicted against the poor results from a systematic war 
waged against them by the rich. As such one must expose the fundamental order of 
things, the background of starvation and suffering which pushes men to accept death 
in a revolt for justice over a life of continued injustice.299  
Blanqui thus carries out a conceptual operation in which both facets of his 
dual conception of civil war outlined earlier are united and understood together. 
Whether ‘l’oppression se manifeste sous la forme d’aristocratie militaire ou 
commerciale’ or the people are ‘exploité par le sabre ou par les écus’, whether seen in 
‘les souffrances du paysan foulé aux pieds du coursier de son châtelain’ or heard in 
‘l’agonie de l’ouvrier dont le sang sert à graisser les mécaniques de son suzerain 
industriel’, all these forms of suffering, violence and conflict are products of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
294 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au process des Quinze’, MA, p. 64. 
295 Blanqui, ‘Procès des Poudres’, October 1836, OI, pp. 352-353. 
296 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Adélaïde de Montgolfier’, 27 July 1832, OI, p. 230. See also Blanqui, ‘Défense 
d’Auguste Blanqui au process des Quinze’, MA, p. 64. 
297 !i"ek, Violence, p. 1.  At a certain level, here Blanqui appears to explore a similar question to 
!i"ek, who asks: ‘Is there not something suspicious, indeed symptomatic, about this focus on 
subjective violence – that violence which is enacted by social agents, evil individuals, disciplined 
repressive apparatuses, fanatical crowds? Doesn’t it desperately try to distract our attention from the 
true locus of trouble, by obliterating from view other forms of violence and thus actively participating 
in them?’ (ibid., p. 9).   
298 Harsin, Barricades, p. 9.  
299 See Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au process des Quinze’, MA, p. 77. 
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socio-political order of property.300 The manner in which Blanqui brings together 
what Galtung calls personal-direct with structural-impersonal forms of violence 
would suggest that Blanqui too held a broad, extended understanding of violence.301 
Perhaps nowhere is this clearer than in his reflections on the French Revolution. 
Before 1789 popular suffering was socially prescribed. ‘L’histoire jusque-là n’est que 
l’éternel récit de vos férocités et de vos supplices. Vous avez régné 1.400 ans par le 
glaive.’302 Therein lies the historical function of the Terror: it breaks the cycle of 
perpetual, ubiquitous violence; it is the moment at which the people ‘retourne 
l’épouvante contre ses tyrans’; ‘une délivrance’, its aim was ‘de combattre, avec ses 
propres armes, l’éternelle terreur appesantie sur l’humanité’.303 Blanqui challenges 
those who, in the face of the explosive upheaval of the Revolution, are blinded to the 
much greater ‘eternal’ violence of society under the ancien régime, as if the Terror 
were a violent aberration on an otherwise peaceful historical plane.304  
All the death, destruction and suffering of French society, from physical 
fighting to the harm inherent within social structures - including the masses’ state of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
300 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 111.  $%"!The short Appel au peuple de Paris issued by the Société des Saisons during the failed coup attempt 
of 12 May 1839 reveals the influence of this concept of structural violence on Blanqui’s practice. 
(Blanqui was a leading figure of the group since its establishment in 1837 and, according to the Appel, 
the ‘commandant en chef’ of the impending provisional government. It is no surprise, then, that his 
intellectual influence permeates this document, as well as the Society’s founding declaration.) The 
document targets the ‘lâche tryan des Tuileries se rit de la faim qui déchire les entrailles du peuple’, 
declaring that the exploitation and inequality of French society were ‘crimes’ demanding punishment. 
See ‘Appel au peuple de Paris du comité de la Société des Saisons’, 12 May 1839, MA, p. 129. As the 
grounds on which those leading the revolt account for their action, it could be said that this conception 
of state violence justified, in part, the use of revolutionary violence. As Harsin notes, ‘the performance 
of violent acts obviously begged the question of legitimacy. Republicans, as the initiators, stressed the 
prior aggression of the government, which promoted an economic system in which men could not 
protect their families from starvation’ (Harsin, Barricades, p. 9). !
302 Blanqui MSS 9581, fo. 39 [15 January 1859]. See also the description of starvation as ‘une arme 
plus meurtrière’ than the guillotine (Blanqui MSS 9583, fo. 20-21 [n.d.]).  
303 Auguste Blanqui, ‘Introduction’, in Gustave Tridon, Les Hébertistes (Brussels: Imprimerie de J.H 
Briand, 1871), p. 8. 
304 ‘There were two “Reigns of Terror” if we would but remember it and consider it’, Mark Twain 
similarly later wrote; ‘the one wrought murder in hot passion, the other in heartless cold blood; the one 
lasted mere months, the other had lasted a thousand years … what is the horror of swift death by the 
axe, compared with life-long death from hunger, cold, insult, cruelty, and heart-break?’ (cited in Slavoj 
!i"ek, ‘Foreword: The Dark Matter of Violence, Or, Putting Terror in Perspective’, in Sophie 
Wahnich, In Defence of the Terror [London: Verso, 2012], p. xiv).   
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unenlightened ignorance - are part of the logic of a social order based on the 
monopoly of property.305 These are the ‘désastreuses conséquences d’une loi sociale 
qui concentre dans un petit nombre de mains toute la fortune publique et qui [dote] 
une caste du droit de vie et de mort sur l’immense majorité de la population’.306 
Property is the root cause of the ‘effroyable dégradation d’un grand peuple’.307 
Property is inequality is violence - whether witnessed in society itself or during a 
revolt against it. Such is one of the essential lessons of the Lyon canuts revolt: those 
workers who do rise up against a dehumanizing social order in which they are nothing 
more than a ‘homme machine’ will face an uncompromising, brutal military 
repression, an ‘extermination jusqu’au dernier homme’, dehumanized once again in 
revolt as in daily life to be dealt with as if they were ‘une invasion de sauterelles.’308 
The violence of revolt or the violence of their subscribed role in society – this is the 
stark reality workers face: 
 
L’extermination, telle est la seule alternative qu’on lui offre avec celle de 
rentrer dans le devoir. Le devoir des ouvriers, c’est de se considérer comme 
des machines fonctionnant pour créer des jouissances aux privilégiés ; le 
devoir des ouvriers, c’est de mourir de misère sur les étoffes de soie qu’ils 
tissent pour les riches ; le devoir des ouvriers, c’est de subir le supplice 
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305 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, pp. 109-110; Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit 
appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, p. 125; Blanqui, ‘Qui fait la soupe doit la manger’, OI, p. 293. 
Blanqui later resumes in the Critique Sociale: ‘Depuis que le monde est monde, la force seule 
gouverne, grâce à l’ignorance ; la lutte entre le droit opprimé et la violence n’a jamais cessé. 
L’oppression, victorieuse et maîtresse, se manifeste à travers les âges par la loi, expression de la 
volonté du plus fort. Ces lois ont constitué toutes les sociétés sur le principe de la propriété, autrement 
dit sur la servitude du travail’ (Blanqui, ‘Garnier’, July 1870, CSI, p. 247). Again we see here, as in the 
previous chapter, that for Blanqui ignorance is at once the cause and consequence of inequality and 
injustice. 
306 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, pp. 122-123. 
307 Ibid., p. 119.!
308 Ibid., p. 122. Blanqui, ‘Qui fait la soupe doit la manger’, OI, p. 293. 
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d’Ugolin, c’est de voir leurs femmes et leurs enfants périr lentement, 
consumés par la faim, et d’expirer ensuite eux-mêmes…309   
 
Or as Blanqui affirms more concisely in 1850: ‘La servitude ou la mort, c’est la 
devise d’extermination arborée par les riches.’310 Revolt could not be divorced from 
the social order in which it appeared. On the contrary, in the eyes of Blanqui and his 
followers revolt and civil war ‘helped to clarify the terms of the struggle, everpresent 
[sic] but often obscured.’311 After the canuts revolts of the early 1830s the June Days 
of 1848 reconfirmed this battle; after Lyon the streets of Paris set the record straight 
once again. If the Réveil newspaper evoked ‘Le malentendu de juin’ for Blanqui the 
inverse was now the case: ‘Plus souvent un malentendu ! Jamais on ne s’est mieux 
compris que ce jour-là.’312 Gustave Tridon, one of Blanqui’s closest followers and a 
leading intellectual figure of the Blanquist movement that emerged during the Second 
Empire, would repeat the same point in September 1870 just as the Prussian siege of 
Paris began. It is all too easy, Tridon argues, for the well-fed bourgeoisie and those 
indifferent to injustice to preach reconciliation between classes. For the poor, 
famishment dispelled this fantasy. Conditions in Paris during the Franco-Prussian war 
were not an exception, Tridon writes, but the manifest extension and intensification of 
the everyday suffering of the poor. The rich gorge themselves on the boulevards while !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
309 Ibid., p. 122.!
310 Blanqui MSS, 9590(2), fo. 465 [June 1850]. Cf. ‘La presse conservatrice de toutes nuances n'a 
jamais opposé au parti révolutionnaire que l'argument ci-dessus, et, convenons-en, il est décisif : « 
Soumission ou la mort ! » Ce dilemme est fort commode, assurément, pour les aristocraties. Mais la 
nation le trouve violent et voudrait mettre un terme à cette sinistre plaisanterie. Sire capital est une 
puissance sans contrepoids. Nulle force ne lui est un obstacle. Il ne souffre ni qu’on le gène, ni qu’on 
fasse mine seulement de le contrarier. Il a les nerfs horriblement susceptibles. Dès qu'une politique lui 
déplaît, il coupe les vivres. S’il veut dompter une population, la mettre à genoux, il suspend la 
production par une double manœuvre. La part de ses dépenses est réduite au strict nécessaire. Tout le 
reste va se joindre à l'épargne, et l'épargne elle-même s'ensevelit tout entière dans les coffres. Elle ne 
daigne même plus en sortir pour exploiter le travail, lui arracher ses dîmes. Non, rien ! Elle le 
supprime. On voit le système et ses conséquences. Plus il y a d’affaires et d’activité, plus un pays 
tombe à la merci de sa majesté l'Empereur-Écu’ (Blanqui, ‘Le luxe’, n.d., CSI, p. 102). 
311 Hutton, The Cult of the Revolutionary Tradition, p. 59. 
312 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 62-63 [2 September 1869]; emphasis in original. 
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the poor of Belleville were dying from starvation. That this situation is avoidable 
through rationing renders it even more disgraceful. The need of the many must be 
placed above the greed of the few. Reprising the line of thinking developed by his 
master, Tridon infers from ‘la faim’ devastating the French capital a vital lesson: ‘Il 
n’y a pas de fraternité entre le tigre et sa proie ; entre l’oppresseur et sa victime ; entre 
l’affamé et l’affameur.’313 History took little time to offer brutal confirmation of 
Tridon’s hypothesis, for just eight months later the semaine sanglante destroyed any 
remaining myths of fraternity.  
Blanqui had therefore concluded earlier in the Critique Sociale that it is ‘le 
spectacle de nos ennemis surtout’ that serves as ‘notre meilleur plaidoyer.’ Such 
moments of open political conflict have the potential for latent social antagonisms to 
sharpen. But following this assertion, and as we observed in Chapter 1, Blanqui goes 
on to say that the popular anger these struggles can produce is alone not sufficient. 
Anger is a ‘force précaire. La colère d’aujourd’hui devient souvent la peur de demain. 
Point de base solide que l’instruction’.314 We thus see that while manifest conflict has, 
in Blanqui’s eyes, the potential to advance the cause of revolution, public instruction 
forever remains the sole reliable force of emancipation. Across the century it was in 
the ‘sanglante arène de la guerre civile’315 that for Blanqui many fundamental social 
illusions were exposed, many political realities revealed. The extent to which the 
people as a whole could grasp these realities is, however, a problem that will persist, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
313 Gustave Tridon, ‘La Faim’, La Patrie en Danger, Monday 19 September 1870. A regular 
contributor to the newspaper and close follower of Blanqui during the Second Empire, Tridon’s 
political and philosophical essays were revered not only for their intellectual insight but for the power 
and style of the prose, leading him to be described as the ‘intellectual spokesman’ of the Blanquist 
movement (see Hutton, The Cult of the Revolutionary Tradition, pp. 28, 164.) While Tridon does not 
directly or officially speak on Blanqui’s behalf, their personal and intellectual proximity provides 
legitimate grounds for illuminating one aspect of their overall, shared conception of politics, and 
justifies Tridon’s inclusion here. This article, which explores the socio-politics of starvation, a major 
issue that would take on even greater significance as the siege of Paris went on, is perhaps even more 
notable for having been published on the very day the siege began.  
314 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, pp. 202-203. 
315 Blanqui, ‘A la Montagne de 93. Aux socialistes purs, ses véritables héritiers !’, MA, p. 153. 
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he equally believes, and it is this view that once again leads him back to the key role 
of an enlightened leadership capable of revealing to the people the real state of things. 
Although this arguably causes Blanqui to again unduly diminish the potential for 
collective conscious volition, the basic political point nonetheless retains its force of 
insight. Éric Hazan is right to speak of the ‘immense truth effect’ produced by the 
recurring defeats of the nineteenth century: ‘defeat suddenly reveals the true nature of 
the enemy, it dissolves the consensus, dismantles the ideological mystifications of 
domination. No political analysis, no press campaign, no electoral struggle, so clearly 
bears a message as the spectacle of people being shot in the street.’316 And yet if the 
violence upholding the status quo was clear for all to see in 1830-34, 1848 and 1870-
71, these were only the localised, ephemeral explosions of a much wider and more 
sustained social conflict rooted in the injustices and inequalities of property and 
perpetuated in the practices of the state. Behind seeming political tranquillity and 
social harmony, for Blanqui as for Hazan, the civil war continues ‘by other means’.317 
With a lucidity, force and urgency of enduring import, Blanqui alerts us to what is 
fundamentally at stake in any attempt to struggle for the rule of the people. ‘You can 
pretend to ignore power,’ Bensaïd tells us, ‘but it will not ignore you.’318 You can 
either turn away from the state, political violence and social conflict or confront it. 
Blanqui chooses to confront it. Where starvation, inequality and oppression abound, a 
political conflict is being waged. Starvation and the everyday suffering of the people 
were fully within the domain of politics; as such, they required political solutions.  
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316 Éric Hazan, The Invention of Paris (London: Verso, 2011), p. 309. 
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We have seen that, for Blanqui, so long as property exists, no matter when or what its 
form, the privileged will maintain control of production and profits, the state will 
facilitate meeting the needs of the few over the many and, in all such respects, a war 
will be waged against the people. Blanqui’s first move is to go from the recognition of 
conflict in human, material experience to the naming of it in thought. How, we might 
then ask, are these political observations translated into political principles and 
practice? If, for Blanqui, the meaning of politics is the conflict between rich and poor 
and the suffering borne by the latter, what is the role of politics? Blanqui’s response is 
to assert that the meaning and role are, and must be, one and the same. The diagnosis 
is the remedy: a diagnosis of politics as civil war implies a full assumption of the 
struggle. With this comes the necessity of taking sides, of completely rejecting any 
notions of a juste milieu or consensual politics in the determined pursuit of this task.  
 
Two irreconcilable principles 
Throughout Blanqui’s life there was a fluid relationship between the interpretation 
and analysis of contemporary political struggles on the one hand and a profoundly 
principled, conviction-oriented thought on the other. The intellectual origins of this 
battle of principles can be found in Blanqui’s reflections on the politics of the July 
Monarchy.  
Despite the nascent July Monarchy’s attempts to portray itself as rooted in 
national sovereignty, as seen in the crowning of the duc d’Orléans as Louis-Philippe 
‘King of the French’ rather than ‘King of France’, for Blanqui these tautological 
manoeuvres could not conceal the fact that a monarchical order, a so-called 
! 114!
‘compromise’, had been illegitimately imposed on the people. Against the claims to 
have created in the July Monarchy ‘a popular throne surrounded by republican 
institutions’, a ‘monarchie républicaine’ led by a ‘roi citoyen’,319 for Blanqui there 
was only ‘la monarchie monarchique et la république républicaine’. ‘Il n’y a et ne 
peut y avoir en France que des royalistes et des républicains’, he unambiguously 
states.320 Between the principles of legitimacy and popular sovereignty ‘[i]l n’y a pas 
de troisième drapeau, de terme moyen.’321  
Louis-Napoleon, Blanqui later argued, only receives lukewarm support. By 
the same token, however, ‘il n’a contre lui qu’une demi-hostilité des partis. Point 
d’amour, mais point de haine. Il n’est un ennemi complet pour personne. … Le genre 
neutre a son abri dans l’indifférence.’ Just as the soon-to-be-crowned Napoleon III – 
who appeared in Blanqui’s eyes as a ‘[d]ictateur contre-révolutionnaire protégé par un 
masque de parvenu’322 - revealed the threat of supposed consensus, so too had the 
July Monarchy’s juste milieu been a dangerous façade and a rhetorical calculation 
facilitating continued oppression.323 The war against the poor can be waged through 
deceit – such as the widely-propagated fiction of the proletariat’s position serving the 
greater good - more than actual physical violence.324 The idea, Blanqui writes, 
peddled by the press of the rich - and shared, we should note, by the likes of Saint-
Simon, Fourier, Cabet, indeed all pre-1848 French socialist theory in its attempts to 
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319 See David Pinkney, The French Revolution of 1830 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 
pp. 144, 188; Pilbeam, The 1830 Revolution in France, p. 161. 
320 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au process des Quinze’, MA, pp. 73-74. 
321 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, MA, pp. 92-93. The facade of the juste milieu 
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322 Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 367 [6 September 1852]. 
323 See Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, MA, p. 96. 
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de violence’ (Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, p. 123). 
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appeal to bourgeoisie and workers alike325 - that unity is possible between workers 
and the rich, that equality and emancipation can be achieved through collaboration or 
cooperation, must be fully rejected. Attempts to portray social cohesion and harmony, 
in which the mutual necessity of working together seemingly reveals a common 
interest and solidarity between capitalist and worker, are tantamount to reconciling 
Cain and Abel, the lion and the lamb.326  
Neutrality is not an option. To ostensibly renounce any form of conviction or 
to claim impartiality ‘entre ceux qui souffrent et ceux qui font souffrir’ is, as the ‘But 
du journal’ of Le Libérateur unequivocally states, a cowardly, dishonest illusion - 
hence the newspaper was conceived from the unashamedly passionate conviction to 
forcefully intervene in support of the oppressed and in hatred of the oppressor.327 
Blanqui is himself emphatic that his writings in the newspaper express ‘des 
convictions profondes chez moi’, convictions that were ‘mortellement hostiles à 
l’ordre social dans lequel nous vivons’.328 Blanqui’s voice is one of militant 
conviction. ‘Avouer hautement ses affections et ses haines, c’[est] le seul rôle qui 
convienne à un honnête homme. Il faut plaindre ceux qui se targuent de n’aimer et de 
ne haïr personne.’329 Any talk of a so-called neutral juste milieu is an ‘absurdité’ that 
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325 See Harsin, Barricades, p. 28. 
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327 Blanqui, ‘Présentation et but du journal’, 2 February 1834, OI, p. 258. 
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Adélaïde de Montgolfier’, 16 July 1831, OI, p. 176).  
329 Blanqui, ‘Présentation et but du journal’, OI, p. 258.!
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only serves to delay the necessary moment at which people must take sides and 
choose, ‘selon leur passion et leur intérêt’, between two opposing principles.330  
Blanqui notes how he is not alone in seeing past the obfuscatory conflation of 
first principles. Observing in the early 1830s that one section of the upper classes - ‘la 
partie la plus pourrie, celle qui veut avant tout de l’or et des plaisirs’ - may 
temporarily welcome Louis-Philippe’s advances and support the monarchy through its 
own opportunistic self-interest, ‘l’autre portion, celle que j’appellerai les moins 
gangrenés, afin de ne pas prononcer le mot honorable, celle qui a le respect d’elle-
même et foi en ses opinions, qui a voué un culte à son drapeau et à ses pieux 
souvenirs, celle-là repousse avec dégoût les caresses du juste milieu.’331 One 
discovers in this fascinating passage an important insight into the moral dimensions of 
Blanqui’s thought. A certain degree of respect – albeit very minor – is openly 
professed for an outright adversary precisely because they too, through their 
principled integrity, dismiss the idea of a juste milieu as a non-sense. The terms of this 
conflict of morals, passions and interests, the fundamental political choice at stake 
could not be clearer. Politics is a struggle of philosophies, of ideas; conflictual in its 
essence, it precludes consensus. Just as with social groups in ‘la guerre des idées, il 
n’y a ni paix ni conciliation possible’; as such ‘le combat doit toujours finir par la 
destruction de l’un des partis’.332 The relationship between equality and privilege and 
the groups that represent them – however much they may deny or obfuscate this fact - 
is but one of irreconcilable enemies. One side will be overpowered. Which will 
prevail?333  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Formulated in response to the consensual pretenses of the Orléanist order, this 
fundamental logic of irreconcilable principled convictions and presenting an 
alternative was conceptually extended to underpin Blanqui’s entire project thereafter. 
Indeed, as the century progressed and even republicanism had become appropriated 
by conservativism Blanqui felt compelled to restate the essence of his doctrine. Citing 
Jules Ferry’s claim to be a ‘Républicain, mais Républicain-conservateur’, Blanqui 
retorts: ‘Républicain-conservateur est un Royaliste-conservateur … Enfants du même 
père. Le prénom seul varie’. Ultimately what matters is not one’s self-ascribed 
signifer, for royalists, bonapartists, liberals, democrats, republicans and socialists 
alike could all be conservatives. What matters is whether one supports the established 
order or not. ‘Aujourd’hui il n’existe que deux partis, celui qui veut conserver l’ordre 
social actuel, celui qui ne veut pas le conserver. Tout le reste n’est qu’une apparence, 
un masque.’334 This phrase encapsulates the basic logic that had forever guided 
Blanqui’s thinking. For Blanqui politics in its purest form can, and in fact should, be 
reduced to this basic battle between those who preserve the current order of inequality 
and injustice and those who work to overthrow it in the name of equality and justice. 
In the face of opportunistic appropriation and deceitful obfuscation Blanqui returns 
politics to its preeminent paradigm from which he had been working all along: 
revolution or counter-revolution. 
 
Some practical implications 
Political practice therefore has to cut through the veil of illusory rhetoric and act 
according to the actual state of things. In the first instance, as noted in Chapter 1, this 
means dismissing any form of tepid, gradualist reformism as a matter of course. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
334 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 71-72 [n.d.]; emphasis in original.! See also the assertion that 
‘Opportunisme et République conservatrice sont synonymes’ (Blanqui MSS 9588(2), fo. 459 [14 July 
1870]). 
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Certain texts may appear to suggest that Blanqui’s programme is based around a 
series of fairly reasonable reforms;335 the proposals outlined in the defence speech, 
some readers have suggested, are hardly radical in and of themselves, even by 
contemporary standards.336 But to think of Blanqui’s proposals within our 
understanding of ‘reform’ is misleading. As Le Nuz notes, ‘les réformes sociales’ and 
‘la révolution sociale’ were synonymous terms for Blanqui.337 His reforms may seem 
piecemeal at first, yet he is not merely suggesting they supplement the existing order. 
On the contrary, the destruction of the old order is the essential condition of their 
realisation. Only structural transformation will end structural servitude. ‘Au peuple le 
choix’, Blanqui maintained in 1850, ‘l’esclavage ou la refonte de la société ! Les 
demi-mesures sont sa ruine.’338 Acts of charity or minor concessions occasionally 
conceded to the people by their oppressors therefore must be dismissed,339 just as any 
exclusively legal path to emancipation must be rejected. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 
1, for Blanqui the mere existence of a law did not mean that it was not ‘ridiculous’, 
‘odious’ or ‘immoral’. On the contrary, the rich simply hide behind the ‘abstract 
word’ of the law so as not to confront the suffering created and reproduced in the 
name of that very law.340 ‘When powerful men abuse it,’ Rousseau’s Discourse on 
Political Economy declares, ‘the law becomes an offensive weapon for them and a 
shield against the weak, and the pretext of public security is always the most 
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335 In place of the grossly unjust, unequal, unrepresentative system he believes was imposed on the 
French people in the wake of July 1830, Blanqui outlines a republic built around a set of concrete 
reforms: he calls for universal suffrage to allow the French people to choose their government and 
legislators; for an equitable, progressive tax and credit system; for the Stock Exchange – the ‘funeste 
tripotage’ – to be replaced with a system of national banks; and for a patriotic war, not of conquest, but 
to restore national prestige. See Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au process des Quinze’, MA, p. 
71. 
336 Bernstein, Auguste Blanqui and the Art of Insurrection, p. 48; Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories 
of Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 98. 
337 Le Nuz, ‘Introduction’, MA, p. 32. 
338 Blanqui MSS, 9590(2), fo. 465 [June 1850].!
339 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au process des Quinze’, p. 71. 
340 Ibid., pp. 68-69. 
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dangerous scourge of the people.’341 Blanqui espouses with equal force these 
concerns regarding legally sanctioned injustice, particularly when justified in the 
name of stability and order. Against the belief that ‘la loi est respectable parce qu’elle 
est la loi’, for Blanqui the law ‘n’est respectable que si elle a ses racines dans la 
conscience publique et dans la justice. Hors de là ce n’est plus que la force brutale.’342 
The struggle for justice does not recognise and will not yield to illegitimate forces.  
Social change is first and foremost a question of political power: of who has it, 
of who will take it, of who will wield it. Blanqui knows that social emancipation can 
only be realised through the struggle for and seizure of power – that is, in the domain 
of politics. This marks his clearest rupture from ‘utopian’ socialism. We might recall, 
in fact, the etymology of ‘utopia’. Based on the Greek ‘ou’ (not) and ‘topos’ (place), 
the word itself - in essence ‘not here’ - highlights the belief, characteristic of all 
‘utopian’ thought, that future forms of egalitarian social organisation can only be 
conceived through intellectual withdrawal. Practice followed suit. All the various 
utopian-inspired projects, from the phalanstères of Fourier to the Icarian communities 
of Cabet, sought to change society from the outside in. Equality would emerge not 
here, but in the confined isolation of rural France or the United States. By direct 
contrast, Blanqui’s project to seize centralised state power in Paris in order to institute 
the rule of popular sovereignty across France moves from the inside out in an 
affirmation of the here and now. To change society one has to first take and maintain 
political power – such is one of Blanqui’s most basic assumptions. For Blanqui 
socialism is not about ‘inventing the future’;343 it is only through collectively working 
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341 Rousseau, ‘Discourse on Political Economy’, pp. 20-21. !
342 Blanqui MSS 9582, fo. 35 [n.d.]. 
343 Cf. Quand les socialistes inventaient l’avenir: Presse, théories et experiences, 1825-1860, eds. 
Thomas Bouchet, Vincent Bourdeau et al (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 2015). It is instructive to note 
that Blanqui barely features in this volume. Whether this is a deliberate omision on the part of the 
editors is unclear, however.   
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to realise the principle of social equality that its actual form will become clear, as we 
shall see in Chapter 4.  
By the same token, the role of the republic within this schema is that of a 
vehicle for the idea of equality. Blanqui sees the republic as but a (political) means or 
form to realise the (social) end or content; it is not the definitive means, still less the 
end in and of itself. Revolutionaries do not venerate institutions. In politics they are in 
fact ‘profondément indifférents à la forme’. Bypassing such distractions they go 
straight to the core of society, to the struggle of equality against privilege.344 
Revolutionaries only self-identify as republicans because ‘nous espérons de la 
république une refonte sociale’. But a caveat must be added: ‘Si la république devait 
tromper cette espérance, nous cesserions d’être républicains’.345 ‘La République serait 
un mensonge si elle ne devait être que la substitution d’une forme de gouvernement à 
une autre’, Blanqui’s Société Républicaine Centrale later declared in March 1848. ‘Il 
ne suffit pas de changer les mots, il faut changer les choses.’ Therein lies the 
relationship between real, material social change and the political form delivering it: 
‘La République, c’est l’émancipation des ouvriers, c’est la fin du règne de 
l’exploitation, c’est l’avènement d’un ordre nouveau qui affranchira le travail et la 
tyrannie du capital.’346 Any political form, republican or otherwise, that failed to 
achieve such ends must be opposed. Blanqui’s ultimate loyalty is to equality, not the 
republic; one has to serve the idea as the social end, not its political form as the 
means. The republican model of nineteenth-century France is another stage in the 
historical struggle to achieve real equality.347  
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344 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 108. 
345 Ibid., p. 108. See also Blanqui, ‘Propagande Démocratique’, 1835, OI, p. 314 for a lucid description 
of the relationship between political means (electoral reform, universal suffrage) and social ends 
(establishing real equality). !
346 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 95 [22 March 1848].  
347 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 108.  
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It is interesting to note how many contemporary debates on communism share 
in Blanqui’s basic assumption here: if the form of the idea’s realisation failed and the 
political answer to the social question proved to be misconceived, that is not to say 
that the original idea – be it justice, equality, emancipation or communism - should be 
abandoned. Rather, failure compels us to seek new avenues and solutions capable of 
realising the idea. In all cases, the task, Blanqui reasons, is not to deny or retreat from 
the social conflict but to recognise and confront it head on through political, through 
revolutionary, struggle. This is indeed one of central messages of the letter to 
Maillard: to be a socialist is to be a revolutionary, and vice versa. Not all socialists 
were so, of course. The likes of Louis Blanc, Ledru-Rollin and those prominent 
figures in the provisional government of 1848, not to mention the ‘utopian’ socialists, 
were, in Blanqui’s eyes, ‘socialistes pacifiques, gens de cabinet … dépaysés au milieu 
des armes et du tumulte’; evading the question of how to actually overthrow the old 
order and make revolution - and in some cases wary of doing so at all - they were 
‘révolutionnaires seulement par les idées’. Blanqui’s revolutionary socialism, by 
contrast, unifies revolutionary thought with revolutionary action; it is, in every 
respect, a ‘socialisme pratique’, as he terms it, a political praxis rooted in the 
exigencies of the practical so as to realise the possible.348 A socialist believes in 
‘l’égalité réelle entre les citoyens, le renversement de toutes les castes et de toutes les 
tyrannies’.349 How will this be realised? What will it take? Blanqui’s revolutionary 
socialism poses these inescapable political questions; it advocates the necessity of a 
determined and organised insurgent force, of the seizure of power and of the 
overpowering of the enemy in the realisation of this egalitarian principle. Any !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
348 For Bensaïd and Löwy ‘Blanqui displays a robustly practical understanding of the possible’ 
(‘Auguste Blanqui, heretical communist’, p. 32). See also Trotsky’s description of Blanqui’s ‘military 
revolutionary realism’ in ‘The History of the Russian Revolution. Volume Three: The Triumph of the 
Soviets’, ch. 43 <https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1930/hrr/ch43.htm> 
349 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, MA, pp. 179, 185. 
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deviation from these practical imperatives, any failure to confront the question of 
political power would forever hold the same outcome, defeat, in all its consequences: 
violent repression at first, poverty and suffering forever.350 
One question that has been lingering since the earlier discussion of the state 
concerns the pertinence of this conception of power today. For Blanqui the 
government, the state, organises and determines all facets of social relations, from 
popular consciousness and morality to material well-being, hence the belief that 
seizing state power is the prerequisite to social change.351 In light of the work of 
Gramsci and of Michel Foucault further still, many would dismiss Blanqui’s views as 
reductive and limited, at once conforming to and anticipating the anachronistic 
Jacobin-Leninist stato-centric view of power. There is a certain amount of truth to 
this. Nonetheless, one cannot deny that established power today remains no less of a 
consciously-organised actor deliberately deploying strategies – which themselves 
need not necessarily use physical force nor direct personal agency, debt being one 
such example – to coerce and control. Attempts to re-think emancipatory politics 
cannot overlook the role of the state, both uni- and multilaterally, as the unifying site 
of these mechanisms of power, purposefully advancing the specific interests it 
represents and defends, consciously constructing and organising social relations. 
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350 Blanqui, ‘Avis au peuple’, MA, p. 167. 
351 Governments, Blanqui writes, ‘sont responsables de tout, de l’ignorance, de la misère, de la 
perversion des idées et des mœurs, de la décadence et de la ruine matérielle, intellectuelle et morale. Le 
pain du peuple dépend d’eux aussi bien que son honneur. … La question de gouvernement est une 
question de vie ou de mort.’ This position also explains Blanqui’s rejection of cooperatives, as he 
continues: ‘Rien ne serait plus funeste que de détruire cette vérité dans l'esprit des masses et de leur 
persuader que leur bien-être matériel n’est pas de la compétence de l’État. C’est ce qu’a tenté la 
coopération, soufflée par l’économie politique du laissez-passer et du laissez-faire, qui veut, paraît-il, 
qu’on passe et qu’on fasse, alors même qu’il n’est permis ni de faire, ni de passer. Elle a essayé de 
convaincre les prolétaires qu'il serait facile de marcher, pieds et mains liés. L’illusion ne sera pas 




Blanqui’s is a politics of conviction over calculation. Alongside the rejection of any 
juste milieu on the grounds that the rhetoric of neutrality, the denial of passion or self-
interest is the mask that conceals the face of the continued material impoverishment 
and disenfranchisement of the poor, Blanqui also rejects the politics of expediency for 
the politics of principles. In this final section, I will consider the content of these 
principles and how this links to the (more formal) concerns discussed above. 
 
Equality and justice 
Blanqui defines equality first against inequality and second as a historical, indeed 
eternal struggle that continues from generation to generation. France may lead the 
way, but the march towards the triumph of absolute equality continues across 
countries.352 It is a battle between ‘le privilège et l’égalité’; these are, Blanqui 
believes, ‘les deux principes qui se disputent la France dès son berceau’.353 Blanqui 
traces a centuries-long battle between privilege and equality, highlighting the multiple 
struggles against feudal tyranny, ignorance and oppression.354 Adopting different 
guises over time and across the world, the fundamental conflict between privilege and 
equality has always existed: as long as a social system founded on property and 
exploitation reproduces itself, the struggle for equality remains just as constant.355 In 
doing so, Blanqui outlines a view of politics as a moral and historical project that 
transcends the constraints of ‘official’ politics in its aim to realise the emancipation of 
the French people. These writings certainly do not lack breadth and ambition. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
352 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, pp. 125-126.!!
353 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, pp. 109, 112.  
354 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 111. 
355 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, p. 118. 
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Blanqui’s concern with the practical problems of the present is understood in relation 
to a much wider historical struggle over the fundamental structures of society. In 
many ways Blanqui sees himself as the contemporary agent of a struggle that 
transcends the temporal and geographical boundaries to which his thought is often 
reduced and confined.  
‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’.356 This declaration – the title of an article from 
Le Libérateur - heralds the arrival of the core, animating principle, alongside justice, 
of Blanqui’s politics. The tripartite motto of ‘Liberté ! bien-être ! dignité extérieure 
!’357 expressed in the defense speech two years earlier has now been subsumed by one 
sole idea. Against mere equality before the law or equality of opportunity, Blanqui 
stands for ‘l’égalité réelle entre les citoyens, le renversement de toutes les castes et de 
toutes les tyrannies.’358 Equality, for Blanqui, means the end of all forms of 
exploitation of man by man - that is, in the first instance, the end of individual 
property ownership, understood as the origin of all other forms of exploitation.359 
Equality unifies humanity and ends egoism, suffering, exploitation, the usurpation of 
rights and the enforcement of autocratic rule, all of which are not only profoundly 
harmful and destructive but also utterly irrational – hence equality is not only 
‘possible’ but ‘nécessaire’.360 Equality means ‘le principe d’ordre et de justice 
éternelle’. The highest expression of enlightened thought, equality establishes unity, 
fraternity and ‘le bien-être de tous’ on earth, bringing an end to ‘la distinction des 
privilégiés et des prolétaires’, which itself represents ‘le plus grand service qu’elle 
rendra à l’humanité.’ Put simply: ‘Egalité, droit commun, ces deux mots résument 
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356 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 107. 
357 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au process des Quinze’, MA, p. 76. 
358 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, MA, p. 179.!
359 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, p. 117.  
360 Blanqui, ‘Propagande Démocratique’, OI, p. 314. 
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tous nos projets d’améliorations et de réforme sociale.’361 Inequality denotes 
ignorance, deceit, hatred, isolation, expropriation, disorder, destruction and violence; 
absolute equality signifies, in intentionally broad terms, the antithesis of all these 
values.362 Where egoism and competition, hatred and isolation, war and destruction, 
idleness and exploitation once reigned, unity and fraternity, association and collective 
well being, enlightenment and work would emerge.363 Equality and justice are thus 
employed largely interchangeably. If justice is the universality of ‘l’unité de droits et 
de devoirs’, equality and solidarity are accordingly sometimes described as the 
meaning of justice,364 itself the ultimate arbiter of social relations. Elsewhere, as we 
have seen above and will see again below, equality is the overarching principle 
through which justice derives its meaning.  
In more concrete terms, equality and justice could not be achieved through 
equal land redistribution, Blanqui insists, for this would merely recreate individual 
ownership of the ‘instruments de travail’ with which major estates and social 
inequality would promptly return. Individualism would only be overcome by 
collective ownership of the land and the ‘instruments de travail’ – that is, through 
association.365 ‘Le communisme n’est que le terme (final) dernier de l’association.’366 
Beyond holding up the idea of association or communism, no further insights are 
offered into the functioning of such a system – again, an intentional decision on 
Blanqui’s part as he renounces any capacity to prescribe the ends of an emancipatory 
process. A passage from the first volume of Critique Sociale provides a useful 
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361 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 110; ‘Tout l’espoir des prolétaires est dans la 
République’, January 1834, OI, p. 255.!
362 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, pp. 109-110. 
363 See, for example, ‘Formulaire de reception de la Société des Familles’, July-August 1834, OI, p. 
300. 
364 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 274 [n.d.].!
365 See Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, pp. 116, 126.  
366 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 59 [15 March 1869]. 
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overview of this relationship between first principles and socio-political 
arrangements. ‘Sous le régime communautaire,’ writes Blanqui, ‘le bien profite à tout 
le monde et le mal ne profite à personne. Les bonnes récoltes sont une bénédiction, les 
mauvaises une calamité. Nul ne bénéficie de ce qui nuit aux autres et ne souffre de ce 
qui leur est utile. Toutes choses se règlent selon la justice et la raison.’367 Just as we 
saw regarding Blanqui’s critique of property, the point is not to strictly define equality 
and justice so much as maintain them as guiding principles in the realisation and 
eventual organisation of social arrangements. The revolution, Blanqui thus explains, 
‘doit se faire au profit du travail contre la tyrannie du capital et reconstituer la société 
sur la base de la justice.’368  
 
The struggle over meaning 
The relationship between equality and freedom is a problematic yet politically 
significant issue worth considering. In the first instance Blanqui is more or less clear: 
‘La démocratie avec le principe d’autorité, c’est le régime asiatique, l’égalité des 
esclaves. La démocratie avec la liberté, c’est l’idée moderne, l’égalité des 
citoyens.’369 Until 1848 the evocation of such terms or indeed of the tripartite 
republican motto remain largely unqualified in Blanqui’s writings. As the events of 
1848 unfolded and particularly by the late 1860s, however, the extent to which words 
like ‘democracy’ and particularly ‘freedom’ had become ‘le drapeau de la contre-
révolution toute entière’ increasingly drew Blanqui’s attention. He observes how a 
notion of freedom – conceived in the liberal sense as the absence of interference – is 
ultimately invoked as nothing more than a justification for the oppression and 
exploitation of one individual or group by another, accompanied by the belief in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
367 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 175. 
368 Blanqui, ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, 1868, MA, p. 257.!
369 Blanqui MSS 9586, fo 403 [n.d.].  
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equality before the law as the only possible form of equality.370 Blanqui, by contrast, 
not only conceives freedom in terms of the emancipation from oppression and 
exploitation - deprived of their ‘instruments de travail’ and therefore at the mercy of 
those who do own them, man is not free - but also insists that freedom and equality 
are indivisible. ‘Il ne peut pas y avoir, il n’y a pas d’égalité sans liberté. L’Egalité 
seule peut établir et conserver la liberté.’371 Where inequality persists freedom does 
not exist. The end of exploitation alone could ensure the end of domination, and vice 
versa. But under no circumstances could freedom be deprived of equality as its 
essential qualification. Appeals to freedom in the name of cupidity and egoism strip it 
of its ‘real’ meaning and deceive the people, Blanqui believes. Those, like himself, 
who uphold freedom in its ‘real’ sense - in so doing demarcating the parameters of 
their specific political space and its distance from the nefarious forces of opportunistic 
manipulation - are left with no choice: ‘Rayons ce mot de notre dictionnaire. … 
L’Egalité, voilà notre devise. Elle renferme tout. … Aussi jamais l’ennemi ne 
prononce ce nom d’Egalité. Il lui est odieux.’372  
 As with the question of the relationship between political form and social 
content, Blanqui’s concern for the reactionary appropriation of once progressive 
notions is again timely in the eyes of the contemporary reader. Take recent debates on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
370 ‘Liberté !’ Ce mot est aujourd’hui la drapeau de la contre-révolution toute entière. Nous disons : 
« ce mot », parque ce n’est plus qu’un mot, mot perfide est menteur, mot de tromperie et de trahison. 
Quelle est la devise des Jésuites ? – La Liberté. – des aristocrates ? La Liberté - de l’exploitation ? La 
liberté. La liberté, pour les prêtres, c’est, comme ils disent, la liberté du bien, la liberté de bruler les 
libres penseurs, la liberté de l’inquisition. Pour les aristocrates, c’est la suprématie de ce qu’on appelle 
les grandes existences, la liberté d’avoir les esclaves. Bancel s’écrie. « Sans la liberté, point d’Egalité ! 
ou plutôt l’Egalité dans la servitude ! » L’égalité dans la servitude ! Les pauvres seuls la connaissent, 
ils n’en connaissent même point d’autre. Disons bien haut : «  sans l’Egalité, point d’autre liberté que 
celle de l’oppression. « Très bien » réplique l’aristocrate, « l’Egalité devant la loi. Car, elle seule est 
possible. » L’Egalité devant la loi ! il faut beaucoup d’audace pour affirmer encore cet odieux 
mensonge en présence de la réalité’ (Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 63-64 [1869]).  
371 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 171 [14 July 1869]. Cf. ‘L’Egalité est la limite de la Liberté’ (Blanqui 
MSS 9592(3), fo. 71 [15 Novembre 1869]). 
372 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 171 [14 July 1869]; cf. ‘Liberté ! L’égalité ! Fraternité ! Voilà qui est 
bien, qui est sublime. C’est clair, net et surtout laconique. Cette formule résume l’avenir de 
l’humanité ; c’est la notre’ (Blanqui MSS 9587, fo. 204 [n.d.]).  
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the continued relevance of the word democracy. If at times Badiou voices skepticism 
as to whether the word can be salvaged from its contemporary reactionary usage,373 
on other occasions he is unequivocal: ‘The enemy today is not called Empire or 
Capital. It is called Democracy.’374 Blanqui’s anticipation of this point is emphatic. 
‘Quelque sinistre escobarderie, embusquée derrière une définition. L’oligarchie ne 
s’intitule-t-elle pas démocratie … ?’375 Whether ‘duty’ and ‘virtue’ or ‘freedom’ and 
‘democracy’, in all cases the same logic is at work applies: ‘Aujourd’hui chaque mot 
signifie des choses toutes différentes et diamétralement contraires.’376 ‘Laissons ce 
mot’, he therefore concludes with regard to ‘democracy’. ‘Il est déshonoré, depuis que 
les suppôts de la servitude dans les deux mondes l’ont pris pour enseigne. C’est leur 
tactique de tromper le peuple en s’affublant de notre livrée. Ruse de l’ennemi qui 
endosse l’uniforme des assiégés pour se glisser dans la place.’377 As we have just 
seen, freedom is likewise a ‘mot volé par les oppresseurs pour déguiser la tyrannie.’ 
In Blanqui’s view any word, however cherished, appropriated and altered in meaning 
by the enemy so as to serve as an instrument of deception and oppression must be 
abandoned.378  
No less than one hundred and fifty years apart, in both cases the same question 
nonetheless presents itself: when oligarchy operates under the banner of democracy 
and egoist greed is celebrated in the name of freedom, should we follow Blanqui and 
Badiou in abandoning these terms? Just as both Blanqui and Badiou alike insist on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
373 Badiou, ‘The Idea of Communism’, p. 9, n.10. 
374 Badiou cited in Jason Barker, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in Alain Badiou, Metapolitics, trans. 
Jason Barker (London: Verso, 2005), p. xxviii. 
375 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 188. 
376 Blanqui MSS 9587, fo. 359 [January 1862]. !
377 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 277 [December 1862]. !
378 Blanqui explains: ‘Il faut rejeter tous les mots qu’ils nous prennent pour les travestis, et en faire des 
instruments d’iniquité. […] Il ne faut pas prendre à l’ennemi ses mots. Il faut même lui abandonner les 
autres, quand il s’en emparer, même nos (les) mots qui nous furent les plus chers, celui de liberté. Il a 
changé de sens. Liberté, dans la bouche des Chrétiens, signifie liberté de l’inquisition ; dans la bouche 
des aristocrates, liberté veut dire liberté des grandes existences, liberté de l’exploitation, liberté d’avoir 
des esclaves’ (Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 171 [14 July 1869]). 
! 129!
retaining the true meaning of an equally disputed notion like communism,379 do 
democracy as the rule of the people and freedom as the collective transcendence of 
domination not also have enduring meanings worth salvaging? Commenting on this 
problem of ‘central concepts of our political vocabulary’ having been ‘so corrupted 
that they are almost unusable’, Michael Hardt offers a perceptive response. ‘We could 
abandon these terms and invent new ones,’ writes Hardt, ‘but we would leave behind 
the long history of struggles, dreams and aspirations that are tied to them. I think it is 
better to fight over the concepts themselves in order to restore or renew their 
meaning.’380 Commitment to first principles, then as now, must surely extend to this 
task. To disavow such concepts for the sake of maintaining at all costs their original 
meaning or their divisive function at a formal level (as we shall see in Chapter 3) is to 
concede victory to the usurpers, surrendering to their hegemonic triumphs; it is to 
willingly abandon the terrain on which the struggle for principles that define what is 
politically possible, if not what defines politics as such,381 is won or lost. ‘Liberté ! 
Egalité ! Fraternité ! Cette devise qui brille au fronton de nos édifices, ne doit pas être 
une vaine décoration d’opéra’, Blanqui’s own club wrote in 1848. A politics of 
principles is undoubtedly at its most forceful when engaging in this struggle over 
meaning and thereby opening up the space for the division, choice and commitment it 
itself prescribes. As the club’s proclamation continues: ‘Il n’y a pas liberté quand on 
manque de pain. Il n’y a pas égalité, quand l’opulence fait scandale, à coté de la !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
379 On the meaning of the word communism for Blanqui, see ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société, 
CSI, p. 210. For Badiou, see The Meaning of Sarkozy, trans. David Fernbach (London: Verso, 2008). 
380 Michael Hardt, ‘The Common in Communism’, in The Idea of Communism, p. 131. The same could 
be said for historical figures – the Suffragettes, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela… - who have 
been appropriated by the established order and divorced from their radical politics in the process. 
Hardt’s own work on Thomas Jefferson serves as a good example of rediscovering the figures and 
ideas behind the officially sanctioned representation.  
381 As Rancière states: ‘Being fought over is what makes a political notion properly political as I see it, 
not the fact that it has multiple meanings. The political struggle is also the struggle for the 
appropriation of words’ (Jacques Rancière, ‘Democracies Against Democracy: An interview with Éric 
Hazan’, in Democracy in what state? [Columbia University Press: New York, 2010], p. 78). 
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misère. Il n’y a pas fraternité, quand l’ouvrière avec ses enfants affamés, se traine aux 
portes de palais.’382 Blanqui fails to follow the logic of his own position to the end, 
seemingly abandoning a crucial question he himself once appears to pose: what do we 
mean by genuine freedom, equality and fraternity? Make your decision, choose your 
side.  
 
Writing in the wake of the bloodshed that tore through Paris during the semaine 
sanglante, Marx concludes that ‘there can be neither peace nor truce possible between 
the working men of France and the appropriators of their produce.’383 Perhaps taking 
his lead from Marx, Walter Benjamin suggests that ‘the Commune puts an end to the 
phantasmagoria holding sway over the early years of the proletariat. It dispels the 
illusion that the task of the proletarian revolution is to complete the work of 1789 
hand in hand with the bourgeoisie. This illusion dominates the period 1831-1871, 
from the Lyons uprising to the Commune.’384 Reworking Benjamin’s formulation, 
Éric Hazan pushes back the shattering of the ‘illusion’ to the 1848 June Days, adding 
that ‘c’est pourquoi, à la différence de juillet 1830 et de février 1848, les journées de 
Juin ne font pas partie des images d’Épinal de l’histoire républicaine. Car l’illusion de 
« la main dans la main », la bourgeoisie cherche de tout temps à l’entretenir. Le 
maintien de l’ordre est à ce prix, aujourd’hui comme autrefois.’385 If, however, as 
Benjamin goes on to say, the ‘bourgeoisie never shared in this error’, for its ‘battle 
against the social rights of the proletariat dates back to the great Revolution’, before !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
382 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 95 [22 March 1848]. 
383 Marx, The Civil War in France, p. 90. Marx and Engels had acknowledged, however, in 1848 that 
‘[i]n depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the more or less 
veiled civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open 
revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the 
proletariat’ (Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 49). It seems Marx was forced to return to 
this earlier assumption in the wake of the Commune. !
384 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, pp. 12-13.  
385 Éric Hazan, Paris Sous Tension (Paris: La Fabrique éditions, 2011), p. 64.  
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May 1871, before June 1848, Blanqui never shared in these phantasmagorias, 
illusions and errors either. Blanqui’s battle for the social rights of the proletariat dates 
back to his great revolution, July 1830. Blanqui’s experience of July and its aftermath 
rendered any semblance of compromise, conciliation and neutrality obsolete to the 
point that their continued propagation was a dangerous, deceitful instrument wielded 
by the forces of oppression. Conflict in fact, conflict in principle, is the only maxim to 
which a revolutionary should subscribe. From this basic assumption Blanqui lays the 
groundwork for an understanding of the decisive action popular power will 
necessarily demand, the obstacles it will necessarily face, the subjective resources it 
will necessarily require. In other words, it underpins his entire political project. The 
role this also plays in informing his conception of the people and the proletariat is 













Chapter 3 - The People and the Proletariat  
‘La société se compose de riches et de pauvres, de puissants et de faibles, 
d’exploiteurs et d’exploités. Il faut choisir entre ces deux catégories. Qui pourrait 
hésiter ? Les supprimer toutes deux, c’est le véritable progrès à poursuivre.’386 
  







- Votre état ? 
- Prolétaire.  
- Ce n’est pas là un état.  
- Comment, ce n’est pas un état ! C’est l’état de 30 millions de Français qui vivent de 
leur travail et qui sont privés de droits politiques.388  
Ranking as one of his most memorable statements, and recently receiving renewed 
attention thanks to Jacques Rancière’s interest in the exchange,389 Blanqui’s forceful 
reply to the judge at the opening hearings of the Procès des Quinze in January 1832 
not only contains all the audacity, provocation and combativeness that would continue 
to define his life and thought.390 Blanqui’s self-identification as and with the 
proletariat also announces the question of agency that plays such a crucial, and by 
equal measure often contentious, role in his politics.  
For a political project built on the basic assumption that historical change only 
occurs through conscious and deliberate human action, that humans are capable of 
shaping their own destiny through what they know and do, the question of political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
386 Blanqui, ‘L’impot progressif’, 1867, CSII, p. 39. 
387 Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 71 [n.d.].!
388 Société des Amis du Peuple, Procès des Quinze (Paris: Imprimerie de Auguste Mie, 1832), p. 3.!!
389 See Jacques Rancière, La Mésentente (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1995), pp. 61-64; Aux bords du 
politique (Paris: Gallimard, 2004), pp. 118-119. Here and below, because of the particularly neologistic 
nature of Rancière’s terminology I have decided to refer to and quote in the original French. 
390 The speech could certainly be placed in the canon of politically radical defence speeches, alongside 
the likes of Fidel Castro’s ‘History will absolve me’ (1953) and Nelson Mandela’s ‘I am prepared to 
die’ (1964).  
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agency indeed logically follows. We have seen that Blanqui conceives politics as an 
irreconcilable struggle of interests and ideals. The resulting understanding of society 
as divided into oppressor and oppressed, exploiters and exploited, paves the way for a 
conception of the proletariat as a means of identifying and identifying with the 
exploited and their exclusion. So who or what is this group with whose interests and 
ideals Blanqui emphatically aligns? Is there, for Blanqui, a universal subject of 
history? How and when is this subject, this actor, this class, constituted? Does an 
oppressed class bring about the dissolution of class? Does one actor’s own 
emancipation herald the emancipation of all? And how and when can or will this 
occur?  
This chapter explores perhaps the most significant implication of the 
preceding chapter - that is, the people or the proletariat as a political notion and 
function of Blanqui’s politics of conflict and commitment. I will begin with a general 
outline of the central features of Blanqui’s proletariat before engaging with its 
reception, showing how and why the majority of previous accounts are, in my 
opinion, flawed and misleading. Together with Rousseau, I suggest that reading 
Blanqui, the so-called ‘pre-Marxist’, with and through two of the foremost ‘post-
Marxist’ political theorists, Ernesto Laclau and Jacques Rancière, can in certain ways 
help us arrive at an understanding of the meaning his ‘proletariat’. That is not to say 
that Marx is a redundant point of reference; though certain key differences remain, in 
some interesting and useful respects Blanqui and Marx’s conceptions of the political 





A political actor 
Two classes  
As we saw in Chapter 2, driven from the land and production the people are the 
majority of the population forced to provide for – and those exploited by – the 
wealthy minority of idle, parasitic usurpers who do not themselves contribute towards 
production yet exclusively own its means of production and exclusively benefit from 
its fruits.391 ‘Le peuple est l’ensemble des citoyens qui travaillent’; the people names 
‘la classe pauvre et laborieuse’.392 In turn, this group has no representatives in power 
to defend its rights and interests.393 Non-representation and non-recognition at the 
level of state and government have further consequences. ‘Nos lois actuelles sont 
toutes en faveur des riches,’ Blanqui argues, ‘et il ne pourrait en être autrement avec 
notre organisation politique ; nos législateurs ont en vue leurs intérêts, et ils sont 
riches ; ils ont en vue les intérêts de leurs commettants, et leur commettants sont 
riches’394 Designating, then, the thirty million French men and women who live from 
their labour and are ‘privé[s] de tous les droits de la cité’,395 the proletariat is outside 
of the socio-political order; it is defined by its exclusion. In a system that ‘concentre 
les trois pouvoirs [législatif, judiciare et exécutif] entre les mains d’un petit nombre 
de privilégiés unis par les mêmes intérêts’, thereby constituting ‘la plus monstrueuse 
des tyrannies’, the result is that ‘le prolétaire est resté en dehors.’396 The proletariat is 
those who have no right to education, whose voice and interests are simply 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
391 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appertenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, 2 February 1834, MA, pp. 116-
118; Blanqui, ‘Qui fait la soupe doit la manger’, March 1834, OI, p. 291. See also Blanqui, 
‘L’aristocratie et le peuple’, 23 July 1831, OI, p. 167.  
392 Blanqui, ‘Formulaire de réception de la Société des Familles’, July-August 1834, OI, p. 299; 
Blanqui, ‘De la législation’, 18 August 1831, OI, p. 170.!
393 Blanqui, ‘De la législation’, OI, p. 170. 
394 Ibid., p. 170. 
395 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, 12 January 1832, MA, p. 63. 
396 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
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unrecognised by the government, the legal system and the press.397 As Blanqui later 
reaffirms in the pages of the Critique Sociale, the established order is comprised of  
‘deux catégories’: ‘de privilégiés et de parias’.398  
Immediately we are struck by at least two points. First, we see that Blanqui’s 
subject is an extremely wide and flexible, to not say a vague and imprecise, 
construction, employing catch-all terms to designate, in the broadest possible sense, 
the under-privileged many as distinct from the privileged few. ‘Classe’, where it 
appears, is not routed in a specific social or economic position but denotes an 
approximate set or category of common properties or attributes – labour, 
impoverishment, disempowerment. Second, and directly following the first point, ‘le 
prolétaire’ and ‘le peuple’, along with ‘le multitude’, ‘les pauvres’, ‘les masses’, ‘les 
plébéiens’ and ‘les opprimés’ are employed as interchangeable synonyms, to the 
extent that Blanqui will switch between the terms in the course of a few lines.399 
Hereafter I will therefore do likewise. (We shall return to the import and 
consequences of these two characteristics below.)  
An article from the Journal des Débats from 8 December 1831 gained 
notoriety for suggesting that the canut revolt in Lyon had revealed ‘un grave secret, 
celui de la lutte intestine qui a lieu dans la société entre la classe qui possède et celle 
qui ne possède pas.’ The author, Saint-Marc Girardin, continues: ‘Les barbares qui 
menacent la société ne sont point au Caucase, ni dans les steppes de la Tartarie ; ils 
sont dans les faubourgs de nos villes manufacturières. … C’est là où est le danger de 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
397 See Blanqui and Hadot-Desages, ‘Propagande Démocratique’, 1835, OI, p. 314; Blanqui, 
‘Formulaire de réception à la Société des Saisons’, 1837, OI, p. 382. 
398 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, 1869-70, CSI, p. 189. 
399 See for example, Blanqui, ‘Loi qui interdit au peuple la faculté de lire’, 2 February 1834, OI, p. 273; 
Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, pp. 76-77. 
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la société moderne ; c’est de là que peuvent sortir les barbares qui la détruiront.’400 
The article seemed to articulate what many on the both sides of the political spectrum 
were thinking: not only the existence of a society split into two groups – the 
proletariat and the privileged401 - but that the former were debased and depraved feral 
animals with ‘appétits de brute’ who were indeed doomed to a ‘vie de brute’, as 
Blanqui subsequently declared.402  
Another significant point of reference in Blanqui’s thinking here is Roman 
history. The people are the modern day plebe; the proletariat of Rome is the 
proletariat of Orléanist France. The defence speech, for instance, speaks of ‘le 
drapeau plébéien de 1830’.403 A text thought to be written just prior to the first edition 
of Le Libérateur in 1834 directly addresses the lineage between the proletariat of 
ancient Rome and the nineteenth-century usage of the term to designate ‘l’immense 
majorité des Français.’404 Responding to the reproach that under a regime in which all 
are equal before the law allusion to the Roman proletariat is an anachronistic 
misnomer, the text asserts that the condition of the proletariat of Rome - whose 
triumphs on the battlefield were only for the benefit of the patricians; who in return 
for completing the most grueling public works received nothing but hatred and ill 
treatment from the aristocracy; who were granted no political rights in return for their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
400 Journal des Débats, Thursday 8 December 1831, p. 1. The author later commented on the affair in 
his memoires: ‘Je fus très-frappé [sic] du caractère nouveau de cette insurrection, et, en cherchant à la 
définir, je comparai ces ouvriers qui cherchaient à se faire place dans notre société aux barbares qui 
avaient autrefois envahi l’empire romain et qui sont devenus la souche des peuple modernes. Il n’y 
avait, dans cette comparaison, ni haine ni injure. Mais ce mot de barbares fut pris comme une 
expression de dédain ; de là, dans la plupart des journaux, une explosion d’indignation contre 
l’insolence du Journal des Débats’ (Saint-Marc Girardin, Souvenirs et réflexions politiques d’un 
journalise [Paris: Michel-Lévy frères, 1859], pp. 143-144).! 
401 ‘La société est partagée en deux classes, les prolétaires et les hommes de la propriété ; voilà ce 
qu’on ne cesse de répéter aujourd’hui’ (L’écho de la fabrique, Sunday 29 April 1832, p. 1).  
402 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, p. 75; Blanqui, ‘La richesse 
sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, p. 121. !
403 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, p. 76.  
404 ‘Tout l’espoir des prolétaries est dans la République’, January 1834, OI, p. 253. Though the text 
cannot be conclusively attributed to Blanqui and must be approached with this in mind, it nonetheless 
contains ideas formulated in his immediate intellectual environment, shedding light on this issue from 
his perspective, broadly speaking. See OI, p. 253n for information on the text.  
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service to the country; who were quite simply ‘rayés de la liste des hommes, et 
ravalés au niveau de la brute’ - is precisely the condition of the workers and peasants 
in Orléanist France. The proletariat of both ancient Rome and nineteenth-century 
France, the texts states, in terms interestingly reprised verbatim by Marx and Engels 
in The German Ideology, ‘supportent toutes les charges de la société, sans jouir 
d’aucun de ses avantages.’405 It is the proletariat who built society only to be excluded 
from it. It is the proletariat who is dehumanized to the point of having its humanity 
denied altogether. It is the proletariat who the self-appointed guardians of ‘la 
civilisation’ considered as ‘barbares’ (the text cites the Journal des Débats article).406 
The politics of Rome could indeed be transposed to contemporary political groups, 
interests and struggles, Blanqui again contends in 1855: ‘nous ne représentons ni les 
patriciens ni les prétoriens. Nous sommes leur ennemi commun, le peuple des 
catacombes, creusant sous leur pas le tombeau qui doit tous les engloutir.’407 
Blanqui’s project is aligned with the common people, with the invisible and 
anonymous workers, and their timeless struggle, from ancient Rome to modern 
France, for freedom and equality. Blanqui evokes and applies the same terms to what 
is in essence the contemporary manifestation of the same struggle of labour against 
capital with the same two adversaries, proletarians against patricians, that has defined 
history since ancient Rome.408  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
405 Ibid., p. 253; Marx and Engels cited in Michael Löwy, The Theory of Revolution in the Young Marx 
(Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005), p. 113.!
406 Ibid., pp. 254-255. Cf. Past struggles between ‘Patriciat et Prolétariat … sur la question politique et 
sociale’ correspond to ‘la situation du travailleur européen’ (Blanqui, ‘L’usure’, n.d., CSI, p. 47-48).  
407 Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 370-371 [September 1855]. 
408 For Blanqui all facets of the plutocratic Second Empire, in which ‘[l]es ouvriers soumis à un joug de 
fer, sans liberté de parole ni d’action, surveillés par des yeux d’argus, expulsés au moindre symptôme 
d’indépendance politique, à la moindre révélation d’une pensée libre’, in which ‘le pauvre, impuissante 
complète de ouvrir la bouche et écrasement sous les pieds du Riche’, amount to a ‘démagogie 
Césarienne’ (Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 151-152 [27 February 1869]). 
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In short, the proletariat, Blanqui believes, is seen as having no right to exist, 
no right to live.409 This helps to explain the assertion that the people are those treated 
as slaves by the law,410 for to be outside is to be nothing: ‘Le peuple … n’est rien, ne 
compte pour rien.’411 So begins a cycle of political exclusion and material suffering. 
Under Louis-Philippe’s ‘gouvernement des riches … [l]e sort du prolétaire est 
semblable à celui du serf et du nègre, sa vie n’est qu’un long tissu de misères, de 
fatigues et de souffrances.’412 We see that the proletariat is, in humanist terms, those 
who are the subject of grave injustice. In 1831 Blanqui therefore spoke of ‘l’existence 
de deux classes d’hommes bien distinctes, de deux grandes catégories sociales … 
d’un côté les douceurs de l’abondance, les avantages de la civilisation et tous les 
privilèges de l’oisiveté ; de l’autre les horreurs de la misère, les maux de l’ignorance 





409 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, p. 62; Blanqui, ‘Formulaire de 
réception à la Société des Saisons’, OI, p. 382.  
410 Blanqui, ‘Formulaire de réception de la Société des Familles’, OI, p. 299. 
411 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du Peuple’, 2 February 1832, MA, p. 93.!
412 Blanqui, ‘Formulaire de réception de la Société des Familles’, OI, p. 299.  
413 Blanqui, ‘L’aristocratie et le peuple’, OI, p. 167. It is worth recalling that Blanqui’s proletariat is 
generally consistent with the intellectual context of its genesis. ‘Before Marx,’ Peter Stallybrass notes, 
‘proletarian was one of the central signifiers of the passive spectacle of poverty. In England, Dr 
Johnson had defined proletarian in his Dictionary (1755) as “mean; wretched; vile; vulgar”’. ‘In this 
sense,’ adds Laclau in light of this citation, ‘the term “proletariat” is part of a whole terminological 
universe which designates the poor, but a poor outside any stable social ascription’ (Ernesto Laclau, On 
Populist Reason [London: Verso, 2005] p. 143). Though, as we shall see, Blanqui will insist – to a far 
greater degree than Laclau - on the necessity of transforming poverty from a passive social spectacle to 
an active political force, his proletariat is broadly in line with this long intellectual tradition that sought 
to name the nameless, non-existent ‘scum’ of society, and affirm their common political agency. 
Blanqui directly identifies the ‘canailles’, ‘la populace’ (Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du 
Peuple’, MA, p. 88; Blanqui, ‘Adresse au gouvernement provisoire’, 20 April 1848, MA, p. 139; 
Blanqui, ‘Les massacres de Rouen. La Société républicaine centrale au gouvernement provisoire’, 2 
May 1848, MA, p. 142; Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, 6 June 1852, MA, p. 186), those vehemently 
despised by and excluded from the established order with the struggle of the people. Cf. Louis 
Chevalier, Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses (Paris: Editions Perrin, 2007), pp. 457-458.!
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France and Paris 
Three further points should be established here. First, in stark contrast to the 
cowardice, corruption and egoism of the bourgeoisie,414 Blanqui depicts the people as 
the true representative of French society. Bourgeois egoism had no concern for France 
and would soon sell it down the river in favour of personal gain, as occurred after 
1830.415 In Blanqui’s analysis it is not the working men who have no country, as 
Marx and Engels would later declare, but the commercial middle classes; the centre of 
finance capital, the Bourse, serves as the capital of the bourgeoisie.416 The people 
therefore embody the nation. The destiny of the nation is inextricably linked to the 
cause and interests of the people. Moreover, though major revolutions and uprising 
may occur elsewhere – and such events should be actively celebrated and supported – 
France alone remains the true beacon of revolution. The foremost agent, the primary 
battlefield and combatants of revolutionary politics are found in France; the destiny of 
the continent as a whole is determined, in the last instance, by the political struggles 
in France, the microcosm and vanguard of European politics. Since the causes of ‘le 
peuple’ and ‘la nation’ went hand in hand Blanqui’s position is therefore a double 
bind: to serve the nation is to serve the oppressed, to serve the oppressed is to serve 
the nation.  
Does the nation-state mark the limit of Blanqui’s conception of the people? At 
times a register of internationalist solidarity against a common adversary would 
suggest not. ‘Les travailleurs de toutes les nations sont frères, et ils n’ont qu’un seul !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
414 See Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du Peuple’, MA, p. 81. In the same speech Blanqui’s 
scorn of bourgeois cowardice is also seen in his description of their state of ‘une telle épouvante … une 
si profonde consternation’ during the Trois Glorieuses, when ‘pâles’, ‘éperdus’, their ‘peur’ and 
‘lâcheté’ (p. 84) meant that they only reappeared once the fighting – carried out by the people - had 
finished (p. 86).  
415 Ibid., p. 95. 
416 Blanqui MSS 9586, fo. 401 [n.d.]. See also Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des 
Quinze’, MA, p. 67; Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du Peuple’, MA, p. 93. Cf. Marx and 
Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 58. 
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ennemi, l’oppresseur qui les force à s’entr’égorger sur les champs de bataille’, 
concludes the Instructions pour une prise d’armes. ‘Tous, ouvriers et paysans de 
France, d’Allemagne ou d’Angleterre, d’Europe, d’Asie ou d’Amérique, tous, nous 
avons mêmes labeurs, mêmes souffrances, mêmes intérêts.’417 We discover therein a 
certain international dimension to Blanqui’s political struggle, yet overall his thought 
on this point contains a notable degree of tension. Take the Rapport from 1832. At 
one level it speaks of two, antagonistic Europes - ‘l’Europe des rois’ and ‘l’Europe 
des peuples’418 - applying the same analysis to Britain as he does to France and 
evoking an internationally interconnected struggle between the masses and the 
aristocracy.419 But it also seems to suggest that the European struggles are largely 
specific to nation-states. While forever expressing a clear interest and solidarity with 
the struggles engulfing the many corners of the continent, from Britain to Poland,420 
ultimately one cannot escape the political primacy of France within Blanqui’s project. 
The ‘people’ with which Blanqui tends to be principally concerned is the French 
people, their universality often not extending beyond the French border.421 There is no 
doubt that conceiving the people first and foremost in terms of a national body is 
important in initiating often major international political sequences, as clearly 
demonstrated if not by France itself in 1789 and 1848 but perhaps most clearly by the 
anti-colonial struggles of the twentieth century and again more recently during the 
Arab Spring. Marx and Engels are correct to argue that ‘the struggle of the proletariat !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
417 Blanqui, ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, 1868, MA, p. 291.!!
418 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du Peuple’, MA, p. 99. 
419 See the comments on the British reaction to July 1830, ibid., pp. 98-99.!
420 See, for example, Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, pp. 77-78; 
Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Lelewell’, 29 February 1832, OI, pp. 225-226.  
421 ‘Nous n’avons point d’exemples à prendre en Angleterre,’ Blanqui once claimed, ‘mais seulement 
une plèbe opprimée à y plaindre et une oligarchie sans entrailles à y détester. Pourquoi chercher des 
modèles au delà des frontières ? Nos pères, il y a 70 ans, nous ouvraient la bonne route. On s’est égaré 
on l’abandonnant. Rentrons-y. Toute autre conduit aux fondrières’ (Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 
277 [December 1862]). See also Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Degeorges’, 22 October 1844, OI, p. 630. Blanqui’s 
Germanophobia became particularly pronounced during the Franco-Prussian War.  
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with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle’,422 and Blanqui’s insistence on the 
mobilisation and empowerment of the French people is strategically astute in this 
respect. Yet what Blanqui lacks, arguably like Rousseau yet unlike Marx and Engels, 
is sufficient concern for political agency beyond the confines of the nation-state. Marx 
and Engels know that it is only after the proletariat acquires ‘political supremacy’ 
through constituting itself as ‘the leading class of the nation’ that universal 
emancipation can proceed. But the consequences of the first step are tied to and 
limited by the second; again, the experience of the twentieth century clearly 
demonstrates this point. ‘United action, of the leading civilized countries at least, is 
one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat’, the Manifesto 
states.423 We might suggest that it is with the national struggle that Blanqui is 
primarily, if not often solely, concerned. And though such thinking is perceptive, 
politically speaking, it nonetheless remains a limitation. 
Just as the French people take precedence within Europe, we must recall that 
the people of Paris take precedence within France. As we saw in Chapter 1, it is above 
all the people of Paris in whom Blanqui has confidence; Parisians are the 
revolutionary agent par excellence. The basic reason for this is worth repeating: 
Parisians are enlightened. The ‘force principale’ of the ‘ouvriers parisiens’ is their 
‘supériorité de l’intelligence et de l’adresse’.424 Free from the ignorance holding sway 
over most of the country, the people of Paris have the concentrated collective 
enlightened thought, power and material resources capable of freeing France from the 
chains of any tyranny. Blanqui consequently accords primacy to the capital as 
representative and determinate of the nation as a whole.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
422 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 49.  
423 Ibid., p. 58; emphasis added.!
424 Blanqui, ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, MA, p. 284. 
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The actor’s political action 
The final point is of particular importance since it concerns the construction, 
emergence and continued empowerment of the people as a political actor. Referring in 
1832 to the conflict between three competing groups and interests, after the 
aristocracy and the bourgeoisie Blanqui consciously places ‘le peuple en dernier’ 
because ‘il a toujours été le dernier et que je compte sur une prochaine application de 
la maxime de l’Évangile les derniers seront les premiers.’425 Such imagery 
exemplifies a view of the oppressed that echoes the well-known words of The 
Internationale, ‘we are nothing, let us be everything’.426 Blanqui’s conception of the 
people, though not an international class, nonetheless stands for those who count for 
nothing, those dismissed as capable of nothing. Revolution inverts this logic; it is the 
moment at which the people can transform from nothing to everything, proving 
themselves as capable of everything - of completely transforming the country, of 
subverting all hierarchies and established orders, of destroying all presuppositions. To 
become all or to remain nothing – this is, for Blanqui, the essence of revolutionary 
politics, as July 1830 revealed.  
A truly radical intervention, an event of immense beauty and wonder, July 
marked the rebirth of the people, Blanqui believes, demonstrating their collective 
power and capacity to make and determine their own history. Blanqui often – though 
not always – depicts revolt as the necessary condition for the emergence and creation 
of the people as a political actor. In July they subverted bourgeois rule and united 
their oppressors against them, confirming not only the existence of the political 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
425 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du Peuple’, MA, pp. 80-81. In stark contrast to his later 
vehement atheism, Blanqui readily evokes biblical imagery in some of his early writings. That is not to 
say that religion is not yet a target, however. Indeed the Rapport itself also denounces the ‘fanatisme de 
la religion’, declaring it necessary for Catholicism and legitimism to ‘mourir ensemble’ (p. 91).  
426 This phrase has generated interest recently by virtue of its evocation in the works of Badiou and 
Rancière. See Badiou, Metapolitics, p. 115. 
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conflict described above but also their agency as the true representative of French 
society.427 The people, dormant for fifteen years, finally woke again in 1830. On 
Thursday 29 July, the third consecutive day of fighting in Paris, ‘le peuple est 
vainqueur.’428 In the streets and on the barricades the last had become the first. In the 
wake of July the people ‘veut être quelque chose’.429 Revolution is, we might say, the 
actualization of a latent potential or possibility.430 In this respect, when speaking of ‘la 
force des masses’431 the term ‘force’ denotes, in Blanqui’s lexis, the collective power 
and energy of the people as an active political agent; their force is their capacity – 
realised and manifested in the act of collective revolt – to create political change. It is 
in this sense that we should distinguish between an actor and a subject. Following the 
Rousseau-Jacobin tradition,432 Blanqui employs the term ‘subject’ in the pejorative 
sense of subjection and submission to oppression. To be a subject is to be externally 
controlled and dominated; it is to be a constrained and passive involuntary object, and 
thus neither active nor self-determining. A manuscript note in which Blanqui 
classifies political vocabulary according to meaning and usage offers instructive 
clarification of this point. Blanqui first groups together synonyms of domination and 
disempowerment: ‘Force, violence, contrainte, oppression, asservissement, 
assujettissement, autorité, coaction, coercition, intolérance, joug, sujétion, tyrannie !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
427 See Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du Peuple’, MA, pp. 83-85. 
428 Ibid., p. 84.!
429 Ibid., pp. 93-94. 
430 It would be wrong to think that Blanqui exclusively insists on the necessity of insurgent force as 
redefining the possible and the thinkable. In 1879, for instance, he notes how his election by proxy in 
Bordeaux ‘révèle à l’improviste la force latente qu’on croyait disparu. Le choix d’un candidat ultra-
révolutionnaire, enterré vivant dans les prisons conservatistes, ne peut plus laisser de doute sur la 
portée de ce réveil, et de tous les points de la France un cri de joie répond au coup hardi frappé par les 
Bordelais.’ He thus speaks of ‘la joie commun du succès que la Révolution vient de remporter à 
Bordeaux. Elle n’est rien, mais l’énergique et soudain levée de ces 7000 électeurs est un événement’ 
(Blanqui MSS 9588(2), fo. 456 [11 July 1879]). Such exceptional events aside, the popular capacity to 
exercise their collective power is, during the majority of Blanqui’s lifetime, created and can only be 
sustained in revolutionary upheaval, as witnessed from 1830 through 1848 to 1871.  
431 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du Peuple’, MA, p. 85. 
432 On this point I follow Peter Hallward’s assertion that usage of the term ‘actor’ avoids the problem 
of the subject’s ‘underlying submission’. ‘Willing and able: political will and self-determination’, 
lecture given at the American University in Paris, 10 April 2015. 
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…’. These are then followed with terms for empowerment: ‘Force, pouvoir, 
puissance, faculté, virtualité, vigueur, énergie, effort, intensité’.433 What defines the 
latter from the former is the capacity to consciously act, the process of empowerment 
through determined action. Collective political action is, then, to cite Rousseau, ‘the 
act by which a people is a people’;434 it is, in other words, the act that creates the 
actor. Hereafter I will therefore recognise this distinction in privileging the notion of 
the actor over that of the subject.!
Blanqui knows that a political actor will not overcome its domination and 
disempowerment through a single, isolated act, however. It must discover ways to 
further empower and strengthen its initial action, to persist and advance through and 
beyond the rupture it itself created in order to impose its collective will and 
implement a new social order. The action required to sustain popular power is thus 
vital if the people are to truly transcend their domination. Again, for Blanqui 1830 
clearly demonstrates this fact. Once the fighting had finished the bourgeoisie 
reappeared from hiding to grasp the reins of power, reasserting its dominance over the 
people. Domination, hierarchies, prescribed places and roles all returned: ‘Chacun son 
rôle ; les hommes des ateliers s’étaient retirés, les hommes du comptoir parurent.’435 
Workers went back to the workshops and their prior state of non-existence. Most 
significantly of all the outcomes of July, ‘le peuple, qui a tout fait, reste zéro comme 
devant.’436 The revolution and the opportunity it presented - and briefly realised - was 
lost. Those who had done and had become everything returned to being nothing. In 
Blanqui’s mind this gives rise to a crucial question: why was this awakening and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
433 Blanqui MSS 9591(1), fo. 90, 92 [n.d.]. ‘Le Capital’, Blanqui explains in one example of this 
distinction, ‘veut avoir raison de l’audace de ses sujets, et en finir avec ces associations qui ont osé 
mettre une borne à sa puissance’ (Blanqui, ‘Saint-Étienne: Lutte entre les fabricants et les ouvriers’, 
December 1849, CSII, p. 228). 
434 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 54. 
435 See Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, MA, pp. 86-87.  
436 Ibid., p. 87.!!
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initial popular victory not sustained and ultimately triumphant? How could one 
account for the hijacking and betrayal of ‘notre révolution’,437 for the rupture between 
the immediate achievements and long-term possibilities of July and the realities of its 
aftermath?438 Blanqui seems to reason that true politics, revolutionary politics, is at 
once a triumphant opportunity and a perilous uncertainty. The task, therefore, is to 
conserve and secure the former in order to eliminate the latter, to remove the gap or 
distance between what is and what should have been so as to ensure that a revolution 
is indeed a revolution. It is a question that will underpin Blanqui’s entire political 
project: how to be, how to remain, victorious. Crucial to such thinking is maintaining 
a belief in the possible. In spite of the realities of Orléanist rule and the people’s 
continued marginalisation, in July ‘un fait terrible s’est accompli’, Blanqui asserts. 
‘Le peuple est entré brusquement comme un coup de tonnerre sur la scène politique 
qu’il a enlevée d’assaut et, bien que chassé presque au même instant, il n’en a pas 
moins fait acte de maître, il a repris sa démission.’439 To qualify the unexpected 
creation and emergence of the people as the primary accomplishment or ‘revelation’ 
of the revolution - July is hailed as ‘une révélation si soudaine et si redoutable de la 
force des masses’440 - displays a conviction that unanticipated outcomes should not 
invalidate revolutionary politics or the potential it holds. The promise of the end of 
bourgeois rule and the accession of popular rule may ultimately have been cruelly 
inverted, resulting in a bourgeois despotism, greater suffering for the people and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
437 Ibid., p. 94.  
438 Here are the key passages: ‘citoyens, comment se fait-il qu’une révélation si soudaine et si 
redoutable de la force des masses soit demeurée stérile ? Par quelle fatalité cette révolution, faite par le 
peuple seul et qui devait marquer la fin du règne exclusif de la bourgeoisie ainsi que l’avènement de la 
puissance populaire, n’a-t-elle eu d’autre résultat que d’établir le despotisme de la classe moyenne, 
d’aggraver la misère des ouvriers et des paysans, et de plonger la France un peu plus avant dans la boue 
? … Comment imaginer aussi que la révolution ne serait pas une révolution, que l’expulsion des 
Bourbons ne serait pas l’expulsion des Bourbons, que le renversement de la Restauration serait une 
nouvelle édition de la Restauration?’ (ibid., pp. 85, 95). 
439 Ibid., p. 87.!
440 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, MA, p. 85.!
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further national decline. But in the face of incredulity, despondency and apparent 
defeat Blanqui’s voice is one of enduring belief. That the revolution did not remain a 
revolution must not give way to disillusionment with the original act. What occurred 
in the more basic act of revolution itself is the confirmation of a possibility. That the 
last became the first, the slave became the master, the oppressed became the 
emancipated, however ephemeral such a transformation may ultimately have been, 
commands a continued confidence and an unwavering commitment to re-actualizing 
and then imposing this potential, which means discovering and harnessing the 
capacities to do so. 
‘Rien’, ‘en dehors’, ‘pauvres’, ‘souffrances’, ‘force’, ‘tout’ – we can now 
begin to piece together some of the basic defining traits of Blanqui’s actor. The 
proletariat or the people are the ordinary or common people, the anonymous masses 
without wealth, education, property or power. Born to work, to suffer, to die, the 
people have nothing, they count for nothing, they are nothing. Yet through their 
collective political action they prove themselves capable of doing and becoming 
everything. This group is not objectively constituted through its a priori inscription 
within the socio-economic structure but is above all created through the conscious act 
of political struggle. The gap between nothing and everything, between outside and 
in, can only be eliminated through sustained collective political action and the 
conditions it itself creates.  
 
Interpretations 
Before advancing my own view as to how we should conceptualise Blanqui’s use of 
these notions, it is instructive to first see how others have interpreted Blanqui’s 
proletariat, for just as the judge responded with incredulity to Blanqui’s provocative 
! 147!
use of ‘proletarian’ many others have since followed suit. Blanqui’s proletariat is 
indeed a contentious construction. The common line of criticism is that, since 
Blanqui’s understanding of the constitution of the proletariat particularly as expressed 
during the trial clearly has no bearing on the reality of contemporary socio-economic 
conditions, it is mere restatement of the eighteenth-century idea of the ‘people’, 
owing more to the ‘unsophisticated Babouvist dichotomy of “rich and poor”’ than 
representing a harbinger of the modern combatant in the class struggle of History, ‘a 
true industrial proletariat’.441 For V. P. Volguine, Blanqui’s proletariat designates ‘le 
travailleur en général’; Blanqui ascribes it ‘le même sens que les démocrates 
donnaient à la notion de « peuple », in which ‘l’opposition entre « l’aristocratie de la 
richesse et le peuple » ou bien entre « la bourgeoisie et le peuple » - a characteristic of 
contemporary social thought – attested to an ‘imprécision dans les termes’ that 
‘reflétait le niveau insuffisant du développement capitaliste en France, le non-
achèvement de l’évolution industrielle’ and leading Blanqui to confuse ‘prolétaire’ 
and ‘pauvres’. Such shortcomings are, Volguine goes on to observe, symptomatic of a 
crude analysis of capitalism in which capital is synonymous with usury (profit derives 
from the inequality of exchange), and capitalism is principally critiqued in terms of 
moral and rational judgment (capitalism is incompatible with justice and logical 
reason). It follows for Volguine that Blanqui’s ‘petit bourgeois’ analysis of 
exploitation – which is ‘profondément erronée’ and rooted in the conflation of 
‘prolétariat’ with all social groups living from their labour - is unable to understand 
the class structure of capitalist society.442  
As regards the thirty million proletarians depicted in the defence speech, 
affirming that ‘neither the term nor the number could withstand economic analysis’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
441 Roger Garaudy and Arthur Rosenberg cited in Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste 
Blanqui, p. 96. 
442 V.P. Volguine, ‘Les idées politiques et sociales de Blanqui’, pp. 10, 33-34.  
! 148!
Bernstein joins Volguine in believing the conception of social classes offered in the 
Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple to be poorly defined, ‘schematic and 
superficial’.443 Bernstein notes that the ‘prerequisite situation of a revolution’ is 
something that ‘forever escaped his analysis’. In Bernstein’s eyes, such an analytical 
limitation owes to the basic fact that Blanqui ‘could not get inside the economic 
structure to study its dynamics’. Consequently, while a ‘romantic rebel’ and a ‘Titan 
of revolt’, Blanqui’s ‘weapons were museum pieces’, leaving him ‘poorly equipped to 
give history a push.’444 Philippe Vigier, meanwhile, suggests that Blanqui never 
offered a ‘rigorous’ definition of his conception of the proletariat, and the term could 
certainly not apply to his social background.445 It therefore falls to Alan Spitzer to 
reveal that while such interpretations are validated by some of Blanqui’s writings, 
particularly the eighteenth-century-influenced conception of ‘the people’, ‘there is 
considerable material which shows that Blanqui’s idea of “the people” contains 
implications beyond the vague democratic dichotomy of “the many and the few.”’446 
Spitzer then goes on to offer a concise overview of the development of Blanqui’s 
thinking on class and class struggle that is particularly useful in understanding this 
issue and so worth our consideration before we proceed.  
Ideas expressed in the defence speech, for example, ‘contain the germs of a 
fairly sophisticated theory of historical development based upon the conflict of 
economic and social classes’, Spitzer observes.447  But Blanqui’s analyses in both the 
defence speech and the Rapport after it ‘[do] not define in economic terms the social 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
443 Bernstein, Auguste Blanqui and the Art of Insurrection, pp. 48-49; V.P. Volguine, ‘Les idées 
politiques et sociales de Blanqui’, p. 15. 
444 Bernstein, Auguste Blanqui and the Art of Insurrection, p. 49.  
445 Philippe Vigier, ‘Préface’, OI, p. 18.  
446 Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 97.  
447 Ibid., p. 98. Spitzer sees this in the assertion: ‘Il me semble que c’est là, sous une nouvelle forme et 
entre d’autres adversaires, la guerre des barons féodaux contre les marchands qu’ils détroussaient sur 
les grands chemins’ (Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, p. 64).  
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categories of “bourgeois” and “proletarian” whose conflict was to decide the political 
configurations of the future.’ Spitzer thus draws readers’ attention to the writings 
from Le Libérateur in which one discovers the first allusions to exploited workers, 
ownership of the instruments of production and the antagonism between wages and 
profits. It is only here, then, that Blanqui begins to describe his subject under the 
rubric of socio-economics so as to produce a ‘somewhat clearer statement of the 
economic relations among the contending classes.’448 
In the letter to Maillard Blanqui sets out a more ‘precise’ definition of the two 
opposing groups of proletariat and bourgeoisie, Spitzer suggests. Blanqui describes 
the existence of a class that, though less clearly defined than the nobility or clergy, is 
nonetheless distinct and known by the name of the ‘classe bourgeoise’.  
 
Elle comprend la plupart des individus possédant une certaine somme 
d’aisance et d’instruction : financiers, négociants, propriétaires, avocats, 
médecins, gens de foi, fonctionnaires, rentiers, tous gens vivant de leurs 
revenues ou de l’exploitation des travailleurs. Joignez-y un assez bon nombre 
de campagnards qui ont de la fortune mais point d’éducation, et vous 
atteindrez un chiffre maximum de quatre millions d’individus peut-être. 
Restent trente-deux millions de prolétaires, sans propriété, ou du moins sans 
propriétés sérieuses, et ne vivant que du maigre produit de leurs bras.449  
 
The thirty-two million proletarians Blanqui evokes here, as in the defence speech, 
‘would still have included a small proportion of industrial workers and an 
overwhelming majority of those petit bourgeois elements which Marx considered !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
448 Ibid., pp. 99-100. !
449 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, MA, p. 177. Spitzer cites this passage ibid., p. 101.  
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essentially reactionary’, Spitzer notes, ‘the peasant proprieters, petty functionaries, 
shopkeepers, and self-employed artisans, who, after all, were “the people” evoked by 
any good Jacobin.’450 After elaborating on the concept in his post-1832 work, 
however, Blanqui’s proletariat ‘is no longer equivalent to “the people” of the 
eighteenth-century reformers. This honorable title he now bestows upon the “class of 
the workers” to distinguish them from the “third estate”.451 This brings Spitzer to his 
concluding remarks, which are worth quoting in full: ‘When he applies this distinction 
to an analysis of contemporary political conflict, and especially when he relates it to 
control over the instruments of labor he has come quite close to the Marxian 
conception of class. However, the Soviet historian, Volgin [sic], has correctly 
observed that the clearest distinction made by Blanqui is between the class which 
lives by exploitation and the class which supports itself without exploiting others. 
This is by no means the same as the basic Marxist dichotomy between the swelling 
mass of wage laborers and the dwindling number of those who reap the surplus values 
of the workers’ industry through their control over the means of production.’452 Later 
Spitzer offers what seems to be his overall assessment: ‘Blanqui’s conception of the 
relations between the class struggle and revolutionary politics is worked out with a 
heavy emphasis upon voluntarist and intellectual factors and virtually no reference to 
the long-run political potential of the industrial proletariat viewed as a specific socio-
economic group. Blanqui’s Parisian workers are virtually indistinguishable from “the 
people” of Jacobin mythology’.453 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
450 Ibid., pp. 101-102 
451 Ibid., p. 102. !
452 Ibid., p. 102. This can be seen to follow on from Spitzer’s earlier insistence that Blanqui ‘lacked the 
theoretical equipment to define clearly his “socialism”’ (ibid., p. 95). 
453 ‘Sociologically,’ Spitzer continues, ‘the proletarian elements of “this Parisian folk” were not, in the 
nineteenth century, equivalent to the factory proletariat of an industrial center such as Lyons. … 
Although Blanqui saw political promise in the early struggles of the Lyons proletariat, his conception 
of a revolutionary elite was always focused on the Paris of artisans and intellectuals.’ (ibid., pp. 165-
166).!
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One can certainly agree with many of the assertions Spitzer puts forward in a 
sensitive reading of this point. But let us take a step back. In the first instance, to 
adopt rigid sociological or economic criteria – classical Marxian or otherwise – as 
either the stick with which to beat every facet of Blanqui’s thought as ‘vague’, 
‘unrigorous’, ‘unsophisticated’ and ‘unscientific’, or equally as the position from 
which to defend it against such critiques is to miss the point - and interest - of 
Blanqui’s project. Blanqui’s thought is not and never has been a means of gaining 
empirical insight. By such standards, arguably much of his work will appear crude 
and intellectually inadequate, which it undoubtedly does to many readers; this 
certainly goes a long way in accounting for why Blanqui has lacked serious, critical 
study for so long. But should this be the last word on the matter? Why is Blanqui’s 
thought, and particularly the eighteenth-century usage of ‘the people’, or indeed ‘the 
proletariat’, ‘the plebe’, ‘the multitude’ for that matter, as an equivalent of ‘the poor’ 
or ‘the oppressed’, only valid when it becomes ‘quite close to the Marxian conception 
of class’, as Spitzer claims, or completely invalid precisely because it fails to meet 
this criterion, as Bernstein, Volguine and the other readers cited above believe? Is 
Blanqui’s proletariat, even if - or perhaps precisely because - it is synonymous with 
the people in a Jacobin or voluntarist sense, really of no value?  
 
From socio-economic to political reasoning 
There are, I would suggest, two possible responses to this issue. It could be said that 
close reading in fact reveals a conception of the proletariat or the people that has a 
bearing on six inter-related domains: the strictly political (state power, self-
governance), the judicial (rights, laws), the economic (ownership of the instruments 
of production, wages and remuneration), the material (well-being), the public sphere 
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(voice) and the cerebral (education, enlightened thought). Blanqui’s actor is at present 
dispossessed and excluded from or exploited within each domain; as such, social 
revolution will bring about an order of equality in which the people can exercise self-
rule over or prosper within each domain, as attested to by the respective programmes 
of the Société des Familles and its successor the Société des Saisons.454 In accounting 
for Blanqui’s interest in the actor and its relation to state power, education and the 
public sphere alongside economic relations and material conditions, we begin to see 
how the purely economic lens through which Blanqui’s proletariat has been read, and 
in turn dismissed, is inadequate, failing to capture a conception of the actor that is 
neither purely economic nor determined by the economy in the last instance. Given, 
however, that Blanqui never precisely enumerates these demands or seeks to define 
their specific content, attempting to extract such a conceptual framework or unified 
typology is unsatisfactory and, moreover, when pursued to its logical end can but only 
lead back to a form of positivist rejection like those cited above. A different approach 
is required. To paraphrase Ernesto Laclau, hitherto readers have remained solely 
concerned with the socio-economic content Blanqui’s actor expresses (or indeed fails 
to express), rather than considering why that political form of expression is necessary. 
Rather than focusing on the conceptual content of Blanqui’s actor, which 
unquestionably lacks systematic exposition, can we not approach Blanqui’s actor 
from a different perspective, one which can in fact account for the wider, more 
flexible conception of the revolutionary actor?  
Laclau’s own work on populism forms a stimulating point of comparison in 
this regard, offering insight by way of contrast as well as providing some routes out of 
the blind alleys in which Blanqui has been left. To summarise the main features of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
454 See Blanqui, ‘Formulaire de réception de la Société des Familles’, 1834, OI, pp. 298-300; Blanqui, 
‘Formulaire de réception à la Société des Saisons’, 1837, OI, pp. 381-384. 
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Laclau’s thought that concern us here, Laclau’s theoretical point of departure is the 
struggle for hegemony within a heterogeneous social field, and not the class struggle 
inscribed in the internal logic of objective social processes of orthodox Marxism. 
When a series of specific demands – be they for public services, civil rights or basic 
social provisions - are coherently linked and articulated together to form an 
‘equivalential chain’ a popular identity, the people, is produced. As the people, like 
the content of their demands, is not ‘objectively’ created by a pre-given social order, 
one must ‘conceive the “people” as a political category, not as a datum of the social 
structure. This designates not a given group, but an act of institution that creates a new 
agency out of a plurality of heterogeneous elements.’455 For Laclau it is not a question 
of locating the positive content of the popular demands themselves but of the basic 
formal function of their collective articulation – that is, first, the construction of a 
universal political subject that transcends the actual content of the initial demands 
through which it emerged and, second, the creation of an antagonistic frontier within 
the social field between the two (necessarily heterogeneous) forces of the ‘people’ 
and the ‘enemy’. ‘This division presupposes’, Laclau explains, ‘the presence of some 
privileged signifiers which condense in themselves the signification of a whole 
antagonistic camp (the “regime”, the “oligarchy”, the “dominant groups”, and so on, 
for the enemy; the “people”, the “nation”, the “silent majority” and so on, for the 
oppressed underdog – these signifiers acquire this articulating role according, 
obviously, to a contextual history).’456 One of Laclau’s crucial moves is to privilege 
form over content, to contemplate not ‘systems of ideas qua ideas’ but ‘their 
performative dimensions’, from which follows the importance of signifiers, 
metaphors and rhetoric in the construction of political identities, if not of politics as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
455 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 224; emphasis in original.  
456 Ibid., p. 87. 
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such.457 Naming a universality, the people, is, for Laclau, the political act par 
excellence.  
To place Laclau alongside Blanqui is to be confronted with some marked - and 
therefore illuminating and instructive - differences. Limiting myself to the most 
obvious points, first and foremost, for Blanqui the people is created above all through 
its conscious thought, its active will, its actual power, rather than merely through the 
representative function of collective signifiers. Blanqui does place importance on 
naming an otherwise unnamed group and representing the unrepresented, as we have 
seen above and will again see below, but this is with the view to initiating or 
sustaining the process that will bring about their active empowerment. Rhetoric and 
signifiers thus anticipate the beginning of (or supplement an ongoing) actual political 
struggle, and are in no way its substitute or endpoint. Though the question of 
representation is a complex one on which Blanqui and Laclau share certain similar 
limitations (an issue to which we shall return in Chapter 4), Blanqui would 
nonetheless emphatically oppose Laclau’s assertion that naming ‘a series of 
heterogeneous elements as “working class” … performatively brings about the unity 
of those elements, whose coalescence into a single entity is nothing other than the 
result of the operation of naming’.458 For Blanqui, by contrast, and this leads on from 
the first point, unity is not a ‘performative act’ produced as a result of naming a 
passive object. Unity is created through the actor’s deliberate and actual act of 
association, as Rousseau states before him.459 Blanqui would dismiss any concession 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
457 Ibid., pp. 14, 18-19 
458 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 183; emphasis in original. !
459 See ibid., pp. 17-18. ‘Immediately,’ Rousseau writes, ‘this act of association produces, in place of 
the individual persons of every contracting party, a moral and collective body … which, by the same 
act, is endowed with its unity, its common self, its life, and its will’ (Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 
56).  
! 155!
to the ‘precarious unity’460 of Laclau’s popular force as a matter of course. Blanqui 
certainly shares in advancing a socially heterogeneous actor insofar as the people 
come from an extremely wide social base.461 Yet if this heterogeneity is not overcome 
by strict political unity, by a shared commitment to a common purpose, the only 
certainty is defeat and failure. As June 1848 proved to Blanqui beyond any doubt, 
without concrete unity, organisation and discipline popular victory is inconceivable, 
popular power an impossible dream.462 One could also note Blanqui’s assertion that 
the tendency during revolutionary sequences for the struggle of opposing camps to 
intensify gives rise to a sharp polarization of the political field, at which point any 
initial social heterogeneity is rendered inconsequential as everyone is forced to choose 
their side and commit to a cause, uniting with their allies and confronting their 
adversaries. In every instance, however, these choices and commitments are grounded 
above all in actual, not nominal, political practices.  
If these differences help us to delineate key facets of Blanqui’s thinking, I do 
not think by extension they altogether exclude Laclau from aiding our understanding 
of Blanqui’s political actor. Laclau’s notion of an actor not as ‘pure class actors … 
defined by precise locations within the relations of production’ but as a formal 
political logic that cuts across specific, sectorial agents to designate, in consciously 
broad terms, ‘the outsiders of the system, the underdogs’ remains particularly 
useful.463 Indeed, we can see how Blanqui’s similar use of an interchangeable 
signifier follows the same logic: insofar as ‘proletariat’, ‘people’, ‘poor’, ‘multitude’, 
‘masses’ and so on all carry for Blanqui the same basic concepts and lived realities – 
dispossession, exclusion, domination, oppression, exploitation - the strict socio-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
460 Ibid., p. 118.!!
461 This heterogeneous composition is also acknowledged by Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of 
Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 168. 
462 See Blanqui, ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, MA, p. 262. 
463 Laclau, On Populist Reason, pp. 122, 150. 
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economic sense of each term or each supposedly differentiated group it designates is 
of little importance compared with their commonly ascribed political meaning and 
use.  
More generally, one cannot but be struck by the similarity between Blanqui’s 
conception of the people, the rationale behind its multiple criticisms and some of the 
reasoning informing Laclau’s exposition of populism. Is it not also the case with 
Blanqui that, since his proletariat has been depicted merely in terms of its 
‘“vagueness”, “imprecision”, “intellectual poverty” … there is no way of determining 
its differentia specifica in positive terms’, as Laclau asserts apropos of populism?464 
In order to overcome this impasse Laclau proposes the full assumption of those very, 
supposedly pejorative, characteristics as the basic condition of politics as such. The 
‘simplification’ or ‘condensation’ of the complex social field and political space into 
a basic dichotomy between two imprecise poles of the people and the oligarchy, the 
toiling masses and the exploiters (Laclau’s examples), the oppressed and the 
oppressor, the worker and the idler (Blanqui’s further dichotomies), should not be 
dismissed out of hand as politically naïve and immature but instead be seen as an 
essential political operation. As Laclau explains, ‘there is in these dichotomies, as in 
those which constitute any politico-ideological frontier, a simplification of the 
political space (all social singularities tend to group themselves around one or the 
other of the poles of the dichotomy), and the terms designating both poles have 
necessarily to be imprecise (otherwise they could not cover all the particularities that 
they are supposed to regroup.)’ The question arises: rather than a symptom of political 
marginality or immaturity ‘is not this logic of simplification, and of making some 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
464 Ibid., p. 16. 
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terms imprecise, the very condition of political action?’465 Though Laclau is at pains 
to strictly differentiate his own schema from that of Marxian thought, we might in fact 
note that the authors of the Communist Manifesto, particularly in that very text, follow 
the same logic of reduction in the face of ostensibly complex social relations to 
present a struggle that over time polarizes into bourgeoisie against proletariat, 
oppressors against oppressed.466 Rousseau, too, had previously maintained that 
society can be basically divided into two contesting groups: rich and poor, strong and 
weak, conqueror and conquered. Of course, it goes without saying that the respective 
accounts by which Rousseau (usurpation, theft), Marx and Engels (capitalism) and 
Laclau (hegemony) arrive at these dichotomies are totally at odds, and the comparison 
is ultimately limited for this reason. Yet in all cases the practical political exigencies 
behind it nonetheless remain almost identical. Placing primacy on political action 
compels us to redefine the nature and scope of the political more generally; it reveals 
how broad, antagonistic dichotomies are inevitable in and thus crucial to any militant 
politics, from Rousseau’s time to our own.  
Blanqui willingly and explicitly carries out this form of political 
simplification. Anyone who opposes free and compulsory education, for example – a 
decisive issue in Blanqui’s eyes – is ‘un agent du jésuitisme’ and therefore an 
accessory to oppression, no matter what their purported political label or 
convictions.467 With regards to the function of popular demands, one could say that it 
is also in this sense of condensing and dividing the political space through specific 
demands that one can read the injunction of 1848: ‘Du travail et du pain ! L’existence 
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465 Ibid., p. 18. See also pp. 98-99.  
466 ‘Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses … this distinctive feature: it has simplified the 
class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into 
two great classes directly facing each other: bourgeoisie and proletariat’ (Marx and Engels, The 
Communist Manifesto, p. 35).  
467 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, pp. 180-181.  
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du peuple ne peut rester à la merci des frayeurs des rancunes du capital !’468 In 1917, 
Laclau suggests, since ‘peace, bread and land were not the conceptual common 
denominator of all Russian social demands’ it stands that ‘grievances which had 
nothing to do with those three demands nevertheless expressed themselves through 
them’, hence their necessary ‘imprecision’ and ‘vagueness’.469 Blanqui’s call for work 
and bread is likewise at once a specific demand owing to the specific circumstances 
of 1848 - in which, as Blanqui described from the dungeons of Vincennes, ‘[l]a 
fermeture des ateliers, le retrait des capitaux, la suppression du travail jettent le 
prolétaire sur le pavé’470 - and the condensed expression of the entire political conflict 
in France between the two antagonistic forces of ‘the people’ and ‘capital’, thereby 
enabling it to transcend the specificity of the initial demand and take on a universal 
dimension. Since the failure to provide work and bread is a structural imperative of 
the established order, their articulation as a simple demand calls into question the 
entire social edifice as such and the structural position therein of those to whom they 
and other such basic necessities are denied. As a universal political operation, to 
demand bread and work is to challenge by extension the structure of social relations 
based on exploitation and domination; one particular demand can therefore show how 
‘capital’ is inherently and invariably at odds with ‘the people’, how so long as an 
order reigns in which the existence of the people is dependent on its continued 
subjugation to capital the people will not thrive, they will not exist.  
The ‘multitude’, ‘proletarians’ are, for Blanqui, those who are external to the 
community,471 those who do not exist in the eyes of the status quo because they 
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468 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 95 [22 March 1848]. 
469 Laclau, On Populist Reason, pp. 97-98. As Laclau explains: ‘While it remains a particular demand, 
it also becomes the signifier of a wider universality’ (ibid., p. 95). 
470 Blanqui MSS 9590(2),  fo. 465 [23 September 1848].  
471 Cf. Louis Chevalier’s observation that ‘[l]’attitude des populations bourgeoises envers les classes 
laborieuses emprunte ainsi la plupart de ses caractères à l’attitude ancienne envers une population qui 
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cannot be internal to or exist within the status quo as such; their very existence is 
inherently antagonistic to the established order such that the structural functioning and 
existence of the status quo presupposes and demands their nonexistence and 
exclusion. Blanqui’s only apparent ‘crime’, he thus states at two trials, is to expose 
this structural antagonism. Just as his defence speech of 1832 opens with the 
declaration ‘[j]e suis accusé d’avoir dit à trente millions de Français, prolétaires 
comme moi, qu’ils avaient le droit de vivre’, again in 1849 he challenges the court in 
Bourges to identify the ‘crimes’ he supposedly committed on 17 March at the Hôtel 
de Ville and 16 Avril at the Champ de Mars of the previous year. ‘Ai-je pris les 
armes, lancé les masses sur le gouvernement, tenté une Révolution ? Vous savez bien 
que non. Les masses réunies ce jour-là sur la place publique, ne paraissaient un 
trouble que par leur grande multitude.’472 Again, particularly in this last citation and 
the event to which it refers, we see how Laclau, for his part, fails to offer any clear 
indication as to how rhetoric relates to or translates into concrete collective action and 
popular empowerment. For Blanqui, the proletariat, the multitude, through the 
affirmation in word but above all in deed of its mere existence challenges the entire 
socio-political structure in which it does not exist. So follows the task to go from 
exclusion from to constitution of power. On this decisive point, as well as Laclau 
Blanqui can also be seen to highlight the limitations of Martin Breaugh’s recent 
history of what he calls the ‘plebeian experience’. Following many of the salient 
assumptions of Rancière’s political thought, in plebeian politics Breaugh not only 
recognises but fully endorses a logic of momentary disruption or rupture, of ‘an 
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était considérée comme n’appartenant pas à la ville, comme suspecte de tous les crimes, de tous les 
maux, de toutes les épidémies, de toutes les violences, non seulement par ses caractères propres, mais 
par ce seul fait de son origine extérieure à la ville’ (Chevalier, Classes laborieuses et classes 
dangereuses, p. 460).!
472 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, p. 62; Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 
396 [n.d.]. 
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irruptive event that temporarily fractures the order of domination. The plebeian 
experience per se’, Breaugh therefore suggests, ‘cannot be sustained for any length of 
time.’ Because of its necessary ‘impermanence’, only ‘traces’ of the plebeian 
experience remain, forming a ‘“discontinuous”’ history of political freedom’.473 Both 
politically and intellectually Breaugh’s analysis is very much a product of its time. 
The aversion to leadership and organisation, the emphasis on direct action, the 
transient freedom of the carnivalesque experience, the dismissal of sustained power – 
are these not the dominant motifs of political praxis today, as seen most clearly in the 
Occupy movements? It is here that a return to Blanqui becomes all the more pertinent 
and all the more necessary. Blanqui is right to insist that without forms of leadership 
and organisation, without the continuous and sustained seizure and exercise of power, 
the plebeian outsiders, whenever and wherever they appear, will forever remain 
incapable of transcending their exclusion and domination, as they can and must. The 
horizon of collective political action must extend beyond mere rupture with the order 
of domination; the possibility of the empowerment and emancipation of the 
dominated is subject to their overcoming the order of domination as such.  
Blanqui always begins with a basic assumption: the timeless struggle of the 
poor and powerless many versus the rich and powerful few. ‘L’aristocratie : les fleurs. 
Le peuple – le fumier qui les faits pousser – système des sociétés depuis des 
siècles.’474 All these broad, imprecise concepts – capital, labour, patrician, proletariat 
– and their analogous application as analytical models of both ancient Rome and 
nineteenth-century France attest to a thought more political than economic, more 
Jacobin than Marxist. Neither strict sociological classification nor empirical economic 
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473 Martin Breaugh, The Plebeian Experience: A Discontinuous History of Political Freedom, trans. 
Lazar Lederhendler  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), pp. xx-xxiii. 
474 Blanqui MSS 9582, fo. 14 [n.d.]; Blanqui MSS 9584(2), fo. 20 [n.d.].   
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analysis, Blanqui’s proletariat is a political construction, a political actor.475 The 
proletariat is employed to expose inequality and injustice, to articulate the 
empowering process by which this inequality and injustice is actually redressed, to 
name those whose collective political action actually does so. The proletariat is both 
the call to and the result of political action. The proletariat is both a political idea and 
a political reality.  
Does, then, the same knowing, retrospective dismissal of an ‘immature’ 
politics indicative of ‘underdeveloped’ socio-economic relations highlighted by 
Laclau not apply, mutatis mutandis, to Blanqui’s critics? And does this not similarly 
deny or obfuscate the universal features of Blanqui’s politics? In other words, if 
socio-economic reasoning confines Blanqui to pre-capitalist nineteenth-century 
France, political reasoning can elevate him to a timeless, universal plane. It is in the 
insistence on the political, on the primacy of political form over social content, on the 
antagonistic division delineating a struggle between two opposing camps, that Laclau 
can help us understand Blanqui. And it is according to a necessarily imprecise, 
antagonistic political logic in which formal function takes primacy over socio-
economic content that Blanqui’s proletariat can be described, and valorized, as a 
political actor. Blanqui, we have already said, fails to convincingly account for the 
historical grounds on which political action is exercised. But it is nonetheless in his 
analysis of the action itself, of how the actor acts and the extent to which these 
collective subjective forces, and not immutable objective processes, have the 
collective capacity to ultimately determine and change social arrangements, that the 
power of his thinking still resonates. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
475 ‘Le nom de prolétaire dans la bouche de Blanqui n’a pas une portée sociologique’, Bensaïd 
concisely explains, ‘il ne cherche pas à faire des statistiques. C’est une proclamation politique’ (Daniel 
Bensaïd, ‘Entretien avec Daniel Bensaïd et Eric Hazan sur le recueil de textes d’Auguste Blanqui 




Blanqui with Rancière 
 
Unlike the majority of Blanqui’s readers, Jacques Rancière approaches Blanqui as a 
resolutely political thinker, Blanqui’s proletariat as a political concept, its usage as a 
political intervention. In so doing, Rancière - whose conception of politics also shares 
certain key features and concerns with that of Laclau, a point the latter notes 
himself476 - avoids many of the analytical misadventures of those addressed earlier, 
providing a thought-provoking interpretation of many of the fundamental issues at 
stake in this discussion. I would now like to engage with Rancière’s account, showing 
both its insights and how they align with or supplement our analysis so far, but also 
where I think it is misleading and requires reconsideration.  
 
Counting the uncounted 
Rancière’s interest lies in the exchange cited at the beginning of this chapter between 
Blanqui and the judge. For Rancière the disagreement over the meaning of 
‘proletarian’ marks the point at which the unequal established order, what Rancière 
calls the ‘police’, embodied in this case by the judge, and the radical equality of 
revolutionary politics, embodied here by Blanqui, come into conflict and thereby 
create a political subject. Rancière explains: ‘Du point de vue policier, le procureur 
avait raison : prolétaire n’est pas un métier, et Blanqui n’était pas ce qu’on appelle 
habituellement un travailleur. Mais au point de vue politique, c’est Blanqui qui avait 
raison : prolétaire n’est pas le nom d’un groupe social sociologiquement indentifiable. 
C’est le nom d’un hors-compte, d’un outcast. En latin, proletarii veut simplement dire 
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: ceux qui se reproduisent, ceux qui simplement vivent et se reproduisent sans 
posséder ni transmettre un nom, sans être comptés comme partie dans la constitution 
symbolique de la cité.’477 In self-identifying as a proletariat, Blanqui avows an 
affiliation not to an occupation or to an existing social group or class, Rancière 
argues, but to a collective that forms ‘la classe des incomptés qui n’existe que dans la 
déclaration même par laquelle ils se comptent comme ceux qui ne sont pas 
comptés.’478 Blanqui’s proletariat is as such a radically egalitarian – and so a properly 
political – intervention: it asserts the equality of the non-existent part of a community 
whose founding ‘wrong’ is precisely that part’s non-existence.479 Since the non-
recognition of this class or part is the fundamental injustice or wrong inscribed in the 
status quo, Blanqui’s proletariat, in subjecitifying this wrong, creates ‘un sujet du 
tort’, Rancière writes. ‘Blanqui inscrit, sous le nom de prolétaires, les incomptés dans 
l’espace où ils sont comptables comme incomptés.’480 It is in this sense that the 
proletariat, as suggested earlier, is not a class in the sense of having recognised social 
function.481 The proletariat names those who have no name; it gives a voice to those 
who have no voice. Blanqui’s naming and voicing serves to recognise the hitherto 
unrecognised exclusion of the nameless and the voiceless. Rancière foregrounds the 
manner in which Blanqui’s proletariat, like the Athenian demos, names and thus 
subjectifies those masses who have ‘no share’, who have ‘no part’ in the whole of the 
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477 Rancière, Aux bords du politique, pp. 118-119. See also La Mésentente, p. 62. Cf. Bernstein, 
Auguste Blanqui and the Art of Insurrection, pp. 47-48. 
478 Rancière, La Mésentente, p. 62. Rancière repeats: ‘Le prolétariat n’a, avant le tort que son nom 
expose, aucune existence comme partie réelle de la société’ (ibid., p. 64). 
479 Ibid., p. 63.  
480 Ibid., p. 63.  
481 ‘Des « vraies » classes,’ Rancière writes, ‘cela veut dire – voudrait dire – des parties réelles de la 
société, des catégories correspondant à ses fonctions’ (ibid.., p. 39). In the ‘police’ sense, then, class 
denotes a particular group of people with a particular status and position that is assigned according to 
one’s origins, caste even, or professional activity. Class in the political sense, by contrast, is ‘un 
opérateur du litige, un nom pour compter les incomptés, un mode de subjectivation en surimpression 
sur toute réalité des groupes sociaux’ (ibid., p. 121) 
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community;482 it names those ordinary people ‘en dehors’, to use Blanqui’s own term, 
of the socio-political space yet who, when active and empowered, collectively 
represent society as a whole. They, the excluded, are nothing but can, and must, stand 
for everything.  
On this last issue of active empowerment, however, we confront a limit of 
Rancière’s account to which we shall shortly return but that would benefit from some 
initial observations here. By ‘subjectivation’ Rancière means ‘la production par une 
série d’actes d’une instance et d’une capacité d’énonciation qui n’étaient pas 
identifiable dans un champ d’expérience donné, dont l’identification donc va de pair 
avec reconfiguration du champ de l’expérience.’ Thinking principally in terms of 
sense and perception, Rancière discerns in Blanqui’s proletarian subjectification one 
of many ‘expériences singulières du litige sur la parole et la voix, sur le partage du 
sensible.’ The ‘scène de parole’ in the courtroom of January 1832 is thus notable, 
according to Rancière’s political aesthetics, for being ‘l’une des premières 
occurrences politiques du sujet prolétaire moderne’.483 For Blanqui himself, however, 
this is surely not the case. Proletariat is the name of the political force that actually 
appeared as a collective political actor and drove the revolution in July 1830 before 
by and large returning to dormant inaction. Proletarian nomination is, for Blanqui, 
meaningless and inconsequential without proletarian empowerment.  
 
Division and unity 
Blanqui’s proletariat is, Rancière shows us, at once an assertion of recognition of and 
solidarity with the excluded as equal subjects, and a forceful attack on the order which 
denies that very existence and so denies that very equality. As Laclau writes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
482 Ibid., p. 63. 
483 Ibid., pp. 59, 61.!
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following Rancière, the proletariat stands for ‘the universality of the partial and the 
partiality of the universal.’484 To reopen and expose this otherwise dismissed or 
obscured structural division and the injustice it carries is precisely the political 
function of Blanqui’s intervention: the proletariat serves to clarify once again the 
fundamentally conflictual nature of politics.485 Yet Blanqui’s insistence on the 
divisive character of the term ‘proletariat’ was not unique. Those who sought reform 
through co-operation and mutual partnership explicitly rejected the term precisely on 
the grounds of the discord and division it created. ‘Que le nom de prolétaire, nom 
insultant et devenu odieux, disparaisse, et que ceux qui le portaient trouvent en nous 
aide et secours’.486 So pleaded the pages of L’écho de la fabrique in January 1832, for 
example. Blanqui subscribes to the same logic from the inverse position, for if politics 
demands the recognition and full assumption of conflict, it follows that the name 
‘proletariat’ must also be fully assumed. As Kristin Ross observes, and adopting 
Rancierian terms herself, Blanqui’s insistence in the letter to Maillard on speaking of 
proletariat is precisely to create a gap, a division and a rupture where the term 
‘democrat’, having been appropriated by Napoléon III’s Imperial regime, now created 
consensus in the service of continued inequality and domination. Proletariat, unlike 
democrat, still named ‘the division to be overcome between those judged capable of 
governing and those judged incapable’.487 Proletariat, unlike democrat, had not been 
deprived of its political function: to reflect and expose the often concealed but no less 
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487 Kristin Ross, ‘Democracy for Sale’, in Democracy in what state?, pp. 90-91. Cf. Rancière, La 
Mésentente, p. 63. 
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real ‘guerre civile’ and the two opposing groups waging this conflict.488 Only through 
subjectifying structural inequalities can the task of ending them begin, Blanqui 
assumes.  
To take this analysis further, it is in this respect that Blanqui can be seen to 
hold a dual concept of popular unity. On the one hand there is the popular unity that is 
constructed around and serving as justification for an unjust and unequal social 
order.489 On the other hand there is a conception of popular unity that assumes the 
equality of all and affirms and practices solidarity as the political translation of this 
principle. If the first illusory unity creates and upholds the barrier to equality by 
means of consensual domination, the second genuine, emancipatory unity can shatter 
that consensus and overcome that barrier. In all cases there must be no doubt around 
whom and what political unity is sought. ‘Le mot : « Union » est devenu l’arme de 
guerre de tous les ennemis de la Liberté’, Blanqui warns in La Patrie en Danger. 
‘Qu’on le sache bien, concorde, pour les républicains, ne signifie pas asservissement 
aux contre-révolutionnaires. Ils veulent l’union pour le salut et non pour la ruine de la 
République.’490 Without clarity of positions the ‘mélange d’éléments aussi disparates 
ne pourrait qu’être dangereux pour le cause’, Blanqui later told Clemenceau in 1879. 
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488 ‘On les repousse comme provocateurs de la guerre civile. Cette raison ne suffit-elle pas pour vous 
ouvrir les yeux ? Qu’est-ce donc que nous sommes contraints de faire depuis longtemps, sinon la 
guerre civile ? Et contre qui ? Ah ! Voilà précisément la question qu’on s’efforce d’embrouiller par 
l’obscurité des mots ; car il s’agit d’empêcher que les deux drapeaux ennemis ne se posent carrément 
en face l’un de l’autre afin d’escroquer, après le combat, au drapeau victorieux les bénéfices de la 
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ont pas d’autre’ (Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, MA, pp. 176-177). 
489 This is also evident in the distinction Adolphe Thiers establishes, when speaking in May 1850, 
between ‘le peuple’ as conceived and recognised in the eyes of the law and ‘la multitude’ as those 
unrecognised by the law and intentionally kept outside of the official order. Thiers’s contempt for the 
outsiders who must remain outside, the plebs who do not form part of the populus, is indeed arrestingly 
clear: ‘C’est la multitude, ce n’est pas le peuple que nous voulons exclure, c’est cette multitude 
confuse, cette multitude des vagabonds dont on ne peut saisir ni le domicile, ni la famille, si remuante 
qu’on ne peut la saisir nulle part, qui n’ont pas su créer pour leur famille un asile appréciable : c’est 
cette multitude que la loi a pour but d’éloigner’ (cited in Chevalier, Classes laborieuses et classes 
dangereuses, p. 459).  
490 Blanqui, ‘La réaction’, La Patrie en Danger, Monday 19 September 1870.!
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Without clear choices, without clear sides and without a clear understanding of 
interests and principles, the false consensual unity of the adversary will absorb and 
weaken the cause of true emancipatory unity, as occurred in 1848. ‘C’est ce mot 
perfide : union, qui a été notre ruine.’491 
The fundamentally divisive logic of Blanqui’s politics again takes centre 
stage; again, between exploiters and exploited there is no third option; and again most 
readers have overlooked this formal imperative of Blanqui’s politics. When 
commenting that ‘[w]hether or not Blanqui’s conceptions of class struggle anticipated 
modern socialist theories, they did define the nature of socialist action for him’492 
Spitzer appears to hit on the crucial point yet he fails to then grasp its full 
implications: creating a divide in order to expose a conflict is itself of far greater 
practical political importance to Blanqui than establishing precisely who or what 
compromises each side. Naming the subject of social inequality establishes the 
political divide between us, we (the people and those united in working for its 
emancipation, which is the emancipation of all) and them, you (the rich and those 
sustaining its supremacy over all). It is for this reason that Blanqui can, paradoxically 
it may otherwise seem, describe his usage of the terms ‘proletariat’ and ‘bourgeois’ as 
having ‘un sens clair et net ; ils disent catégoriquement les choses.’493 Proletariat, in 
this sense, is a subjective position; it both presupposes and expresses a political 
choice, a political principle. ‘Democrat’, meanwhile, having been appropriated by all 
political camps, is ‘un mot vague, banal, sans acception précise, un mot en 
caoutchouc.’ The word has been deprived of its strictly political functions – decision, 
allegiance, division – and therefore must be abandoned. Blanqui thus compels his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
491 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Clemenceau’, MA, p. 394. On this point, see also in particular Blanqui, ‘L’union 
des vraies démocrates’, November 1848, MA, pp. 147-148. 
492 Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 102. 
493 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, MA, p. 176. See also Blanqui MSS 9582, fo. 78 [n.d.]. 
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interlocutor, Maillard: ‘Soyez de votre camp et mettez votre cocarde. Vous êtes 
prolétaire, parce que vous voulez l’égalité réelle entre les citoyens’.494 To be a 
proletarian is to side with us over them, with the people over capital, with 
emancipation over domination, with equality over inequality. So make your choice: 
Proletarian or bourgeois? Us or them? Philippe Vigier’s claim noted earlier that 
Blanqui’s background is inconsistent with that of a proletarian completely overlooks 
this point. Blanqui is indeed well aware that ‘par ma famille, par mon éducation, je 
suis un bourgeois’. But that is not to say that a bourgeois by birth cannot join the 
proletarian camp out of conviction, uniting with and supporting their struggle.495 
Blanqui’s proletariat is only an extension of the logic of making choices and taking 
sides outlined in Chapter 2. For Blanqui all politics comes down to a matter of 
voluntary choice. Although, as I also suggested in the previous chapter, Blanqui is 
arguably too willing to abandon words and concepts whose meanings are worth 
struggling over, we can now understand the concerns informing this approach: the 
term proletariat is an operator of political choice and commitment; it says whom you 
are for and whom you are against. 
So far we can see that Rancière brings into focus several important elements 
of Blanqui’s politics. First and foremost, Rancière reaffirms the view that Blanqui’s 
proletariat should not be read as a sociological category but in political terms as an 
excluded group, as ‘les incomptés’, to employ his term. Moreover, and perhaps most 
usefully, it is clear that proletariat is for Blanqui a subjective political position – it 
carries a political choice, a political side, a political conviction. In this respect, the 
proletariat and the people are extensions of some of Blanqui’s most basic political 
assumptions regarding conscious choices and militant engagement, as outlined in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
494 Ibid., p. 179. !
495 Ibid., p. 177. 
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preceding chapter. The term proletariat cuts through the veil of consensual 
domination to present politics in its purest form: a conflict of two irreconcilable 
groups, interests and principles. It brings into focus questions of unity and division 
and their role in any attempt to create and sustain the popular unity of the dominated 
as the essential prerequisite to recognising and overthrowing the order of domination.  
Beyond such insights some problems nonetheless present themselves. 
Rancière, much like Laclau, overemphasises the extent to which naming an unnamed 
group, the performative affirmation driving this ‘processus de subjectivation’, alone 
creates a subject or actor. Principal concern for the politics of perception fails to take 
sufficient account of the action constitutive of the actor and of the material realities of 
both the absence and the exercise of political power. The purely nominal inscription 
of the proletariat’s exclusion cannot redress the actual material conditions of that 
exclusion. It is this point that I shall now address.  
 
Blanqui beyond Rancière 
 
Central to Rancière’s reading is the explicit denial that for Blanqui the proletariat has 
any bearing on labour, work or the conditions of work. ‘Les prolétaires ne sont ni les 
travailleurs manuels, ni les classes laborieuses.’ What is subjectified with Blanqui’s 
proletariat, Rancière believes, ‘ce n’est ni le travail ni la misère, mais le pur compte 
des incomptés’.496 For Rancière the wrong of the ‘miscount’, that which is 
subjectified with the name ‘proletariat’, is largely expressed in terms of the politics of 
perception, of the distribution of who is and who is not audible or visible and the 
social order in which this distribution is assigned, structured and legitimised. Simply 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
496 Rancière, La Mésentente, pp. 62-63. 
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put, for Rancière, after Ballanche and Jacotot, to be amongst the ‘uncounted’ is to be 
unacknowledged as an equal speaking being and considered incapable of rational 
argument, capable only of the animalistic expression of pleasure and pain. Injustice 
emanates from the perceived inequality of speaking beings and its manifestation in a 
social body in which one of its parts – the sans-part – is unseen and unheard, its equal 
participation in political life as equal speaking beings denied. Politics thus conceived 
concerns speech and the account of speech. Politics aesthetically verifies the 
presupposed intellectual equality of speaking beings.497  
Such assertions require further consideration with greater reference to 
Blanqui’s thought, for they represent at once a great strength and an ultimate 
limitation of Rancière’s account.  
 
(In)equality of intelligence 
We have seen that equality, in Blanqui’s eyes, is rooted in a notion of intellectual 
equality. ‘La pensée,’ Blanqui explains, ‘courant électrique entre les membres de la 
grande famille humaine, transmissible en raison de la facilité des communication et de 
l’accroissement des lumières. L’isolement et l’ignorance interceptent le courant.’498 
Yet an important contrast between Blanqui and Rancière concerns the question of 
capacity. Where Rancière sees injustice is the present non-recognition of the existing 
equal intellectual capacities of all, for Blanqui to assert the basic equality of 
intellectual capacity is not to presume or presuppose the actual yet unacknowledged 
existence or exercise of that capacity within present society, or indeed that the 
capacity can exist or be exercised at all within the status quo. Intellectual equality is 
not unheard or unseen and requiring its confirmation in the face of its denial so much !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
497 See ibid., pp, 45-58, 71. See also Jacques Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in 
Intellectual Emancipation, trans. Kristin Ross (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). 
498 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 137 [n.d.]. 
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as actually manipulated and repressed; the capacity is unrealised and unexercised at 
present and will only achieve its full realisation and exercise through a didactic 
process of intellectual development and progress. To put it another way, Rancière has 
already arrived at the popular enlightenment to which Blanqui aspires. The political 
implications of these contrasting anthropological assumptions are profound. Blanqui’s 
understanding of the intellectual inequality of the proletariat radically alters the 
meaning and role of politics to that of Rancière. Politics is not simply the verification 
of an at-present-unrecognised intellectual equality; politics is the material work of 
overcoming the powers upholding the intellectual inequality of the present as the 
prerequisite to finally allowing for the creation and exercise of intellectual equality. 
Hence Blanqui’s diagnosis of unprivileged masses forced to languish in uneducated 
ignorance; hence the need for an enlightened leadership to speak on their behalf until 
they are capable of speaking for themselves; hence the need for a revolution to 
inaugurate the process by which this intellectual capacity can be fully exercised and 
the forces maintaining its current impediment suppressed; and hence Blanqui’s 
conception of the processes of popular transformation, an issue we shall address in the 
next chapter. On all these points Blanqui and Rancière are totally at odds. Arguably 
Blanqui recognises to a greater extent than Rancière what is fundamentally at stake in 
the empowering of a political actor and the overcoming of the real obstacles that the 
construction of a more materially equal social arrangement will demand, yet neither’s 
approach and solutions are entirely satisfactory. If Rancière seems to overlook the 
role of organised political action in bridging the (also overlooked) gap between the 
status quo and the advent of more just and egalitarian social arrangement, Blanqui too 
often overstates the division between knowledge and ignorance, between those who 
are presently capable of understanding and thus of decisively acting and those who 
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are not.  
 
Perception 
To expand on the discussion of the importance of the written word in Chapter 1, let us 
consider Blanqui’s concern for perception, beginning with the 1832 defense speech. 
Under the Orléanist regime any attempt to hear the plight of the oppressed, who work 
day and night only to remain starving, Blanqui told the Parisian court in January 
1832, falls on deaf ears. ‘Les organes ministériels répètent avec complaisance qu’il y 
a des voies ouvertes aux doléances des prolétaires, que les lois leur présentent des 
moyens réguliers d’obtenir place pour leurs intérêts’, he notes, offering a 
characteristically blunt response: ‘C’est une dérision.’499 The proletariat remains 
invisible, inaudible, mute; they are, to paraphrase Rancière, only recognised and only 
exist through their very non-recognition and non-existence:  
 
Le peuple n’écrit pas dans les journaux ; il n’envoie pas de pétition aux 
Chambres : ce serait temps perdu. Bien plus, toutes les voix qui ont un 
retentissement dans la sphère politique, les voix des salons, celles des 
boutiques, des cafés, en un mot de tous les lieux où se forme ce qu’on appelle 
l’opinion publique, ces voix sont celles des privilégies ; pas une n’appartient 
au peuple ;  il est muet ; il végète éloigné de ces hautes régions où se règlent 
ses destinées.500  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
499 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, p. 68. 
500 Ibid., p. 68.!
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Press freedom is therefore in many ways ‘[la] liberté la plus précieuse de toutes’501 
because what is perceived helps to define the political, shaping the parameters of 
political action. The battle over who or what is seen and heard, written and read, in 
many ways cuts to the heart of the Blanqui’s politics. The Orléanist government’s 
attempts to end press freedom, which is the freedom to think and write,502 must be 
resisted at all costs.503 Almost forty years later, when Napoleon III was in power, 
Blanqui still decried, in strikingly similar terms to the 1832 defence speech, ‘[l]a 
prétendue égalité devant la loi, donnant au riche le monopole de la presse et la parole, 
imposant le silence et le soumission au pauvre’.504 There is no doubt here that 
Blanqui’s proletariat clearly has an aesthetic dimension; it subjectifies, as Rancière 
affirms, ‘la différence entre la distribution inégalitaire des corps sociaux et l’égalité 
des êtres parlants.’505 Moreover, Blanqui speaks repeatedly of how during the 
Restoration the people had fallen silent and remained a passive, ‘spectateur 
silencieux’ to the conflict between the middle and upper classes in which they had no 
stake. It therefore follows that political (non-)subjectivity is often defined in terms of 
perception and the insistence that to be a spectator (that is, an inactive or passive 
onlooker) is to be silent, with the implication to be inactive is to be mute, to be active 
is to have a voice that is heard.506 In unifying the lone voice of the individual with that 
of the collective voice of the people a truly political intervention is created: ‘Nos cris 
isolés se perdraient dans le tumulte immense de la société ; mais unis en faisceaux 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
501 Blanqui, ‘Loi qui interdit au peuple la faculté de lire’, MA, p. 104. 
502 Blanqui, ‘Première Saisie’, March 1834, OI, p. 279.!
503 See Blanqui, ‘Attentat contre le peuple’, March 1834, OI, pp. 281-282.  
504 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 151 [27 February 1869].!
505 Rancière, La Mésentente, p. 63.  
506 Blanqui repeatedly uses this analogy: during the Restoration, he states in the ‘Rapport à la Société 
des Amis du Peuple’, MA, the people ‘se tut’ (p. 81); ‘Il restait spactateur silencieux’ (p. 82); ‘il épiait 
en silence’ (p. 83); ‘le peuple silencieux et cru démissionnaire depuis quinze ans’ (p. 84). See also in 
Le Libérateur where Blanqui speaks of ‘le silence de la rue’ (‘Pourquoi il n’y a plus d’émeutes’, 2 
February 1834, OI, pp. 266, 271).  
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d’acclamations, ils formeront une grande voix qui fera taire ces charmeurs de la 
tyrannie.’507  
So important is perception and the sensory that the issue remained a key 
concern of Blanqui’s writings, particularly in the early 1830s. But it also raises some 
important questions about Blanqui’s project more generally. The opening line of the 
‘But du journal’ of Le Libérateur declares that: ‘De toutes les exclusions qui pèsent 
sur le citoyen sans fortune, la plus douloureuse et la plus amèrement sentie, est celle 
qui lui interdit de publier sa pensée.’508 In a society in which the press is nothing more 
than the mouthpiece for the ‘classes opulentes’ and persecution means those men 
devoted to equality find ‘un gantelet de fer leur brise la parole sur les lèvres’, Blanqui 
writes that he ‘entreprend de braver l’interdiction lancée par l’aristocratie des écus 
contre le pauvre qui ose penser.’ Le Libérateur, the self-styled ‘Journal des opprimés’, 
was therefore conceived to ‘exposer en termes simples, clairs et précis, pourquoi le 
peuple est malheureux, et comment il doit cesser de l’être.’509 It offers a voice for 
those who have no voice in the political sphere. The tension here is obvious enough. 
To respond to the inaudibility of the poor by speaking on their behalf, speaking for 
and to them, rather than providing a platform or opening a space from which they can 
truly speak for themselves (a position Rancière would advocate) is no doubt 
indicative of the often excessively top-down nature of Blanqui’s politics. It could be 
said to reveal the lack of self-emancipatory practice within Blanqui’s project, 
informed as this by a belief in necessity of instruction, of the hierarchical transmission 
of knowledge from the enlightened to the unenlightened, from those who know to 
those who do not. Indeed, we must recall, as was outlined in Chapter 1, that for 
Blanqui the importance of newspapers and propaganda is also, and perhaps most !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
507 Blanqui, ‘Déclaration du Comité provisoire des Ecoles’, 22 January 1831, MA, p. 60.!
508 Blanqui, ‘Présentation et but du journal’, 2 February 1834, OI, p. 258.  
509 Ibid., p. 259.!
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fundamentally, rooted in his conception of the decisive role of intelligence and the 
insistence on popular enlightenment as the precondition for social emancipation.  
 
The untold suffering of work 
Rancière’s insistence on the aesthetic dimension of political subjectivity, though 
undeniably important and informative as far as Blanqui is concerned, nonetheless 
leads him to ignore or implicitly dismiss other factors at play in Blanqui’s conception 
of the proletariat and the people, particularly the human suffering caused by political 
marginalisation and the conditions of work, broadly defined. (We might in fact point 
out that the citations upon which Rancière’s reading is based are muddled, his 
conclusions perhaps misleading as a result.)510 Of course, a possible problem that 
presents itself here is locating the point at which Rancière’s reading of Blanqui ends 
and the exposition of his own political thought begins, if indeed such a demarcation 
can be established at all. On the other hand, one might respond that even as a broader 
discussion the exercise remains instructive and valid. With such caveats in mind, the 
assertion that Blanqui’s proletariat is impervious to material conditions nonetheless 
remains misleading.  
The defense speech, which Rancière likewise takes as his point of departure, 
depicts the proletariat or people as not only those with no political voice and no 
recognised part in the social order, but also those who suffer and whose suffering goes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
510 Rancière quotes Blanqui as stating that his self-styled ‘profession’ of proletariat ‘[c]’est la 
profession de trente million de Français qui vivent de leur travail…’. But this is a combination of two 
different exchanges between Blanqui and the judge. In the first exchange, on 10 December 1831, when 
the judge asks for Blanqui’s ‘profession’ and is met with the response of ‘prolétaire’, the judge states 
that it is not a profession, to which Blanqui declares: ‘Si ce n’est pas une profession, je suis sans 
profession.’ It is only on 10 January, and responding on this occasion to the key word of his ‘état’ and 
not ‘profession’, that Blanqui offers the famous reply cited at the beginning of this chapter: ‘C’est l’état 
de 30 millions de Français …’. (‘Procès des Quinze’, 10 December 1831 and 10 January 1832, OI, p. 
184, 186). Given that in Rancière’s analysis, as he himself states, ‘[t]out y tient à la double acceptation 
d’un même mot, celui de profession’ (La Mésentente, p. 62) this cannot but call into question some of 
his assertions. !
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unseen and unheard, the suffering excluded. Elucidating this point, much of the 
intervention first strives to pull away the veil of democratic inclusion and 
representation. Blanqui derides the Orléanists’ self-professed representative 
government, in which ‘cent mille bourgeois en forment ce qu’on appelle, par une 
ironie amère, l’élément démocratique.’511 Propping up this system - and returning to a 
theme evoked at the beginning of the speech when Blanqui declares the court and 
judicial system illegitmate and rejects its authority512 - the law is nothing more than 
an ideological tool of exclusion. ‘Les lois sont faites par cent mille électeurs, 
appliquées par cent mille jurés, exécutées par cent mille gardes nationaux urbains’, he 
states, asking the court in turn, and here we come to the crucial point, ‘que font les 
trente millions de prolétaires dans toutes ces évolutions ? Ils paient.’513 In reasserting 
the gap between the official order and the plight of the oppressed multitude, Blanqui’s 
proletariat is not only paying in the literal sense of the unequal distribution of the 
fiscal burden, but is also paying materially and physically for its ever-increasing 
impoverishment.  
How, if at all, does Blanqui believe the rich respond to the suffering for which 
they are responsible? While most remain blind or indifferent, the more astute among 
them sense that potential problems are afoot, and so offer tokenistic gestures to 
alleviate poverty - not out of humanitarian concern but as the minimal pragmatic 
measures necessary to prevent undermining their order and to save them from the 
potential ‘péril’ posed by a starving and hopeless multitude. In a metaphor that 
encapsulates the thrust of this argument, Blanqui reaffirms that social injustice exists 
between the domains of both material and political inequality, and any minor 
concessions will never end such injustice: ‘Quant aux droits politiques, il n’en faut !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
511 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, p. 65. 
512 See ibid., pp. 62-63.  
513 Ibid., p. 69!!
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pas parler, il ne s’agit que de jeter aux prolétaires un os à ronger.’514 The proletariat is 
starved of food and rights. Any form of recognition is solely the instrument of 
continued unrecognition: the privileged classes ‘ne reconnaîtraient au peuple que des 
appétits de brute, afin de s’arroger le droit de se dispenser ce qu’il faut d’aliments 
pour entretenir sa végétation animale qu’elles exploitent !’515 Even when ‘la tribune’ 
or the press offer some vacuous words of pity towards this misery, silence is imposed 
in the name of public safety, raising such matters is reproached as anarchy, and any 
remaining voices of dissent are ultimately imprisoned. No one is allowed to pose the 
real, profound questions which might disturb the social order. When the silence of 
subservience is finally returned, the supporters of the government claim France to be 
happy, peaceful and for order to reign.516 And so the proletariat continues to be 
unheard, their suffering continues in silence and without end, and the conflict at the 
heart of French society remains concealed beneath the apparently ‘tranquil waters’517 
of order. In a system that concedes nothing to the great majority of the people, that is 
arrogantly indifferent to injustice and the ‘si cruel outrage’ of present society, simply 
no opportunities or channels exist to break the very monopoly of power that only 
serves the imperatives of exploitation.518 In the eyes of the privileged few, the under-
privileged many are condemned, destined to have ‘leurs souffrances … leur état 
d’abjection sur la terre’ compensated only in another life.519 Unlike his accusers, 
however, Blanqui claims to hear the screams and cries of the starving. The exclusion 
of this group under the law, through the tax system, in the public sphere, indeed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
514 Ibid., p. 70. 
515 Ibid., p. 75. 
516 Ibdi., p. 68.  
517 Here I am thinking of Johan Galtung, who observes that ‘personal violence may more easily be 
noticed, even though the ‘tranquil waters’ of structural violence may contain much more violence’ 
(Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’, pp. 173-174). 
518 See Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, pp. 67, 70.  
519 Blanqui, ‘L’aristocratie et le peuple’, OI, p. 167; ‘De la législation’, OI, p. 170. 
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within all facets of the politico-social structure is a manifestation of injustice and 
inequality. Because of their exclusion from the public sphere, the proletariat’s plight, 
exposed by Blanqui as a product of the socio-political system, is not even recognised 
in the mainstream political discourse. It is untold – in both senses of the word - 
suffering. As Blanqui again asked in the late 1850s, and again referring to plebeians: 
‘Qui voudrait prêter l’oreille aux cris et aux pleurs de ces vils troupeaux tombant par 
milliers dans les abattoirs de l’histoire ?’520  
What of the relationship between the actor, work and the conditions of work? 
Worker, in Blanqui’s lexicon, to be sure is an extremely broad concept requiring 
explanation. Evoked largely in the Saint-Simonian sense, it denotes the producers, the 
vast majority of the population (‘thirty’ or ‘thirty-two million’ French men and 
women) who together form the working masses as distinct from the small group of 
rich, parasitic idlers whose wealth and power derives solely from the work of the 
(poor and powerless) majority.521 In turn, work is often valorized as an ideal and 
principle: together with enlightened thought the two compromise the exclusive 
‘sources de la richesse sociale’; ‘l’âme et la vie de l’humanité’, together they form the 
banner of equality, contrasted with ‘oisiveté et exploitation’ of privilege. Again 
presenting a set of rigid dichotomies, with thought and work, society breathes, grows 
and progresses; without them society is doomed to collapse, disintegration and 
death.522  
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520 Blanqui MSS 9581, fo. 39 [15 January 1859].  
521 Read in purely economic terms Blanqui’s many critics are right to point out how this fails to capture 
the social dynamics it describes, for as Max Weber of course showed capitalist accumulation is by no 
means linked to idleness - on the contrary. Blanqui for his part appears to later take account of this, 
using the term ‘oisif’ less and less in his later writings and even describing himself a form of Protestant 
ethic linked to economic activity (see for example Blanqui MSS 9587, fo. 204 [n.d.]).!The term ‘oisif’ 
did not disappear altogether, however, as seen, for example, in Blanqui, ‘L’Armée escalve et 
opprimée’, 31 October 1880, MA, p. 418.!
522 Blanqui ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, pp. 115-116; ‘Qui fait la 
soupe doit la manger’, OI, p. 291. 
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However (intentionally) broad and imprecise the notion, contrary to 
Rancière’s insistence, for Blanqui the proletariat unquestionably does imply, in the 
most general of senses, both work and, more importantly, the destitution and suffering 
caused by that work under the established order. Blanqui locates in the social relation 
between worker and employer (or worker and capitalist, wages and revenues) the 
source of human suffering.523 Just as the point of departure for Blanqui’s analysis of 
property is explicitly a question of its human impact, his analysis of production only 
mirrors this logic, sharing and extending its humanist concerns. A political actor – 
whatever its collective noun – is formed when individuals consciously and 
collectively directly unite in the name of their collective humanity, of their right to 
live a life free of the pain, suffering and misery inflicted upon them solely as a 
consequence of their lack of wealth and power.524 We might finally add that Blanqui 
willingly uses the word ‘victim’,525 a term Rancière rejects, to highlight the brutality 
of everyday life for the poor and, in so doing, revealing the unity between these 
victims of social forces and the victims of state repression in times of revolt, as we 
saw in the previous chapter. ‘Travailler, souffrir et mourir pour les/des nouveaux 
maitres, c’est le devoir qu’elle impose à la Plèbe par la mitraille, le bagne et la 
guillotine.’526 The proletariat names at once the expression of destitute suffering and 
the committed, active movement to alleviate it.  
All this is not to say, however, that Blanqui’s workers or proletariat should 
now be seen as sociological category. Blanqui’s conception of work and the worker 
still cuts across an entire range of sociological groups – artisans, peasants, labourers. 
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523 See, for example, Blanqui, ‘Présentation et but du journal’, OI, p. 259; ‘Qui fait la soupe doit la 
manger’, OI, p. 293.  
524 Blanqui, ‘Pourquoi il n’y a plus d’émeutes’, OI, p. 270. 
525 See, for example, Blanqui ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, p. 119; 
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Any concessions to work do not necessarily mean that his actor is a strictly socio-
economic category conceived in terms of its relation to the means of production. 
Blanqui’s actor does not emerge from the historical evolution of the modes of 
production and the capitalist wage relation. Blanqui’s actor is, first and foremost, a 
political actor created through its conscious voluntary action, not through its historical 
development as a specific socio-economic group which in turn accords it a privileged 
political role and agency. Though Blanqui does on occasion come close to aspects of 
Marxian thought, as we have seen, those who suggest Blanqui pre-empts the 
sociological class categories and economic analyses of the late Marx’s critique of 
political economy or the Marxian conception of class struggle more generally are 
clutching at straws, attempting to establish prophetic insight or linear development 
where the actual substance of such claims is far from clear, its textual illustration far 
from abundant, its conclusions far from convincing. (I return to the comparison with 
historical materialism in Chapter 5.) At all times Blanqui’s fundamental distinction 
remains between the rich, the small group at the top of society holding all wealth and 
power who produce and contribute nothing but gain everything, and the workers, the 
majority without wealth or power who produce and contribute everything but gain 
nothing. This division, in turn, can be reduced to two sets of moral and political 
principles and ideals, privilege versus equality. The primacy of political form over 
strict socio-economic content therefore still stands.  
The point, instead, is to acknowledge the role of impoverishment and material 
inequality in the construction of this political schema, to understand that Blanqui’s 
proletariat is at once an impoverished worker and a potential political actor.527 Work, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
527 Cf. Buret, who similarly wrote: ‘Les ouvriers sont aussi libres de devoirs envers leurs maîtres que 
ceux-ci le sont envers eux ; ils les considèrent comme des hommes d’une classe différente, opposée et 
même ennemie. Isolés de la nation, mis en dehors de la communauté sociale et politique, seuls avec 
leurs besoins et leurs misères, ils s’agitent pour sortir de cette effrayante solitude, et, comme les 
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in this sense, is primarily a political concept operating as a divide between exploiters 
and exploited, oppressors and oppressed, in which the subjective commitment to 
moral and political principles – dignity, justice, equality, freedom – are privileged 
over a historical materialist critique of the internal mechanisms of capitalist 
production generating the objective conditions for subjective engagement. Speaking 
of common destitution and its common alleviation through collective emancipation to 
bring about the freedom and equality of all, Blanqui could be placed in the tradition of 
humanist socialism for which the conditions of the poor as those excluded from power 
and the fruits of prosperity is so crucial. Is this humanist commitment to the common 
people and to equality and emancipation as moral principles not in fact reminiscent of 
the young Marx’s well-known first description of the proletariat? Articulated in 
‘philosophical’ or ‘ideal’ terms that predate his later ‘actual’, ‘concrete’ conception of 
the proletariat by way of the ‘critique of political economy’,528 Marx depicts ‘a class 
of civil society which is not a class of civil society, a class which is the dissolution of 
all classes, a sphere which has a universal character because of its universal suffering 
and which lays claim to no particular right because the wrong it suffers is not a 
particular wrong but wrong in general’?529 Certainly, Blanqui suggests a universal 
character of proletarian suffering and conversely the proletariat’s common humanity 
in the face of its dehumanization. We can also add that equality as a general principle 
denotes the end of social distinctions, of all forms of domination, bringing about 
freedom and equality through democracy – the rule of the common people. In terms 
of the actor, Blanqui’s vision of post-revolutionary society in this respect inverts the 
basic distinction at stake in his conception of revolutionary politics according to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
barbares auxquels on les a compares, ils méditent peut-être une invasion’ (cited in Chevalier, Classes 
laborieuses et classes dangereuses, p. 453). 
528 Daniel Bensaïd, Marx for Our Times, trans. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2002), pp. 193-194. 
529 Marx, ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction’, Early Writings, p. 256. Rancière also 
alludes to this passage, see La Mésentente, p. 39; Aux bords du politique, pp. 118-119.!
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which, as we have seen, the people either remain nothing or become everything. 
Having politically become everything, the realisation thereafter of a society devoid of 
‘différences (diversité, multiplicité) de classes’530 demands the people once again 
become nothing, in a sense; the people must disintegrate or dissolve, to adopt Marx’s 
term, along with the transitional power that facilitates this dissolution.  
Where does this leave Blanqui and Rancière? We have seen that for Rancière 
to be amongst the ‘uncounted’ of an existing social order is to be unacknowledged as 
an equal speaking being; this excluded part of the community is perceived only 
through its animalistic voicing of pleasure and suffering. But does inequality not 
amount to more than speech and the injustice of its miscount? Is it not also a matter of 
what that miscount materially produces so long as it is sustained, of how being 
unseen, unheard and uncounted denies the expression of what it concretely means to 
be amongst the unseen, unheard and uncounted, of the realities of the everyday 
existence of those deemed non-existent? Therein lies the importance of suffering, as 
well as pain and deprivation, alongside intelligence and speech in any account of 
inequality. The proletariat may at present only be recognised as the figure of passive 
suffering, it may at best only receive vacuous compassionate gestures from those who 
ultimately posit the structural continuation of the proletariat’s role and position - and 
Blanqui shares Rancière’s concerns in this respect. But that is not to say that politics 
should not seek to fully and forcefully expose the status quo’s structural imperative of 
dehumanization, suffering and other forms of inequality from the principle that they 
have no place in a truly free and humane society. ‘Le jour où par la communication 
universelle de la pensée, toute l’espèce humaine ressentira électriquement les griefs 
du plus humbles de ses membres,’ writes Blanqui, ‘ce jour-là sera proclamée la !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
530 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 107 [14 October 1867]. See also Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, 
MA, p. 110; ‘Tout l’espoir des prolétaires est dans la République’, OI, p. 255. 
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souveraineté absolue de la faiblesse et l’enfant qui nait sera roi, parce qu’il est l’être 
faible par excellence.’531 Rancière does not seem to have much concern for the 
material inequalities that produce and indeed reproduce aesthetic inequality. Rejecting 
the notion of exclusion as unthinking suffering, Rancière’s conception of politics 
affirms intelligence without any obvious means of transcending suffering. And though 
Blanqui certainly expresses similar concerns regarding the (in)equality of speaking 
beings, he is nonetheless also acutely aware of the harmful consequences of non-
recognition beyond a solely perceptive sense, bringing into focus the suffering, misery 
and impoverishment of the excluded and the unheard. It is not just a matter of 
asserting the basic fact of the injustice of an unegalitarian social order, but of going 
beyond its (no less significant) non-recognition tout court to actually interrogate the 
material conditions of this injustice. Therein resides the socio-economic content of 
Blanqui’s proletariat to complement (yet not surpass) its primarily political form. The 
social and the aesthetic are united in and through a principled political struggle. 
‘Prolétaries qui souffrez et qui faites entendre d’inutiles plaintes, c’est la république 
seule, c’est l’égalité qui peut mettre un terme à nos souffrances’.532 Proletariat, for 
Blanqui, subjectifies the ‘uncounted’ as the toiling masses and the impoverished 
workers, those who can live only from their labour and are excluded from wealth and 
power as opposed to the privileged, those who can prosper purely from their birthright 
and guarantee of wealth, education and power. Proletariat names at once workers and 
excluded outcasts, an occupation and the subjectivation of a wrong. Blanqui affirms 
the common humanity of the proletariat in spite of its systemic dehumanization and 
suffering. 
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531 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 287 [n.d.]. 
532 Blanqui, ‘Tout l’espoir des prolétaires est dans la République’, OI, p. 255.  
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We might therefore say that in Blanqui’s understanding of ‘la guerre entre les 
riches et les pauvres’ the oppression of the proletariat functions in two closely-linked 
dimensions. First, there is the material reality of injustice itself: the proletariat goes 
hungry and is dying of starvation while the rich lead a life of opulent excess, and 
indeed the structure of society is such that the latter is dependent on the former, thus 
exploitation serves inequality. Second, there is the oppression at work that enables 
this suffering to go unheard and unrecognised. Dispossessed from the land, the 
‘instruments de travail’ and the fruits of their labour, and disenfranchised from the 
political sphere, the proletariat is discarded to the periphery and a state of exclusion 
where they face misery and starvation. Each form of oppression therefore reinforces 
the other in a self-perpetuating cycle. Injustice is the condition of exclusion, exclusion 
the condition of injustice - both are symptomatic of inequality, both the condition of 
the proletariat.  
 
A form of political reasoning is, then, the framework through which we should read 
Blanqui’s conception of the people and the proletariat. Blanqui’s people or proletariat, 
understood as in the work of Laclau and Rancière as a consciously broad political 
construction, designates the anonymous masses, the invisible and forgotten multitude, 
the excluded ‘barbarians’ and ‘brutes’ whose struggle to assert its equality in an order 
in which it counts for nothing will necessarily bring it into conflict with that very 
order. Blanqui invites us to reconsider how we define the marginalised, the 
impoverished and the oppressed, those who continue to be excluded from political, 
social and economic wealth and power. Moreover, having acknowledged the central 
importance of choice and commitment for Blanqui’s politics in Chapter 2, we now see 
how his use of the people and the proletariat as an extension of this principled 
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political engagement. Blanqui attests to a timeless political conviction: no matter what 
the guise, no matter where it occurs, as long as injustice and inequality prevail, so too 
will the politics of confronting it, of naming it, and of ending it. Further than Laclau 
and Rancière, however, Blanqui insists on the material empowerment of the people, 
on the seizing and sustained exercise of its collective power, as the prerequisite to its 
emancipation. It is to the question of how to collectively act in line with these insights 
that I shall now turn in addressing Blanqui’s voluntarism, at which point we will be 
able to begin to piece together some of the basic elements of Blanqui’s politics 





Chapter 4 – Voluntarism and Will 
‘La gloire est dans le péril affronté volontairement pour le triomphe des convictions ; 




We can now begin to piece together some of the constituent elements of Blanqui’s 
project. The previous three chapters revealed a politics organised around a theory of 
the conscious and committed actor. For Blanqui, we have seen, communism results 
from an enlightened and active collective political movement. Enlightened thought 
precedes decisive action. Unenlightened, unguided and uninformed political action is 
doomed to manipulation, appropriation and disintegration – to failure, in short. So, 
moving beyond the enlightened prerequisite, what are the characteristics of political 
action? We have considered who will carry out this mobilization, but we have only 
begun to consider how and why those actors will do so. This brings us to the question 
of voluntarism and will, of Blanqui’s conscious volition.  
 This chapter will begin by assessing the main features of Blanqui’s 
voluntarism, namely that politics is a battle of wills and so the first decisive step is the 
voluntary decision to fully assume this struggle; that any emancipatory political will 
must be grounded in the capacity for its own practical exercise; that the actual form 
and consequences of a process of collective volition are neither predetermined nor 
prescribed but only created through its own exercise; that political will demands a 
sense of moral duty and purpose, a principled conviction, unyielding resolve and 
unwavering faith, not least to overcome all the obstacles that will inevitably appear on 
the path to its realisation; and finally that all forms of voluntary servitude or collusion 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
533 Blanqui MSS 9586, fo 402 [n.d.].  
! 187!
with the forces of oppression prevent the realisation of a process of collective 
volition, and so must be renounced. In each of these respects Blanqui offers valuable 
insights into the theory and practice of voluntarist politics. Like many other 
organising principles of Blanqui’s thought, voluntarism has not received systematic 
treatment. The task of reconstructing Blanqui’s conception of political will is 
therefore the aim of the first half of the chapter. I will then engage with what are, in 
my view, some of the major problems or limitations that Blanqui’s conception of 
volition confronts, particularly when considered in light of the notion of post-
revolutionary transition.   
 
How to begin 
 
What is meant by political will? Following Hallward,534 my definition of this 
contentious and neglected notion turns to the tradition from which Blanqui’s own 
conception of will derives that begins with Rousseau and finds later articulation and 
amendment in the writings and practice of Robespierre and Saint Just, Marx and 
Lenin, Gramsci and Che Guevara, amongst many others. I shall limit myself here to 
Rousseau, however, as both the theoretical point of departure for the tradition as a 
whole and for Blanqui in particular.  
‘Since, in order to will, it is necessary to be free’, Rousseau writes, political 
will begins when ‘[e]ach of us puts his person and all his power in common under the 
supreme direction of the general will’. A group of individuals’ conscious act of 
voluntary association produces a ‘moral and collective body’, the people, of which all 
willing individuals are part and through which a unified, common, general will is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
534 Here as before I follow Hallward’s conception of political will as outlined in ‘The Will of the 
People’, which also includes an overview of the extent to which the will has become arguably the most 
disputed notion in contemporary philosophy and political thought.  
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created and actively affirmed as the will of the people and, by extension, as a 
declaration of sovereign authority.535 Blanqui broadly follows the most salient 
features of Rousseau’s conception of political will: enlightened thought and 
knowledge; deliberate, voluntary action; collective association, concentration and 
organisation; constituting and imposing a collective goal, cause or principle; the 
resources of duty and principle to sustain or preserve this collective volition and 
popular empowerment.536 (As noted in Chapter 3, Blanqui also shares what might be 
seen as a limitation of Rousseau’s political will – namely, its confinement to the 
boundaries of the nation-state.) Before exploring these features I shall first focus on 
the most basic assumption in Blanqui’s account of voluntarism: conscious volition.  
 
Conscious volition  
Let us briefly recap the philosophical basis of Blanqui’s voluntarism as touched upon 
in Chapter 1. Blanqui’s thought begins with the strict division between the realms of 
nature and humanity. The capacity for thought is what distinguishes humanity from 
nature. Reason separates humanity from animals, enabling it to understand society 
individually and collectively and affording it the capacity, the potential power, to 
bring society into line with reason itself. To activate this capacity intelligence must be 
affirmative; it must actively work towards its self-realisation. Blanqui’s dualism 
therefore privileges ‘pensée-volonté’ as the force behind socio-political change.537 An !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
535 Rousseau, ‘Discourse on Political Economy’, p. 10; The Social Contract, pp. 55-56. 
536 Perhaps nowhere else does Blanqui bring these elements together so clearly as in Le Libérateur. 
Equality is, Blanqui writes, ‘le principe d’ordre et de justice éternelle, destine à fermer les plaies 
hideuses creusées par le privilège ; l’Égalité appelle toutes les vertus et refoule tous les vices. Elle tue 
l’égoïsme et ne vit que de dévouement ; c’est par le dévouement qu’elle réunit et qu’elle associe les 
hommes ; c’est par l’intelligence seule qu’elle les gouverne et qu’elle fait concourir leurs efforts à un 
but commun qui est le bien-être de tous. C’est enfin l’unité et la fraternité qu’elle établit sur la terre, de 
même que le privilège n’y produit que haine et isolement’ (Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, 2 
February 1834, MA, p. 110). See also Blanqui, ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, 1868, MA, pp. 
261-262.  
537 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo 53 [15 April 1868]. 
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active will is a product of enlightened thought, yet enlightened thought cannot but 
remain mere abstract speculation without the will to materially realise it. And so from 
Blanqui’s dualism emerges the basis of his conception of conscious volition: 
‘L’œuvre de la nature est fatale et s’accomplit suivant une loi immuable. L’œuvre de 
la pensée humaine est mobile comme la pensée elle-même et dépend de la volonté, de 
l’énergie ou de la faiblesse.’538 A form of dialectical movement between instruction 
and thought is precisely how a conscious will can be actively encouraged, again as we 
have already seen.  
Although the philosophical grounding of Blanqui’s voluntarism only received 
substantial articulation in the 1860s, its core organising principle can in fact be traced 
back to his formative political engagements in post-1830 France. Already in 1832 
Blanqui carries a basic assumption of all voluntarist politics, if not, one might 
suggest, of all politics tout court: ‘nous le pouvons ! si nous le voulons’.539 In linking 
vouloir and pouvoir, willing and doing, Blanqui, after Rousseau, ties collective will to 
collective capacity. This can be seen to offer greater precision to the earlier assertion 
from 1831: ‘nous la voulons et nous l’aurons’.540 In affirming the importance of 
pouvoir, of the actual capacity or the doing, Blanqui makes clear that we can will 
what we are collectively capable of doing. If we have the collective will to realize a 
goal or end then we can realise it, but its realisation remains at every moment subject 
to our collective capacity to do so.541 We are therefore collectively capable of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
538 Blanqui, ‘Développement de l’athéisme’, n.d., NDNM, p. 46.  
539 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, 2 February 1832, MA, p. 98.  
540 Blanqui, ‘Déclaration du Comité provisoire des Ecoles’, 22 January 1831, MA, p. 60. Earlier in the 
same text, Blanqui writes that students and young people ‘ont le droit de s’associer pour diriger leurs 
efforts vers un but commun, et ils useront de ce droit’ (ibid., p. 58). Some of the foundational elements 
of this Rousseauist conception of political will – the act of association, collectively working towards a 
common goal – are thus already in place.   
541 As Hallward affirms: ‘the practical exercise of will distinguishes itself from mere wish or fantasy 
through its capacity to initiate a process of genuine “realization”’ (Hallward, ‘The Will of the People’, 
p. 25). My analysis of the conjunction of vouloir and pouvoir follows Hallward’s discussion of this 
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realising a goal or project so long as we are prepared to collectively will it. Across the 
course of his life and work Blanqui would affirm this basic principle again and again, 
be it in the midst of the upheaval of 1848 or in the seeming impotence of Belgian 
exile in 1868.542 Politics means making a choice, deciding to take a principled stand, 
and then actively willing it. When collectively exercised, subjective determination has 
the capacity to will and realise any common goal or principle – this is the urgent, 
sanguine message at the heart of Blanqui’s voluntarism.  
 
A conflict of wills 
One significant assumption of Blanqui’s project is that society comprises a conflict of 
wills. Unlike nature, established human relations are in no way inevitable, the 
necessary result of a natural or historical progression and development. All social 
structures and norms, whether formally enshrined in statute and political institutions 
or simply upheld in the dominant way of understanding oneself and one’s relation to 
others, derive from a dominant will. For Blanqui the law, as we have already seen, 
‘est la volonté de celui qui a la force. Reste à savoir si cette volonté est conforme au 
bien.’543 It follows that, within Blanqui’s view of society as a conscious construction 
based on specific interests, will serves a particular intellectual conception of how 
society should best be organised in order to meet those interests. In the case of an 
oppressive established order, having imposed its will upon the people it will not 
readily relinquish that dominance – quite the contrary: it actively seeks to neutralise 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
issue in ‘Willing and able: political will and self-determination’, lecture given at the American 
University in Paris.!
542 See Blanqui, ‘Les massacres de Rouen. La Société républicaine centrale au gouvernement 
provisoire’, 2 May 1848, MA, p. 142; Blanqui, ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, MA, p. 262. I 
return to these two examples below.  
543 Blanqui MSS 9586, fo. 402 [n.d.]. See also Blanqui MSS 9590(1) fo. 278 [n.d.]. Cf. Rousseau : 
‘laws … are nothing but the record of our acts of will. … Laws properly speaking are no more than a 
society’s conditions of association’ (The Social Contract, p. 74). 
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any popular threats to its power, as Blanqui notes when contemplating the struggles in 
Saint-Étienne in 1848-49. ‘Jamais le capital ne consentira à l’abandon de la moindre 
parcelle de sa puissance’, he writes. ‘Il ne veut pas, il ne peut pas faire de 
concessions.’544  
 An oppressive order’s crucial ruse, however, is its ability to pursue its own 
private interests ‘sous prétexte des intérêts généreux’.545 Further and more damaging 
still is the conflation in the popular imagination of a consciously organised order 
based on its own self-interests with a form of natural fate or historical destiny. This 
strategy has been achieved so successfully that the mechanisms of organisation and 
will are totally obscured, to the extent that a contingent act of conscious volition 
becomes perceived as inevitable objective fact. One could say that for Blanqui the 
oppressor’s greatest trick is convincing the world he did not exist.546 ‘L’oppression’, 
Blanqui therefore insists by contrast, ‘a triomphé, sans doute, partout et toujours, 
jusque aujourd’hui, mais non point sans combat.’547 As with Rousseau and Marx,548 
for Blanqui all forms of hegemonic power, whether that of the rich or of the people, 
are the product of conscious thought, of conscious will and organisation - that is, of 
human praxis. All social orders deploy consciously conceived means in the active 
pursuit of consciously conceived ends. Blanqui even summons a maxim more 
commonly associated with revolutionary movements in order to bring the oppressive 
practices and strategies of the established order to the fore. ‘Qui veut la fin, veut les 
moyens’, he proclaims. ‘Abrutir pour exploiter, amener l’homme à la docilité du !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
544 Capital, Blanqui adds, ‘veut avoir raison de l’audace de ses sujets, et en finir avec ces associations 
qui ont osé mettre une borne à sa puissance’ (Blanqui, ‘Saint-Étienne: Lutte entre les fabricants et les 
ouvriers’, December 1849, CSII, pp. 227-228). 
545 Blanqui, ‘Projet de discours’, August 1867, CSII, p. 153.  
546 For an instructive example of the use of and implied contrast between destiny and conscious 
organisation, see the assertion: ‘La destinée régulière des faibles, leur mission providentielle est de 
servir de pâture aux forts. La société n’est autre chose que cette anthropophagie organisée’ (Blanqui, 
‘Rapport gigantesque de Thiers sur l’assistance publique’, 1850, CSII, p. 246).!!
547 Blanqui, ‘Garnier’, July 1870, CSI, p. 248. 
548 For Marx on this point see Löwy, The Theory of Revolution in the Young Marx, p. 108. 
! 192!
cheval, telle est la visée sociale’ of the oppressor of old and new.549 The will of the 
rich acts in the name of oppression, the will of the people in the name of justice; both 
wills emanate from an intellectual conception of man and society, both serve a 
particular set of social interests: the privileged and duplicitous few on one hand, the 
impoverished and oppressed multitude on the other. Again, Blanqui’s politics begins 
with taking the first decisive step and assuming this inevitable conflict of wills; 
politics means consciously associating, organising and asserting a popular will 
capable of overcoming the will of the privileged. ‘L’ouvrier, par la force de l’union, 
cesse de subir la volonté de ses anciens dominateurs.’550 This leads to the question of 
how this will is formed in the first instance and how it becomes capable of 
undertaking this task.  
 
Collective volition as positive and practical exercise  
One of the root causes of the ultimate defeat of July 1830 in Blanqui’s eyes was that 
‘les masses n’avaient exprimé formellement aucune volonté politique positive. Ce qui 
s’agitait en elles, ce qui les avait jetées sur la place publique,’ he suggests, ‘c’était la 
haine des Bourbons, la résolution ferme de les renverser. Il y avait du bonapartisme et 
de la république dans les vœux qu’elles formaient pour le gouvernement qui devait 
sortir des barricades.’551 At least three consequences follow from this assertion. First, 
an upsurge of defiant indignation or opposition, anti-Bourbonism in the case of 1830, 
is inadequate when it comes to the subsequent, decisive work of formulating and 
declaring a collective and egalitarian goal or project, which will require concentrating 
and organising a power capable of sustaining the initial popular mobilization in order !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
549 Blanqui, ‘Discours du fabricant-sénateur Comte de Mimeral’, February 1866, CSII, p. 303. For the 
same idea with regard to religion, see Blanqui, ‘Puissance d’oraganisation du christianisme’, n.d., 
NDNM, pp. 64-65. 
550 Blanqui, ‘Saint-Étienne: Lutte entre les fabricants et les ouvriers’, CSII, pp. 226. 
551 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, MA, p. 86. 
! 193!
to collectively determine and realise that project as an act of sovereignty.552 In 
Blanqui’s eyes opposition to hereditary monarchy is not, by extension, an affirmation 
or exercise of justice, freedom and equality, as the people discovered in the wake of 
July when their fellow enemies of the Restoration, the bourgeoisie, simply replaced 
one despotism of private interests with another upon seizing power. A genuine act of 
popular will, Blanqui reasons, is capable of articulating what it stands for and 
implementing it. By clearly stating its principles a collective actor will also create a 
rupture and force the taking of sides, thereby exposing those who oppose and seek to 
repress and deceive it. In July, however, the people did not go beyond anti-
Bourbonism in order to form, declare and enforce a collective will as sovereign, nor, 
more decisively, did they believe or know themselves to be capable of constituting 
and sustaining that power themselves - hence their inability to distinguish between 
their genuine allies and enemies; hence their readiness, having offered alliance with 
and accepted the leadership of their adversaries, to put down their arms and willingly 
surrender their concentrated and collective power to the bourgeois usurpers; and 
hence their transformation, following the bourgeois betrayal, from an active, 
empowered and concentrated force to a passive, inert and divided spectator to the 
drama in which they previously had the leading and decisive role.553 However 
resolute and courageous, popular mobilisation can only lead to popular empowerment 
if it is driven by the will to formulate and then realise a project based on collective 
interests.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
552 As Rousseau states: ‘a will is either general, or it is not; it is the will of the body of the people, or of 
a part only. In the first case, this will, once declared, is an act of sovereignty and has legal authority’ 
(Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 64). 
553 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, MA, pp. 85-87. Blanqui would later lament that 
‘si la revolution avait fait son devoir en 1830, en 1848, ce demi-siecle si tristement perdu aurait suffi 
pour toucher le but’ (Blanqui, Le communisme, avenir de la société’, 1869-70, CSI, p. 182). 
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Blanqui extends these principles to form a broader - and particularly 
stimulating - critique of resistance to injustice as merely a minimal level of political 
engagement. On many occasions the term is invoked as a necessary though ultimately 
unsubstantial endeavour, often accompanying a depiction of resignation (‘même la 
pensée d’une résistance’; ‘l’idée seule de la résistance’; ‘une ombre de résistance’).554 
Far from being an end, resistance is and can only ever remain a beginning. Resistance 
must be linked ‘to the practice of emancipation. If resistance is defined first and 
foremost as resistance to oppression, domination or coercion,’ Hallward recently 
asserted, ‘then engagement in resistance would itself involve some appeal to the 
normative criteria of freedom and the work of self-liberation.’555 A note from the 
Critique Sociale lucidly illustrates Hallward’s point. A strike, Blanqui writes, ‘c’est 
l’idée simple, la résistance à l’oppression. Tous s’y rallient.’ Blanqui even goes so far 
as describing a strike as ‘la seule arme vraiment populaire dans la lutte contre le 
capital’. And yet precisely because they can but remain a temporary form of mass 
resistance to the structures of capitalist exploitation, strikes – much like revolutionary 
seizures of power – are not ends in themselves so much as an initial means of popular 
mobilisation through which to further assemble, concentrate and then organise the 
popular power and political process through which capital can be overthrown and 
enduring social justice created. ‘Appuyées provisoirement sur la grève comme moyen 
défensif contre l’oppression du capital,’ Blanqui explains, ‘les masses populaires 
doivent concentrer tous leurs efforts vers les changements politiques, reconnu seuls 
capables d’opérer une transformation sociale et la répartition des produits selon la 
justice.’556 At stake in militant politics, Blanqui is right to affirm, is far more than an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
554 Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 466-467 [June 1850]; 9590(2), fo. 369 [6 September 1852].!
555 Hallward, ‘Defiance or emancipation?’, p. 25. 
556 Blanqui, ‘Grève et coopération’, October 1867, CSII, pp. 166-167&! ‘The strength of the people,’ 
Rousseau similarly recognises, ‘is effective only when it is concentrated: it is dissipated and lost when 
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ephemeral rupture in the prevailing order of domination but actually forming and 
exercising a collective, organised power from which to overcome the order of 
domination as such. This is precisely why, as Blanqui notes, the concentrated will of 
‘les masses populaires’ poses such a threat to the established order of privilege and 
private interests. It explains why the forces of oppression seek to maintain the 
workers in their ‘individualité d’atome’, content with the so-called freedom of 
individual interests; it is why when it becomes a question of ‘un peu de véritable 
liberté, qu’on réclame en son nom la faculté d’associer ses efforts contre l’oppression 
industrielle du capital, on prétend l’isoler dans son impuissance individuelle.’557 The 
established order and the exercise of exploitative social relations rely on an 
uninformed, passive, unorganised and divided population.558  
Just as momentary disruptions to an established power are inadequate when 
compared with the real, decisive work of establishing and exercising power itself, 
Blanqui adds that emancipatory politics is not a matter of making demands to and 
receiving concessions from an established power but of the people, a voluntary 
association of individuals, organising and imposing their own collective power so as 
to formulate and assert common not private interests as the fundamental, guiding 
principle of social arrangements. Those who think the privileged would step forward 
as the agents of change to in any way compromise a system from which they prosper 
are under the sway of naïve fantasy. History and its political struggles are Blanqui’s 
witness to this. In 1789 had the people humbly begged the nobility to relinquish their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
spread out, like the force of gunpowder, which ignites only in the mass, and not when it is scattered on 
the ground’ (Rousseau, The Social Contract, pp. 115-116). !
557 Blanqui, ‘Les articles 415 et 416 contre les coalitions’, 1849, CSII, pp. 175-176. 
558 ‘Ce qu’il faut à ce parti, c’est abrutissement des masses. L’exploitation n’est possible qu’à ce prix. 
Des animaux stupides, dociles et infatigables, tel est le personnel populaire. A créer pour le maintien de 
l’ordre social’ (Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 87 [16 March 1866]). 
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feudal rights they would have been punished for insolence.559 The passing of 
historical time did not change the terms of the political struggle. ‘Ils sont furieux de 
recevoir la loi des ouvriers’, Blanqui notes with regard to the factory owners in Saint-
Étienne half a century later having to comply with the ‘puissance nouvelle’ of the 
workers’ association, Société populaire, and prophesising the city’s ruin as a result. 
Why did this cause such fury? Quite simply because the rule of the people defies the 
most basic existing relations of power. When it came to legislation hitherto the 
factory owners ‘étaient habitués à la faire. C’est la condition de l’ordre social actuel. 
Le capital commande et n’obéit pas. Dès qu’il ne peut plus dominer, il crie à 
l’oppression. La liberté pour lui, c’est le pouvoir absolu. Il n’admet d’autres rapports 
avec le travail que ceux de maitre à esclave.’560 For Blanqui the law, properly 
understood, is an act of the general will. As he said of the people in 1832: ‘Il veut 
faire et il fera les lois qui doivent le régir : alors ces lois ne seront plus faites contre lui 
; elles seront faites pour lui parce qu’elles le seront par lui.’561 
The second point that emerges from Blanqui’s analysis of the failure of July 
1830 is the belief that political will must forever remain linked to its practical 
exercise. Like Rousseau and the Jacobins before him, Blanqui’s ‘volonté positive’ 
denotes the actual, material realisation of a capacity. Recall that according to the 
maxim ‘nous le pouvons ! si nous le voulons’ the capacity to realise freedom and 
equality is dependent on the capacity to will it. Insofar as a collective group is unified 
and organised, determined and resolute in the willing of a goal or ideal it is capable of 
doing so. (As we have seen, Blanqui sees Paris as having the concentrated capacities 
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559 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, 12 January 1832, MA, p. 70. 
560 Blanqui, Blanqui, ‘Saint-Étienne: Lutte entre les fabricants et les ouvriers’, CSII, p. 226. 
561 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, p. 71. Cf. ‘Will commands the 
initiation of action, not representation. An exercise in political will involves taking power, not 
receiving it, on the assumption that (as a matter of ‘reason’ or ‘natural right’) the people are always 
already entitled to take it’ (Hallward, ‘The Will of the People’, p. 23).!
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to realise their collective will and impose it on the country as a whole.) And the 
practical work of willing would continue to guide the post-revolutionary social order, 
Blanqui contends, as he sets out in the broadest of terms the manner in which an 
enlightened popular will would be exercised and would see to the organisation of 
socio-economic and political relations. After the work of popular enlightenment was 
completed – a problematic issue to which we shall return below – an enlightened 
general will could govern society through the free, active and enlightened citizenry of 
whom it would be constituted. ‘Tous les travailleurs, devenus, d’instruments passifs, 
des citoyens éclairés,’ Blanqui describes, reaffirming the centrality of ‘pensée-
volonté’ as the dual process of collective empowerment and emancipation, 
‘associeraient spontanément leurs intelligences et leurs bras, et le problème de 
l’organisation du travail selon la justice se trouverait résolu.’562 The ‘grande 
association’563 of the people, ‘la démocratie entière, sans distinction de nuances’,564 as 
Blanqui later describes it, would empower and thereby realise the capacity for popular 
self-determination, enabling general interests to prevail over private interests in the 
arrangement of social and economic life. ‘Créations industrielles, travaux publics, 
seront l’œuvre féconde de la volonté générale, et non plus le jeu ruineux de la 
spéculation ou du pouvoir absolu.’565 Communism, ‘l’association intégrale’,566 is the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
562 Blanqui, ‘Projet de discours’, CSII, p. 154. The general outline of an emancipated society found in 
the Formulaire de Réception à la Société des Saisons of 1837 again attests to Rousseau’s legacy. 
Indeed, in many ways the text effectively amounts to a faithful restatement of Rousseau’s political 
theory: the revolutionary overthrow of royalty and the destruction of aristocracy and privilege will 
establish the ‘governement du peuple par lui-même’, a republic founded on equality, imposing equal 
duties (‘L’obéissance à la volonté générale, le dévouement à la patrie, et à la fraternité envers chaque 
membre de la nation’) and according equal rights (‘Le droit à l’existance, à la condition du travail’, ‘Le 
doit à l’éducation’ and ‘Le droit électoral’) to each person. Only those who fulfill their duties to the 
social body in turn receive rights from it; only those who participate in and thus actively constitute the 
sovereign authority form citizens (as individuals) and the people (as a collective). The law ‘n’est autre 
chose que l’expression de la volonté générale’, and which is prepared by a chamber of deputies before 
being submitted before the people for approval or rejection. See ‘Formulaire de réception à la Société 
des Saisons’, 1837, OI, pp. 382-383.  
563 Blanqui, ‘Projet de discours’, CSII, pp. 151, 153. 
564 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 181.!
565 Blanqui, ‘Le luxe’, n.d., CSI, p. 109. 
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name of the only possible social organisation which can establish ‘l’égalité absolue, 
moyen unique de concilier les impérieuses prétentions de tous’,567 for if freedom 
means ‘[la] parité sociale entre les individus … il suit que la liberté a pour limite 
l’égalité.’ Therein lies the conjuncture within Rousseau’s thought between the 
individual and the social body of which the individual constitutes: only the common 
and complete association of individuals can at once allow individual freedom to 
flourish and protect every individual from the egoist private interests of 
individualism.568 Much like Rousseau’s balance sheet on the civil state,569 Blanqui 
sees the loss of a certain kind of freedom as the means to gain another. Just as 
Rousseau maintains that ‘to be driven by our appetites alone is slavery, while to obey 
a law that we have imposed on ourselves is freedom’,570 Blanqui too prioritises the 
freedom from oppression and domination over the so-called freedom of individual 
gain and egoist self-enrichment through the exploitation of others.571 Hence the reign 
of individualism is that of ‘l’ignorance, de la sauvagerie (et de la bestialité)’,572 while 
only ‘l’Humanité, être multiple’573 can solve the problems of society and emancipate 
all its individual members. But that is not to say that economic and political 
association can be the result of coercion or compulsion: ‘il faut déclarer nettement que 
nul ne pourra jamais être forcé de s’adjoindre avec son champ à une association 
quelconque, et que, s’il y entre, ce sera toujours de sa pleine et libre volonté.’574 
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566 Blanqui, ‘Capital et travail’, n.d., p. 74; ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 189. It is 
instructive to note that Blanqui also speaks of ‘l’association intégrale de tout le pays’. See Blanqui, ‘Le 
communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 210. 
567 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 212. 
568 Ibid., p. 189. 
569 ‘What man loses by the social contract is his natural freedom and an unlimited right to anything by 
which he is tempted and can obtain; what he gains is his civil freedom and the right of property over 
everything that he possesses’ (Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 59). 
570 Ibid., p. 59.  
571 See Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, pp. 187-188. 
572 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 58-59 [15 March 1869].  
573 Blanqui, ‘L’usure’, n.d., pp. 45-46.!
574 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 210.   
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Blanqui is forever emphatic that genuine political subjectivity begins with genuine 
freedom – that is, with conscious volition. The act of collective association is a 
product of individual voluntary choice and conscious decision, or it is not.575 The 
‘œuvre commune’576 of association is, by definition, a collective activity. The one 
exception to this, the groups who cannot be part of the will of the people in this sense, 
are those who seek to deceive and oppress the people; these groups will be forced to 
either submit to the rule of the sovereignty of people or be punished as usurpers and 
enemies of the people.577! 
An actual, collective process of political willing therefore cannot preconceive 
the actual form its ends will take. Politics, for Blanqui, is the voluntary process of 
collectively working towards the realisation of a guiding ideal; it is an activity that 
must be practised, a goal that must be pursued. Only on the road to the new society, 
only in ‘agissant toujours dans le but final du triomphe de l’égalité’,578 will its actual 
form become apparent.579 Again, these are the grounds from which Blanqui rejects 
advancing ‘une formule, une administration, un système, une réglementation’580 of an 
imagined future society in the manner of Fourier, Saint Simon and Cabet, the latter of 
which ‘a eu précisément le tort d’assimiler l’idéal régulier de l’avenir aux hypothèses 
en l’air des révélateurs de pacotille.’581 Like Marx, Blanqui’s communism, by 
contrast, is not preconceived or imposed a priori as if emanating from some higher 
authority. ‘On se borne à prédire qu’il sera le résultat infaillible de l’instruction 
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575 Blanqui, ‘Les sectes et la révolution’, October 1866, CSII, p. 116. 
576 Blanqui, ‘Qui fait la soupe doit la manger’, March 1834, OI, p. 295.  
577 See ‘Formulaire de réception à la Société des Saisons’, OI, p. 383.  
578 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 112. See also Blanqui, ‘L’impot progressif’, 1867, 
CSII, p. 38. 
579 See Blanqui, ‘Les sectes et la révolution’, CSII, p. 116. 
580 Ibid., p. 113. 
581 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, pp. 198-199. !
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universalisée.’582 The ‘mirage fantastique des programmes, ces brouillards du 
royaume d’Utopie’ must be well and truly abandoned for the realm of the real; 
revolutionaries had to ‘[sortir] du roman pour rentrer dans la réalité’, focusing all their 
energy and efforts on the work of practical, organised revolutionary politics here and 
today. ‘Le reste’, Blanqui adds, ‘n’est plus de notre compétence.’583 Emancipation is, 
for Blanqui, the result of a series of conscious decisions and actions. ‘It is the process 
of actively willing or choosing that renders a particular course of action preferable to 
another’, Hallward similarly maintains. ‘It is the active willing which determines what 
is possible and what is right, and makes it so.’584 Only through the exercise of 
collective voluntary action can the capacity for such activity be proven and the 
possible ends of such a capacity be determined and realised.585  
The final point is more implicit and returns us to the question of leadership. 
Having spoken critically in February 1832 of the extent to which July did not go 
beyond anti-Bourbonism, Blanqui reiterates this point in 1834 when looking back on 
the political sequence inaugurated by the Trois Glorieuses: ‘les diverses 
manifestations populaires, loin d’avoir pour but le renversement de la dynastie, ne 
tendaient qu’à l’éclairer. Il est constant que ni en décembre 1830, ni en février, juin et 
septembre 1831, l’idée de détruire la monarchie nouvelle n’était entrée dans l’esprit 
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582 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 189. On this point see also Blanqui, ‘Notre 
drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, pp. 107-109 and Blanqui, ‘Sur la révolution’, 1850, p. 164. 
583 Blanqui, ‘À propos des clameurs contre l’Avis au peuple’, April 1851, MA, p. 170; Blanqui, ‘Le 
communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 196. See also the assertion that since ignorance reigns over 
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franchir’ (ibid., p. 211).  
584 Hallward, ‘The Will of the People’, pp. 20-21, 23.  
585 Such are the terms by which Blanqui distinguishes his political priorities from the speculative, 
passive utopianism of his contemporaries, as he figuratively illustrates in one particularly memorable 
image. ‘Communisme et Proudhonisme se disputent avec acharnement, au bord d’un fleuve, pour 
décider si l’autre rive est un champ de maïs ou un champ de blé’, Blanqui writes. ‘Ils s’entêtent à 
résoudre la question avant de franchir l’obstacle. Eh! passons d’abord ! Nous verrons là-bas !’ 
(Blanqui, CSII, 1850s, p. 314).  
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du peuple.’586 During 1830 and its aftermath the people, lacking confidence in its 
collective capacity, dissipated their assembled and unified force, willingly 
surrendering their concentrated and collective power to the bourgeois usurpers. 
Blanqui believes that this fatal mistake would not have happened if it had had time to 
find its ‘chefs naturels … qui auraient donné cours à sa victoire’587 A popular force, if 
it is to form successfully and impose its power, cannot be blind energy. The will of 
the people needs encouragement, direction and guidance. The people must know that 
the exercise of its power is sovereign and it must know how to exercise that power. 
The role of leadership is thus to inform the people that it has the collective capacities 
necessary for its own empowerment; the people must be told of the possibility of its 
own power. ‘Il est temps enfin de faire connaitre aux peuple leur position réelle,’ 
Blanqui writes, ‘de leur apprendre comment ils peuvent conquérir et conserver leurs 
droits, de les éclairer sur leurs intérêts, sur le mode de gouvernement qui leur convient 
le mieux, et qui seul peut assurer leur bien-être.’588  
 
How to continue 
 
Overcoming obstacles and resistance 
Blanqui’s project is concerned with foregrounding the paths to an unknown and 
unknowable destination. Understanding the approaching obstacles and barriers the 
paths will present, along with the requirements for their successful negotiation, are 
therefore both vital considerations. If an emancipated, egalitarian society ‘se forme 
peu à peu par l’affluent de mille sources, de milliards de gouttes d’eau’, the task of 
the revolutionary is clear: ‘Abaissez les obstacles, créez-lui une pente, mais n’ayez !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
586 Blanqui, ‘Pourquoi il n’y a plus d’émeutes’, 2 February 1834, OI, p. 269. 
587 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, MA, p. 85. 
588 Blanqui, ‘L’aristocratie et le peuple’, July 1831, OI, pp. 167-168, 169. 
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pas la prétention de créer le fleuve.’589 Since obstacles and resistance are only 
overcome when directly confronted and actively negotiated, the emergence of 
obstacles and resistance is itself a crucial issue for Blanqui. Blanqui here again 
follows Rousseau’s recognition that ‘the sole means that [men] have of preserving 
themselves is to create, by combination, a totality of forces sufficient to overcome the 
obstacles resisting them, to direct their operation by a single impulse, and make them 
act in unison’.590 Yet Blanqui radicalises Rousseau’s assumptions regarding both the 
inevitability of resistance and the demands of overcoming it. The century separating 
the two thinkers, the differing pressures and priorities of two distinct sets of historical 
circumstances, without question drove Blanqui to pursue the point to a greater degree 
than Rousseau before him. The political struggles, and failures, of the nineteenth 
century informed and continually reinforced Blanqui’s persistent preoccupation with 
the question of how to organise and impose a collective will and common goal or 
cause in the face of those dominant groups and private interests that will inevitably 
work, with all the resources at their disposal, to impede, contain, deceive and divide 
it. For Blanqui any political analysis essentially boils down to comprehending the 
balance of forces between the people and the privileged few. In this respect an 
established power’s response to the people is of particular interest to him. The fear of 
the people is the key to understanding the reaction of those whose interests are 
threatened by that very people.591 To understand the politics of the July Monarchy, he 
told an audience in 1832, is to identify the spectre that haunts it, the people of 1830, 
since just one popular victory is all it took, and all it will take, for the established 
order to break, such is the potential political force of popular empowerment.592  Hence !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
589 Blanqui, ‘Les sectes et la révolution’, CSII, p. 115.   
590 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 54. 
591 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, 6 June 1852, MA, p. 186. 
592 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, MA, p. 92. 
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the imperative, on the part of the government, to cover up its inconveniently 
insurrectionary genesis and delegitimise the origins of its own power.593 Blanqui 
indeed describes at length the Orléanist government’s attempts to derail the forward 
march of the revolution and their need to not appear openly hostile when working, 
both independently and with their foreign allies, to contain the threat posed by ‘le 
peuple de Juillet’ so as not to provoke another popular uprising.594 In attempting to 
establish its control and satisfy the European monarchs’ demand to disempower the 
French people, the government tentatively began to ‘amortir l’enthousiasme, 
décourager les patriotes et jeter la défiance et la discorde dans la nation.’595 The kings 
of Europe granted Louis-Philippe time ‘pour augmenter le découragement du peuple, 
le dégoûter de la révolution, et le frapper d’inertie.’596 Beyond regretfully having to 
concede the government’s success in containing and neutralizing this revolutionary 
passion, thereby preventing a second revolution,597 the wider implication for 
Blanqui’s thought is the belief that self-confidence, unity, energy and enthusiasm are 
all essential for the people to become a revolutionary force capable of prevailing over 
its adversaries. Revolution in this sense is an act requiring concentrated, guided 
energy to conceive and thereafter nourish it if the stagnation, containment and 
division to which its past defeats are owed are to be successfully avoided.  
The extent to which the assembled power of the people would be met by the 
power of those threatened by that emergent group, such that revolution would 
invariably incite counter-revolution, remained a key concern of Blanqui’s in the wake 
of the July Revolution. What, Blanqui asks, is necessary for the concentrated creative 
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593 See H.A.C. Collingham, The July Monarchy: A Political History of France 1830-1848 (London: 
Longman, 1988), p. 39, 109. 
594 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, MA, p. 95. 
595 Ibid., pp. 95-96. 
596 Ibid., p. 97. See also Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Adelaïde de Montgolfier’, 31 July 1832, OI, p. 233. 
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energy of popular mobilisation to be successfully converted into a concrete and 
generalised set of egalitarian and democratic socio-political relations? Just as 
obstacles will continue to appear in the struggle for equality and justice, Blanqui 
responded, the people must continue in the work of overcoming them; only a 
determined popular movement can surmount the barriers that will block its path. It is 
only in the collective willing towards the end that the obstacles to its realisation – the 
certain difficulties, the potential defeats - will be overcome. ‘Il faut marcher’, Blanqui 
declares; ‘quand les masses rencontrent un obstacle, elles s’arrêtent, s’amoncellent et 
le renversent. C’est l’histoire du passé, c’est aussi celle de l’avenir.’598 Resolute 
determination in the pursuit of a common goal is precisely the great achievement of 
February 1848 when, ‘après trois jours de résistance’, the people, ordinary individuals 
without wealth or power, together had ‘contraint la garde bourgeoise à subir la 
République’.599 1848 would also demonstrate, however, that as an initial mobilisation 
takes hold, as a popular movement advances, radicalises and the stakes are raised, 
resistance will remain forthcoming. In the wake of a political revolution those who 
sought to exploit, oppress and manipulate the people for their own personal gain 
would not simply disappear. On the contrary, as long as the people remain 
unenlightened and thus unaware of these dangers, counter-revolutionary forces will 
appear and attempt to reassert their control.600 And where manipulation is not 
employed, the force of arms readily will be. April 1834, June 1848, March 1871 – all 
showed the forceful resistance that any popular movement threatening the established 
interests of the status quo will continually face. Overall Blanqui therefore sees only 
the concentrated, organised (and enlightened) armed Parisian masses as capable of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
598 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 115. !
599 Blanqui, ‘Les massacres de Rouen. La Société républicaine centrale au gouvernement provisoire’, 
MA, p. 142. 
600 See Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 184.  
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overcoming the resistance a revolution will face. This is one of the key messages of 
the Instructions pour une prise d’armes – a text explicitly conceived as a purely 
practical solution to a purely practical problem.601 No government forces could 
withstand the collective power of the unified and organised people of Paris 
collectively and consciously working towards the same goal: ‘l’aspect d’une armée 
parisienne en bon ordre, manœuvrant selon les règles de la tactique, frappera les 
soldats de stupeur et fera tomber leur résistance.’602 Or as Blanqui put it most 
emphatically earlier in 1851: ‘En présence des prolétaires armés, obstacles, 
résistances, impossibilités, tout disparaîtra.’603   
 
Moral duty, resolute commitment 
Blanqui is, then, in no way ignorant of the difficulties facing a process of popular 
empowerment. On the contrary, it is precisely because of acknowledging these 
difficulties that he emphasises the collective will to overcome them. But the 
fundamental necessity of actively pursuing a goal in the face of obstacles and 
resistance nonetheless also inevitably invites the question of the requirements and 
motivations, both individual and collective, of this activity itself. If emancipation is a 
project achieved only through the concrete efforts and actions of humans in the face 
of barriers and direct opposition then one must be prepared to see to this task of 
practical realisation with all the courageous determination the process will continually 
demand. The overcoming of obstacles and resistance must be nourished by a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
601 See Blanqui, ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, MA, p. 257. 
602 Ibid., p. 262. As noted in the previous chapter, ‘force’ denotes an empowered and - as Blanqui 
insists even more so after June 1848 - organised collective actor imposing its will in the face obstacles 
and resistance. It is in this sense that we should read the insistence that in the face of well-armed and 
well-organised government troops ‘la force est la seule garantie de la liberté’ (ibid., pp. 262-263). 
603 Blanqui, ‘Avis au peuple’, MA, p. 167. The public statement released during the failed uprising of 
May 1839 contains a similar, though arguably less powerful, formulation: ‘Peuple, lève-toi ! et tes 
ennemis disparaîtront comme la poussière devant l’ouragan’ (‘Appel au peuple de Paris du comité de la 
Société des Saisons’, MA, p. 130). 
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conviction, a clear and conscious sense of moral duty and purpose from which 
emerges a resolute determination to prevail. 
Blanqui’s insistence on duty - so central to and characteristic of his conception 
of voluntarist politics604 - as well as on resolute commitment and a sense of purpose, 
arises from an acute awareness of the difficulties facing radical emancipatory 
movements. The ‘realization’ of the principles of the sovereignty of the people and 
equality ‘n’est pas facile’, the Formulaire de Réception à la Société des Saisons of 
1837 readily concedes; ‘nos ennemis sont nombreux et puissants ; ils ont à leur 
disposition toutes les forces sociales … nous n’avons que notre courage et notre bon 
droit’.605 Of course, the importance of an organised popular force and the other 
defining elements of Blanqui’s insurrectionary practice often take centre stage in his 
statements regarding the strategic imperatives of a popular uprising. But Blanqui 
always builds such pronouncements on a more fundamental set of moral principles 
and subjective resources that serve to guide individual and collective political 
engagement. ‘La sobriété, le courage, la force, le dévouement’ – these, according to 
the Formulaire de réception de la Société des Familles of 1834, are the ‘vertus’ of a 
true republican.606 ‘Le savoir, l’intelligence, la magnanimité, le dévouement, la vertu’ 
are in fact, Blanqui later observed, the ‘ennemis privilégiés’ of those who seek to 
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604 Blanqui’s first notable articulation of a revolutionary duty was in the 1832 defence speech when he 
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repress, divide and deceive the people both before and after the revolutionary 
rupture.607 
The moral dimension of Blanqui’s conception of duty is indeed essential. 
Though this anticipates parts of the next chapter a few initial remarks should be made 
here. ‘La morale est de toute évidence le fondement des sociétés’, Blanqui claims.608 
Fundamentally, however, there is no such thing as eternal or fixed morals, he adds; 
the belief that human beings possess an innate morality serves only as justification for 
the status quo and all its injustices. Morality varies according to time and place. 
History reveals morals to be always, first, a direct emanation of – and so proportional 
to - the wider level of intellectual enlightenment and, second, acquired and achieved 
not through divine revelation or historical destiny but through the didactic process of 
human cognition and thus through humanity itself. As morals are strictly dependent 
on ‘des variations intellectuelles’, it follows that ‘[s]i la lumière s’éteint, la morale’ – 
that is, enlightened morality - ‘disparaît avec elle.’609 Contrary to the spiritualist 
assertion of the invariability of morality and duty alongside it, for Blanqui both 
morality and duty change and can be changed through the material process of 
cognition outlined in Chapter 1.610 
Here the role of an intellectual elite seems to reappear. Those who have 
already achieved the necessary level of enlightenment, Blanqui appears to suggest, are 
able to act with devotion and a sense of duty to their cause, which is itself the cause of 
engendering enlightened morality through enlightened instruction. In fact, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
607 Blanqui, ‘Malfaisance de l’Eglise’, NDNM, p. 62. See also Blanqui, ‘Le commununisme, avenir de 
la société’, CSI, pp. 186-187.  
608 Blanqui, ‘Candide’, 3 May 1865, MA, p. 247. 
609 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 162-163 [n.d.]. Morality, Blanqui explains elsewhere, ‘fleur de l’arbre de 
la pensée, n’est que l’expression plus ou moins puissante de l’instinct humanitaire qui défend aux 
hommes de s’entrenuire et leur commande de s’entraider’ (Blanqui, ‘Candide’, MA, p. 248).!
610 ‘Fausseté de l’idée d’une morale fine, invariable, éternelle, qui a proclamé ou prescrit dès l’origine 
des devoirs de l’homme’, Blanqui writes. ‘L’idée du devoir, expression et résumé de la morale est 
mobile comme elle et se règle sur sa marche’ (Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 74 [n.d.]).  
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undetermined nature of human affairs is such that only through voluntarist devotion 
and dedication could enlightened thought be guided to the cause of equality: ‘l’on 
n’arrive à l’égalité que par le dévouement ; le dévouement seul prête à la pensée cette 
puissance irrésistible qui commande au monde.’611 Equality’s defining principles of 
enlightened thought and duty are indeed the very means through which it will be 
animated and implemented, converting the ideal into the real. The conscious and 
active commitment to equality is how the principle itself ‘réunit’ and ‘associe les 
hommes ; c’est par l’intelligence seule qu’elle les gouverne et qu’elle fait concourir 
leurs efforts à un but commun qui est le bien-être de tous.’612 Morality, and humanity 
with it, can therefore be lifted to great heights through the work of enlightened 
education, achieving the ‘sentiment de justice’, social solidarity, and uniting the 
people under a collective project for the common good, or be plunged to the depths of 
barbaric egoism through the propagation of ignorance.613 Again as we noted in 
Chapter 1 Blanqui is in fact quite explicit that emancipatory politics is a profoundly 
moral project, as such the violation of this enlightened morality is what commands its 
redress.614 Hitherto immorality has prevailed for the reasons Blanqui takes from 
Rousseau outlined earlier – namely, usurpation, domination and, above all, deceit. 
Those who have already attained the sufficient level of knowledge to see through such 
deceit and deception, who know and understand that injustice presupposes ignorance 
of its existence, are morally obliged to expose this state of affairs. And so a practical 
imperative, a revolutionary duty, emerges: ‘Il faut lutter sans relâche contre 
l’ignorance, d’abord, pour maintenir la morale à sa hauteur présente, ensuite, pour en 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
611 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 113. 
612 Ibid., p. 110. 
613 Blanqui 9590(1) fo. 181 [14 April 1869]; Blanqui, ‘Candide’, MA, pp. 248-249.!
614 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 251-252, 253 [n.d.]. !
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élever le niveau en développement les connaissances acquises et poussant les 
conquêtes de la pensée.’615  
From this insistence on moral duty follows the assumption that at all times and 
in all circumstances, a revolutionary must be prepared to sacrifice wealth and well-
being, to face imprisonment, to even lay down their life in their commitment to their 
convictions. To follow one’s ‘devoir’ is, for Blanqui, necessarily to go ‘jusqu’au 
bout’.616 Blanqui does not shirk at affirming the full implications of this measure of 
political commitment, this standard by which to live: ‘Le devoir d’un révolutionnaire, 
c’est la lutte toujours, la lutte quand même, la lutte jusqu’à extinction.’617 
Furthermore, according to Blanqui strength of intellectual conviction confers strength 
of political force, both individually and collectively. Unlike government troops 
fighting under constraint and compulsion amongst the popular ranks ‘on se bat pour 
une idée. Là, on ne trouve que des volontaires, et leur mobile est l’enthousiasme, non 
la peur.’618 This is why Blanqui ardently rejected the suggestion that Gustave Tridon 
and the other youngsters who comprised ‘le mouvement politique et philosophique du 
quartier Latin’ were ‘des automates’, that the group was a ‘une réunion de machins, 
obéissant en aveugles à un mot d’ordre’. The reality was in fact quite the contrary, 
Blanqui claims: ‘Ils ont des idées, des caractères, des passions, et ces passions, ces 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
615 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 162-163 [n.d.].  
616 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au process des Quinze’, MA, pp. 67-68. One discovers in a 
manuscript note Blanqui lamenting the lack of unapologetic self-sacrifice, the complete renouncement 
of all self-interest, attributing to it the cause of returning defeat: ‘Le repentir (et) le remords sont faits 
pour les gens qui sacrifient leurs convictions à leur intérêt, et non pour ceux qui sacrifient leurs intérêts 
et même la vie à leurs convictions. Et cependant ces derniers sont presque toujours à la merci des 
premières. Ainsi vont les choses humaines. Le triomphe du mal en est l’ordre (règle) presque habituel’ 
(Blanqui MSS 9586, fo 402 [n.d.]. See also ‘Formulaire de réception à la Société des Saisons’, OI, p. 
383). 
617 Blanqui, ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, MA, p. 263. Cf. ‘The duty of every revolutionary is 
to make revolution’ (Fidel Castro, ‘Second Declaration of Havana’, in Fidel Castro, The Declarations 
of Havana, ed. Tariq Ali [London: Verso, 2008], p. 117; translation modified).  
618 Ibid., p. 261. 
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caractères, ces idées, peuvent et doivent souvent entrer en lutte’.619 This insistence on 
individual volition towards a collective goal as a fundamental characteristic of a 
revolutionary actor becomes even clearer when contrasted with the assertion that the 
‘qualité essentielle’ of a government soldier is ‘l’obéissance passive, l’abdication de 
toute individualité’. Never seeking explanation of their actions, never passing 
comment on the situation, the distance between the government soldier and the 
revolutionary, particularly when considered in light of the description of Tridon’s 
group in which the same terms are evoked, is striking. ‘Sous le nom de soldats, on 
prétend fabriquer des machines ambulantes et frappantes, des porte-fusils muets et 
aveugles, des automates sans souvenir et sans avenir, sans patrie et sans famille, sans 
pitié et sans remords.’620 For Blanqui the militant devoted to an idea and principle 
has, precisely by virtue of their voluntary decision to become a militant and to 
resolutely persevere as such, all the resources necessary for the triumph of that cause. 
‘Supérieurs à l’adversaire par le dévouement, ils le sont bien plus encore par 
l’intelligence. Ils l’emportent sur lui dans l’ordre moral et même physique, par la 
conviction, la vigueur, la fertilité des ressources, la vivacité de corps et d’esprit ; ils 
ont la tête et le cœur. Nulle troupe au monde n’égale ces hommes d’élite.’ Although 
during the course of an insurrection the number of leaders that come forward may be 
fewer than would be hoped for, as long as the people are organised around a idea, 
‘[l]e zèle, l’ardeur, l’intelligence des volontaires, compenseront ce déficit.’621 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
619 Blanqui MSS 9589, fo. 123 [n.d.].  
620 Blanqui MSS 9583, fo. 23 [1848].!!
621 Blanqui, ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, MA, pp. 261-262, 263-264. This theme is already 
present in Blanqui’s early writings. When speaking of the enemy in 1831 he writes that ‘la seule chose 
qu’ils redoutent, l’énergie de leurs adversaires. Il n’y que la peur qui ait prise sur de telle âmes, et je ne 
veux pas m’enlever le seul auxiliaire que nous ayons réellement. N’en avez-vous par déjà assez vu 
pour être bien persuadée que rien de noble, de généreux, ni d’humain ne saurait avoir accès dans ces 
cœurs-là ?’ (Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Adelaïde de Montgolfier’, 25 August 1831, OI, p. 180). Similarly in Le 
Libérateur he suggests that in the duel between privilege and equality, the former is ‘impuissant à lutter 
de front parce qu’il se sent écrasé de la supériorité morale de son adversaire’ (Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, 
c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 110).  
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At least two interlinked points might be inferred from the elements above. 
First, according to Blanqui any true sense of duty to will an idea can be in no way 
involuntary. Revolutionary duty and the courage, self-sacrifice, discipline and honour 
it inspires must be a product of conscious volition, of rationally acquired knowledge 
and deliberate action, for this is indeed its source of decisive power over the 
resistance their cause will confront. Second, a voluntary sense of duty by definition 
emanates from and is guided by an enlightened morality, which is itself developed 
and refined through a process of instruction. To qualify the first point, then: one can 
certainly act under a sense of duty, or with a sense of passion, towards reactionary, 
unenlightened causes. Here we should recall the conflict of wills outlined earlier. The 
fundamental distinction for Blanqui lies between the voluntary duty to act in the name 
of freely acquired and developed ideas and the duty to act in the name of corruption, 
deceit and oppression, the latter of which deriving as much from the conscious 
manipulators themselves as from the unconsciously manipulated. As Blanqui explains 
in one note, again calling upon the dualism underpinning his thought, the question of 
duty goes to the heart of what it means to be a free and conscious human being acting 
with integrity to oneself and to others:  
 
Le dévouement absolu est une chose contre nature. Chez le meilleur des 
hommes il existe un coin personnel. On ne serait pas homme sans cela. Ainsi, 
dans les préoccupations politiques l’ambition a fatalement son rôle. Ce qu’on 
peut en exiger, c’est qu’elle soit toujours mise au service d’une idée. Elle 
n’acquiert qu’à ce prix une sorte de légitimité. Par malheur, les ambitieux 
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poursuivent surtout des vues égoïstes. Les idées, pour eux, sont un masque et 
un instrument.622  
 
Absolute devotion to the ideas and morals developed and refined through a process of 
enlightened education is therefore the task of emancipatory politics, Blanqui believes, 
as he traces a successive association of enlightenment, conscious engagement and the 
struggle for equality and freedom.623 Instruction, ideas, morality and volition also 
inform Blanqui’s definition of humanity, for to be a truly committed actor is to fulfil 
one’s most basic human capacity: to voluntarily will an enlightened idea.   
 
Politics as faith 
Blanqui’s politics is ultimately an at once simple yet profound choice of idealist 
conviction – idealist, that is, as Étienne Balibar recently suggested when reflecting on 
the nature of political commitment, ‘both in the ordinary and in the technical sense of 
the term’,624 for Blanqui’s conception of political practice presupposes an 
intellectually informed commitment to an enlightened ideal as much as a form of 
principled, passionate enthusiasm and faithfulness to a belief. Politics, for Blanqui, is 
as much a matter of logical reasoning as it is of passion and morality. Such is the 
meaning behind the invocation of the unity of head and heart: whether drawn from the 
bourgeoisie or the masses, a revolutionary conceives the ending of injustice and 
inequality as a conscious duty and task guided by humanist compassion (heart) on the 
one hand, and cerebral rationalism (head) on the other.625 It is not a case of separating 
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622 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 60 [21 September 1869]. 
623 See Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, MA, pp. 211-212. 
624 Balibar, ‘Communism as Commitment, Imagination and Politics’, p. 15.  
625 See Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, p. 67; Blanqui, ‘À la 
Montagne de 93. Aux socialistes purs, ses véritables héritiers !’, 28 November 1848, MA, pp. 150-151; 
Blanqui, ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, MA, p. 262.  
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material (questions of suffering and well-being) from cerebral (questions of ignorance 
and enlightenment) concerns, but thinking the two together as a critique of the present 
and a guiding ideal for the future. A rationally conceived and passionately espoused 
rejection of injustice and commitment to freedom and equality is the basis of a 
voluntarist actor, triggering both the decision to begin and nourishing the resolve to 
continue. Blanqui makes explicit the link between ‘tête’, ‘cœur’ and ‘esprit’, 
emphasising the political importance of ‘tout ce qui est grand, noble et beau’ and ‘les 
grandes âmes’ – bearers of enlightened thought and virtuous devotion - as the 
resources of emancipatory movements.626 If freedom is the ‘devise immortelle’, the 
‘cri sacré’ for which all revolutionaries energetically act with fervent devotion to 
realise - as they can, as they must – it is because, Blanqui explains in January 1831, 
‘[c]’est son retentissement seul qui a fait vibrer nos cœurs ; c’est elle seule qui a droit 
à notre amour, à notre culte’.627 He thus later professed: ‘L’égalité est notre foi ; nous 
marchons avec ardeur et confiance sous sa bannière sainte, pleins de vénération et 
d’enthousiasme pour les immortels défenseurs de cette foi, animés du même 
dévouement qu’eux, prêts comme eux à verser tout notre sang pour son triomphe.628 
After Buonarrotti, who likewise described equality as his ‘religion’, his life its 
‘témoignage’,629 Blanqui often adopts a quasi-theological discourse of opposing faiths !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
626 Blanqui, ‘Malfaisance de l’Eglise’, NDNM, pp. 61-62. 
627 Blanqui, ‘Déclaration du Comité provisoire des Ecoles’, MA, p. 60. 
628 Blanqui goes on: ‘Nous sommes avec Jésus-Christ contre les juifs matérialistes et haineux ; avec 
Grégoire VII contre les tryans féodaux de l’Europe, avec Rousseau contre une noblesse et un clergé 
perdus de débauche, ignorants et oppresseurs, avec Robespierre contre une tourbe de marchands 
cupides, d’agioteurs sans foi ni loi, de trafiqueurs parricides, prêts à vendre comme Judas l’humanité 
pour trente deniers’ (Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 111). We discover here the link 
between those individuals striving for equality in the nineteenth century and past struggles under the 
same ideal, struggles Blanqui embodies in a series of individuals and leaders, which serves to reassert 
the primacy of enlightened, intellectual leadership. Overall, we could say that Blanqui understands his 
subjective, intellectual faith in equality and dedication to humanity as placing him and his allies as the 
latest subjects of a historical, eternal struggle. Blanqui’s subjective commitment is conceived as a form 
of historical commitment to continue the struggle for collective emancipation. For a largely 
complementary discussion of the relation between the subject, history and an idea, see Badiou, ‘The 
Idea of Communism’, pp. 3-4. 
629 ‘Deux lettres de Buonarroti’, 11 May 1835, OI, p. 307.  
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or, worst of all, of a struggle against those who avow no political faith whatsoever.630 
Blanqui conceives politics in terms of faith, informed and guided by subjective 
passion, confidence and a courageous determination to prevail.631  
 A problem here confronts us. How can Blanqui simultaneously claim that ‘le 
régime d’égalité et de fraternité … est notre seule religion’, ‘notre foi sociale’,632 
whilst maintaining that communism is ‘le dernier mot de la science sociale’?633 Is 
there not a major tension between the insistence on emancipation as a work of faith, 
passion, spirit and heart and the conception of communism as an enlightenment 
project rooted in rational thought and knowledge? As he himself states in one note: 
‘Contradiction complète en toutes choses entre la foi et la raison. Il faut que la société 
abandonne un de ces deux principes. Ils ne peuvent plus vivre ensemble.’634 How 
does Blanqui reconcile his vehement anti-spiritualism with his own frequently 
avowed political faith and his materialism further still?  
Possible explanations of this problem are not particularly forthcoming. One 
note on the meaning of materialism provides some insight. ‘Qu’est-ce que le 
matérialisme,’ asks Blanqui, ‘sinon la doctrine qui déclare l’univers infini dans le 
temps et dans l’espace, et l’esprit une propriété inespérable de la substance nerveuse, 
dans la vie comme dans la mort ?’635 The human mind or spirit – the dual meaning of 
the term itself being one problem, for Blanqui seems to evoke ‘esprit’ in both senses - 
is an emanation of, and so in no way distinct from, the materiality of the human brain. 
While Blanqui insists that ‘la pensée, c’est toute notre personnalité. Le corps 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
630 See Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 110, p. 115; Blanqui, ‘Procès des poudres’, 2-
11 August 1836, OI, p. 352. 
631 Bensaïd and Löwy also highlight this facet of Blanqui’s politics in ‘Auguste Blanqui, heretical 
communist’, p. 29. 
632 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, MA, pp. 182-183.   
633 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 58 [15 March 1869].  
634 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 193 [16 July 1869]. 
635 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 66 [n.d.].  
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appartient à la matière’, he nonetheless adds; thought is ‘emprisonnée dans le cerveau 
et impuissante à en sortir par sa propre force’.636 To champion collective faith or spirit 
is not to abandon the primacy of objective matter, of the human brain, from which 
these cerebrally cultivated subjective conditions (morality, faith, duty, passion, and so 
forth) appear, as spiritualism claims in its distinction between spirit and matter. 
Indeed, Blanqui writes that while Catholicism is the ‘tombeau de l’intelligence, de la 
pensée, du cerveau’ Protestantism is, for its part, the ‘tombeau de la conscience, du 
sentiment, du cœur.’637 Blanqui’s project, by contrast, seeks to develop and defend a 
form of enlightened, materialist morality. Political passion or faith must remain linked 
at all times to reason: ‘Pour ne pas glisser sur [une] pente fatale, le sentiment a besoin 
d’être appuyé/soutenu par une forte intelligence.’638 The synonyms listed in his 
notebook are again revealing in this respect: ‘esprit, âme, cœur, caractère, conscience, 
volonté, génie, imagination, faculté, pensée, idée, sentiment’.639 On this basis there 
would seem to be no contradiction between Blanqui’s materialism and his appeals to 
mind, spirit or faith: enlightened reason leads to enlightened morality, a conscious 
passion for justice and equality rooted the rational knowledge that all human beings 
are born free and equal and any curtailment of these natural rights constitutes 
injustice. Socialism, Blanqui accordingly explains, ‘n’est pas seulement la vérité 
scientifique, mais encore la plus haute morale.’640 !
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636 Blanqiu MSS 9590(1), fo. 287 [n.d.] !
637 Blanqui, ‘Catholicisme et protestantisme’, n.d., NDNM, p. 76. 
638 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 153 [6 March 1869]. In one note Blanqui suggests, like many of his 
contemporaries, that women’s greater propensity for sentimentalism makes them much more 
susceptible to being instruments of reaction and oppression, particularly religious domination. He 
concludes: ‘L’homme, sec, dur, brutal, mais guidé par la raison et dominé par l’idée de justice, est en 
fin de compte, beaucoup plus humain que la femme avec sa sensibilité et ses extases’ (Blanqui MSS 
9592(3), fo. 243 [n.d.]). 
639 Blanqui MSS 9591(1), fo. 89 [n.d.]. !
640 Blanqui, ‘Projet de discours’, CSII, p. 140. See also insistence that one could not ‘[e]xagérer l’idéal 
au-delà des forces humaines’, as did religion (Blanqui, ‘Candide’, MA, p. 247). 
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Blanqui’s form of political faith can be seen to derive from his idealism and 
his voluntarism. To say that communism is the most logical, rational organisation of 
society does not in itself offer the means for its establishment. As Blanqui recognises 
regarding religion: ‘La science et l’histoire ont rendu leur sentence. Il ne reste qu’à 
l’exécuter.’641 Religion and the social injustice it creates may be irrational, it may be 
anachronistic, but that does not mean that human action is no less necessary in order 
to end it. Equality or communism, Blanqui stresses, need humans collectively 
carrying the idea to realise it. To do so requires belief – belief that equality is right, 
belief that it is just, belief that it is true. Only this can sustain commitment to the idea 
of equality in the face of successive defeats, in the knowledge that historical processes 
will not provide the solution sooner or later, in the assumption that we can rely on 
nothing but ourselves as the bearers of our own destiny. ‘À travers les persécutions, 
les violences, nous marcherons fermes, inébranlables, à notre but’, Blanqui defiantly 
declared in 1831; ‘nous sommes jeunes, nous sommes patients ; nous ne désespérons 
pas aisément de la liberté.’642 Defeat is not definitive. Defeat is the summons to begin 
again, to ensure victory next time.  
Castro and Guevara are noteworthy for sharing Blanqui’s privileging of faith 
and spirit alongside a sense of duty, confidence, energy and enthusiasm in the cause 
of victory. As Castro recognised when reflecting on Guevara’s death: ‘Without this 
type of revolutionary and human being, ready to do what they did; without the spirit 
to confront the enormous obstacles they faced; without the readiness to die that 
accompanied them at every moment; without their deeply held conviction in the 
justice of their cause and their unyielding faith in the invincible force of the peoples, 
against a power like Yankee imperialism … without these, the liberation of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
641 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 159 [n.d.]. 
642 Blanqui, ‘Déclaration du Comité provisoire des Ecoles’, MA, p. 60. 
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peoples of this continent will not be attained.’643  And just like Guevara, the extent to 
which Blanqui himself lived up to his prescriptions of revolutionary duty and 
commitment is compelling. For followers and admirers, critics and detractors alike, 
Blanqui is emblematic of what it means to dedicate a life to a conviction and a 
principle. In spite of defeats and divisions, imprisonment and illness, when all seemed 
lost Blanqui’s determined militancy, his political faith and passion remained no less 
resolute.  
 
Voluntary servitude  
Underlying Blanqui’s voluntarism and indeed of major importance to his entire 
project is the conviction that to voluntarily surrender one’s capacity to will is to 
become an agent of oppression and domination. Of course, for Blanqui one has to be 
conscious of one’s servitude before one is capable of voluntarily working to 
overthrow it. It nonetheless still follows that since Blanqui defines humans in terms of 
their capacity for voluntary self-determination, to passively obey is to surrender one’s 
most basic natural ability: to freely will. Just as humanity’s natural freedom ceases 
when its will can be externally constrained, Rousseau states, the renouncement of the 
fundamental freedom to will ‘is incompatible with the nature of man; to remove the 
will’s freedom is to remove all morality from our actions.’644 This conjunction of free 
volition as the natural essence of humanity and moral duty as decisive in the triumph !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
643 Fidel Castro, ‘Death of Che Guevara’, in Cuban Revolution Reader, ed. Julio García Luis 
(Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2008), p. 203. 
644 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 50. See also Étienne La Boétie’s well-known reflection on 
voluntary servitude, in which he advances first tradition and history, second cowardice, obedience and 
compliance, and finally devotion and allegiance as explanations for why a free people consent to their 
own oppression. Like a fire, runs La Boétie’s simile, tyranny derives its power from its fuel. The 
people provide this fuel; they alone empower. And just as ceasing to furnish fuel extinguishes the fire, 
without the consent and obedience of the people tyranny collapses. La Boétie is of course aware that a 
people may initially be coerced and vanquished by force. However, ‘ceux qui viennent après servent 
sans regret et font volontiers ce que leurs devanciers avaient fait par contrainte’ (Étienne De La Boétie, 
Discours da la servitude volontaire [Paris: Librio, 2013], pp. 13, 19). 
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of freedom or tyranny is fundamental for Rousseau and Blanqui alike. Since for the 
latter the brain alone ‘fait l’homme, sa dignité, sa grandeur’ and is the origin of the 
enlightened thought from which political volition derives,645 tyranny accordingly 
requires ‘l’abjection, la soumission rampante, l’abdication de toute dignité, 
l’abrutissement volontaire.’646 Recall Blanqui’s assumption that oppression and 
servitude are not natural, preordained or inevitable but the result of the consciously 
formulated and actively imposed will of the exploiter. Any form of resignation, of 
merely accepting an externally or historically prescribed or imposed fate must 
therefore be dismissed as a matter of course - the political stakes are simply too high. 
‘Quand une nation, affligée d’un mauvais gouvernement, n’a plus la volonté ou la 
force de le changer, elle tombe en agonie et glisse peu à peu dans le sépulcre.’647 
Insofar as the government, the decisive site of power, must be overthrown by the will 
of the people, failure to do so will only perpetuate tyranny and oppression. The people 
must hold, as Blanqui speculated was indeed true in April 1848, ‘[une] défiance … 
profonde envers cette doctrine de l’obéissance passive qui a noyé si souvent Paris 
dans le sang français.’648  
Blanqui does not stop there, however. In the face of systematic oppression and 
ubiquitous injustice, his response is to extend and radicalise the role of duty within his 
voluntarism in line with his notion of political morality noted above. To passively 
obey injustice is to renounce not only the natural ability but also moral duty to 
actively will the cause of justice. In Blanqui’s eyes ‘the passive victim of a violation 
of natural rights was as guilty as his oppressor, for the acceptance of injustice was its 
sanction’, Spitzer notes. ‘Therefore everyone was morally bound to the struggle !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
645 Blanqui, ‘Athéisme et spiritualisme’, NDNM, p. 23. 
646 Blanqui, ‘Malfaisance de l’Eglise’, NDNM, p. 62. 
647 Blanqui, ‘Projet de discours’, CSII, p. 158.  
648 Blanqui, ‘Adresse au gouvernement provisoire’, MA, p. 140.  
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against injustice, no matter what the cost’.649 From his very first public text, a 
passionate call to arms written in the heat of the Trois Glorieuses, Blanqui sets out the 
basis of this fundamental choice between passive compliance and the principled 
defiance through which emancipation can be created. ‘Consentirons-nous à devenir un 
troupeau d’esclaves sous le fouet des jésuites ?’, he asks his fellow citizens. ‘Non, non 
! Plutôt mourir !’650 The belief in taking an informed, principled stand makes no room 
for ambivalence, indecision or purported impartiality: either you reject the injustices 
and oppression of the status quo and work with all your energy to overthrow this 
order and create an egalitarian alternative based on freedom and justice, or you 
consent to and are complicit with injustice and oppression. Spiritualism, for example, 
derives its ‘force’ precisely from the ‘impunité’ conferred upon it; impunity is 
precisely how it remains ‘inviolable, tout arrogant de l’humilité de ses victimes’, 
Blanqui notes, before adding: ‘Malheur à qui subit l’invective sans la rendre !’651 In 
the case of intellectuals who have betrayed the cause of the people and equality, since 
devotion to the plight of the poor and weak is the sine qua non of enlightened thought, 
and since enlightened thought is the decisive factor upon which the path to equality 
would be won or lost, to relinquish this intellectual duty to the oppressed is, by logical 
extension, to be complicit with continued oppression and exploitation. We can also 
now appreciate how the accusation of apostasy is the other side to Blanqui’s 
insistence on politics as faith.652 Those ‘apostates’ who commit the ‘crime’ of 
abandoning intelligence, who ‘blaspheme’ or attempt to suppress enlightened thought, 
Blanqui scornfully writes, provide ‘un signe qu’ils ne marchent plus dans les voies de 
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649 Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, pp. 133-134. 
650 Blanqui, ‘Première proclamation’, MA, p. 54.  
651 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 76 [8 September 1869]; cf. Blanqui MSS 9587, fo. 378 [n.d.]. !
652 For other examples of the accusation of apostasy, see Blanqui, ‘À propos des clameurs contre l’Avis 
du peuple’, MA, p. 169; Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 467 [June 1850] ; Blanqui, ‘Procès des poudres’, 2-
11 August 1836, OI, p. 353; Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 112. 
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l’humanité !’653 Overall we might say, then, that for Blanqui all power that commits 
injustice is illegitimate; all illegitimate power is empowered though voluntary 
obedience; all those who empower illegitimacy consent to injustice; all justice is 
produced through the defiance and overpowering of illegitimate power.  
 
Volition and transition 
 
Blanqui first outlined the notion of a post-revolutionary transitional power in 1837.654 
Such reflections no doubt arose from a set of fundamental questions that confront all 
serious revolutionary thinkers: What would happen the day after power had been 
seized from the ruling government? What was the relationship between political and 
social transformation? Who or what would be capable of continuing the revolution, of 
pushing and guiding it forward? These are questions we will now consider. The 
question of transitional power also brings us to what seems to me the major problem 
and limitation of Blanqui’s voluntarism: the over-privileging of an enlightened 
consciousness as a precondition of volition.  
 
A patient realism 
Surprisingly for a figure often dismissed as an impatient adventurist, when it comes to 
reflecting on the temporality of constructing a new post-revolutionary social order and 
the question of social transformation more generally Blanqui’s voice is one of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
653 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, pp. 112-113, 114-115. We might also note that such 
forthright critiques of those who compromise the integrity of intellectual engagement also emanate 
from the belief in confidence, faith and enthusiasm as forces of political mobilisation. Intellectual 
devotion and dedication to equality forge confidence, trust, faith and hope amongst the people; they 
are, Blanqui reasons, the essential precondition for the people’s necessary obedience to their 
intellectual leadership. Accordingly, when intellectuals betray equality and the people, they too sow the 
seeds of doubt and resignation. All trust in intelligence dissolves, equality perishes, privilege prevails. 
For Blanqui, intellectual betrayal, in short, fatally undermines the entire revolutionary project. 
654 Le Nuz, ‘Introduction’, in OI, pp. 369-370. See ‘Formulaire de réception à la Société des Saisons’, 
OI, p. 383. 
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patience, not to say of pragmatism. After the revolution successfully seized and could 
exercise political power, priorities would have to be made and struggles carefully 
chosen. ‘Trop d’obstacles exigeront des années de tranchée ouverte, pour s’amuser à 
l’attaque en règle d’une haie qui peut se franchir à la course’, Blanqui explains. 
‘L’armée, la magistrature, le christianisme, l’organisation politique, simples haies. 
L’ignorance, bastion formidable. Un jour pour la haie ; pour le bastion, vingt ans.’655 
To evoke terms unfamiliar to Blanqui, we might say that therein lies the relation 
between base and superstructure – although, as already noted, manifestly Blanqui 
maintains with Hegel, not Marx, the primacy of ideas and consciousness as 
determining material reality and the social existence of man. Ignorance is the base on 
which all the material exploitation, inequality and injustice of the established order is 
established; ignorance is the cause of the deception, deceit, hypocrisy and 
manipulation responsible for domination and oppression. Conversely, as the Critique 
Sociale repeatedly insists, universal enlightenment is the base of equality, freedom 
and justice – of communism. Blanqui’s communism, we have seen, posits the end of 
domination and inequality on an informed, conscious population; the advent of 
communism will occur when, thanks to universal instruction, ‘pas un seul homme ne 
pourra être la dupe d’un autre’ and ‘[l]e jugement deviendra l’apanage commun’.656 
To think that radical social transformation can be achieved immediately without the 
protracted work of destroying ignorance through public enlightenment – the 
prerequisite act for successfully establishing community – is therefore ‘le rêve de bien 
des impatiences’; any talk of social transformation ‘avant la transformation des 
esprits’ was nothing more than a ‘rêve irréalisable’. Without ending ignorance, 
without public enlightenment and the free consciousness it creates, ‘[l]a volonté !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
655 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 183.  
656 Ibid., pp. 185-186.!
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même de la France entière resterait impuissante à devancer l’heure, et la tentative 
n’aboutirait qu’à un échec’.657 Popular ignorance or the non-dissemination of ideas 
more generally are, it seems, the one obstacle - unlike those presented by the 
superstructure in the form of the state, socio-political institutions and economic 
relations - that cannot be overcome by force of will alone. Perhaps initially surprising, 
such an affirmation is in fact consistent with the primacy Blanqui accords to 
consciousness in his conception of conscious volition: at all times and in all 
circumstances, ideas and thought remain the basis of decisive action. This is precisely 
why, as already made clear, ‘[l]a communauté ne peut s’improviser, parce qu’elle sera 
une conséquence de l’instruction qui ne s’improvise pas davantage.’658 The process of 
public enlightenment, so it would seem, is the limit of collective political volition.659  
When it comes to the social transformation of the base (to use the terms just 
evoked), of society’s ruling ideas and consciousness, Blanqui has no illusions over the 
difficultly of such a task. He is brutally frank about the time and work needed to reach 
an emancipated society and the distance between now and then. ‘Communisme n’est 
compatible qu’avec l’universalité des lumières et nous n’en sommes pas là.’660 To 
quote phrases in which, without this wider contextualisation and the essential 
qualifications it holds, communism appears as the order-in-waiting, brought to light 
through the force of events alone, is therefore somewhat misleading.661 Political 
revolution can occur immediately, social revolution certainly cannot. One need look !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
657 Ibid., pp. 183-184. 
658 Ibid., p. 184. See also Blanqui, ‘Le communisme primitif’, April 1869, CSII, pp. 72-73. 
659 See in particular Blanqui, ‘Les sectes et la révolution’, CSII, p. 115. !
660 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 213. 
661 See in particular the statement: ‘À juger par la disposition présente des esprits, le communisme ne 
frapperait pas précisément aux portes. Mais rien de si trompeur que la situation, parce que rien n’est si 
mobile’ (Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 211), which serves as the epigraph 
for Quelques agents du Parti imaginaire, ‘Préface: A un ami’, MA, p. 9. Indeed, although Blanqui 
likewise earlier writes that communism ‘est la révolution même’ it is not without going on to add: ‘Il 
lui est impossible de s’imposer brusquement, pas plus le lendemain que la veille d’une victoire’ 
(Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 201) 
! 223!
no further than the Critique Sociale to find a clearer affirmation of the point: ‘le 
lendemain d’une révolution, coup de théâtre. Non pas qu’il s’opère une 
transformation subite. Hommes et choses sont les mêmes que la veille. Seulement 
l’espoir et la crainte ont changé de camp. Les chaines [sic] sont tombées, la nation est 
libre, et une horizon immense s’ouvre devant elle.’662 The horizon of communism 
appears for the first time in the wake of revolution, not communism itself. Let us not 
forget what is at stake here. Like Rousseau, like Marx,663 Blanqui’s social revolution 
seeks to fundamentally change humanity from its current state in order to fully realise 
its humanity as a conscious individual collectively exercising its will. The task of the 
revolution is to change human nature. Blanqui’s project will work towards ‘la 
destruction des habitudes morales’ so as to built them anew;664 only through 
destroying ‘les préjugés, les habitudes de servilité soigneusement entretenues dans le 
peuple’ could human nature be remade.665 Such fundamental changes were nothing 
new, of course. ‘Le genre humain a déjà changé tant de fois de mœurs, de caractère, 
d’habitudes, de lois, de religions, de morale,’ Blanqui makes clear, ‘qu’on ne sait 
vraiment où serait bien sa limite dans cette voie des transfigurations.’666 But without 
fully transforming the habits, the morals, the basic nature of humanity, any attempt to 
create a new and enduring social order will fail, and the old order will return.667 The 
horizon opened up by revolution thus presents less an immediate or an assured !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
662 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 203. See also Blanqui, ‘Les sectes et la 
révolution’, CSII, p. 115-116.!
663 ‘The man who dares to undertake the establishment of a people has to feel himself capable of 
changing, so to speak, the nature of men’ (Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 76). Marx approvingly 
quotes this passage in On the Jewish Question, before adding: ‘All emancipation is bringing back 
man’s world and his relationship to man himself.’ The task, Marx claims, is for man to ‘become a 
species-being; man must recognize his own forces as social forces, organize them, and thus no longer 
separate social forces from himself in the form of political forces. Only when this has been achieved 
will human emancipation be completed’ (Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’, in Karl Marx: Selected 
Writings, p. 64). 
664 Blanqui, ‘Dunoyer’, July 1870, CSI, p. 252; emphasis in original. 
665 Blanqui and Hadot-Desages, ‘Propagande Démocratique’, 1835, OI, p. 314. 
666 Blanqui, ‘Les apologies de l’usure’, n.d., CSI, p. 145.  
667 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 184. 
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eventual triumph than a further injunction: to begin the work of real social 
transformation.  
 
An elitist and substitutionist conception of will? 
Where is this consideration of temporarilty and conscious volition taking us? First, we 
should note that Blanqui is entirely correct to insist that political revolution, the 
overthrow of the old order and the seizure of power, in reality constitutes the 
beginning of a longer, more profound period of transition and transformation. Blanqui 
reminds us of the inadequacy of the view that emancipatory politics can be reduced to 
the moment of rupture - a suggestion that not only conveniently overlooks the 
practical problem posed by the forces who will inevitably resist any such movements, 
as noted earlier. It also evades the question of how an oppressed people can become 
capable of genuine ‘self-government’, to use Blanqui’s term.668 With regards the latter 
point such an evasion is in fact often quite explicit, predicated on the belief that the 
people is already capable of self-rule. Blanqui, however, like a whole series of 
thinkers from Rousseau, Jefferson and Lenin to Hardt and !i"ek more recently, insists 
that the practice of democracy demands a change in human nature. As Hardt affirms 
with Lenin and Spinoza (and the same presuppositions apply to Blanqui): ‘if the 
population is ignorant and superstitious then establishing democracy would merely 
mean instituting the rule of ignorance and superstition. The multitude will not be 
spontaneously or immediately transformed by the revolutionary event. It is the role of 
the transition to accomplish this task: to make a multitude capable of democracy, with 
the skills, talents, and knowledges necessary to rule themselves.’669 Any attempt to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
668 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 107 [14 October 1867]; Blanqui, ‘Projet de discours’, CSII, pp. 160-161.!
669 Hardt, ‘Introduction: Thomas Jefferson, or, The Transition of Democracy’, in Thomas Jefferson, 
The Declaration of Independence (London: Verso, 2007), p. xvi. The point of departure here is Lenin’s 
! 225!
resolve this problem therefore rests on how one conceives the relation between the 
mechanisms of transition and the transformation of the people. What is Blanqui’s 
proposed solution, and how does it compare to that of these other political theorists?  
Before examining Blanqui let us first consider Hardt’s reflections on this 
subject a little further, for he highlights some of the fundamental tensions and 
advances some solutions – and in my opinion convincing ones – to the problem of 
revolutionary transition. Hardt begins by outlining the concept of transition as 
fundamental both in thinking revolution as necessarily a process - the revolutionary 
event marks the beginning of the revolution, not its end - and yet as one of the major 
impasses of revolutionary praxis. ‘The (often authoritarian) means employed during 
revolutionary transitions frequently conflict with and even contradict the desired 
(democratic) ends; moreover, these transitions never seem to come to an end.’670 
Theory and historical practice alike attest to the need to re-engage with this at once 
contentious and vital concept. Hardt traces Lenin’s concept of transition as the most 
insightful and significant contribution to this discussion. Against the social democrats, 
who believe the rule of the people is impossible and so seek to maintain the state as a 
mediating force in the necessary division between rulers and ruled, and against the 
anarchists, who think that the rule of the people is possible now and only requires the 
abolition of the state for humanity’s otherwise repressed natural capacity for self-rule 
to be realised, Lenin, explains Hardt, posits that the state is antithetical to democracy 
and as such must be abolished, yet democracy cannot simply be established through 
the state’s immediate abolition. A process of transition is therefore necessary during 
which a dictatorship of the proletariat completes the work of popular education, 
eventually arriving at democracy and allowing the withering away of the state !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
assertion that ‘human nature as it is now … human nature that cannot do without subordination, 
control, and “managers”’ is, Hardt adds, ‘trained to be subservient and passive’ (ibid., p. x, xvi). 
670 Ibid, p. viii. 
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altogether. Lenin’s reasoning derives in part from the practical need to wield the 
power of the state in the defense and consolidation of the revolution against the 
counter-revolution, but above all it concerns human nature and its capacity for self-
rule. The central strength of Lenin’s thought, Hardt suggests, is to recognise that a 
transitional period must be undertaken in order for the people to learn how to rule 
themselves; human nature must be transformed through education and training so that 
the people become capable of self-rule.671  
The major weakness with Lenin’s schema, however, according to Hardt, ‘lies 
in the radical division it requires between means and ends, between the form of 
transitional rule and the revolutionary goals.’672 Enter Thomas Jefferson. Hardt 
discovers in Jefferson’s concept of participatory democracy a corrective to the 
attempts of Lenin, as well as of !i"ek and Laclau more recently, to present the source 
of popular transformation as a figure standing outside or above the people in a 
transcendent position of hegemony or authority rather than from coming within the 
people themselves. An externally-imposed transformation becomes a self-
transformation. Though Jefferson agrees with Lenin that a new human nature must be 
created through popular education, training and the establishment of democratic 
habits, and that this new humanity is ‘the outcome of the revolutionary process’ rather 
than its prerequisite, Jefferson’s decisive move is to not divorce the means and ends 
of the transformative process itself but, rather, to present them as one and the same. In 
Jefferson, writes Hardt, ‘the means and ends of the transition are never separated 
entirely: democracy is the goal of revolutionary process and, paradoxically, 
democracy is also the means of achieving it.’673 Therein lies the crux of Hardt’s 
argument. ‘A transition ruled by a hegemonic figure does not teach people anything !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
671 Ibid., pp. ix-xi.!
672 Ibid., p. xi. 
673 Ibid., p. xv. 
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about self-rule’, Hardt writes, ‘it only reinforces their habits of subservience and 
passivity. People only learn democracy by doing it. The necessary transformation – 
learning to rule ourselves without a master – can only take place through practice, in 
action.’ For Hardt, transition, in this Jeffersonian sense, particularly when 
supplemented by Jefferson’s simultaneous insistence on periodic popular rebellion 
against the government, ‘is recast as a process of infinite becoming’.674  
 Turning now to Blanqui, three notes from the late 1860s and 1870 reveal the 
premise and reasoning as well as the solutions and outcomes of his own concept of 
revolutionary transition. Writing in 1870 Blanqui sets out, with austere directness, the 
fundamental elements of his approach: 
 
L’instruction, indispensable et rare. Impuissance du peuple à se gouverner. Ce 
ne serait qu’une apparence. Le suffrage universel, funeste en 48. Plus funeste 
serait le gouvt. [sic] du peuple par le peuple. Proie des intrigants, des bavards, 
des charlatans, des tartuffes. Quoi qu’il décide, toujours, simple écho, 
serinette, porte-voix de quelqu’un. Le gouvt. [sic] mal nécessaire jusqu’à 
l’instruction complète. Le gouvt. [sic] du peuple, mensonge et illusion 
aujourd’hui – aussi impossible qu’un voyage à la Lune – on pourra le prendre 
par flagornerie. Il le paiera cher. Dictature Parisienne, comme représentation 
nationale, seul gouvernt. [sic] raisonnable et possible. Développement rapide 
de l’instruction, unique instrument de salut.675  
 
The people’s insufficient level of enlightenment presently excludes the possibility of 
genuine democracy, Blanqui believes. Without the transformative effects of education !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
674 Ibid., pp. xx, xxii.!
675 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 107 [28 April 1870].  
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and the consciousness it engenders, far from self-rule based on collective interests the 
rule of the people would merely reflect the structures and interests of the established 
order - that is, oligarchic rule based on private interests. The sole practical means to 
bridge the gap between what is and what ought to be is thus the negation of direct 
self-rule: dictatorship. The necessity of Paris’s temporary primacy is explained in a 
second note: 
 
Paris, représentation nationale, fait la puissance de la France, en condensant 
sur un point toutes les forces intellectuelles. Ce moyen peut être bon pour 
constituer un pays et lui donner à la fois énergie extérieure et interne. Mais ce 
n’est pas là un état normal. Un peuple doit vivre par lui-même et non par 
représentations. Paris est la France entière aujourd’hui. Il faut que la France 
entière devienne Paris, et Paris aura cessé d’être une nécessité vitale (pour la 
nation). Sa nation est à l’état de tutelle et de minorité sous l’autorité naturelle 
d’un parent supérieur en intelligence. L’Enfant ne peut rester indéfiniment 
mineur. Il doit arriver à sa majorité.676  
 
In Blanqui’s project the primacy of Paris is symptomatic of the primacy of the idea. 
The bastion of ignorance, as Blanqui calls it, propping up tyranny and preventing 
democracy can only be overthrown through exercising and extending the concentrated 
intellectual authority of Paris over France. Paris is both representative and creator of 
the people; Paris instructs the people, developing its thought, intellect and thereby its 
capacities for self-government to the extent that the work of the central authority 
renders itself obsolete through its completion of this task. This brings us to a third 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
676 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 173 [n.d.]. See also Blanqui MSS 9581, fo. 93 [7 February 1856].!
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note, which expands on the consequences and goals of transition. Suggesting that in 
1793 Paris replaced ‘l’autocratie d’un seul’ with, so Blanqui writes in a somewhat 
curious phrase, ‘l’autocratie de tous’, that is, equality, in the 1860s Paris remained and 
would remain the representative of equality until France as a whole had adopted the 
principle - and until that day arrives any curtailment of the centralised power of this 
beacon of enlightenment and revolutionary force is a counter-revolutionary measure. 
Maintaining that the details of this future egalitarian social arrangement were of no 
interest or concern for revolutionaries, its essential contours could still be traced: 
 
Il n’y aura plus alors ni Royauté, ni patriciat, ni clergé, ni bourgeoisie, ni 
plèbe, ni dictature Parisienne, ni Centralisation, ni Fédéralisme, ni différences 
(diversité, multiplicité) de classes. Ces mots n’appartiendront plus qu’à 
l’histoire. La nation, une, libre, maîtresse d’elle-même, sans millionnaires et 
sans mendiants, sans exploiteurs ni exploités, surtout sans oisifs, possédera la 
véritable self-government qui, jusqu’à cette heure n’existe nulle part, pas 
même aux Etats-Unis, tant s’en faut, et en Angleterre, moins que partout 
ailleurs.677  
 
The third part of this schema is, then, the end of all forms of authority, of the 
emergence of the rule of the people in a unified, truly free and egalitarian society. 
Enlightenment through dictatorship to democracy – these are the three components of 
Blanqui’s concept of transition.  
We can now see how Blanqui’s reframing of the temporality of revolution 
anticipates the two central pillars of Lenin’s theory: maintaining state power as the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
677 Blanqui MSS, 9590(1), fo. 106 [14 October 1867]. See also the earlier assertion that equality will 
end ‘la distinction des privilégiés et des prolétaires, voilà le plus grand service qu’elle rendra à 
l’humanité’ (Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 110).  
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practical means through which to simultaneously enact transition and defend the 
revolution from its enemies, as noted earlier, and the necessity of remaking and 
transforming the population’s human nature, of developing its thought and knowledge 
so as to make it capable of self-rule. Blanqui is useful, if not rather prescient, in 
conceiving, like Lenin after him, ‘the revolutionary event as both rupture and 
duration, an historical break that opens a new historical process.’678 Blanqui’s 
attempts to respond to the dilemma of how to achieve democracy also display an 
admirable level of political realism in assessing an actual state of affairs and 
advancing resolutely practical solutions. He provides, in this respect, ‘a concrete 
analysis of a concrete situation’, to employ Lenin’s own oft-quoted maxim. 
Nonetheless, Blanqui’s conception of transition comes up against the same hurdles 
Hardt identifies in Lenin. And, again just like the Bolshevik leader, Blanqui offers no 
obvious means of overcoming them. Instead of training the people in democracy 
through the practice of democracy itself, Blanqui’s thinking is properly dialectical: 
the transition to democracy demands the negation of democracy. In this sense Blanqui 
does not go beyond Lenin, or perhaps this should be Lenin’s failure to go beyond 
Blanqui. Predating the dictatorship of the proletariat, in Blanqui’s account it is the 
dictatorship of Paris that stands above the people and forms the transcendent 
revolutionary authority directing the education of the population, the font from which 
enlightenment will flow. The exercise of the general will, the democratic and 
communist social arrangement Blanqui proposes under the name of ‘community’ or 
‘association’, is deferred until the process of enlightenment is complete. Blanqui is in 
fact quite explicit about the division between the means of popular education and its 
goals of universal enlightenment and, as a result, communism. Having noted in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
678 Hardt, ‘Introduction: Thomas Jefferson, or, The Transition of Democracy’, pp. x-xi. 
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Critique Sociale, for example, some of ‘les conséquences de l’universalité des 
lumières’, Blanqui flags up to readers that ‘le communisme figurera comme simple 
effet, non comme cause. Il naîtra fatalement de l’instruction généralisée et ne peut 
naître que de là.’679 The strict incompatibility of causes and effects, of means and 
ends, necessarily gives way to delay and deferral. Communism cannot be imposed 
‘brusquement’680 because, as we have seen, enlightenment is ‘la condition sine qua 
non du communisme’.681 Only when universal instruction is finally complete can its 
fruits be enjoyed, as Blanqui summarises in one note: ‘La lumière manque ; il faut la 
faire. C’est de devoir et la tache de la Révolution. L’instruction du procès terminée, la 
nation prononcera.’682 Communism thus conceived excludes by definition any form of 
self-transformation, a communism or democracy produced through its own practice, 
since education as the sole means of achieving communism and democracy is posited 
on a fixed hierarchy of intelligence and knowledge, on an irreducible master-student 
relation.683 To act otherwise is, in Blanqui’s eyes, to short-circuit the necessary 
process of the proper dissemination of thought and ideas. The assertion that ‘les 
communistes n’ont cessé de former l’avant-garde la plus audacieuse de la 
démocratie’684 could therefore be read not only as Blanqui’s dismissal of the 
revolutionary credentials of contemporary political movements or tendencies – Saint-
Simonians, Fourierists, Positivists – but also as a more literal assertion of the need for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
679 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 187. 
680 Ibid., p. 201. 
681 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 59 [15 March 1869]. 
682 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 160 [n.d.]. 
683 Blanqui is as such completely at odds with Hardt’s assertion that for Jefferson ‘when people 
participate actively in government, deciding on all the matters that concern them, either directly or by 
instructing their delegates up to the highest levels of government, they are transformed. There is no 
great instructor that teaches [the people] the necessary lessons. The process of transition is a self-
training in the capacities of self-rule. Through practice they develop the skills, knowledges, and habits 
necessary for self-government and, in the process, a new humanity is created’ (Hardt, ‘Introduction: 
Thomas Jefferson, or, The Transition of Democracy’, p. xx). 
684 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 199. 
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democracy to be carried by an elite capable of conferring it upon the people when 
they are intellectually capable of its proper exercise.  
The problem of transition reveals one of the major structural problems of 
Blanqui’s political project as a whole. The price Blanqui pays for his insistence on 
conscious volition is extremely high: it is at odds with a conception of popular 
political will in which conscious volition is by definition an ‘inclusive’ process 
involving ‘direct participation’685 and therefore opens the door to the accusation of 
vanguardist elitism. The overriding logic in Blanqui’s writings is one in which, 
lacking the adequate level of consciousness produced through enlightened instruction, 
not all the people are presently capable of freely willing, or at least that this capacity 
is stifled or repressed – whether internally or externally – to the extent that it cannot 
be properly exercised as it can and must.686 Only an external, hegemonic force can 
correct this. As a result of the strictly dialectical process by which he conceives 
transition and change, does Blanqui not over-emphasise this pedagogical prerequisite, 
the conscious thought demanded for decisive voluntary action, thereby delaying – 
unnecessarily no doubt - the exercise of a truly democratic, participatory political 
will? In short, does Blanqui’s conception of ‘pensée-volonté’ not display a certain 
lack of confidence in the people?  
Consider the following striking passage on cooperatives, which can, I think, 
be regarded as generally illustrative of Blanqui’s thought on this issue. In Blanqui’s 
view the primary shortcoming of these forms of worker associations is, again, the 
wider level of ignorance amongst the population. As a result of not merely !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
685 See Hallward, ‘The Will of the People’, p. 21. 
686 Perhaps the most notable exception to this poisition is found in the affirmation of the ‘Formulaire de 
reception de la Société des Familles’ that ‘tout citoyen qui réunit discrétion et bonne volonté mérite 
d’entrer dans nos rangs, quel que soit d’ailleurs son degré d’instruction. La société achève son 
éducation politique (‘Formulaire de réception de la Société des Familles’, OI, p. 298.) I would argue, 
however, that this is statement is not representative of Blanqui’s overall position more consistently put 
forward.  
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insufficient education but of miseducation at the hands of the clergy, ‘[l]a plupart des 
prolétaries n’ont pas les connaissances suffisantes pour juger par eux-mêmes la 
gestion d’une société’.687 Credit societies, meanwhile, ‘exigent une instruction qui en 
rétrécit singulierement le cercle’. Likewise, since only a small minority of workers 
possess the intellectual ‘capacité nécessaire’ to undertake the self-management of 
production, pursuing this goal in unenlightened society risks divorcing them from the 
ignorant and impoverished majority and becoming an enriched ‘demi-bourgeoisie’, 
henceforth simply pursuing private interests rather than collective emancipation; it 
would cream off from the mass of the people its ‘protecteurs naturels’.688 Without the 
necessary critical faculties required of egalitarian socio-economic practices – to 
repeat, without the ‘capacité nécessaire’ – any form of direct, popular political 
participation must be delayed. Blanqui is explicit about this. Only after a programme 
of mass public education, based on reason and science instead of the clerical 
superstition and in a process that would last less than ten years, so Blanqui speculates, 
would the intellectual transformation of France be complete. Then and only then 
could the general will reign. So while Blanqui describes how thanks to this process 
‘[t]ous les travailleurs, devenus, d’instruments passifs, des citoyens éclaires, 
associeraient spontanément leurs intelligences et leurs bras, et le problème de 
l’organisation du travail selon la justice se trouverait résolu’, even this depiction of an 
enlightened citizenry actively and collectively participating in the ruling of society is 
then immediately qualified as a distant reality, a move on Blanqui’s part that 
reinforces the current state of passive ignorance for which, regrettably, no instant 
remedies could be applied: ‘Par malheur, nous n’en sommes pas là’.689  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
687 Blanqui, ‘Projet de discours’, CSII, p. 154. 
688 Ibid., pp. 155-156.  
689 Ibid., p. 154. 
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The same passage also reaffirms the conviction noted above that the work of 
establishing democracy is restricted to an elite capable of conferring it upon the 
people. The emancipation of the people could not take place through ‘petites sociétés 
coopératives … . Le peuple ne peut sortir de servage que par l’impulsion de la grande 
société, de l’État’, Blanqui writes. ‘Car l’État n’a pas d’autre mission légitime.’ A 
centralised authority is the driving force of popular emancipation; the post-
revolutionary state alone possesses the knowledge and power to liberate and thus to 
create the people, to the extent that the activity of the people cannot take place ‘en 
dehors de son gouvernement’.690 Only the government could simultaneously direct 
popular education and activity while protecting the people against ‘les races des 
vampires’ whose inevitable reappearance before this process is complete will threaten 
to re-enslave the ignorant masses through manipulation and deception, causing the 
people to fight on the side of their oppressors and against their own interests just as 
before the revolution, and in so doing derailing the entire revolutionary process with 
disastrous consequences.691 To return to a point evoked in the previous chapter, 
Blanqui and Laclau are in this respect quite close in prioritising forms of 
representation over direct popular empowerment (Blanqui for the non-elite sections of 
the people in the provinces, Laclau for the people as a whole), and are accordingly 
both limited in their own ways. As Hallward affirms, the people must be collectively 
and actively willed and empowered in order for it to then be collectively and actively 
named or represented, and not vice versa.692   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
690 Ibid., p. 157. Blanqui uses as the basis to critique the discipline of political economy: ‘Quelle est 
donc cette thèse nouvelle, soulevée en dépit de l’expérience et du sens commun par une prétendue 
science qui s’intitule économie politique ; thèse étrange, qui place toute l’activité d’un peuple en 
dehors de son gouvernement et l’en déclare radicalement indépendante ? Une pareille doctrine est le 
plus audacieux démenti à l’histoire, par conséquent une sottise. Pis que cela, elle est une immoralité et 
un crime’ (ibid., pp. 157-158).  
691 See for example Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 184. 
692 ‘The will of the people is a matter of material power and active empowerment, before it is a matter 
of representation, authority or legitimacy’  (Hallward, ‘The Will of the People’, p. 22). Cf. Laclau: ‘the 
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Indeed, for Hallward the belief in the necessity of patience is characteristic of 
those ‘who lack confidence in the people’, a view which ‘takes the general form of an 
insistence on socially mediated time, the time of ongoing “development”. … It is 
always too early, from this perspective, for equality and participation’, Hallward 
writes. ‘Only when they “grow up” or “progress” might today’s people become 
worthy of the rights that a prudent society withholds.’ Unlike others who may espouse 
this view, however, Blanqui can in no way be accused of substituting ‘confidence in 
the people’ for ‘confidence in historical progress’.693 With Blanqui the necessity of 
socio-political patience is not symptomatic of the patience of historical necessity. 
Nonetheless, such a stringent conception of conscious volition forces us to confront 
the fact that so long as an actor is not intellectually conscious they remain incapable 
of the conscious volition Blanqui advances as the definitive practice of a free, 
egalitarian society ruled by collective interests. The result is in many ways an 
undeniably elitist and/or substitutionist conception of transition and change: only 
those with the necessary knowledge can act to create a society in which all are 
informed and so all are actors. It is a question of representing and eventually giving 
power to the people, not of their direct self-empowerment.694  
 
The legislator as transitional power? 
A possible explanation for Blanqui’s limitation in this respect might be found in 
Rousseau’s distinction, noted in Chapter 1, between the people and the people ‘when 
properly informed’.695 ‘The people, being subject to the laws, must create them’, 
Rousseau explains, ‘it is the associates who have the right to determine the conditions !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
construction of a “people” would be impossible without the operation of mechanisms of representation’ 
(Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 161).  
693 Hallward, ‘The Will of the People’, p. 23. 
694 Ibid., p. 22.!
695 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 66. 
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of society.’ As we have seen, Blanqui likewise affirms that laws, as an act of the 
general will, must bear out that most quintessential of democratic principles: of the 
people, by the people, for the people. ‘But how are they to determine them?’, 
Rousseau goes on to ask. ‘Who will give it the foresight it needs to produce acts of 
will … ? How can the blind multitude, often ignorant of what it wants, because it 
seldom knows what is good for it, accomplish by itself so large and difficult an 
enterprise as a system of legislation?’696 Earlier, in the Discourse on Political 
Economy, Rousseau had similarly outlined how a truly popular government, ‘which 
has as its object the good of the people’, must ‘follow the general will in everything’. 
In order for the general will ‘to be followed’, however, ‘it must be known’ and, as 
such, ‘it must be clearly distinguished from the particular will’. Making this 
distinction is ‘always very difficult,’ Rousseau acknowledges, ‘and only the most 
sublime virtue is capable of giving the necessary enlightenment.’697 Rousseau 
advances a form of socio-political education as the basis upon which the general will 
can be clearly known and so can be properly exercised.698 Citizenship in this sense is 
a didactic construction – it must be taught and trained, assimilated and acquired 
though its instruction and practice.  
A sustained discussion of who or what may fulfill the role of ‘the official 
appointed to preside over this form of education, which is certainly the state’s most 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
696 Ibid., p. 75.!!
697 Rousseau, ‘Discourse on Political Economy’, pp. 9-10. !
698 ‘Public education, following rules prescribed by the government, and controlled by officers 
established by the sovereign, is therefore one of the fundamental principles of the popular or legitimate 
form of government. If children are brought up in common on terms of complete equality, if they are 
imbued with the laws of the state and the maxims of the general will, and instructed to respect them 
above everything, if they are surrounded with examples and objects that unceasingly speak to them of 
the tender mother who provides for them, of the incalculable gifts they receive from her and the 
gratitude they owe her in return – we cannot doubt that they will learn in this way to cherish each other 
like brothers, to want nothing except what is wanted by society, to replace the sterile and empty 
chattering of the sophists by the actions of men and citizens, and one day to become the defenders and 
fathers of their country, whose children they have been for so long’ (ibid., p. 23). 
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important affair’699 is left to The Social Contract, in which the figure of the 
‘legislator’ appears. Society, like all creations, requires solid, durable foundations, 
Rousseau insists. It follows that ‘the wise creator of institutions will not begin by 
drafting laws good in themselves, but will first consider whether the people for whom 
they are intended is capable of receiving them.’700 Consideration of the people’s 
capacities, and whether they are sufficient as presently constituted or in need of full 
realisation, is thus vital. And since the latter is indeed the case, the legislator is 
presented with its task, a task that cannot be overstated. ‘The man who dares to 
undertake the establishment of a people has to feel himself capable of changing, so to 
speak, the nature of man’, writes Rousseau; the legislator ‘must deprive man of his 
own strength so as to give him strength from the outside, which he cannot use without 
the help of others. The more completely these natural strengths are destroyed and 
reduced to nothing, the more powerful and durable are those which replace them, and 
the firmer and more perfect, too, the society that is constituted’.701 This wise man has 
the intellectual power to understand the mechanisms of enduring socio-political 
change, to transform the human nature of each individual so as to constitute the social 
body. The legislator guides the people, steering them from external manipulation. The 
legislator anticipates popular power and paves the way for the empowerment of an 
oppressed people, initiating the process through which the sovereign body is 
constructed and the general will exercised. The legislator is a creator – of a society, of 
a people, of a humanity.  
Blanqui takes up and in many ways extends Rousseau’s basic assumptions, 
focusing his attention on the role of thought and knowledge in the construction of a 
voluntary political actor. Blanqui appears to conclude that to not be ‘properly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
699 Ibid., p. 24. 
700 Rousseau, The Social Contract, pp. 79-80. 
701 Ibid., pp. 76-77. 
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informed’ is, by definition, to form part of the ‘blind multitude’ incapable at present 
of conscious volition. On many occasions Blanqui seems to conceive the enlightened 
revolutionary elite of which he forms part and the revolutionary power they wield as a 
form of Rousseau’s legislator. The writings above on the post-revolutionary period 
certainly suggest these positions, yet perhaps the most striking example is found in 
the Formulaire de Réception à la Société des Saisons. The established order forms the 
point of departure. ‘L’État social [est] gangrené’, and as a result the people cannot 
govern itself immediately after the revolution. The text therefore asserts that ‘pour 
passer à un État sain, il faut des remèdes héroïques’. (Note here the echoes of 
Rousseau’s depiction of the legislator as ‘a man extraordinary in every respect’.)702 
Hence the necessity of a temporary revolutionary power ‘qui mette le peuple à même 
d’exercer ses droits.’703 The task of the revolutionary power, for Blanqui and 
Rousseau alike, is to transform the people, to make it capable of exercising its 
collective will, capable of democracy. 
That is not to say that Blanqui’s reflections amount to a dismissal of the 
political agency of all but himself and his small revolutionary vanguard. Blanqui 
forever maintains that a part of the people is properly informed, namely the people of 
Paris, to the extent that the part (Paris) represents the whole (France). Hence 
Parisians’ position as Blanqui’s revolutionary agent par excellence. Not only do the 
enlightened workers of Paris represent the nation as a whole, however - they do so in 
spite of those very workers and peasants of the provinces who numerically comprise 
the majority of the nation yet remain under the sway of clerical domination and thus 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
702 Rousseau describes the legislator as almost a quasi-deity, ‘a mind of a superior kind’ taking 
‘decisions of [a] higher reason, beyond the scope of average men’ (ibid., pp. 76-78). We might also 
note the extent to which the Formulaire’s corporal analogy of politics - an unhealthy state suffering 
from gangrene and in need of remedies to reach good health - follows Rousseau’s evocation of ‘the 
body politic’ and society as comparable to the human body.  
703 ‘Formulaire de réception à la Société des Saisons’, OI, p. 383.!
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in their passive, miseducated ignorance are manipulated as the agents of reaction.704 
In Blanqui’s thought revolution, democracy and emancipation are not a purely 
numerical question – they are first and foremost a matter of the actors bearing them as 
ideals, of locating who is capable of exercising conscious volition and offering 
encouragement, support, organisation and leadership in order to facilitate its practice. 
In all cases Blanqui’s emancipatory volition comes back to a fundamental distinction: 
conscious thought. If ‘les ennemis du peuple’ are those who tell the proletariat that 
‘les habiletés de la main valent les puissances du cerveau. Les travailleurs dévoués à 
l’émancipation des masses connaissent bien tout le poison de cet encens.’705 To be 
‘properly informed’ is, first, to understand the strength and significance of one’s own 
enlightened thought as the basis of one’s capacity for conscious volition in the cause 
of emancipation and, second, it is to devote oneself to the emancipation of all, to 
those who remain uninformed and as such remain oppressed.  
But do many other political theories not also privilege certain actors within a 
wider struggle? Whether for socio-economic (proletarians, peasants), cultural 
(students, intellectuals), geographic (urban masses) or political (disenfranchised 
plebeians) reasons, one group is frequently seen as the most susceptible to becoming 
the leading actor of an emancipatory struggle, often to the point of embodying the 
cause to the virtual exclusion of all other groups. Blanqui merely adopts another 
category - intelligence - as another means for conceptualising the context and 
conditions that give rise to political agency. If he gets caught in a trap, he is not alone 
in doing so.   
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
704 Such an observation is made, for example, in a description from November 1848 of the Parisian 
workers as the embattled revolutionary minority facing the force of the reactionary majority, exactly as 
in 1793. See Blanqui, ‘À la Montagne de 93. Aux socialistes purs, ses véritables héritiers !’, MA, pp. 
153-154. 
705 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, MA, pp. 213-214. 
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We have seen how Blanqui’s voluntarism is built on a concept of conscious volition. 
Politics is a conflict of wills and collective will a positive, affirmative action to realise 
collective principles. These are the assumptions from which he insists on the practical 
dimensions of collective political action, in particular the manner in which a process 
of popular empowerment will have to overcome the resistance that will confront it. 
Blanqui maintains that if a conscious collective actor has the organised, unified and 
resolute collective will to prevail it can do so. Contrary to the beliefs of his ‘utopian’ 
contemporaries, Blanqui insists that it is indeed only through collectively working 
towards its realisation that the actual form of the project itself will appear. Moreover, 
we can now understand the role of duty, morality, resolute conviction and faith in 
Blanqui’s wider project as the subjective resources sustaining a process of political 
volition. These are the factors according to which one not only can but also must will 
an idea or a principle to the end, to the exclusion of any form of renunciation or 
resignation. On all these points Blanqui provides major insights into voluntarist 
politics, revealing the extent to which within the wider voluntarist tradition his 
politics advanced on the theory and practice of those before him (Rousseau, 
Robespierre, Babeuf…) while in many ways anticipated the assumptions of those who 
followed him (Lenin, Castro, Guevara…). 
When it comes to the question of post-revolutionary transition and the 
temporality of socio-political change, however, certain limits of Blanqui’s thought 
appear. Although astute in its confrontation of a basic problem ignored elsewhere of 
the practical exigencies of social transformation in the wake of political revolution, a 
theory that generally tends towards conceiving an enlightened elite presiding over the 
transformation of the ignorant and passive masses in many ways prefigures the 
practice – and failures – of twentieth-century communism: purportedly temporary and 
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exceptional initial periods became the permanent state of things and the state, far from 
withering away, grew ever stronger. Jefferson, but also Rousseau in his concern for a 
government’s inevitable tendency to usurp the sovereign power of the people and 
proposal of popular assemblies as a means of preventing this threat,706 both offer 
useful correctives to these problems. Despite such limitations with regard to the 
temporality of transition, Blanqui’s reflections on historical time more generally are, 
however, extremely rich, as we shall now see in the final chapter.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
706 This issue is central to Book III of The Social Contract. 
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Chapter 5 – History and Progress 
‘La seconde d’après suit la seconde d’avant. Mais l’engrenage des choses humaines 
n’est point fatal comme celui de l’univers. Il est modifiable à toute minute.’707 
 





Questions of history and progress have generated more interest than all other aspects 
of Blanqui’s thought – and with good reason. Blanqui’s writings on historical time 
and the possibility for social change provide some of his most stimulating intellectual 
reflections, particularly when considered within the context of their author’s own life 
and the often embattled personal and political circumstances of their genesis. But the 
attention has not always resulted in convincing interpretation. Indeed, perhaps 
nowhere else has Blanqui’s thought been so misrepresented as on the concept of 
history.  
The aim of this chapter is therefore to reconstruct Blanqui’s reflections on 
these themes in order to comprehend how they shape his project as a whole. As with 
the previous chapter we will be able to draw on our earlier discussions and 
conclusions, thereby forming a broader picture of Blanqui’s politics. I will begin with 
an examination of Blanqui’s thought on history and historical change. Rooted in 
thought, ideas and human consciousness, we see the distance between Blanqui’s view 
of history and that of Marx, allowing us to reflect on its overall merits and flaws, 
particularly with regard to questions of determinism, fatalism and the historical role of 
human agency. All these issues are present within L’Éternité par les astres, Blanqui’s 
most complex and enigmatic text. My reading aims to show that through maintaining !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
707 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 61 [1 April 1869].  
708 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 36 [n.d.].!
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the primacy of politics as Blanqui’s central concern we can arrive at the core meaning 
of L’Éternité and see how it fits within Blanqui’s overall project.  
 
What is history? 
 
Philosophical primacy 
We saw in Chapter 1 how Blanqui ascribes primacy to philosophy, ideas and thought 
in ‘governing’ the world and the societies it contains. Social change is, for Blanqui, 
the result of philosophical change.709 It follows that on the question of the history of 
those societies and that world – a matter of great importance to Blanqui - as well as 
denoting in a conventional sense the occurrence of events and the passage of time, 
history in a more fundamental sense is the account of the ideas, thought, 
consciousness and morality that define and determine all material social 
arrangements. ‘Faire de la philosophie, c’est étudier la pensée et la conscience. Faire 
l’histoire, c’est raconter le rôle de la conscience et de la pensée dans la vie des 
peuples.’710 The foundational role of philosophy and thought in Blanqui’s project thus 
leads him to conceive historical change as philosophical change; any given social 
transformation is fundamentally the product of a transformation in the ruling 
philosophy of that society.  
A fascinating manuscript note sheds a great deal of light on the consequences 
of Blanqui’s claims that ‘l’omnipotence (la puissance de la) philosophie’ constitutes 
the basic force of history, and is therefore worth quoting at length. In essence, 
historical change, Blanqui believes, denotes the supersession of an old philosophy 
with a new one. In the necessary transitional period of struggle between the two !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
709 See Blanqui MSS 9592(3) fo. 384 [n.d.].!
710 Blanqui, ‘Candide’, 3 May 1865, MA, p. 249. 
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opposing philosophies the primacy of philosophy itself may appear illusory; 
seemingly under attack from ‘des forces extra-philosophiques’ and subordinate to the 
socio-political influence of other ‘sciences’, philosophy may therefore appear 
destined to disappear altogether and be replaced ‘par des pouvoirs nouveaux d’un 
ordre tout différent’ in determining the structure of society as a whole. This is a 
profound error, Blanqui suggests. ‘Ces forces nouvelles ne sont que les éléments 
d’une nouvelle philosophie, bien qu’elles paraissent étrangères par leur nature à cette 
idée et en dehors de toute philosophie. Elles retrouveront leur assise régulière 
qu’après d’être traduites condensées en une philosophie qui, à son tour, sera la pensée 
publique et la souveraine de la société.’ Opposing ideas, the overcoming of a 
seemingly stable philosophy and its corresponding social order, the emergence and 
eventual establishment of a new philosophy and a new social order – one might 
suggest the presence of a certain dialectical motion to historical change here. Blanqui 
continues: ‘Ce qu’on appelle les temps de transition ne sont précisément que le temps 
de la durée de la guerre entre deux philosophies, l’une qui s’en va, l’autre qui vient.’ 
Rather than a negation of philosophy as such, historical change is a process of 
philosophical struggle between conflicting ideas and then of the synthesis of the 
philosophy and the real, material structures of society, Blanqui concludes.711  
Despite their primacy in governing social arrangements, then, for Blanqui 
philosophies and ideas do not simply conceive and realise themselves a priori. 
Philosophies are conceived by humanity and realised in a war that can only be waged 
by the militants of those philosophies in order to change and, in Blanqui’s case, to 
perfect humanity through intellectual consciousness and reason. It is in this important 
respect that history, as Blanqui views it, is above all human history; history is the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
711 Blanqui MSS 9592(3) fo. 384-385 [n.d.]. 
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realm of human thought and activity. As noted in Chapter 1, in many ways Blanqui 
appears to share Hegel’s insistence on human thought, understanding and 
consciousness as the determinant factors in the making of history. For Blanqui as for 
Hegel, so Spitzer notes, humanity is ‘both the agent and the product of endless 
change.’712 Against Fourierism, a doctrine built on the ‘base fausse’ of ‘la fixité des 
instincts, l’identité constante de l’homme avec lui-même’, for Blanqui the 
transformation and perfection of humanity and human reason as the key to social 
justice is the most basic historical task.713 If Fourierism’s foremost contradiction is its 
attempt to construct ‘une organisation définitive sur la permanence des penchants et 
des passions’, a move consistent with its failure on the social question to offer 
anything other than the conservation of the existing order,714 Blanqui’s thought is 
animated by movement and transformation at the level of people and social 
arrangements alike. Blanqui offers a view of history and progress as rooted in the 
process – again depicted in near dialectical terms - of humanity becoming more 
conscious of and perfecting itself through the exercise of its own thought:  
 
tout le développement des choses terrestres s’est accompli d’après la loi 
opposée, le changement perpétuel et insensible, la mutation progressive des 
êtres. L’homme est le produit d’une transformation continue, aussi lente dans 
ses effets que persistante dans sa marche. Il abandonne et il acquiert. Il se 
renouvelle dans ses instincts et ses facultés, comme le corps dans ses tissus. La 
permanence des instincts et leur utilisation par une méthode harmonique est 
donc une théorie radicalement contraire à notre nature et aux lois physiques. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
712 Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 44. 
713 As Blanqui affirms: ‘Tout n’est pas admirable ni séduisant dans l’homme. Il a de vilains cotés et de 
sales inclinations’ (Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 188 [23 April 1869]).  
714 Ibid., fo. 187-189.! 
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Tous les instincts, à un moment donné, ont leur utilité et concourent à la 
conservation des individus et de l’espèce. Mais le temps les modifie au moyen 
de l’homme lui-même qui progresse par le perfectionnement continu du 
cerveau.715  
 
Like Hegel, Blanqui insists on the development of human consciousness through the 
exercise and perfecting of human thought as the primary motor of historical change 
and progress, which again is human change and progress, for the capacity to 
collectively arrange social, political and economic relations in line with morality and 
justice is the corollary of collective self-consciousness. For Blanqui only in thinking 
and understanding ourselves as free can we actually become free. But between 
consciousness of freedom, of justice, and its realisation forever lies political action. 
History is the account of the political struggle this process of human transformation 
entails. History is indeed as much the account of humanity becoming collectively 
conscious of its capacity for collective self-determination and actually imposing that 
capacity as it is the account of the forces actively preventing, undermining or undoing 
this process through miseducation, deceit and manipulation. ‘L’expérience des siècles 
démontre que le seul agent du progrès est l’instruction, que la lumière jaillit (presque) 
uniquement de l’échange (et du choc) des pensées humaines, que par conséquent tout 
ce qui favorise et multiplie cet échange est le bien, que tout ce qui supprime ou 
l’entrave est le mal.’716 Consistent with his wider contempt for unprincipled 
vacillation or ostensible neutrality, it is in this sense of history as the site of conflict 
and struggle between two profoundly moral positions – enlightened emancipatory 
justice and ignorant repressive injustice - that Blanqui rejects the notion of ‘histoire 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
715 Ibid., fo. 187-188. On this point see also Blanqui, ‘Les apologies de l’usure’, n.d., CSI, p. 145. 
716 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 64 [n.d.]. 
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impartiale’.717 Blanqui’s history is at once human and political; it is the process 
whereby humans consciously strive, through struggle and conflict, in the face of 
obstacles and resistance, to realise their freedom and achieve justice.  
The modern age, born out of ‘la civilisation Gréco-Romaine’ and overcoming 
‘l’ère de sang et de ténèbres’ of the Middle Ages and the reign of Christianity through 
the advent of the printing press – the instrument of progress par excellence718 - is 
defined by this struggle for freedom – the freedom of the people, as equals, to 
collectively determine the organisation of their social, political and economic life. To 
be modern is to be conscious of one’s own freedom, aware of oneself as a self-
determining actor capable of moral judgement, and to actively strive for the collective 
realisation of this freedom as the foundation of an egalitarian, self-governing social 
order.719 With echoes of the manner in which Hegel advances the attainment of the 
consciousness of freedom as the standard by which to judge advances in history, 
Blanqui sees the exercise of conscious volition as the criterion from which to plot and 
judge the socio-political development of peoples and civilizations. Genuine historical 
judgment can be attained, then, but the capacity to judge history itself presupposes 
consciousness. History, in other words, is the result of the history it recounts – both 
historical change and its narration are attained through the exercise of 
consciousnesses. ‘Dans les procès du passé devant l’avenir, les mémoires 
contemporains sont les témoins, l’histoire est le juge, et l’arrêt est presque toujours 
une iniquité, soit par la fausseté des dépositions, soit par leur absence ou par 
l’ignorance du tribunal’, Blanqui notes. ‘Heureusement l’appel reste à jamais ouvert,’ 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
717 See Blanqui, ‘Résignation’, April 1863, CSII, pp. 109-111. 
718 The Middle Ages, Blanqui writes, ‘n’est autre chose que le règne du Christianisme’ and so marked a 
period of regression that was only halted and undone with the advent of the printing press. See Blanqui 
MSS 9590(1), fo. 157 [n.d.]. 
719 Cf. ‘La démocratie avec la liberté, c’est l’idée moderne, l’égalité des citoyens’ (Blanqui MSS 9586, 
fo 403 [n.d.]). 
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he adds, ‘et la lumière des siècles nouveaux, projetée au loin sur les siècles écoulés, y 
dénonce les jugements de ténèbres.’720 Though differing sharply in their respective 
criteria of analysis - Hegel’s advocacy of the freedom produced in Germany through 
the advent Christianity is quite clearly directly at odds with Blanqui’s Paris-centred 
atheism – the far East nonetheless exemplifies for both Hegel and Blanqui how the 
absence of conscious thought results in the absence of freedom and progress. If for the 
former ‘[t]he Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit – Man as such – is 
free; and because they do not know this, they are not free’,721 the latter, too, invites us 
to ‘[voir] l’Inde et la Chine. L’Europe n’a jamais pu égaler les Hindous dans le tissage 
du cachemire. Comme artistes, comme artisans, les Chinois sont au moins nos rivaux. 
Et cependant quelle dégradation ! Pourquoi ? La pensée est absente.’722 It is this 
insistence on thought and consciousness from which comes morality and justice as the 
yardstick of historical progress, and not on production and all it entails, which 
explains Blanqui’s suggestion that beyond trading with China ‘on paiera un service 
aux chinois en pillant deux ou trois de leurs palais et de leurs villes pour les civiliser 
et les décrasser de leur barbarie.’723 
Insofar as the attainment of communism is presented as the goal, the ‘terme 
final’ of human association, Blanqui’s conception of history can be said to have broad 
stages of development. The extent of humanity’s ‘double vie, la vie individuelle et la 
vie de relation’, from which arouse ‘un double instinct, celui de la conservation 
personnelle et celui de la conservation sociale’, were, Blanqui wrote in Candide, both 
variable and subject to change according to ‘le degré de lumière’. As such both were 
the consequence and the measure of the level of public enlightenment. ‘Ces échanges !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
720 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 59 [n.d.]. 
721 G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History (Mineola, New York: Dover, 1956), p. 18. 
722 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, 1869-70, CSI, pp. 214-125. !
723 Blanqui MSS 9587, fo. 358 [16 April 1862]. 
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successifs marquent les étapes de l’humanité. À toute date, la conscience publique est 
le reflet et le thermomètre de la science publique.’724 History is, for Blanqui, the 
account of ‘la variabilité de la morale selon les temps et le lieux, sa progression plus 
ou moins lente ou rapide, mais toujours proportionnelle au développement des 
lumières.’725 Those spiritualists who insist on the unity and inflexibility of an absolute 
morality ‘seront un jour eux-mêmes déclarés des barbares’, he thus states, ‘violateurs 
de la morale’.726 Indeed, a form of ‘communisme primitif’ characteristic of early 
forms of social arrangements is instructively dismissed as ‘diamétralement le 
contraire de la vérité’. Again, this assertion derives from the basic assumption of 
cerebral change as the causal factor behind social transformation. Since cerebral 
transformations are ‘l’œuvre des siècles’,727 it follows that communism will be the 
future socio-political expression of the enlightenment achieved though universal 
instruction. Writing under the similar heading of ‘communisme, avenir de la société’, 
Blanqui depicts a ‘marche constante du genre humain’ in which the future will clearly 
reveal ‘que tout progrès est une conquête, tout recul une défaite du communisme … ; 
que tous les problèmes successivement posés dans l’histoire par les besoins de notre 
espèce ont eu une solution communiste, que les questions aujourd’hui pendants, si 
ardues, si pleines de trouble et de guerre, n’en peuvent pas davantage recevoir d’autre, 
à peine d’aggravation du mal et de chute dans l’absurde.’728 All progress in human 
affairs, from taxes and various forms of commercial and industrial associations to the 
army, education and government, are ‘innovations communistes’; all have been 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
724 Blanqui, ‘Candide’, MA, p. 248. 
725 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 74 [n.d.]. Or as he likewise reasserts elsewhere: ‘l’étude historique du 
genre humain démontre la fausseté de cette prétendue pérennité de la morale. La morale est une 
résultante, toujours mobile et variable, du mouvement intellectuel accompli par les hommes’ (Blanqui 
MSS 9590(1), fo. 163 [n.d.]). 
726 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 74 [n.d.].  
727 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme primitif’, April 1869, CSII, p. 73. 
728 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, pp. 173-174.!
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achieved, and in time will be necessarily transcended, as stages of ‘cette voie’ towards 
communism. The idea of communism, Blanqui accordingly notes, ‘a dit à peine son 
premier mot. Avant d’en être à son dernier, elle aura tout changé de face. Nous ne 
sommes encore que des barbares.’729 With self-consciousness – and this is a crucial 
point – we locate ourselves within an ongoing movement, a wider process of 
achieving socio-political progress through the realisation of self-consciousness. The 
extent of our collective association, itself tied to the level mass enlightenment, 
provides ‘le véritable instrument/et thermomètre du progrès’.730 Blanqui’s awareness 
of contemporary’s society’s relative barbarism thus serves to reinforce self-conscious 
human activity as history and historical change in two coupled respects: realising self-
consciousness is humanity’s self-narrated history and the self-conscious task of the 
historical actor as such.  
This in no way implies that history is an invariable linear sequence of events 
or that communism is humanity’s natural fate or inevitable destiny, however. For 
Blanqui there is no ‘filiation constante dans les événements’; every era is not the 
logical product of the preceding one.731 Though we shall consider these questions of 
determinism and alternatives at greater length below, in essence Blanqui stands for 
political possibility over historical necessity. To reject historical necessity is to 
renounce any purported form of objective or immutable immaterial forces, laws, 
morals or processes in the realm of human activity; it is to insist on the primacy of 
pensée-volonté in determining – and so in changing – human affairs; it is to explicitly 
open the door to alternatives and bifurcations, to contingency and discontinuity. In the 
realisation of communism, then, ‘[c]haque pas dans cette voie est la conséquence d’un 
progrès dans l’instruction. Toute victoire de l’ignorance, au contraire, est une atteinte !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
729 Ibid., p. 174. 
730 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 59 [15 March 1869].  
731 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 61 [1 April 1869]. 
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à l’association.’732 Blanqui’s response to the problem of progress as possibility is 
voluntarism. ‘Sans doute nos fautes ou nos vertus peuvent ralentir ou accélérer la 
marche de la civilisation,’ he states, ‘ce qui nous laisse la disposition entière de notre 
destinée.’733 History as possibility is at once a difficult task and an opportunity. 
Humans have the capacity, indeed the duty and obligation, to create their own history 
and realise their own destiny. But only conscious, decisive action here and now can 
create and continue to create the path to future emancipation; only through this 
undetermined process can humanity arrive at its ultimate realisation - the definite 
outlines of which are unknown and unknowable, of course, and as such of no concern 
to Blanqui.734  
 
Historical materialism? 
An important area that has not always received the convincing interpretation it 
deserves is the extent to which Blanqui’s thought is analogous to historical 
materialism. Some have advanced Blanqui’s view of history as, if not a forerunner, 
then at least broadly similar in orientation to that of Marx and Engels.735 This can be 
seen, it is claimed, when, building on passages from the defense speech,736 the 
Rapport asserts the class dimensions of the civil war in France, describing a country !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
732 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme primitif’, CSII, p. 69.  
733 Blanqui, ‘Les apologies de l’usure’, CSI, p. 146. 
734 ‘Mais que le chemin s’abrège ou s’allonge par notre fait, à chacune de ses étapes, lente ou rapide, 
l’humanité est saisie par sa loi de développement qui l’arme et l’approvisionne pour la continuation du 
voyage. Mais laissons l’avenir à lui-même’ (ibid., p. 146).!
735 ‘La lutte des classes est fondée en effet sur une argumentation de type économique’, Le Nuz says of 
the January 1832 defence speech. Similarly Le Nuz suggests with regard to the writings in Le 
Libérateur: ‘La conception de Blanqui de la lutte de classe est encore justifiée par l’analyse de 
l’histoire. Bien que moins approfondie que celle de Marx, elle est néanmoins antérieure et approchante’ 
(Le Nuz, ‘Introduction’, OI, p. 89; ‘Introduction’, OI, p. 250). See also Spitzer, The Revolutionary 
Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 98, 102 and Dommanget, Auguste Blanqui à Belle-Île, pp. 10, 
12. 
736 See in particular the description of the war between rich and poor as being, ‘sous une nouvelle 
forme et entre d’autres adversaires, la guerre des barons féodaux contre les marchands qu’ils 
détroussaient sur les grands chemins’ (Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, 12 
January 1832, MA, p. 64).  
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gripped by a conflict between three groups and three opposing interests: the upper 
class, the middle class and the people.737 Blanqui does indeed depict a class war that 
is also a historical struggle, with July 1830 as merely its latest manifestation, abruptly 
punctuating an ongoing conflict.738 Yet perhaps aside from the notable exception of 
Walter Benjamin’s Blanqui-infused ‘materialist conception of history’, which we 
shall look at later, to suggest that in Blanqui one discovers the germs of a more 
classical form of Marxian historical materialism is misleading on three counts, two of 
which can be seen in the Rapport itself, the other finding clear refutation in later 
writings.  
First, it overlooks the explicitly national dimensions of Blanqui’s thought that 
have already been noted and commented on in the preceding chapters. France, 
Blanqui writes in 1832, is engulfed in a struggle between the people, the true 
representatives of the nation, and republican ‘patriotes’ on the one hand, and the 
bourgeoisie and ‘royalistes’, the lackeys of the Sainte-Alliance of European reaction, 
on the other.739 Blanqui’s central concern is the political and intellectual dynamics 
that define and differentiate national peoples and struggles. Second, and following the 
first point, it overlooks the lack of any critique of political economy, Marxian or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
737 Blanqui’s analysis could be summarised as follows: France’s capitulation in 1814-15 was the work 
of ‘la classe bourgeoise’ who, as ever more concerned with material self-interest than liberty, opened 
their arms to France’s foreign enemies, supporting the Restoration in order to bring an end to a war that 
was beginning to hinder commerce. Under Louis XVIII the bourgeoisie entered into an alliance with 
‘les hautes classes’ – Bourbon supporters emanating from the nobility and rich landowners – in return 
for the Charter and the Chamber of Deputies. Bourgeois support for the reactionary and repressive 
Restoration and their role in this marriage of self-interest continued happily, Blanqui is keen to point 
out, until Charles X’s attempts from 1825 to re-establish the nobility’s domination and regress to the 
principles of the ancien régime prompted a struggle between the upper and middle classes in the years 
leading up to the July Revolution. The bourgeoisie began to gain greater power through their increasing 
dominance in the Chamber of Deputies, posing a threat to a government ultimately ruling in the name 
of the upper class. The people, meanwhile, were in a state of political retreat. Disorganised and 
demoralised in the face of the foreign invasion and having lost faith in the cause of liberty, the events 
of 1815 caused the people to fall silent and submit to their oppressors - the middle and upper classes. 
Yet the people had not resigned themselves to their fate, as soon became clear in the summer of 1830. 
See Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, 2 February 1832, pp. 81-83. 
738 As Blanqui insists at the beginning of the speech: ‘aucun parti nouveau n’a surgi du sein et comme 
conséquence de cette révolution’ (ibid., p. 80). 
739 See ibid., pp. 90, 95. 
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otherwise, in both France and elsewhere. Blanqui’s depiction of class war is one 
emanating from political history, not from the historical evolution of the mode of 
production, as historical materialism would of course later advance as determining 
social relations. Accordingly, Blanqui never seeks to offer a critique of production, 
exchange or political economy more generally.740 In Blanqui’s eyes, moreover, the 
war between republicans and royalists that began in 1789 is still the principal battle 
line in France and, by extension, in Europe.741 Blanqui does suggest the bourgeoisie is 
driven by commercial imperatives while the masses seek to end their exploitation, and 
class clearly has some socio-economic bearing for him. Yet as I suggested in Chapter 
3, the primacy of politics, or more specifically national politics, and not economics, is 
key to understanding Blanqui’s conception of class, class struggle and its relation to 
history in turn. Finally, to conflate Blanqui’s and Marx’s views of history is to 
overlook the foundational role of thought and intelligence in history and historical 
change developed at greater legnth in Blanqui’s late thought as outlined above. 
Blanqui never made a sustained attempt to reprieve or develop this notion of a 
historical class struggle after 1832-34, hence it remains unrepresentative of his 
concept of history as a whole which, more Hegelian than Marxian, advances human 
thought and the consciousness of man as determinant of social relations, and not vice 
versa.  
What does this mean for Blanqui’s project? Its distance from a more classical 
form of Marxian historical materialism rooted in a critique of political economy has 
both its uses and flaws. As we shall see below, it enables Blanqui to avoid any 
objective forms of determinism (economistic, natural, scientific or theological) that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
740 1830, for example, is described in the Rapport as a ‘crise politique’ provoked by Charles X’s 
ordinances and the suppression of the press, and indeed throughout the speech the revolution is 
explained first and foremost in political terms. See ibid., p. 84.  
741 Ibid., p. 92.!
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may lead to fatalism and the political disengagement and disempowerment it begets, 
or to reduce in any way collective conscious volition as the ultimate determinant force 
of historical change. In terms of the actor, we have seen how Blanqui’s flexible notion 
of the proletariat likewise emphasises the extent to which collective actors are the 
result of collective action, of pensée-volonté, which in turn shows the importance of 
organising, concentrating and directing this capacity. Blanqui reminds us that socio-
economic exploitation or domination do not in themselves inevitably engender the 
agency through which their redress can occur; ultimately it is conscious, purposeful, 
determined political action alone that creates a collective actor (again we shall return 
to this below with Marx and Hobsbawm). The major limitation, however, is the 
implications this has for understanding the grounds upon which this collective action 
appears. To be clear, Blanqui is not ignorant of the constraints of circumstance. He 
does not think that collective action appears or can be made to appear out of nothing, 
with no consideration of when and why it emerges. The image of a reckless 
adventurist, forever insistent on seizing power ‘no matter how, no matter when, by no 
matter whom’742 is an unfounded distortion. ‘Il faut du courage,’ states Blanqui, ‘mais 
point de témérité.’743  
Spitzer provides a useful survey of this point, highlighting Blanqui’s support 
for non-insurrectionary tactics amongst the masses (electioneering, strikes, 
propaganda) alongside his ‘reluctant putschism’, according to which he dismissed his 
supporters’ calls for a seizure of power that was not propelled by a mass movement 
(February 1848, the duration of Second Empire) or, again owing to unpropitious 
circumstances, was compelled against to his own better judgment to be involved in or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
742 M. Ralea cited in Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 135. 
743 Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 356 [18 April 1866]. 
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lead ultimately unsuccessful coup attempts (15 May 1848, 14 August 1870).744 One 
might also recall the politically repressive climate of the July Monarchy in which 
Blanqui’s secret societies were conceived, effectively forcing such subversive groups 
to adopt clandestine activity.745 Although the basic tenets of his philosophy could be 
said to have pushed Blanqui towards this top-down conception of political action, the 
political context obviously has a significant part to play in the conception of Blanqui’s 
conspiratorial politics. To this we might add one particularly insightful and on the 
whole illustrative statement from Blanqui’s private correspondence. As we saw in 
Chapter 4, Blanqui’s conception of revolutionary duty is one that is neither 
involuntary nor the product of unenlightened manipulation. A voluntarist 
revolutionary duty, it follows, cannot be a form of blind, unreasoned intervention. 
‘Notre devoir à tous est de nous y jeter sans hésitation,’ a letter from 1879 affirms, 
though without then adding the essential qualification, ‘dès que les circonstances 
l’ordonnent.’ At this moment, but only at this moment, Blanqui’s conception of 
revolutionary duty demands the dedication of one’s entire force and energy to the 
situation in order to seize the opening as it presents itself: ‘« Fais ce que dois, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
744 See Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, ch. 7. Spitzer’s conclusion is 
instructive: ‘The record of his failures would certainly seem to indicate a persistent indifference to the 
objective revolutionary potentialities of his time. Paradoxically, this conclusion is contradicted by the 
details of his revolutionary career. In every political crisis after 1839 with which we connect Blanqui, 
we find that he actually attempted to postpone the violent consummation of the movements he had 
helped to organize because the immediate circumstances were not propitious for a revolution’ (ibid., p. 
145). One of the most striking examples of Blanqui’s ‘anti-putschism’ is found in the ‘Discours du 
Prado’, 25 February 1848, MA, pp. 134-135, when he asserts: ‘Si nous nous emparons du pouvoir par 
un audacieux coup de main … qui nous répondra de la durée de notre puissance ? … Ce qu’il nous faut 
à nous, c’est le peuple immense, les faubourgs insurgés, un nouveau 10 août. Nous aurons au moins le 
prestige de la force révolutionnaire.’  
745 As Harsin notes, the ‘[r]epublican opposition was driven underground, and the new societies 
exchanged the goal of open debate for rigid orthodoxy and unquestioning obedience. The attack on 
political rights began with the association law of April 1834, a blunt instrument that required all clubs 
to obtain police permission no matter how often they met, or how large the group, or whatever their 
purpose. After this came the famous September Laws of 1835, made possible by public revulsion over 
the Fieschi assassination attempt … .  It was in this changed legal environment that the Société des 
Familles emerged from the remnants of the SDHC [Société des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen]’ 
(Harsin, Barricades, pp. 106-107, 110).  
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advienne que pourra ». Il n’existe pas d’autre opportunité. Cette maxime seule est 
toujours opportune.’746  
Though Blanqui’s writings arguably place less sustained emphasis on the 
point, attention is certainly drawn on numerous occasions to the constraints imposed 
by contexts and circumstances. Evidently Blanqui recognises that successful 
revolutionary activity presupposes the existence of certain conditions; revolutionary 
strategy therefore had to adapt to and reflect these conditions.747 But he does not go 
far enough, and in many crucial respects his analysis remains inadequate. Indeed, it is 
largely with political contexts and conditions that Blanqui is concerned. What about 
underlying economic considerations? Blanqui’s disdain for the ‘pseudo-science’ of 
political economy is explicit, a corollary of his renouncing any worldview that fails to 
take sufficient account of rationally apprehended moral judgement, justice, as the 
ultimate measure of human affairs. Economists, so Blanqui explains, ‘s’occupe de ce 
qui est et se soucie peu de ce qui devrait ou pourrait être. Pour lui, justice, iniquité, 
sont des mots vides de sens. Le fait est tout, le droit rien.’ He continues, with even 
greater political emphasis: ‘Le socialisme n’a point à ménager l’économie politique 
qui lui fait une guerre déloyale. … L’économie politique n’a jamais été une science. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
746 Blanqui MSS 9588(2), fo. 457 [June-July 1879]. 
747 For instance, Blanqui wrote when advising his young protégée Tridon in April 1866: ‘Je conçois 
qu’on cherche à pénétrer dans les masses, pour connaître leurs sentiments, pour y infuser un peu 
d’énergie, d’activité. Mais il faut alors rester dans les limites d’une grande prudence, ne pas s’aventurer 
dans des velléités d’action, impuissantes et sans issue. Peut-on, aujourd’hui, organiser les masses pour 
la bataille ? Je ne le crois pas et ne le conseille pas. Alors, qu’on se tienne tranquille, qu’on ne fasse 
rien dans le peuple qu’avec réserve et avec cette idée toujours présente qu’on ne peut pas jouer la partie 
et aboutir à une fin finale. En rien, il ne faut agir au hasard, sans but arrêté ; c’est une ruine. Cette 
action vague et indéterminée me semble aujourd’hui le défaut capital du groupe. Il n’a point de plan 
fixe.’ Blanqui therefore recommend, as the political tasks of the day, ‘la persuasion, l’activité, la 
prudence en même temps. Ne heurtez pas, évitez les divisions, les ruptures, ménagez les personnes.’ In 
order to maintain the unity of the central vanguard, avoid arrest and imprisonment and thereby enable it 
to carry out the principal task of spreading the revolutionary thoughts and ideas within the masses on 
which revolutionary action was based, revolutionary strategy had to adapt to the constraints of the 
situation within Imperial France. Hence Blanqui’s conclusion: ‘Le groupe ne peut aujourd’hui 
conquérir de l’empire que par la plume’ (Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 357 [18 April 1866]). 
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C’est de l’anatomie froide et brutale … une leçon sur le cadavre.’748 The idealism of 
Blanqui’s socialism here becomes clear. Analysis of what (materially) is provides no 
obvious account or means for achieving what (socially) ought to be. Rather than the 
contradictions inherent within capitalism, only the idea and the militants of the idea 
provide the potential for a new social order, Blanqui believes. Its scientific pretentions 
may be contentious, yet for a militant politics to do away with any form of political 
economy is without question a glaring omission. Taking sufficient account of grounds 
from which thoughts, ideas and morals develop, of the processes that, though not 
ultimately determinant, certainly shape political struggles and the actors waging them 
is a necessary component of any emancipatory project. Should one not in fact seek to 
combine critique of political economy with a politics of principled conviction? Is the 
challenge not to align the real and the ideal, the objective and the subjective forms of 
determination, whilst retaining ‘the primacy of the latter’?749 
 
Equality or catastrophe  
‘Le bon droit et l’avenir sont à nous ; le jour de la justice arrivera.’750 With these 
assurances of future victory in spite of the short-term constraints and defeats that 
marked the six months following July 1830 Blanqui set the agenda and tone for his 
January 1832 defence speech. Popular revolutions can be suppressed, Blanqui 
similarly maintained a year later, but one cannot suppress the truths borne out of the 
event. ‘Il est aisé de mettre la baïonnette sur la poitrine à des hommes qui ont rendu 
leurs armes après la victoire. Ce qui sera moins facile,’ Blanqui declares, warning his 
adversaries and emboldening his allies, ‘c’est d’effacer le souvenir de cette victoire. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
748 Blanqui, ‘Les apologies de l’usure’, CSI, pp. 136, 134-135. See also Blanqui, ‘L’economie politique 
sans morale’, March 1870, CSII, p. 58. !
749 Hallward, ‘The Will of the People’, p. 17. 
750 Blanqui, ‘Déclaration du Comité provisoire des Ecoles’, 22 January 1831, MA, p. 60.!
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… Nulle force humaine ne saurait repousser dans le néant le fait qui s’est accompli.’ 
Something happened in July. Something was achieved that cannot be undone, 
forgotten, covered up or destroyed. Further defeats may occur, the forces of reaction 
may return. But all such efforts cannot prevent the birth - however prolonged, 
however painful - of the new republican order and the rule of the people. And so 
concludes the speech just as it begins, in emphatic, uncompromisingly combative 
style:  
 
Vous avez confisqué les fusils de Juillet. Oui, mais les balles sont parties. 
Chacune des balles des ouvriers parisiens est en route pour faire le tour du 
monde ; elles frappent incessamment ; elles frapperont jusqu’à ce qu’il n’y ait 
plus debout un seul ennemi de la liberté et du bonheur du peuple.751 
 
With an audacious forcefulness these lines encapsulate the essential message of the 
speech as a whole: where injustice prevents liberty and general happiness, where 
inequalities and suffering are enforced through violence, no consensus will occur, no 
compromise will be offered. Accepting the realities of the social conflict, the people 
will take their struggle for victory to the end - and they will be victorious. The people, 
Blanqui reaffirmed barely a month later, in terms that echo, if not complement and 
complete, the defence speech’s remarkable denouement, ‘renversera de ses bras de 
géant la bourgeoisie et l’aristocratie coalisées. La révolution est en marche, rien ne 
peut l’arrêter.’752  
A pronounced conviction strikes us in these early writings: the revolution, the 
ideals of freedom and equality, will be triumphant. For all his ‘ultra-voluntarism’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
751 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, 12 January 1832, MA, p. 79.  
752 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, 2 February 1832, MA, p. 94. 
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Blanqui seems strangely deterministic, at least in the sense that an ultimate victory 
appears to be beyond doubt. How can this be so? Following these texts from 1831-32 
one of the most intriguing aspects of 1834’s Le Libérateur is indeed its sustained 
reflection on the future triumph of equality. Blanqui’s point of departure is the 
conviction that in the struggle between privilege and equality only one side can win, 
leaving the other to perish. He thus addresses the obvious question posed by his own 
analysis: who will succumb in this struggle? Why will they be victorious? The 
seeming certainty of the victory of equality appears to rest on four modes of reasoning 
– moral (the ‘supériorité morale’ of equality ensures its victory over privilege),753 
logical (workers hold the power since society could not function without their labour; 
the idle landowners are ultimately dependent on the workers),754 political (‘nous 
pouvons, sans illusion, nous persuader que les nations marchent, les Français en tête, 
à la conquête définitive de l’égalité absolue’)755 and historical (the morals and ideas of 
the nation’s past revealed that the ‘refonte sociale’ Blanqui proposes is one that ‘la 
France réclame impérieusement et qui est dans sa destinée’).756 These factors enable 
Blanqui to conclude confidently, and with a generous dose of intellectual optimism: 
‘C’est facile aujourd’hui de s’apercevoir que le principe de propriété est sur son 
déclin.’757 
This apparent belief in the inevitable triumph of equality expressed throughout 
Le Libérateur is unrealistically optimistic, to say nothing of the facile reasoning upon 
which such naively bold assertions are based. And yet if we look beyond these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
753 See Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, February 1834, MA, pp. 
123, 125; Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, 2 February 1834, MA, pp. 110, 112. 
754 See Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, p. 124; Blanqui, ‘Qui 
fait la soupe doit la manger’, p. 294. 
755 See Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, pp. 125-126. 
756 See Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 108; Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit 
appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, pp. 121, 125). 
757 Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, p. 125. See also Blanqui, ‘Notre 
drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 110.!
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assurances and unqualified claims of future victory, Blanqui’s basic assumption is 
that equality will be victorious because it must be. The insistence derives from the 
fear, and the real possibility, of defeat and failure. It is unsurprising, Blanqui 
contends, that in this struggle between equality and privilege ‘la victoire demeure 
invariablement à l’égalité, puisqu’il faut qu’elle triomphe ou que l’humanité 
périsse’.758 Equality is still ‘la condition nécessaire’ or an essential political project in 
the sense of a state of affairs that must be achieved by human action in order to avoid 
universal catastrophe.759 Close reading reveals, then, the underlying logic at work in 
all these early writings: the belief in the possibility of equality’s ultimate victory, but 
only if the need to struggle for that victory is fulfilled. Recall that for Blanqui to take 
up the struggle for equality – for it is indeed an actual struggle and task, an endeavour 
and enterprise demanding resolute commitment – is, as he also affirmed in 1834, to 
‘continuer un mouvement admirable de progrès qui s’est fait jour avec une irrésistible 
persévérance, en brisant l’un après l’autre les obstacles qui renaissaient incessamment 
pour entraver sa marche.’760 The nineteenth-century revolutionary movement is 
therefore a continuation of past struggles761 that must confront and overcome the 
obstacles and barriers to progress; and where privilege and the enemies of equality 
remain, hurdles and obstructions will continually and inevitably appear. The 
movement for equality is ‘admirable’ precisely because it only emerges through 
perseverance and persistence in the face of ever-recurring difficulties and constraints. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
758 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 112. See also the similar assertion that ‘si le droit 
de propriété était destiné à vaincre, c’est un triste avenir que celui qui s’ouvrirait devant nous’ 
(Blanqui, ‘La richesse sociale doit appartenir à ceux qui l’ont créée’, MA, p. 125). 
759 Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 109  
760 Blanqui continues: ‘Or, tous ces obstacles n’ont pas disparu ; car l’ennemi qui les suscite, le 
privilège, est encore debout, poursuivant contre l’égalité, mère du progrès, cette guerre implacable qui 
a duré dix-huit cents ans’ (ibid., pp. 109-110). 
761 See, for example, the defence speech’s assertion that July 1830 ‘est venue pour servir de 
complément à nos quarante années révolutionnaires’ (Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès 
des Quinze’, MA, p. 76). As Spitzer notes: ‘All Frenchmen who devoted themselves to human progress 
were, for Blanqui and many others, but the executors of the testament of the great Revolution and at the 
same time its heirs’ (Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 121).!!
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Far from the inevitable product of the inevitable movement of history, it was only 
through a series of forceful interventions that equality had imposed itself, creating the 
conditions for its own realisation and progress. It is in this respect that when ‘Le 
communisme, avenir de la société’ begins with the assertion that the careful study of 
geology and history reveals how ‘l’humanité a commencé par l’isolement, par 
l’individualisme absolu, et qu’à travers une longue série de perfectionnements, elle 
doit aboutir à la communauté’, the choice of modal verb, devoir, is essential.762 Its 
meaning of ‘should’ and ‘must’,763 both of which stand to Blanqui’s ascription of 
‘cette vérité’ to this course of development, cannot escape our attention. Communism 
is, for Blanqui, a necessary task. The same goes for the writings from 1831-32 cited 
above: the revolution will only continue and will only be victorious through 
conscious, deliberate action. It is imperative to work, with resilient devotion and 
persistence, to realise equality in order to avoid the catastrophic consequences of 
failure.  
In contemplating the relationship between human history and human agency 
Blanqui is not alone, of course. Eric Hobsbawm’s subtle reading of the Communist 
Manifesto, a text which contains claims regarding the seemingly ‘equally inevitable’ 
fall of the bourgeoisie and victory of the proletariat, confronts this very problem. ‘The 
Manifesto’, writes Hobsbawm, ‘has been read primarily as a document of historical 
inevitability, and indeed its force derived largely from the confidence it gave its 
readers that capitalism was inevitability destined to be buried by its gravediggers’. 
Rousing rhetorical flourishes proclaiming the certainty of victory also characterise 
much of Blanqui’s early writings, as we have seen. And given the even greater !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
762 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 173. 
763 Here I follow Hallward’s observation that ‘Fanon stresses the need to think the actuality of both 
necessity, actuality and possibility, in an emancipatory dialectic whose essential ambiguity is already 
expressed in his own choice of modal verb. With its literal meaning of duty and obligation, devoir or 
on doit means both “one must” and “one should”’ (Hallward, ‘Defiance or emancipation?’, p. 31). 
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political premium Blanqui places on the resolute subjective determination to prevail 
than Marx and Engels it is unsurprising that the tenor of his writings would share in, if 
not go further than, the enthusiastic confidence of the Manifesto. ‘Yet contrary to 
widespread assumptions’, Hobsbawm continues, ‘inasmuch as it believes that 
historical change proceeds through the men making their own history, it is not a 
determinist document. The graves must be dug by or through human action.’764 The 
same is true for Blanqui. Emphasis on certain victory is, paradoxically, a surface 
symptom of a deeper anti-determinist assumption that only though fully committing 
oneself to think and act in line with the possibility of victory can it be realised.  
In Blanqui’s project historical change and progress are likewise products of 
instruction, of organisation, of volition - of human praxis. Certainly the goal of the 
revolution, a 1836 text co-written by Blanqui states, is ‘l’établissement complet du 
règne de l’égalité’ – and to know and determine one’s basic ends is indeed crucial. 
But first principles must be conceived, the text goes on to affirm, within and through 
the decisive work required in the actual collective striving towards these goals: ‘il ne 
suffit pas de déclarer vaguement les hommes égaux … il faut convaincre les 
prolétaires que l’égalité est possible, qu’elle est nécessaire’.765 Such is the political 
function of Blanqui’ journalism: to teach, to convince the people that equality is both 
possible and essential – possible in that humans have the capacity to realise it, 
essential in that failure to do so spells victory for injustice and inequality. This 
certainly goes a long way in explaining why Blanqui would readily indulge in 
hyperbole regarding certainty of victory. The written word is intended above all to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
764 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Introduction’, in Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 27.!
765 Blanqui and Hadot-Desages, ‘Propagande démocratique’, 1835, OI, p. 314. 
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show that revolution is and must be possible; it must generate the confidence and 
conviction for the action required in converting the possible into the real.766  
Like Blanqui, Marx and Engels depict a struggle between oppressor and 
oppressed that could end ‘either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, 
or in the common ruin of the contending classes.’767 Like Blanqui, Rosa Luxembourg 
advances a clear choice between ‘socialism or barbarism’.768 Like Blanqui, Fidel 
Castro and Che Guevara have no illusions that the ‘people would triumph or be 
defeated … either we are all saved or we all sink’.769 In any given instance resolute 
dedication to and confidence in emanciption, equality and justice does not ‘exclude 
the alternative: “common ruin”’770 – on the contrary. Blanqui’s conviction is forged 
through a confrontation with the real, immediate possibility of such a catastrophe, and 
thereafter resolving to avoid it at all costs. ‘C’est le passé et l’avenir, le privilège et la 
liberté, le vieux monde et le monde nouveau, l’immobilisme et le progrès aux prises 
dans un combat éternel’, Blanqui declares. ‘On peut crier: Alarme ! Ce sont les 
ennemis! Nous avons toujours devant nous la contre-révolution.’771 It is only in the 
recognition of the continual, imminent threat of reaction and regression that one can, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
766 Cf. Che Guevara’s assertion that the ‘favourable circumstances’ of revolution are ‘consciousness of 
the necessity of change and confidence in the possibility of this revolutionary change.’ However, Che, 
more than Blanqui, insists that these two subjective factors and conditions must be ‘combined with the 
objective conditions’. See Che Reader, ‘Guerrilla Warfare: A method’, in Che Guevara Reader, p. 75. 
On this point see also Che Guevara, ‘Cuba: Historical exception or vanguard in the anti-colonial 
struggle?’, in Che Guevara Reader, pp. 140-141.  
767 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 35. 
768 Bensaid and Lowy also discern in the writings from Le Libérateur the precursor of Luxembourg’s 
maxim. See Bensaïd and Löwy, ‘Auguste Blanqui, heretical communist’, p. 28.!
769 Che Guevara, ‘Political sovereignty and economic independence’, in Che Guevara Reader, p. 102. 
770 Hobsbawm, ‘Introduction’, p. 28. 
771 Blanqui, ‘Débats parlementaires de février sur l’enseignement’, n.d., NDNM, pp. 54-55. Blanqui 
would reiterate the necessity of sounding the alarm against an imminent threat again in 1851 (see 
Blanqui, ‘A propos des clameurs contre l’Avis au peuple’, April 1851, MA, p. 168), in 1862 (‘Une 
seconde d’oubli, on est mort. Le péril est connu’ [Blanqui MSS 9587, fo. 378 [1862]]) and in 1879 
(‘Notre rôle, ce me semble, est de prendre l’offensive, de dénoncer à haute voix la conspiration 
orléaniste du pouvoir, de tirer la nation de sa sécurité funeste, de lui signaler l’imminence du péril, en 
un mot, de sonner l’alarme’ [Blanqui MSS 9588(2), fo. 541 [25 September 1879]]. 
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one must, make a choice and undertake the task of struggling against it with the 
urgency and determination it requires.772 
Despite first appearances it would be entirely misrepresentative to label any of 
these writings as determinist. Blanqui’s moments of rhetorical exuberance do not 
undermine so much as paradoxically highlight and reinforce his voluntarist anti-
determinism. Throughout his life and work Blanqui forever remained faithful to his 
youthful prescription that ‘on ne doit jamais accuser que soi, il n’y a point de hasard 
ni de fatalité dans la vie, et cela est désespérant.’773 The responsibility for failure and 
defeat, the myth of historical necessity, the task of social progress – Blanqui is the 
first to recognise the forbidding state of human affairs. And yet he is also the first to 
recognise that this should not, this cannot, lead to resignation. The only response, the 
duty in fact, is to assume the task, to individually and collectively take up the struggle 
against supposed historical necessity, externally imposed fate or destiny. Rather than 
an aberration or anomaly, then, these early statements prepare the ground for the anti-
determinism that infuses Blanqui’s mature thought. 
 
The poverty of positivism 
 
The defeat of 1848 had a profound impact on Blanqui. To a greater extent than any of 
the many other major political events that punctuated the course of his life the 
revolution and its aftermath sharpened his early anti-fatalist view of history. Though 
the intellectual consequences of 1848 may not have been immediately manifest, with 
Blanqui still assuring in November 1848, even in the aftermath of the June Days, that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
772 Walter Benjamin was particularly taken by this idea of an imminent threat, highlighting Blanqui’s 
‘firm resolve to snatch humanity at the last moment from the catastrophe looming at every turn’ 
(Benjamin, The Arcades Project p. 339). Cf. Michael Löwy, Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin’s 
‘On the Concept of History’, trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2005).  
773 Blanqiu, ‘Lettre à Adélaïde de Montgolfier’, 20 May 1831, OI, p. 162.!
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‘[l]e temps nous donnera la victoire sans combat’,774 by the early 1850s, as Louis-
Napoléon strengthened his grip on power and France slid back towards autocratic 
rule, the weight of events and force of circumstance clearly compelled Blanqui to 
confront anew his avowed belief of 1832 that ‘toute révolution [est] un progrès’.775 
Combined with a critique of Auguste Comte’s positivism, these events informed a 
sustained reflection on political fatalism and historical determinism that would 
dominate much of Blanqui’s thinking during the Second Empire. 
 
Against fatalism 
Just as the realm of human action is completely devoid of the laws that structure the 
realm of nature Blanqui likewise applies this principle to human history. ‘La Fatalité,’ 
Blanqui states, ‘c’est la loi à la place du caprice.’ To advance ‘une règle immuable à 
la place du caprice’ is the ‘inverse du gouvt. [sic] humain.’776 Blanqui’s absolute 
opposition to ‘[p]rétendue fatalité des lois économiques qui régissent la société’ 
insists in every respect that ‘[p]artout où l’homme intervient, il ne peut plus être 
question de loi, mais de caprice et d’arbitraire.’777 Blanqui’s conception of pensée-
volonté as determinant of humanity and human affairs excludes as a matter of course 
of all forms of transcendent, immaterial laws or authorities, be they spiritual or 
scientific - and indeed one note instructively couples the two together for this very 
reason. ‘Le Positiviste est un demi-Dieu qui sait tout, qui embrasse tout, depuis les 
derniers confins de la Mathématique transcendante jusqu’aux plus minces détailles de 
la sociologie, passée, présente et future’, Blanqui writes. ‘Du haut de son trône 
omniscient, il laisse choir un regard de dédain sur le myrmidon qui ose se prétendre !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
774 Blanqui, ‘Réponse à la demande d’un toast pour le banquet des travailleurs’, November 1848, MA, 
p. 150.  
775 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, p. 76.  
776 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 280 [n.d.]. 
777 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 146 [27 April 1868].!
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son pareil et lui dit comme à un chétif insecte : «  qu’y-a-t-il entre nous ? »’778 The 
mask of Comte’s purported ‘science’ conceals the face of ‘une religion ultra-
aristocratique, le système des castes, l’asservissement des masses, la domination 
absolue des Riches’. Comte’s is a pseudo-science for the status quo, offering the 
inviolability of empiricism and ‘des vérités scientifiques démontrées’ to guard against 
the threat of revolution.779 God or the market, in the eyes of Blanqui’s materialism 
both are no more than intellectual constructions in the deliberate service of specific 
interests and aims, for ultimately ‘l’univers est un effet et ne saurait être une cause, 
par la raison qu’il est matière, et que la cause initiale est nécessairement une 
intelligence unie à une volonté.’780 Such is the basis of Blanqui’s politics of 
possibility, of cutting through the supposedly immutable (and therefore immensely 
complex) social field to present humans as the masters of their own destiny. Should 
they recognise it, choose to assume it and work to realise it, humans can make their 
own history. For revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces alike, political 
possibility not historical necessity created the past just as it will create the future. 
Scientific, spiritual or socio-economic claims to the historically immutable and the 
socially inevitable merely serve to obfuscate the human agency consciously enforcing 
them.  
 This last point is key. Since Blanqui’s central concern is human history his 
critique of fatalism operates a double movement: ‘Doctrine exécrable du fatalisme 
historique, du fatalisme dans l’Humanité.’781 To champion historical determinism is 
to rationalise and condone all humanity’s past afflictions as an inevitable part of an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
778 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 66 [n.d.].!
779 ‘Il lui suffit de s’intituler science,’ Blanqui continues, ‘de s’affubler du nom universellement 
respecté pour devenir aussitôt sacrosaint. Personne n’ose le regarder en face. On s’incline avec humilité 
et on lui tire bas son chapeau’ (Blanqui MSS 9590(1) fo. 60 [1 April 1869]; emphasis in original). See 
also Rancière, ‘The Radical Gap’, p. 21.!
780 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 53 [15 April 1868]. 
781 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 60 [1 April 1869].  
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equally inevitable process. For Blanqui it follows, and even more critically, that 
positivism, indeed any ‘objective’ form of determinism, is an inadequate 
philosophical conception of human history that legitimises human suffering. The 
failure or refusal to take account of human experience and moral judgment based on 
an enlightened sense of justice forms the thrust of the anti-positivist statements that 
pervade his writing during the Second Empire. Positivism ‘n’admet que la loi du 
progrès (quand même et) continu, la fatalité. Chaque chose est excellente à son heure, 
puisqu’elle prend dans la série des perfectionnements. Tout est au mieux toujours. 
Nul critérium pour apprécier le bon ou le mauvais. Ce serait du préconçu, de l’à-
priori, de la métaphysique.’ As positivism ‘exclut l’idée de la justice’,782 in the eyes of 
these ‘fatalistes de l’histoire, adorateurs de ce fait accompli’, Blanqui writes, ‘[t]outes 
les atrocités du vainqueur, la longue série de ses attentats sont froidement 
transformées en évolution régulière, inéluctable, comme celles de la nature.’783 At 
every step Blanqui’s socialist humanism is conceived in absolute opposition to ‘la 
doctrine de la fatalité des souffrances sociales’.784 Outside of nature all must be 
conceived first and foremost in terms of humanity and social justice because all is 
human in cause and consequence – it has always been so and will never be otherwise. 
Since all forms of social organisation are consciously conceived and imposed by 
humanity itself, nothing in human history is inevitable, natural or predestined; nothing 
outside of the moral principles historically developed through human consciousness 
provide an arbiter for the assessment of human relations past and present. It is in this 
sense that for Blanqui enlightened reason and social justice go hand in hand. The 
intellectually conceived and developed notion of justice is Blanqui’s sole criterion for 
historical and political judgement. When the illusions of natural, economic or spiritual !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
782 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 64 [n.d.]. 
783 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 61 [1 April 1869].  
784 Blanqui, ‘Les apologies de l’usure’, CSI, p. 136. !
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laws, tendencies and transcendent authorities are stripped away to leave all but the 
foundational pensée-volonté of humanity determining all social arrangements, justice, 
the highest emanation of human thought, solely remains. The importance of 
consciousness in the writing and popular understanding of history reasserts itself here, 
too. Justice and freedom - the sole standards of historical judgement and the pre-
eminent results of enlightened consciousness - can alone guard against the rewriting 
of history. ‘Les sophismes des charlatans ont effrontément transformés huit années de 
déclin en huit années de progrès’, Blanqui lamented in 1879.785  
Blanqui applies this critique of historical determinism with equally 
uncompromising force to his own political camp. To the extent that revolution 
reconfirms the power of the people and redefines the thinkable and the possible 
Blanqui forever sees it as a basic and necessary act of progress. But he does so not to 
the exclusion of regression and reaction. After 1848 this conviction became far more 
pronounced. With the recognition that ‘chaque avortement entraîne une réaction plus 
terrible’ as witnessed in ‘la catastrophe’ of Louis-Napoléon’s 2 December 1851 coup 
d’état, the choice between eternal domination and poverty or armed struggle acquired 
an even greater sense of urgency.786 Behind renewed strategic imperatives lay more 
fundamental philosophical assumptions, however. It was in the fallout of 1848, when 
the promises of ‘la victoire du peuple’ had been destroyed in mass bloodshed, 
political betrayal and a resurgent Bonapartism, that Blanqui penned one of his most 
effective attacks on the politics of positivist determinism. Written in June 1850 from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
785 Blanqui MSS 9588(2), fo. 457 [June-July 1879]. 
786 Blanqui, ‘Lettre à Maillard’, 6 June 1852, MA, pp. 179-180; Blanqui, ‘Avis au peuple’, 25 Feburary 
1851, MA, p. 167; Blanqui, ‘A propos des clameurs contre l’Avis au peuple’, MA, p. 171. The use of 
childbirth analogy here in particular highlights the shift in Blanqui’s thinking from January 1832 when, 
as alluded to above, he insists: ‘La France a conçu dans les embrassements sanglants de six mille héros 
; l’enfantement peut être et douloureux ; mais les flancs sont robustes, et les empoisonneurs 
doctrinaires ne la feront point avorter’ (Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, p. 
79).!
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his cell in Doulens prior to his transfer to Belle-Île in October, Blanqui castigates the 
‘[f]atalisme stupide du parti révolutionnaire’ and its attempts to rationalise defeat, in 
all its human carnage, as merely part of history’s inexorable march towards progress. 
The ‘parti révolutionnaire’, Blanqui writes, 
 
ne gagne de batailles que pour sa ruine, empressé toujours de rendre aux 
vaincus le pouvoir aussi tôt que la soif de la vengeance. Puis il se console par 
les hymnes sur la marche irrésistible de l’esprit humain et la certitude de son 
triomphe définitif. Trente ou quarante ans de despotisme, le sang de millions 
des martyrs, les douleurs de millions d’infortunés, qu’importe à la sérénité de 
ces placides contemplateurs ? Qu’est-ce pour eux que deux ou trois 
générations sacrifiées ? Deux ou trois chutes de feuilles.787  
 
For Blanqui the philosophical error of fatalism has the gravest socio-political 
implications, which explains above all the significant attention it is accorded in his 
writings: fatalism fails to recognise the basic need to seize, maintain and wield power 
in order to initiate the process of transformation and protect this process from its 
enemies; fatalism promotes a form of cold, dispassionate detachment, if not 
indifference, to the suffering caused in the name of ostensibly immutable objective 
forces and processes; as such, while this human suffering, far from relenting, 
increases and intensifies, fatalism creates waiting over engaging, passivity over 
activity.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
787 ‘Ils semblent prendre plaisir à plonger le règne de la contre-révolution, en lui restituant ses armes,’ 
Blanqui adds, ‘chaque fois qu’une secousse imprévue les lui arrache des mains, sauf à reprendre le 
sourire béat et la phrase stéréotypée de Crétinisme musulman : «  C’était écrit. Le Progrès ne peut pas 
reculer. » En attendant, le passé continue son retour offensif’ (Blanqui MSS 9590(2), fo. 465 [June 
1850]). 
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The tradition of the oppressed  
Blanqui’s dismissal of positivist and determinist historiography is thus pegged at 
every moment to his resolutely humanist advocacy of morality and social justice. For 
Blanqui, there is a clear continuity between historiographical and political practice. 
The historian, like the pseudo-scientific sociologist or political economist, is no 
innocent onlooker. The idea of political, social or economic laws of history is a 
‘mauvaise plaisanterie’788 precisely because of its social implications. ‘C’est une 
immoralité, c’est un crime, de glorifier le passé quand même, de le justifier par de 
prétendues lois immuables, d’invoquer la dignité de l’histoire qui commande le 
respect ou même l’indulgence pour les horreurs des temps évanouis.’789 In Blanqui’s 
eyes, the people are key to understanding past and present alike; the history of the 
people, and the historian’s relation to the people as the object of their study, is tied to 
the people as the subject of the present struggles that form part of this history. In both 
cases morality and justice come centre stage. To denounce social injustice and 
oppression in the present is to do likewise for the past. In the eyes of positivist 
determinism, however, past generations are nothing more than ‘[f]euilles mortes ! on 
en fait litière.’ Blanqui continues:    
 
L’Histoire s’esquisse à grands traits, du plus beau sang-froid, avec des 
monceaux de cadavres et de ruines. Nulle boucherie ne fait sourciller ces fronts 
impassibles. Le massacre d’un peuple, évolution de l’humanité. … Quant aux 
populations et aux villes que le fléau a couchées sur son passage, ... nécessité ... 
marche fatale du progrès. Tout est bien qui a enfanté le présent, c’est-à-dire 
nous. Pas d’avances trop dispendieuses pour un si beau produit. … Tout est !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
788 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 278 [n.d.]. 
789 Blanqui MSS 9590(1) fo. 61 [1 April 1869].!
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réglé d’avance, comme un papier de musique, pour les pauvres petits automates, 
et à perpétuité, s’il vous plaît. Religion perpétuelle, dynastie perpétuelle, lois 
perpétuelles ...790 
 
Revolution is condemned by those parties and interests this historiography defends for 
no other reason than it subverts the most basic ‘law’ of history: ‘Notre rôle était de 
mourir, le vôtre de tuer.’ The people’s capacity to overcome its prescribed social 
position – ‘nous sommes sortis de notre rôle’ – is the greatest fear of the established 
order, Blanqui states; it is why, compared to the Terror, ‘les boucheries de la réaction 
thermidorienne’ go unmentioned. The French Revolution thus marked the moment at 
which 
 
les victimes cessent de tendre la gorge avec résignation. Elles se dressent et 
frappent à leur tour. Elles sont frappées, mais elles rendent coup pour coup, 
souvent avec usure ! … Etrange nouveauté ! Scandale inouï ! … Quel 
renversement de toutes les lois divines et humaines ! N’est-ce pas la 
Providence elle-même qui a créé ces catégories d’opprimés et d’oppresseurs, 
assignant pour destinée aux unes la tranchant, aux autres la poignée de la 
hache ? Et on se révolte contre les décrets ! Les plébéiens ne sont-ils pas nés 
pour souffrir ?791  
 
The people are the cannon fodder of positivist historiography. Their experiences are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
790 Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, pp. 193-194. 
791 Blanqui MSS 9581, fo. 39 [15 January 1859]. See also the earlier assertion that for the forces of 
reaction: ‘il n’est pas question de tout ce sang ; on trouve qu’il a coulé tout naturellement. Mais 93 ! … 
Que l’on ne plaint que les bourreaux, quand par hasard ils succombent parce que leur métier est d’etre 
bourreaux non victimes, que les pauvres, le peuple, sont faits pour être victimes et qu’il est scandaleux 
qu’ils changent quelquefois de rôle’ (Blanqui, ‘Lettre à [Adelaïde de Montgolfier]?’, 19 or 29 
September 1831,  OI, p. 585). 
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meaningless, their lives expendable. ‘Qui voudrait prêter l’oreille aux cris et aux 
pleurs de ces vils troupeaux tombant par milliers dans les abattoirs de l’histoire ?’, 
asks Blanqui.792 Poverty and suffering, famine and disease, slaughter and destruction - 
all must bow before the unending tyranny of teleology. Like a form of Hegelian 
cunning of reason, for Blanqui the Comtean appeal to an inner logic of history, in 
which humanity unknowingly becomes the instrument of history’s rational designs, 
legitimises the immoral injustice of the present by way of legitimising the immoral 
injustice of the past. And just as in 1832 Blanqui noted the impression of the people 
as an ‘instrument des classes moyens … des gladiateurs qui tuent et se font tuer pour 
l’amusement et le profit des privilégiés’,793 these passages from the Critique Sociale 
exercise no restraint when characterising the champions of historical necessity from 
the future perspective of the ‘poupées’ of history: 
 
Dans l’histoire de l’Humanité, vous êtes la page du choléra et de la peste. Les 
barbaries et les sottises de vos aïeux étaient la faute de l’ignorance, le résultat de 
convictions aveugles. Vous avez fait le mal, vous, sciemment, avec 
préméditation, par noir égoïsme. Car vous n’avez jamais cru à rien qu’à votre 
intérêt, ignobles sceptiques, et à cet intérêt, vous avez voulu sacrifier jusqu’à 
vos plus lointains neveux.794 
 
Just as the suffering, oppression and injustice inflicted against the people must speak 
through any present account of history worth the name, the future emancipation of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
792 Blanqui MSS 9581, fo. 39 [15 January 1859]. !
793 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, p. 77. 
794 Blanqui continues, with no less venom: ‘Qui vous avait donné mandat de stipuler en notre nom, de 
penser et d’agir pour nous ? Avons-nous consenti la traite tirée sur notre travail ? Tartufes! sous 
prétexte d’assurer notre bien-être, vous avez dévoré d’avance le fruit de nos sueurs, nous crevant de 
votre a mieux les yeux et les oreilles pour nous empêcher de voir et d’entendre’ (Blanqui, ‘Le 
communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, p. 195). 
! 273!
people, as the task of that history, will avenge their historical suffering in a cry of 
‘vengeance à tous les siècles’.795 Through consciousness the people, no longer passive 
subjects but empowered, free actors, will attain the capacity for historical judgment 
and will speak for themselves; they will recount their history.  
 
Reappraising the astronomical hypothesis 
 
The manner in which Walter Benjamin’s late writings, particularly the Theses on the 
Philosophy of History, echo the lines above has caught the attention of several readers 
- and rightly so.796 The nineteenth-century revolutionary so captivating to Benjamin in 
many ways seems to synthesize ‘the discontinuity of historical time; the destructive 
power of the working class; the tradition of the oppressed’ advanced as the basis of 
the materialist conception of history in a preparatory note of the Theses and translated 
into the conceptual framework of the work itself.797 But it is with the ‘hypothèse 
astronomique’ Blanqui penned in 1871 while imprisoned at the Fort Taureau that 
Benjamin is most associated. L’Éternité par les astres forms the central ‘passage’, to 
borrow from the title of Miguel Abensour’s essay, linking the two men.  
Benjamin makes two claims regarding L’Éternité par les astres of significant 
import for Blanqui’s politics. First, he contends that the text signals a political 
surrender. With L’Éternité, Benjamin tells us, Blanqui offers a ‘resignation without 
hope’ that was to be ‘the last word of the great revolutionary’.798 Second, he asserts 
that Blanqui rejects any notion of progress. According to Benjamin, although in 
L’Éternité ‘Blanqui displayed no antipathy to the belief in progress; between the lines, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
795 Blanqui MSS 9581, fo. 40 [15 January 1859].  
796 See in particular Abensour, Les passages Blanqui, pp. 19-20, 45 and Abensour and Pelosse, Libérer 
l’Enfermé, p. 17.!
797 Abensour, Les passages Blanqui, pp. 40-41; Hallward, ‘Blanqui’s bifurcations’, p. 40. 
798 Benjamin, ‘Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century: Exposé of 1939’, The Arcades Project, p. 26. 
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however, he heaped scorn on the idea’ - a position that was, in fact, consistent with 
‘his political credo’.799 Both claims are misleading, and yet both have shaped the 
interpretation of Blanqui’s politics. The Blanqui-Benjamin encounter is indeed a 
problematic one, such that it is necessary to make a detour via Benjamin, via the stars, 
in order to re-address these issues.  
The argument Blanqui outlines in L’Éternité par les astres is at once simple 
and complex: to properly comprehend the text as a whole requires systematically 
working though of each of its constituent assumptions, yet once these are established 
it generally reads like a straightforward and coherent (if scientifically flawed) 
mathematical formula. In what follows I trace the steps by which Blanqui builds his 
analysis in order to arrive at an understanding of the text and to consider how we 
might interpret its wider significance within Blanqui’s project.  
 
The finite, the infinite 
The opening line of L’Éternité par les astres advances the first of three basic theses 
that will inform Blanqui’s overall analysis. ‘L’univers est infini dans le temps et dans 
l’espace, éternel, sans bornes et indivisible.’800 Since comprehension of infinity 
exceeds the limits of human intellect it remains and shall remain an enigma to us.801 
Incomprehension of eternity should not call into question the knowledge that we 
cannot know, however, or lead us to claim the universe must therefore be limited. 
Contrary to our presumptuous tendency to think otherwise, earth and humanity are but 
a minute part of an immense interstellar system. Human beings are ‘presque des intrus 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
799 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, p. 339.!
800 Blanqui, ‘L’Éternité par les astres’, 1872, MA, p. 318. 
801 ‘Cette certitude absolue de l’infinité du monde, jointe à son incompréhensibilité,’ Blanqui 
acknowledges, ‘constitue une des plus crispantes agaceries qui tourmentent l’esprit humain’ (ibid.., p. 
319). As Hallward notes, this is a typical presumption prior to Georg Cantor’s pioneering work on the 
infinite. See Hallward, ‘Blanqui’s bifurcations’, p. 38.  
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dans le groupe que notre gloriole prétend agenouiller autour de sa suprématie.’802 
Even the sun, the supposed centre of the universe, ‘n’est qu’un point imperceptible 
dans l’étendue.’803 All cannot escape the finitude of their material forms.804 Relative 
to the infinity of the universe, the course of finite material life, whatever its form, is 
‘un tout petit point, et pas un millième de seconde. Entre l’étoile et l’éphémère, 
l’éternité ne distingue pas.’805  
To this conception of an infinite and eternal universe Blanqui adds the 
assumption, taken from the contemporary findings of spectral analysis, of a finite 
number of material elements (‘corps simples’). The breakthroughs of spectrométrie 
show these elements are not specific to the earth but are ‘partout identiques’ in the 
material composition of all the universe’s celestial bodies; the potentially one-
hundred or so ‘corps simples qui forment notre Terre constituent également tous les 
globes sans distinction.’806 The physical laws (gravitation and centrifugal) combining 
and governing these elements are in turn equally universal. The universe, Blanqui 
therefore writes, ‘n’est qu’un ensemble de familles unies en quelque sorte par la chair 
et par le sang. Même matière, classée et organisée par la même méthode, dans le 
même ordre. Fond et gouvernement identiques.’807 Taking these two assumptions 
together, Blanqui supposes that because new atoms cannot be created and because the 
natural laws combining and ordering them are immutable the material forms these 
atoms can produce are necessarily finite.808 Within the universe there certainly exists 
multiple forms this matter can take; the possible number of elemental ‘type-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
802 Ibid., p. 323. 
803 Ibid., p. 342.  
804 Ibid., pp. 342-343.  
805 Ibid., p. 348. 
806 Ibid., pp. 327, 353. !
807 Ibid., pp. 357-358.  
808 As was noted both after the text’s initial publication and again more recently, Blanqui here 
overlooks the extent to which these combinations of elements might themselves form altogether new 
elements and the creation of new material forms in turn. See Hallward, ‘Blanqui’s bifurcations’, p. 39. 
! 276!
combinations’ is indeed ‘inexprimable’, ‘incalculable’. But the basic matter itself, and 
therefore the total number of possible combinations, remains universally invariable.809  
On the basis of the first two assumptions a problem imposes itself. ‘Il ne peut 
se créer un atome de matière,’ Blanqui notes, ‘et si les étoiles trépassées ne se 
rallument pas, l’univers s’éteint.’810 Without the continuous rebirth and resurrection 
of matter the universe would be necessarily finite, too. Confronting the alternative of 
‘la résurrection des étoiles, ou la mort universelle’ Blanqui chooses the former.811 It 
follows that just like all other celestial bodies the matter composing human beings and 
the planets they inhabit is eternal and immanent but only ‘dans ses éléments et son 
ensemble’.812 Eternal rebirth and resurrection of the basic set of elements into new 
finite material forms are the means through which the universe’s vitality is ensured 
and a vacuum avoided.813 Once a certain form of matter reaches the end of its finite 
existence the elements composing it take on a new form through a process of shock 
and atomisation. ‘Les métamorphoses se succèdent sans interruption’, he explains, 
without adding that at no point does this ceaseless, furious dying and rebirth, this 
‘pandémonium’ of material regeneration, ever depart from the strict laws of nature.814 
Such is the process through which elemental matter is transformed, obeying ‘la loi 
commune du changement’ set and imposed by nature on the one hand while avoiding 
‘l’immobilisation éternelle’ that would lead to ‘le marasme et bientôt la 
décomposition’ of the universe on the other.815 Within the spatio-temporal infinity of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
809 Blanqui, ‘L’Éternité par les astres’, MA, pp. 322-323, 359-360. 
810 Ibid., p. 353  
811 Ibid., p. 353  
812 Ibid., p. 342. ‘Si leur durée n’est qu’une seconde,’ Blanqui asserts, ‘leur renaissance n’a point de 
limites’ (ibid., p. 377). !
813 Ibid., p. 362. 
814 Ibid., p. 343. 
815 Ibid., pp. 346, 350. 
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the universe, then, ‘le renouvellement des mondes par le choc et la volatilisation des 
étoiles trépassées s’accomplit à toute minute dans les champs de l’infini.’816  
Placing this finite material set and these natural laws within the spatio-
temporal infinity of the universe leads Blanqui to assume a process of eternal 
repetition; insofar as a finite number of elements are subject to an infinite process of 
shocks, atomisation and transformations within a spatially and temporally infinite 
universe, the logical consequence is the creation of infinite copies of the same limited 
number of elemental combinations or types. Alternatively put, spatio-temporal 
infinity decrees that once the limit of different original elemental combinations is 
reached and the number of types exhausted – as by definition it forever has been - 
new original combinations are unattainable, copies unavoidable. Therein resides the 
relation between the finite and the infinite: ‘Ces combinaisons, malgré leur multitude, 
ont un terme et, dès lors, doivent se répéter, pour atteindre à l’infini.’817 Since 
‘l’infinité des globes ne peut surgir que de l’infinité des répétitions’ the universe is 
made and remade in an unending cycle. Repetition is matter’s response, its only 
possible response, to the call of the universe’s spatio-temporal infinity.818  
Strictly following the logic of these three propositions – an infinite and eternal 
universe, a limited set of material elements governed by universal natural laws, 
infinite repetition of the same elemental combinations – Blanqui does not hold back in 
assuming the consequences infinity prescribes. It leads him to speculate that other 
worlds materially identical to our own, ‘du jour de sa naissance au jour de sa mort’, 
have existed, currently do exist and will again exist within the spatio-temporal infinity 
of the cosmos.819 The same applies to other humanities, too. Since human beings, like !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
816 Ibid., p. 348. 
817 Ibid., p. 359. !
818 Ibid., pp. 361-362. 
819 Ibid., p. 366. 
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animals or things, are one possible form of elemental combination every one of us ‘a 
vécu, vit et vivra sans fin’ in the form of infinite identical twins, copies of ourselves 
who themselves have lived, who will live and who are simultaneously living identical 
lives, at every second of our lives, across eternity. ‘Tout être humain est donc éternel 
dans chacune des secondes de son existence’, Blanqui concludes.820 Separated by 
infinite times and distances the universe nonetheless contains an infinite number of 
exact copies of our own earth ‘avec tous ses hôtes sans distinction, depuis le grain de 
sable jusqu’à l’empereur d’Allemagne’, as well as an infinite number near exact 
copies, of course.821 ‘Sur chacun d’eux se succèdent toutes les choses matérielles, tous 
les êtres organises, dans le même ordre, au même lieu, à la même minute ou ils se 
succèdent sur les autres terres, ses sosies’, Blanqui explains. ‘Par conséquent, tous les 
faits accomplis ou à accomplir sur notre globe, avant sa mort, s’accomplissent 
exactement les mêmes dans les milliards de ses pareils.’822 Identical worlds and 
identical peoples lead to identical histories, both individual and collective, however 
great or small, from the assassination of Caesar through the Battles of Valmy, 
Marengo and Waterloo to Blanqui himself, sat at his desk in his cell on the Fort 
Taureau writings these lines. Every moment of every life is played out, again and 
again, for eternity.  
 
Fatalism against fatalism 
But whereas these finite elemental combinations infinitely recreate the same species, 
peoples and worlds at a purely material level - and here lies the decisive (and often 
overlooked) point of the text as a whole - the same is not true at a political level. 
‘Toutes les humanités, identiques à l’heure de l’éclosion, suivent, chacune sur sa !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
820 Ibid., pp. 377-378, 380.  
821 Ibid., pp. 363, 366. 
822 Ibid., p. 369. !
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planète, la route tracée par les passions, et les individus contribuent à la modification 
de cette route par leur influence particulière.’ In other words, humanity’s capacity for 
choice and commitment means that biologically identical human beings are not 
destined to produce politically identical human histories. Humanity, Blanqui 
reaffirms, ‘n’a pas le même personnel sur tous les globes semblables … chacun de ces 
globes, en quelque sorte, a son Humanité spéciale, sortie de la même source, et partie 
du même point que les autres, mais dérivée en chemin par mille sentiers, pour aboutir 
en fin de compte à une vie et à une histoire différentes.’823 The material world may be 
‘une véritable Terre-sosie … jusqu’aujourd’hui du moins. Car demain, les 
événements et les hommes poursuivront leur marche. Désormais, c’est pour nous 
l’inconnu.’824  
 Understanding the underlying logic at work here, and how it does not 
contradict the assertions above regarding historical repetition, relies on recalling the 
principle foundations of Blanqui’s thought, namely the strict division between the 
immutable laws and processes of the natural world and the undetermined and 
changeable domain of human affairs. L’Éternité imposes the exact same separation, 
with the exact same consequences. ‘La nature n’a que des lois inflexibles, 
immuables’, Blanqui states. ‘Tant qu’elles gouvernement seules, tout suit une marche 
fixe et fatale. Mais les variations commencent avec les êtres animés qui ont des 
volontés, autrement dit des caprices. Dès que les hommes interviennent, surtout, la 
fantaisie intervient avec eux.’825 These lines, which constitute some of the pivotal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
823 Ibid., p. 373.  
824 Ibid., p. 364.!
825 Ibid., pp. 370-71. Note the similarities here with a reflection (probably from the late 1860s) on the 
relationship between Paris, France and what is at stake in revolutionary socio-political transition: ‘Chez 
l’homme, la croissance se fait d’elle-même par le développement organique. C’est une simple question 
d’âge. Dans une nation les choses se passent tout autrement. La minorité se prolonge ou s’abrège par le 
fait des hommes eux-mêmes, de leur bon sens ou de leurs sottises, par les fantaisies des passions et de 
la pensée. Ce développement n’est point, comme celui des organismes, soumis à une loi immuable, 
enfermé dans un cercle fatal. L’Enfance ici point durer de longs des siècles ou quelques années, aboutir 
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passages of L’Éternité, can be seen to reaffirm the most basic assumptions of 
Blanqui’s dualism as outlined in Chapter 1. L’Éternité in no way departs from the 
theoretical framework constructed before 1871. ‘La fatalité’, Blanqui defiantly 
insisted following France’s allegedly unavoidable surrender to the Prussians in 
October 1870, ‘est la loi de l’univers matériel et n’est point celle de l’humanité, qui ne 
relève que d’elle-même.’826 A year later these assumptions accompanied Blanqui to 
the Fort Taureau where they would directly underpin the ‘hypothèse astronomique’. 
In fact, the restatement of this dualism does not even constitute an obscure extract or 
passing inference in L’Éternité itself: Blanqui reiterates exactly the same point lest its 
essential meaning be misunderstood. Relative to the material composition of finite 
planets travelling through infinite time and space even the greatest achievements of 
human volition are utterly inconsequential, he observes. Human activity ‘ne trouble 
jamais sérieusement la marche naturelle de phénomènes physiques, mais’, Blanqui 
then immediately adds, and just as above the conjunction introduces the key point, 
‘elle bouleverse l’humanité.’ Impotent against nature’s terrestrial laws and 
insignificant within the infinite history of the cosmos, human volition is nonetheless 
the agent of the shifts and changes in human affairs that dictate the course of human 
history. ‘Il faut donc prévoir cette influence subversive qui change le cours des 
destinées individuelles ou modifie les races animales, déchire les nations et culbute 
les empires.’ Both individually and collectively, ‘[c]’est parmi eux-mêmes que les 
hommes font des victimes et amènent d’immenses changements. Au souffle des 
passions et des intérêts en lutte, leur espèce s’agite avec plus de violence que l’océan 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
à la virilité ou à l’avortement et à la mort (se nouer et finir par la mort) sans avoir atteint l’âge 
d’homme’ (Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 173 [n.d.]).  !
826 Blanqui, ‘Un dernier mot’, October 1871, MA, p. 296. 
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sous l’effort de la tempête.’827 The division between nature and humanity, formally 
enacted in L’Éternité with the ‘mais’, again attests to Blanqui’s conception of history 
as the site and product of human will and action, of struggle and conflict, of 
discontinuity and change. Impotence and insignificance within nature and the cosmos 
in no way denote impotence and insignificance in human history and politics. If the 
natural world ‘ne connaît ni ne pratique la morale en action, [c]e qu’elle fait, elle ne le 
fait pas exprès’,828 it is because these are the very capacities and resources – 
enlightened consciousness, deliberate action, the pursuit of justice - that only human 
beings can exercise. To cast aside necessity as nature’s concern is to reveal the path of 
possibility, the only path we ever have had and ever will have.829 It is a summons to 
assume the duty and work of principled political commitment, to accept all its 
consequences, in the creation of human history.  
Such are the fundamental political dimensions informing the overall argument 
of L’Éternité. According to Blanqui’s astronomical hypothesis humans are not, as one 
note most likely written in late 1860s maintains, the ‘simple outils de l’Eternel’.830 
Within the confines of our world no force but ourselves can determine our collective 
destiny; only we are capable of deciding upon and changing our future course. The 
past alone is a ‘fait accompli’. The future remains unmade, unwritten. And we can 
make it; we can write it. As this unknown future unfolds ‘chaque seconde amènera sa 
bifurcation, le chemin qu’on prendra, celui qu’on aurait pu prendre.’ Decisions and 
action we do not take will certainly be taken by others in other worlds, creating in turn !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
827 Blanqui, ‘L’Éternité par les astres’, MA, p. 371. Spitzer’s reading likewise highlights the importance 
of the ‘mais’. See Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, p. 39.!
828 Ibid., p. 368. 
829 ‘What is most important in one’s own life or history certainly counts for nothing from the 
perspective of infinite variation and return’, Hallward resumes, ‘but the indifference is symmetrical, 
and leaves the domain of our political priorities and possibilities thoroughly untouched.’ Hallward 
shows how this strict division between ‘volition and fate’ is what distinguishes Blanqui’s notion of 
eternal return from that of Nietzsche - hence the error, which dates back to Benjamin and has persisted 
ever since, of aligning the two. Hallward, ‘Blanqui’s bifurcations’, pp. 41-42. 
830 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 181 [n.d.].  
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other possibilities and other histories. Blanqui’s analysis is indeed posited on every 
possible choice and path having been taken infinite times, since the infinite ‘ne 
connaît point l’alternative et a place pour tout.’831 So while identical worlds and 
identical peoples result in the same individual and collective histories, the infinity of 
worlds and humanities does not fail to also account for the infinity of possible lives 
and histories, for the alternative paths and routes that we might have taken. In other 
worlds Napoleon may have won at Waterloo; by equal measure he may have lost at 
Marengo. Each of our twins follows the paths we ourselves did not, and vice versa.832 
That body doubles do not and cannot warn each other of the consequences of their 
choices certainly constitutes the ‘terrible’ aspect of this universal system, Blanqui 
concedes, for if we were able to provide ‘quelques bons conseils’ to those who had 
yet to live out these choices and actions then they would be spared ‘des sottises et des 
chagrins’ we have had to endure and eventually overcome across the course of our 
history, and again the same applies vice versa.833 But while this ‘séquestration des 
mondes-frères par l’inexorable barrière de l’espace’ is no doubt ‘mélancolique’ in 
principle, ultimately the impossibility of any common and cumulative human 
knowledge or experience within the universe’s spatio-temporal infinity renders the 
point simply irrelevant. ‘Il nous importe assez peu que nos sosies soient nos voisins’, 
Blanqui therefore concludes.834 As we cannot ever anticipate the consequences of our 
choices and commitments the issue cancels itself out without in any way altering the 
significance of choice and commitment in our world. Here lies the decisive point: 
even if on other worlds every path and every possible path has been and will be taken 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
831 Blanqui, ‘L’Éternité par les astres’, MA, p. 364.  
832 ‘Tout ce qu’on aurait pu être ici-bas, on l’est quelque part ailleurs. Outre son entière vie, de la 
naissance à la mort, que l’on vit sur une foule de terres, on en vit sur d’autres dix mille éditions 
différentes’ (ibid., p. 365). !
833 Ibid., p. 367 
834 Ibid., pp. 382, 366!
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an infinite number of times before and after us, that does not alter or diminish our 
capacity alone, at every moment, to freely choose and pursue a course of action in 
order to determine what becomes of this world. 
This is the lens through which we should read one particularly problematic 
passage on the fatalist dimensions of this universal system. Reflecting on the cause of 
‘des variantes humaines’, Blanqui reapplies the decisive logic of free choice when 
confronted by alternatives and bifurcations. ‘Quel homme ne se trouve parfois en 
présence de deux carrières ?’, he asks. ‘Celle dont il se détourne lui ferait une vie bien 
différente, tout en laissant la même individualité. L’une conduit à la misère, à la 
honte, à la servitude. L’autre menait à la gloire, à la liberté.’ These sentences expand 
on and so should be read in conjunction with a preceding passage which likewise 
foregrounds the world’s endless reproduction of voluntary choice and its corollary: 
voluntary relinquishment of all other possibilities. ‘À toute minute, à toute seconde, 
les milliers de directions différentes s’offrent à ce genre humain. Il en choisit une, 
abandonne à jamais les autres.’ In this sense the claim that immediately follows, ‘on 
n’échappe pas à la fatalité’,835 therefore denotes accepting the consequences of the 
initial choice. Just as we saw in Chapter 2, L’Éternité persists - with no less force, 
with no less import - in the conviction that only through the fatalism of fully assuming 
all the implications of a free choice, of pursuing a course of action to the end no 
matter what the consequences, of remaining committed to a principle without 
recourse to concession or compromise, can the fatalism of externally imposed destiny 
be exposed as fallacious and duly overcome.  
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
835 Ibid., pp. 363-364. On this point see also Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste 
Blanqui, p. 44. 
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Signifying eternity 
Given the clear consistency these statements share with Blanqui’s wider thought on 
history and politics, if not the simple fact that some of these phrases and their 
essential meanings are found, albeit slightly reworded, elsewhere in his writings, it 
cannot but seem slightly surprising that L’Éternité par les astres has been the subject 
of such persistent interest - and such persistent misinterpretation - to a far greater 
degree than any other of Blanqui’s writings. Why is this so? Simply the text’s 
seeming incongruity within the predominant preoccupations of Blanqui’s life and 
thought is no doubt a contributing factor. Stylistically L’Éternité is dense and oblique, 
demanding of its reader an investment seldom present (and intentionally avoided) in 
Blanqui’s other major writings.836 Its astronomical theses afford little room for the 
immediate, incendiary prose of an Avis au peuple or an Instructions pour une prise 
d’armes. Even more atypical and unsettling is indeed its apparent indifference 
towards politics. These features, when combined with the circumstances of its 
conception, have invited a certain amount of speculation as to the meaning of the text. 
With his trial impending in early 1872, did Blanqui, as Geffroy suggests, betray his 
political convictions in the hope that his scientific breakthroughs would spare him 
from further imprisonment (he insisted copies of the text be sent to members of the 
Assembly, the Academies and the press) to the extent that ‘s’il y a un « document 
Taschereau » dans son existence inflexible, le voici’?837 Did Blanqui, as Benjamin !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
836 When beginning the section ‘Analyse et synthèse de l’univers’ Blanqui concedes that ‘nous entrons 
de droit dans l’obscurité du langage, parce que voici s’ouvrir la question obscure’ (Blanqui, ‘L’Éternité 
par les astres’, MA, p. 354). 
837 Geffroy, L’Enfermé, p. 403. (Recall that the ‘document Taschereau’ of 1848 accused Blanqui of 
betraying his former comrades). To support this view one might (as does Frank Chouraqui, ‘At the 
Crossroads of History: Blanqui at the Castle of the Bull’, in Blanqui, Eternity by the Stars, pp. 7-8, 31-
32, for instance) point to a letter to his sister in which Blanqui describes his text as ‘tout à fait étranger 
à la politique et très modéré en tout’ (cited in Miguel Abensour and Pelosse, Instructions pour une 
prise d’armes, p. 20). But could this seeming denial of the text’s political aspects not be the result of 
wanting it to be read and taken seriously first and foremost as a piece of scientific analysis? Could 
Blanqui not have placed greater overall emphasis on its scientific discoveries – which certainly account 
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and others following him likewise believe, renounce revolution having reconciled 
himself with its futility, as the defeat of May 1871 had conclusively revealed?838 Did 
Blanqui, in short, abandon the political for the cosmological as a result of political or 
personal circumstances?  
Close reading of the text can only lead one to answer such questions in the 
negative. We have seen that the politics of L’Éternité itself and their place within 
Blanqui’s wider project, if not immediately obvious, become clear when the 
astronomical speculations are carefully examined and correctly understood. 
Moreover, when L’Éternité is properly located within Blanqui’s overall life and 
thought all other concerns as to the possible anomalous status of the text – be they 
intellectual or biographical - are shown to be similarly inconsequential. In the first 
instance, Blanqui’s interest in the composition of the universe began long before 
1871-72. His reflections on the infinite and the possibility of other worlds materially 
identical to our own have been traced back to 1841 during his imprisonment at Mont-
Saint-Michel; later, when an inmate at Belle-Île, he wrote a short piece on man and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
for the majority of the text - yet not at the expense of politics tout court? Sincerely believing he had 
unlocked the secrets of the universe, it seems little wonder that he would place his hopes on these 
insights to enable him to be saved from further imprisonment and the grave mental and physical 
suffering it caused him. ‘Tout mon recours,’ Blanqui pleaded to his sister, ‘toute ma défense étaient 
dans cet ouvrage’ (cited in ibid, p. 378). Or as Geffroy himself notes: ‘Devant le conseil de guerre et 
devant l’opinion, sa science, son éloquence, sa poésie plaideront’ (Geffroy, L’Enfermé, p. 403). At the 
trial itself, however, after hearing the ‘commissaire du gouvernement’ tell the court that ‘[j]e veux que 
vous supprimiez cet homme de la société française’, even Blanqui’s defence lawyer, Georges Le 
Chevalier, described, with Blanqui’s approval, a life devoted to his ideas: ‘Sa vie privée a été tout 
d’honnêteté et de courage ; on peut condamner ses idées, il en a que je ne partage pas moi-même ; on 
ne peut pas ne le point estimer’. Blanqui’s politics was, then, very much present, with Blanqui himself 
no less politically combative against his counter-revolutionary accusers and their ‘idées monarchiques’ 
in his plea (see Decaux, Blanqui l’Insurgé, pp. 593-594). To conclude that at any point in the period 
between his arrest and trial Blanqui betrayed his political principles seems heavy handed and 
excessive, to say nothing of the inconsistency it produces with the politics contained within L’Eternité 
par les astres itself. 
838 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, p. 111. Following Benjmain, Frank Chouraqui claims that ‘the 
hard-nosed activist turned speculative prophet’, in composing this ‘consolation for a life of missed 
opportunities and for a world that shall never come to be what it ought to’ bids a ‘final farewell to 
revolution’ (Chouraqui, ‘At the Crossroads of History: Blanqui at the Castle of the Bull’, pp. 22, 30). 
See also Bernstein’s assertion that Blanqui sought to ‘banish himself as far as possible from earth and 
politics’ (Bernstein, Auguste Blanqui and the Art of Insurrection, p. 342). 
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the universe that in many ways can be seen as a precursor to L’Éternité.839 Though the 
writing of L’Éternité served to divert Blanqui’s attention away from the physical and 
mental hardship of solitary confinement at the Fort Taureau – ‘[j]e me réfugie dans 
les astres où l’on peut se promener sans contrainte’ – that is not to say that the text 
itself was apolitical.840 While its author was not a free political agent, unable to act 
upon its conclusions, the same was not true of its reader. Moreover, as an intellectual 
intervention L’Éternité was not conceived as a direct response to events in the streets 
of Paris in May 1871, of which Blanqui remained ignorant as he composed the text.841 
A more likely explanation for Blanqui’s sustained interest in the universe would be 
his lifelong commitment to the Enlightenment ideal of understanding and explaining 
the world and human existence through reason (hence the passing observation that the 
text’s scientific conclusions disprove the possibility of immaterial ‘chimères’).842 A 
desire to continue and advance the Enlightenment project can certainly be seen to 
inform Blanqui’s assertion, when reflecting on the remaining lacunae within 
Laplace’s cosmogony, that ‘l’énigme de l’univers est en permanence devant chaque 
pensée. L’esprit humain veut la déchiffrer à tout prix.’843 In turn, writings from the 
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839 See Maurice Dommanget, Blanqui, La Guerre de 1870-1871 et La Commune (Paris: Editions 
Domat-Montchrestien, 1947), pp. 145-147. Dommanget thus notes: ‘Se trompent donc lourdement les 
admirateurs de Blanqui qui considèrent L’Éternité par les astres comme un hors-œuvre. C’est une 
œuvre de pensée profonde, longuement murie’ (ibid., p. 145). 
840 Blanqui continues: ‘Ce travail est mon seul remède contre la situation déplorable qui m’est fait au 
physique et au moral par la pauvreté d’aliments matériels et intellectuels’ (cited in Dommanget, 
Blanqui, La Guerre de 1870-1871 et La Commune, p. 144). Dommanget’s own conclusions here are 
strangely inconsistent. He suggests, from these extracts, that: ‘ne pouvant s’occuper de politique,’ 
Blanqui ‘s’occupera d’astronomie. Ne pouvant se promener sur terre, il se promènera dans le ciel’ (p. 
145). Later, having correctly highlighted the text’s separation between human affairs and the 
immutable natural realm, and thus the capacity of human action to change human affairs, Dommanget 
nonetheless again insists that: ‘Après le hiatus philosophique de L’Éternité par les astres, Blanqui est 
décidé à reprendre la lutte, à poursuivre son idéal de transformation sociale’ (ibid., p. 155). I would 
argue the contrary: just as Blanqui never separates philosophy from politics, theory from practice, there 
is no division between Blanqui the astronomer and Blanqui the political theorist; where the separation 
between the universe and human politics occurs in the text itself only serves to return Blanqui – as he 
does towards final sections – to the political concerns of our world with greater force.  
841 Ibid., pp. 138-139. 
842 Blanqui, ‘L’Éternité par les astres’, MA, p. 325.  
843 Ibid., p. 342. 
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late 1870s, particularly the letters surrounding his election in Bordeaux and the 
amnesty campaign for the Communards, put paid to any suggestion of a post-
Commune defeatism, just as one cannot read this into the meaning of L’Éternité itself. 
As he wrote in July 1879, and summarising the general sentiment of his 
correspondence at the time: ‘Il faut se rallier, toiser l’ennemi et marcher à lui.’844 
Whether from L’Éternité itself, from the content of these letters or from his other 
equally combative writings and activities of the late 1870s,845 to suggest that by 1872 
Blanqui had been defeated and succumbed to his enemy once and for all or that he 
had in any way renounced the central tenets of his political project is far from true. 
Of arguably greatest significance in constructing the text’s unique status 
within Blanqui’s life and legacy has been its reception, or rather the principal reader 
through whom it has been widely received. Benjamin’s discovery of this ‘cosmic 
phantasmagoria’ in late 1937846 led him to become, as Hallward notes, Blanqui’s 
‘most influential interlocutor’, diffusing his own ‘idiosyncratic patronage’ of his 
subject.847 Benjamin encouraged both interest in L’Éternité and in Blanqui as a major 
historical figure more generally - ‘[b]efore Lenin, there was no one who had a clearer 
profile among the proletariat’848 - but at the price of the subsequent - and remarkably 
persistent - misunderstanding of the L’Éternité as ‘an unconditional surrender’, the 
moment when its author, near the end of his life, finally ‘yields to bourgeois 
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844 Blanqui MSS 9588(2), fo. 459 [15 July 1879]. ‘Il n’est que temps de se réveiller d’une léthargie qui 
pourrait devenir mortelle’, wrote Blanqui during the same period when thanking supporters from 
Beziers. ‘La monarchie pointe à l’horizon de l’opportunisme. Sachons l’apercevoir assez tôt pour la 
replonger dans le néant’, so declared this self-described ‘pauvre prisonnier engagé dans la lutte contre 
la réaction’ (Blanqui MSS 9588(2), fo. 457 [June-July 1879]). Another letter defiantly describes his 
election in Bordeaux as ‘un succès grandiose et fait pour donner du courage à un parti que 
l’opportunisme semblait avoir anéanti’ (Blanqui MSS 9588(2), fo. 459 [14 July 1879] ; emphasis in 
original).!
845 See, for example, ‘L’armée esclave et opprimée’, 31 October 1880, MA, pp. 399-423; ‘Athéisme et 
spiritualisme’, 12 and 13 December 1880, Ni Dieu, Ni Maître, pp. 17-25. 
846 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, pp. 112, 939. 
847 Hallward, ‘Blanqui’s bifurcations’, pp. 36, 40. 
848 Cited in Abensour, Les passages Blanqui, p. 29 and Hallward, ‘Blanqui’s bifurcations’, p. 40.!
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society’.849 Rather than a restatement of Blanqui’s most basic assumptions regarding 
possibility and necessity, that human volition and human history are strictly separate 
from the inexorable natural and cosmological world, Benjamin’s reading foregrounds 
the text’s supposedly ‘merciless speculations that give the lie to the author’s 
revolutionary élan’ in which ‘basic premises [taken] from the mechanistic natural 
sciences’ present a ‘conception of the universe’ that ultimately ‘proves to be a vision 
of hell’, meriting the designation of a ‘theological’ reflection as such. Hell, Benjamin 
suggests, is the complement of the society Blanqui offers simultaneous condemnation 
of and capitulation to: ‘the terrible indictment he pronounces against society takes the 
form of an unqualified submission to its results’ - ‘an irony which doubtless escaped 
the author himself’, Benjamin adds - leaving a feeling not of triumphant power but of 
‘oppression’.850 As if to reinforce the ‘infernal’ quality of Blanqui’s visions, in which 
the people are addressed ‘as if they were apparitions’ and ‘natives’ this hellish 
world,851 Benjamin even cites the passages above concerning human will introducing 
variation and change in human affairs - passages which in fact contain the basic 
meaning of the text as a whole - under the banner of ‘Blanqui’s misanthropy’.852 This 
is a puzzling ascription. Humanity cannot make or change the course of the material, 
natural world or universe – neither does it seek or have to. That in no way means that 
humanity is ‘damned’ and deprived of a ‘liberating solution’ to the multiplying 
phantasmagorias of the ‘commodity-producing’ society.853 Humanity makes human 
history - it forever does, it forever can. There is neither misanthropy nor ‘mythic 
anguish’, still less any ‘melancholy’ or ‘pessimism’854 to be found here - quite the 
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849 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, pp. 111-112. 
850 Ibid., pp. 25, 112. 
851 Ibid., p. 26. 
852 Ibid., p. 113. Cf. Abensour and Pelosse, Libérer l’Enfermé, p. 33. 
853 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, p. 15. 
854 See ibid., p. 15; Abensour and Pelosse, Libérer l’Enfermé, p. 53; Abensour, Les Passages Blanqui, 
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contrary. L’Éternité is better read, I think, under the banner of Blanqui’s affirmative 
humanism: within the sublime infinity of the universe we modest, finite beings can 
make of our society and our history what we will. ‘Nous vivons, nous sommes ce que 
nous sommes, peu de chose’, Blanqui wrote in 1868. ‘Mais, en reconnaissant ce peu 
que nous valons, n’est-il pas simple et juste de faire pour le mieux et de rendre plus 
acceptable notre rôle, si court et si humble, dans le grand drame de l’univers ?855 Like 
Avis au peuple, like Instructions pour une prise d’armes, like all of Blanqui’s 
writings, L’Éternité celebrates this empowering assumption. Those, meanwhile, who 
read L’Éternité through Benjamin’s project rather than Blanqui’s are led to reproduce 
the former’s misunderstandings and misrepresentations.856  
 
Making progress 
On the question of historical progress, whether in L’Éternité or in Blanqui’s wider 
body of work, Benjamin’s reading – and again those who follow it - likewise misses 
the mark.  
One of the ‘methodological objectives’ of Benjamin’s own research project, 
he explains, is ‘to demonstrate a historical materialism which has annihilated within 
itself the idea of progress’, for unlike ‘bourgeois habits of thought’ historical 
materialism’s ‘founding concept is not progress but actualization.’857 Benjamin 
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p. 38, 56. 
855 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 264 [n.d.]; 9592(3), fo. 148 [22 April 1868]. 
856 It is above all the failure to grasp the decisive function of the dualism upon which Blanqui 
constructs his analysis that leads readers to erroneously claim with Benjamin that for Blanqui progress 
is an illusion and myth (Chouraqui, ‘At the Crossroads of History’, pp. 18, 34, 38, 52-53; Abensour, 
Les Passages Blanqui, pp. 32, 49, 51), that for Blanqui the course of human history is predetermined 
and fated by external causal powers (Chouraqui, ‘At the Crossroads of History’, pp. 20, 34, 49), or that 
Blanqui was defeated and melancholically resigned to political failure, impotence or the eternal 
repetition and return of catastrophe (Chouraqui, ‘At the Crossroads of History’, pp. 30, 33; Abensour, 
Les Passages Blanqui, pp. 21, 56). It is indeed instructive to note that those whose work predates the 
rise to prominence of Benjamin’s reading (see Dommanget and Spitzer in particular) do not share in 
these misinterpretations, providing generally astute accounts of the text’s meaning.  
857 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, p. 460. 
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elsewhere repeats: ‘The belief in progress - in an infinite perfectibility understood as 
an infinite ethical task - and the representation of eternal return are complementary’, 
comprising ‘the indissoluble antinomies in the face of which the dialectical 
conception of historical time must be developed.’858 This is all very well when limited 
to Benjamin’s own thought, but the problem arises in Benjamin’s appeal to Blanqui. 
Actualization, boundless human perfectibility, moral task – these are all precisely 
some of the key elements of Blanqui’s conception of progress; yet Benjamin 
explicitly separates Blanqui from them. ‘The activity of a professional revolutionary 
such as Blanqui does not presuppose any faith in progress’, Benjamin contends, ‘it 
presupposes only the determination to do away with present injustice. The 
irreplaceable political value of class hatred consists precisely in its affording the 
revolutionary class a healthy indifference toward speculations concerning progress. 
Indeed, it is just as worthy of humane ends to rise up out of indignation at prevailing 
injustice as to seek through revolution to better the existence of future generations.’859  
Benjamin is only partially correct here, and his wish to detach contemporary 
struggles from any concern for historical progress creates a false dichotomy in 
Blanqui’s politics. As we have seen, Blanqui certainly does not have faith in progress 
in the sense of a blind optimism in the historical inevitability of its triumph. Blanqui 
explicitly insists: ‘Je ne suis pas de ceux qui prétendent que le progrès va de soi, que 
l’humanité ne peut pas reculer’.860 Historical progress is in no way synonymous with 
the passing of historical time, with the mere occurrence of events regardless of their 
social content and consequences. ‘Ces adorateurs du succès acceptent et acclament 
comme un progrès tout événement,’ Blanqui acerbically observes, ‘à titre seul 
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858 Ibid., p. 119. 
859 Ibid., p. 339. 
860 Cited in Bensaïd and Löwy, ‘Auguste Blanqui, heretical communist’, p. 28. 
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d’événement. Le temps est un progrès, quoi qu’il amène.’861 As the centuries progress 
humanity itself may well regress. But by the same token the assumption that ‘la 
marche des choses humaines’ is arbitrary, irregular and varies ‘au gré de milliards de 
caprices’ does not by extension rule out the possibility of progress altogether. Blanqui 
does believe that historical progress is made possible through the determined struggle 
against present injustice. History does not beget progress. Progress is the result of 
conscious and collective human action. It is neither cumulative nor achieved to the 
exclusion of regression, hence the importance noted earlier of sounding the alarm 
against this imminent threat. Where progress has occurred a conflict has been waged, 
a principle imposed and sustained, a battle triumphant. In no way inevitable, human 
progress nonetheless forever remains possible. Rather than dismissing progress as the 
‘phantasmagoria of history’862 Blanqui’s conception of historical time in fact 
highlights the role of political praxis, of a conscious and deliberate, organised and 
sustained political will, in confronting and overcoming the contingency of history, 
with all its obstacles and barriers, in order to make progress, to make history. Political 
organisation, present injustice and progress are thus all linked, not divorced. ‘Les 
armes et l’organisation, voilà l’élément décisif du progrès, le moyen sérieux d’en finir 
avec la misère !’863 Progress must be made; it must be made possible. To use 
Benjamin’s own terms, progress is actualization.  
Blanqui never deviates from this assumption. The temporality of the political 
struggle for social progress can be seen from his earliest critiques of the law as 
sanctioning injustice. In spite of ‘le cri de faim, poussé par des milliers de 
malheureux’, the 1832 defence speech notes, those who respond to the charge of the 
existence of ‘mauvaises lois’ insist that, to ensure the sanctity of the law and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
861 Blanqui MSS, 9592(3), fo. 161 [24 June 1868]. 
862 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, pp. 25-26.!!
863 Blanqui, ‘Avis au peuple’, MA, p. 167. 
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continued stability and order, one can only demand legal reform; ‘en attendant,’ 
Blanqui adds, ‘obéissez’.864 Wait. Obey. Blanqui’s choice of register when dismissing 
a politics constrained by what Badiou calls the ‘legal formalism of the state’ is no 
coincidence.865 It attests to the conviction that in the struggle for justice and equality 
there could and so would be no obeying of illegitimate powers, no demanding reforms 
that will never be granted, no waiting for progress that will never come. 
Revolutionaries do not ask for new laws, they do not do stand by and comply. 1789 
had shown that the privileged few would not voluntarily relinquish their power. 1830 
had taught a new generation that when it comes to freedom ‘il ne faut pas attendre, 
mais qu’il faut prendre.’866 Any attempt to construct a path to future justice must pass 
through a direct and immediate political confrontation with the social injustices of the 
present. This central pillar of Blanqui’s thought is perhaps best articulated in the 
remarkable ending of Tridon’s article cited earlier in Chapter 2, ‘La Faim’. Declaring 
that the ‘scandale’ of exorbitant inequalities, of opulence living side by side with 
starvation must end, Tridon’s text ends with a maxim as remarkable for its rhetorical 
force as it is for its political insight: ‘La faim justifie les moyens.’867 Tridon’s 
détournement in many ways cuts to the heart of his master’s politics. For a project 
defined by the primacy of human agency, by the rejection of social or economic laws 
and the inevitability of progress, it is the suffering here and now that justifies, that 
requires, our full, uncompromising engagement and devotion here and now. 
Imagining ‘the end’ is not the concern. Emancipatory politics is not a question of 
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864 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, pp. 68-69. 
865 ‘Communist-type politics is an immanent activity,’ Badiou writes, ‘an activity under the sign of a 
shared Idea, not an activity determined by external constraints such as the economy or the legal 
formalism of the state’ (Alain Badiou, ‘The Communist Idea and the Question of Terror’, in The Idea 
of Communism Volume 2, p. 9). Cf. Blanqui, ‘Notre drapeau, c’est l’égalité’, MA, p. 107. 
866 Blanqui, ‘Déclaration du Comité provisoire des Ecoles’, 22 January 1831, MA, p. 58.! See also 
Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, p. 70. !
867 Gustave Tridon, ‘La Faim’, La Patrie en Danger, Monday 19 September 1870. 
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drawing up a vision of a future society or believing in the inexorable forward march 
of history as the means to arrive there. All are illusions, all blind alleys that do not 
confront the problem in hand. Only through a determined conviction and commitment 
to recognising and tackling existing injustice will progress be made possible. 
Wherever ‘la faim’ appears, ‘les moyens’ to end it must follow. From this conception 
of history and progress, that in the face of ‘des cris de détresse d’une population 
affamée’868 one cannot indefinitely defer action or comply with the order responsible 
for that very suffering, comes a central principle of voluntarist politics as outlined by 
Hallward. Voluntarists from Toussaint L’Ouverture and John Brown to Che Guevara 
and Paulo Freire hold that, if ‘confronted with indefensible institution[s]’, inequalities 
or injustices, ‘when the opportunity [arises]’ one must ‘[resolve] to work immediately 
and by all available means for [their] elimination.’ Voluntarists affirm, writes 
Hallward, that ‘an idea, like the idea of communism, or equality, or justice, 
commands that we should strive to realize it without compromises or delay, before the 
means of such realization have been recognized as feasible or legitimate, or even 
possible. It is the deliberate striving towards realization itself that will convert the 
impossible into the possible, and explode the parameters of the feasible.’869 It is this 
last point that evades Benjamin in his reading of Blanqui: the historical realisation of 
the politically possible. Where Benjamin grounds the concept of progress ‘in the idea 
of catastrophe’,870 Blanqui grounds it in principled engagement in the name of an 
affirmative philosophy, in the organised and resolute struggle against present injustice 
and, above all, in popular instruction.871!Where for Benjamin the nineteenth-century 
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868 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au procès des Quinze’, MA, p. 70.!
869 Peter Hallward, ‘Communism of the Intellect, Communism of the Will’, in The Idea of Communism, 
p. 112. 
870 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, p. 473.!
871 In the Critique Sociale Blanqui in fact explicitly rejects moments of ‘catastrophe’ as adequate bases 
for social progress. See Blanqui, ‘Le communisme, avenir de la société’, CSI, pp. 202-203. 
! 294!
‘bourgeoisie consolidated its positions of power’ through ‘the concept of progress’, a 
concept within which the doctrine of natural selection in particular ‘popularized the 
notion that progress was automatic’, enabling it to be further applied to ‘the whole of 
human activity’ as a result,872 for Blanqui ‘l’idée si vraie de Darwin sur la sélection 
naturelle’ could not be interpreted ‘en faveur de l’écrasement du faible au profit du 
fort’ since, unlike animals, in humanity’s ‘struggle for life’ its capacity for collective, 
active association is what has enabled it to ‘combattre et d’annuler ces misères de la 
solitude’. For humanity greater solidarity is ‘l’arme et la protection de faible, sa 
propriété inviolable et sainte.’873 ‘Le progrès et la perfection sont en raison directe de 
cette solidarité’, Blanqui resumes as the meaning of Darwinism for human beings.874  
Although the concluding section of L’Éternité par les astres declares, in a 
seemingly dramatic rupture with all these previous assertions, that ‘il n’y a pas 
progrès’,875 the reader must again be sensitive to the purely astronomical realm to 
which the statement pertains. Blanqui’s admission that, if ‘jusqu’ici, le passé pour 
nous représentait la barbarie et l’avenir signifiait progrès, science, bonheur’ this was 
now an ‘illusion’, is made in light of his discovery of these infinite other worlds 
within the universe whose histories, as copies of our own, will return with them the 
same reactionary barbarisms of our past. The according assumption that ‘les 
ignorances, les sottises, les cruautés des nos vieux âges’ will be seen again in the 
future ‘sur des milliards de terres’ is referring to the futures of the infinite copies of 
our earth, not of our earth itself.876 Tragically, the barbarisms of our history thought 
forever buried and overcome will be faced by our body doubles across their histories. 
But this does not mean that we and our copies alike cannot still achieve progress for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
872 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, p. 476. 
873 Blanqui MSS 9592(3), fo. 148 [22 April 1868].  
874 Blanqui MSS 9590(1), fo. 162 [n.d.]. 
875 Blanqui, ‘L’Éternité par les astres’, MA, p. 380.!
876 Ibid., p. 382. 
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ourselves and do away with these barbarisms in our own times and worlds – as indeed 
we continually must in order to avert new or resurgent barbarisms. At stake is not our 
capacity for progress within our world but the recognition that this progress can and 
will have no bearing or impact on the infinite copies of our world. Progress itself is 
not the illusion, then; the illusion is infinite and eternal progress across the infinite 
and eternal universe. Because of the infinite repetition of the same planetary copies, 
the finite existence of each copy and our inability to communicate from one to the 
next progress cannot be cumulative across each earth’s lifetime. But even if the 
progress humanities achieve in their histories through their choices and commitments 
‘est claquemuré sur chaque terre et s’évanouit avec elle’ then so be it, for so long as 
we terrestrial beings remain concerned with the task, our only possible task, of 
shaping our history and changing our world, the relative insignificance this progress 
means for the cosmos does not diminish its significance for us.877  
Since the central thesis of L’Éternité is consistent with the philosophical and 
political tenets Blanqui had established in some cases long before 1871-72, adding an 
astronomical context that simply extends – albeit to an infinite scale of course – the 
architecture in which the same political project still resides, should its role and 
position within his enterprise not be reconsidered? What is the meaning of L’Éternité 
par les astres within Blanqui’s project? Above all L’Éternité represents Blanqui’s 
most sustained exploration of the manner in which human history, the history of 
human pensée-volonté, is cast against the immanence of natural law and the infinity 
of time and space, an eternal and boundless cosmos. However flawed its scientific 
assumptions may now appear, its compelling force endures: L’Éternité is no less than 
an account of the universe and human life, as formidable and sobering in its scope as 
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it is empowering in its political implications. That it does not challenge or alter so 
much as reaffirm Blanqui’s most basic philosophical assumptions would suggest that 
as an exposition of Blanqui’s project its significance has been overstated. That it 
nonetheless affords a remarkable insight into the power and range of Blanqui’s 
thought would suggest that as testament to the inspiring spirit of Blanqui’s project its 
significance endures.  
 
Blanqui’s overall understanding of history and progress will now be familiar. 
Beginning with the primacy of thought and ideas, Blanqui attributes historical change 
to philosophical change. History is the account of the role of human thought and 
consciousness in determining human affairs. By the same token, however, to attain its 
capacity for change thought must be exercised as an act; the capacity of an idea to 
change human affairs forever rests on those willing to act in its name. These 
assumptions lead Blanqui, throughout all aspects of his life and thought, to maintain 
the primacy of free choice, decision and commitment, strictly divorced from any form 
of objective laws or powers, as the means by which social progress is realised across 
the course of human history. Progress, as Blanqui conceives it, is the result of this 
collective political praxis. But progress is also, Blanqui adds, forever exposed to its 
own undoing. An undetermined history is necessarily open to regression and new 
injustices. The alternative of ‘socialism or barbarism’ thus presents itself at all 
moments of humanity’s past, present and future. The choice is our own, the path our 
own making. L’Éternité par les astres, to re-quote Hobsbawm on the Manifesto, is no 
less a ‘document of choices, of political possibilities rather than probabilities, let 
alone certainties’878 than any other of Blanqui’s writings. If at first the astronomical 
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878 Hobsbawm, ‘Introduction’, in Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 27. 
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hypothesis seems to depart entirely from the politics of our earth it is a detour via the 
stars from which Blanqui’s militant politics re-emerge and reassert themselves with 








































Conclusion: Blanqui today 
 
 
‘Un homme dont la vie entière n’a été qu’une longue et douloureuse lutte contre la 







I want to conclude by considering three points that have served to frame this thesis. 
First, I outline what I take to be the fundamental and most consequential assumptions 
of Blanqui’s politics, as well as its major ambiguities and limitations. Second, I turn 
to the question – at times implicit across the preceding pages – of the meaning and 
relevance of Blanqui’s politics for emancipatory politics today, with a reflection on 
some of the enduring critical insights it provides. Finally, I offer some suggestions as 
to the priorities in terms of future work on Blanqui’s life and thought and where a 
return to Blanqui might fruitfully lead.  
 
Blanqui’s militant politics… 
 
Contrary to the enduring image of Blanqui as nothing more than an unthinking, a-
theoretical insurrectionist, this thesis began with the assertion that Blanqui should be 
rediscovered today as both a thinker and practitioner of revolutionary politics. I have 
argued that throughout the declarations and articles, pamphlets and polemics, personal 
notes and correspondence that make up Blanqui’s body of thought, his fundamental 
aim, as Gramsci wrote of Machiavelli, is to always ‘bring everything back to 
politics’.880 The most significant category of Blanqui’s politics is, in my opinion, that 
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879 Blanqui MSS 9580, fo. 84 [n.d.]; Blanqui, ‘Premier texte autobiographique’, 1849-1852, OI, p. 40. 
880 Gramsci, ‘State and Civil Society’, in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 249. 
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of ‘une intelligence unie à une volonté’, what he calls ‘pensée-volonté’.881 We have 
seen how Blanqui constructs his entire political project on and around this concept: it 
explains the primacy he accords to thought, ideas and education in underpinning 
human affairs; it explains his fundamental insistence on resolute commitment to the 
principles of equality and justice; it explains his notion of the people as a conscious 
collective political actor and ‘proletarian’ as the articulation of a subjective political 
position; above all, it explains the assertion that conscious volition determines and so 
has the capacity to change the course of human history and realise social justice. In 
every respect, for Blanqui politics is a matter of conscious, enlightened thought and 
deliberate, voluntary action.  
To affirm the centrality of pensée-volonté is first to recognise the basic 
function within Blanqui’s worldview of philosophy as determinant of social 
arrangements. I have reasserted the extent to which ideas, thought and education have 
a foundational role in Blanqui’s project. Education is a decisive political mechanism, 
Blanqui believes, the central means by which domination and exploitation are 
perpetuated or ceased. The conflict between ignorance and enlightenment is, then, the 
primary battlefield upon which political struggles are waged. One of the major 
tensions in Blanqui’s project indeed exists between this enlightened consciousness 
and the processes of popular empowerment. Insofar as Blanqui sees human will as a 
product of and conditioned by human thought, failure to have attained the necessary 
level of enlightenment precludes the exercise of genuine volition. To be a decisive 
political actor is to be capable of pensée-volonté. To choose and remain committed to 
the cause of justice over injustice presupposes consciousness of the initial choice 
itself. Like Rousseau, in Blanqui’s eyes those who are miseducated, deceived and thus 
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unconscious are also at present incapable of collectively exercising the form of self-
determination that will arrive at and govern a truly free and equal society.  
Blanqui is no doubt right to insist on the importance of being properly 
informed as the prerequisite to making the free choices upon which political action is 
based; he is right that the deliberate dissemination of misinformation in the service of 
particular socio-political interests prevents this process. But he often places too great 
an emphasis on this point. He too often creates a gap between knowledge and 
ignorance, between an enlightened elite and the ignorant masses, thereby overstating 
the possibility for decisive political engagement on the part of ordinary people. In 
many ways these basic assumptions led Blanqui to his organisational misadventures, 
when a vanguard group set about taking action in the name of rather than with and 
through the people.882 Moreover, in the employment of a transitional apparatus as the 
means by which the revolutionary process would advance after the initial seizure of 
power, Blanqui’s thinking likewise attests to the same assumption of an inseparable 
gap between the capacity for decisive political action enlightened thought alone 
accords and the manner by which those presently deprived of that thought are 
incapable of decisive action, for which instruction is the only remedy. It is in this 
sense of a strict division between the means and ends within an emancipatory process 
that Blanqui’s proposals for a ‘dictature Parisienne’ prefigure the problem of how to 
align political and social change the Leninist project would confront and emphatically !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
882 ‘Dans les périodes historiques de ce genre,’ Geffroy writes of the situation in Paris in September-
October 1870, ‘si les soldats peuvent créer le chef, le chef ne peut susciter les soldats.’ Blanqui’s 
failure to meaningfully shape and strategically reflect popular consciousness would at times leave him, 
as Geffory’s vivid image suggests, ‘un général sans armée’, unable to initiate the popular 
empowerment to which he aspired (see Geffroy, L’Enfermé, pp. 333-334). It would, however, be 
inaccurate to claim, as does Geffroy, that Blanqui continually found himself in these circumstances 
across the course of his life. We have seen that the secret conspiratorial cell can certainly be seen as a 
product of a specific political context, when state repression pushed any opposition underground. And 
Blanqui did not persist with these organisational forms when political conditions allowed for more 
open agitation in and amongst the masses, as seen in 1848, for example. That said, there were no doubt 
moments – 1839, 1870 - when Geffroy’s imagery holds true.  
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fail to resolve. As Hardt convincingly shows in the work of Jefferson, it seems that 
any attempt to confront anew the problem of transition must begin by thinking and 
practising social and political transformation together so as to pursue a politics of self-
emancipation.  
Voluntary choice and resolute commitment therefore form the heart of 
Blanqui’s militant politics. We have seen that without foregrounding the importance 
of commitment and the conflict it begets, without examining the assumptions behind 
and consequences of this essential point, we cannot understand Blanqui’s project as a 
whole. Emanating from a Rousseauist account of property, history and contemporary 
social relations, politics, as Blanqui conceives it, presupposes taking a side to the 
absolute exclusion of any semblance of impartiality or so-called middle ground. 
Whether through active affiliation or passive complicity a side is always taken. 
Blanqui’s uncompromising sense of allegiance and conviction, and particularly the 
moral dimensions therein, finds few counterparts. In his life and work alike Blanqui 
shows with remarkable clarity and power that an informed, principled decision then 
requires principled, unwavering commitment; a politics of free choice is meaningless 
without accepting the consequences - however difficult, however demanding - the 
choice will necessarily impose. Subjective factors such as an enlightened faith and a 
sense of moral duty that sustain a principled choice must therefore be recognised as a 
key concern within Blanqui’s thought, particularly since they inform his conception 
of the political actor.  
We have seen that Blanqui maintains the need for a leading actor, the 
enlightened workers of Paris, whose vanguard political role relies first and foremost 
on their concentrated intellectual supremacy over the nation as a whole. Parisians’ 
shared consciousness of their plight, their knowledge and understanding of the 
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established social order as one of exploitation and domination, will confer upon them 
an unrivalled strength of force through their willingness to fight with a sense of ardent 
commitment and fervent devotion to their cause. This is, for Blanqui, the sine qua non 
of the revolutionary actor. Only a lack of organisation and discipline can prevent this 
determined collective force voluntarily acting for the triumph of an idea from 
overthrowing the forces of the state, Blanqui believes.  
The centrality within this notion of agency of choice and commitment indeed 
enabled us to comprehend Blanqui’s contentious conception of the people and the 
proletariat more fundamentally as a political actor. Collective actors are, for Blanqui, 
not a priori constructions produced through objective historical or economic 
processes but the result of conscious decisions, voluntary action and collective 
empowerment. Through a reading of Laclau’s account of populism we have seen that 
Blanqui’s intentionally broad notions of the people and the proletariat must be read 
primarily not as socio-economic but political concepts. For Blanqui to be a proletarian 
is to subjectively affirm of your commitment to the oppressed. As we saw in light of 
Rancière’s work, Blanqui’s concept of the people or the proletariat is also one that 
recognises the everyday yet unseen suffering of all the excluded, no matter what their 
specific socio-economic role or position, whose exclusion will end as a result of the 
process of their active empowerment.   
Taken as a whole, what distinguishes Blanqui above all from his ‘utopian’ 
contemporaries, thereby building on the Rousseauist-Jacobin project whilst 
anticipating the approaches of figures like Lenin, Guevara and also Marx in certain 
respects, is the assumption that social change is first and foremost a matter of politics 
– that is, of conscious collective volition, of state power, of popular empowerment. 
Blanqui was arguably the first socialist thinker to maintain that only in recognising 
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these basic political factors, and only by organising and implementing the practical 
means and forces necessary to see to these tasks, can the struggle to establish real 
social equality and justice begin. To an unrivalled extent in his own time, and with a 
force of insight that resonates beyond it, Blanqui forever asserts that emancipation is 
an actual project that will require dedicated work, perseverance and resolve. Unlike 
his contemporaries Blanqui became acutely aware of the obstacles and resistance a 
movement for popular empowerment will confront and have to overcome. In the 
aftermath of July 1830 Blanqui discovered that revolution is not a single event but a 
continuous process whose success will rely on harnessing its actors’ concentrated 
collective capacities so as to simultaneously proceed and persist whilst avoiding the 
ever-present risk of manipulation and fragmentation to which disempowerment and 
defeat are owed.  
Of major importance to Blanqui’s perspective here is his distinctive, staunch 
rejection of all forms of determinism within the realm of human affairs. To reject any 
belief in objective socio-economic laws, pre-determined natural fate or historical 
necessity is to advance social progress as a collective project that forever remains 
politically possible – from his proclamations during the Trois Glorieuses of 1830 to 
L’Éternité par les astres of 1872, Blanqui held to this conviction, I have argued. 
Blanqui has no illusions about the task at hand or the efforts demanded in achieving 
this task. But such tasks and such efforts are in no way beyond us. To repeat the 
fundamental maxim formulated in 1832: ‘nous le pouvons ! si nous le voulons’.883 
The history of popular struggles proves time and time again that if we are willing to 
do what is necessary in order to realise a goal or principle then it can be done – such 
is the basic assumption of Blanqui’s voluntarism.  
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883 Blanqui, ‘Rapport à la Société des Amis du peuple’, 2 February 1832, MA, p. 98.  
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The primacy accorded to politics does lead Blanqui, however, to neglect wider 
factors in affecting and shaping political struggles and engagements. To maintain 
‘collective self-determination – more than an assessment of what seems feasible or 
appropriate’ as ‘the animating principle of political action’ must nonetheless still take 
proper account of the ‘objective forms of determination’ through which subjective 
determination appears and advances.884 The image of Blanqui as a blind adventurist, 
completely ignorant of and indifferent to the constraints of circumstance is 
unfounded. But he does nonetheless fail - unlike Gramsci, one might add885 - to take 
sufficient account of the grounds on which collective political action is organised and 
exercised. 
Where Blanqui’s responses and solutions fall short, his strength remains in his 
recognition of and wrestling with some of the most basic, inescapable concerns of 
emancipatory politics - agency and commitment, state power and popular 
empowerment, amongst others - that many of his contemporaries, and indeed many 
others since, ignore as inconsequential or simply reject outright. Blanqui’s project, in 
short, is inadequate yet indispensable.886 Now is the time to return to Blanqui, to 




884 Hallward, ‘The Will of the People’, p. 17. 
885 ‘Politics becomes permanent action and gives birth to permanent organisations’, Gramsci writes in 
one instructive passage, ‘precisely in so far as it identifies itself with economics. But it also distinct 
from it, which is why one may speak separately of economics and politics, and speak of “political 
passion” as of an immediate impulse to action which is born on the “permanent and organic” terrain of 
economic life but which transcends it, bringing into play emotions and aspirations in whose 
incandescent atmosphere even calculations involving the individual human life itself obey different 
laws from those of individual profit, etc’ (Gramsci, ‘The Modern Prince’, in Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks, pp. 139-140). 
886 Here I paraphrase Cornel West’s take on the relevance of Marxism today in ‘An Interview with 






What is the significance of Blanqui’s militant politics today? Here I will propose three 
points under the broad headings of temporality, agency and strategy. It should be 
made clear that in all such respects it is not a case of simply repeating Blanqui.887 To 
say that Blanqui’s politics are of enduring value and interest is not to advocate their 
root and branch adoption, or indeed to suppose their original form could still apply 
today. The challenge, rather, is to locate and extract basic principles, practices and 
assumptions that may be effectively re-imagined for and applied to our own times.  
 
1. A political temporality  
There is an instructive unity between Blanqui’s conception of history and history’s 
conception of Blanqui. Blanqui’s voluntarist rejection of ‘objective laws’ or external 
forces pre-determining or exercising principal causality over humanity’s social 
arrangements, politics and history has been consistently rejected ever since as 
Blanqui’s voluntarist ignorance. ‘What other revolutionary, of thought or action,’ 
Rancière is correct to ask, ‘has ever proposed such a radical gap between the 
“objective conditions” of action and the courage of his enterprise? It is understandable 
that posterity has preferred to retain the reassuring image of an unrepentant 
conspirator who was regrettably ignorant of the laws of history.’888 Blanqui’s open 
and undetermined view of history, its privileging of political possibility over 
historical necessity, its absolute opposition to any form of fatalist teleology, would 
mark some of Blanqui’s most notable readers, from Benjamin to Bensaïd, who in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
887 Cf. Slavoj !i"ek, ‘Afterword: Lenin’s Choice’, in V.I. Lenin, Revolution at the Gates: A Selection 
of Writings from February to October 1917, ed. Slavoj !i"ek (London: Verso, 2002), pp. 310-311.  
888 Rancière, ‘The Radical Gap’, p. 25.   
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nineteenth-century revolutionary discovered paths out of the blind alleys into which 
twentieth-century emancipatory politics had been led.  
The twenty-first century wrestles with these issues perhaps like never before. 
Today, ‘in our bleak age so adoring of every form of necessity’, to again invoke 
Rancière’s characterisation,889 Blanqui invites us to reject any appeal to historical 
necessity, to ‘the end of history’, and to re-imagine the politics of possibility. In the 
ruins of ‘scientific socialism’ and any pretentions to have discovered the internal logic 
of history with its immutable processes, Blanqui’s resolute anti-determinism and anti-
positivism re-emerge with timely forcefulness. Foregrounding a politics rooted in a 
non-determinist view of history indeed has important implications for how we read 
Marx today. To return to Marx in light of Blanqui is to do away with any historical 
determinism in the former – be it sometimes absent, sometimes latent, sometimes 
manifest – that may deny or deviate from the primacy of politics as collective 
volition. Blanqui offers an exceptionally lucid, at times compelling dismissal of the 
claims to recognise ‘the inevitable movement of history’ and the according need to 
move with it. Blanqui recognises with arresting urgency that the organised, collective 
political action of today can, and must, advance the cause of equality and justice 
tomorrow. There is no such thing as historical fate or inevitable future destiny, 
Blanqui tells us. There are only the choices and commitments of the present.  
 
2. A political agency  
In a passage from the preparatory notes for the Procès des Poudres of 1836 Blanqui 
outlines the ruling ideology of his time, which arguably has similarities with the neo-
liberalism of our own. ‘L’égalité est une chimère, le dévouement une sottise. Que 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
889 Ibid., p. 25.!
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chacun se dévoue à soi-même, il n’aura pas besoin du dévouement des autres. Nous 
n’avons qu’un devoir ici bas, c’est de nous enrichir. Au plus adroit et au plus fort le 
champ est libre. Ceux qui rêvent de Bonheur universel sont des insensés ou des 
fanatiques.’890 Against the chorus of self-interest and the pursuit of personal wealth 
and power,891 if the lone voice calling for passionate devotion to a collective ideal is 
to be labeled that of a crazed fanatic then such labels cannot but be fully embraced. 
‘Oui, mes amis, nous sommes des fous’, Blanqui declares. ‘Nous avons une foi, nous 
avons des croyances austères, passionnées. Nous ne sommes pas grâce à Dieu, des 
Républicains d’un jour, enthousiastes la veille, apostats le lendemain. … Tant que 
crieront vers nous les gémissements des enfants du peuple qui ont faim, tant que le 
veau d’or sera Dieu, l’égalité proscrite, la probité bafouée, le vice triomphant, la vertu 
écrasée, nous resterons ce que nous sommes.’892 These passages not only recast what 
it means for individuals to be active participants in society rather than simply 
passively accepting and unquestioningly acting according to the established order of 
things. They also attest to the rebel’s determined faith and conviction; to the 
revolutionary’s dedication and duty; to their defiance and dissent; to their belief in 
and enthusiastic passion for the possibility of creating a better society – all of which 
are fundamental to Blanqui’s conception of militant political agency.  
This resolute commitment to first principles can and should have strong 
reverberations today as attempts are made to rethink the actor and agency or the 
subject and subjectivity for a renewed emancipatory politics. To reaffirm with the 
authors of The Germany Ideology that ‘“communism is the real movement 
overcoming the existing state of affairs” … changes nothing about the situation,’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
890 Blanqui, ‘Procès des poudres’, 2-11 August 1836, OI, p. 353. 
891 On this point see also Blanqui, ‘Rapport gigantesque de Thiers sur l’assistance publique’, 1850, 
CSII, p. 246.  
892 Blanqui, ‘Procès des poudres’, OI, p. 353.!
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Balibar rightly tells us, ‘because subjects can either resist the movement or contribute 
to it, and they contribute to it only if they desire it, whatever the conditions, material 
or spiritual, which can facilitate or even produce this subjective orientation.’ It 
follows that ‘idealism is the condition for communist commitment’.893 Today, then, 
the questions and concerns of Blanqui’s project should be reposed: What are the 
conditions of ‘idealist’ political commitment? How do they inform the approach and 
response to difficulties and defeats, obstacles and impasses as they necessarily appear 
in the course of political sequences, be they local or general, short or long? How are 
commitment and determination, purpose and perseverance sustained, both 
individually and collectively? Is there a role or function for a form of (quasi-
theological or moral) faith, belief or duty in order to pursue and realise a collective 
goal or principle? The lasting lesson of Blanqui’s own militancy is the resolute, 
uncompromising manner in which his own life bore witness to his own politics. 
Blanqui took a side; he made a decision and accepted its consequences. Efforts to 
rethink what Balibar calls, after Badiou, the ‘practical idealism’894 of political agency 
would learn a great deal from arguably the nineteenth century’s leading exemplar of 
‘communism as commitment’.  
 
3. A political strategy  
The extent to which Blanqui’s socio-political analysis in certain respects resonates 
with the present historico-political moment is striking. The critiques of a financial 
oligarchy, of a corrupted democracy (see the description of a government which 
‘concentre les trois pouvoirs entre les mains d’un petit nombre de privilégiés unis par !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
893 Balibar, ‘Communism as Commitment, Imagination and Politics’, p. 15. '() Ibid., pp. 14-15. See also Alain Badiou, Logics of Worlds, trans. Alberto Toscano (London: 
Continuum, 2009), pp. 514, 578. Badiou’s subsequent attempts to rethink the Idea of communism – a 
notion that carries certain salient aspects of Blanqui’s thought – likewise offers many fruitful 
comparisons here worth exploring further. 
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les mêmes intérêts’895) of a growing division between rich and poor – these lines 
could quite credibly be written today.896 In a sense, then, Blanqui is our 
contemporary. This might - though need not have to - lend greater force to the basic 
strategic insights Blanqui outlines in response.  
Blanqui is perhaps the first socialist thinker to seriously pose the question of 
political strategy. Blanqui’s strategic concerns derive from the recognition of a 
central, decisive factor confronting all movements for social change: political power. 
One of the most significant innovations of Blanqui’s project is the understanding that 
without taking, retaining and exercising political power any attempt to enact lasting 
social change will bear no fruit. Such assumptions run contrary to much contemporary 
radical political praxis, however. Leaderless, horizontal movements eschewing 
questions regarding the mechanisms of popular empowerment have dominated the 
most prominent popular movements, certainly in the UK and US, across the political 
sequence that began in 2011.897 These movements, though no doubt inspiring, 
revealed themselves the limits of their political strategy, for so long as the means by 
which power can be collectively taken, sustained and exercised is evaded these 
collective actions will continually be subsumed by the status quo, leaving no trace 
other than that of a momentary rupture. History shows, as Blanqui knew, that the 
realisation of lasting social change relies on political action extending beyond 
localised, ephemeral disruption and resistance. Blanqui’s simple yet decisive question 
thus bears repeating: how do a people go from exclusion from to constitution of 
political power as the basis of enduring social change? Today many are returning to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
895 Blanqui, ‘Défense d’Auguste Blanqui au process des Quinze’, 12 January 1832, MA, p. 69.  
896 See also: ‘On ne peut pas le nier, c’est la Bourse aujourd’hui qui est le centre de la vie matérielle de 
la nation, et par malheur, cette vie matérielle devient chaque jour davantage toute la vie sociale’ 
(Blanqui MSS 9586, fo. 401 [n.d.]).  
897 For an overview of the Occupy Wall Street movement and the theoretical assumptions on which its 
tactics were based, see David Graeber, The Democracy Project: A History, a Crisis, a Movement 
(London: Penguin Books, 2013).  
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this question and re-engaging with thinkers of political strategy (Gramsci, Poulantzas, 
Laclau and Mouffe, Bensaïd). Blanqui, for his part, offers an antidote to those who, 
like in his own day, still believe it possible to Change the World Without Taking 
Power.898 None of this is to say of course that a return to the Leninist party, the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, and so on, still less Blanqui’s variants of these 
organisational forms, provide the solution. But it is to affirm that forms of 
organisation and leadership are necessary. Blanqui recognised the fundamental 
imperative – that is, there is no effective social struggle without political organisation. 
Blanqui is correct in diagnosing this basic problem, even if his own remedies are, 
needless to say, far from satisfactory. The solutions remain to be discovered. The 
ongoing popular movements in Greece and Spain, which themselves also began with 
or took their impetus from mass demonstrations, strikes and occupations, have indeed 
shown the importance of translating and concentrating these localised mobilisations 
into organised political forms capable of constituting and exercising power at a 
national level. Where these political groups, sequences and the possibilities they hold 
will lead is unclear at the time of writing. What is clear, however, is that their 




This thesis has never been conceived as the last word on Blanqui. Quite the contrary: 
I hope it will make a modest contribution towards beginning a wider re-engagement 
with an overlooked figure. So what principal work remains to be done, and where 
might returning to Blanqui lead?  
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898 See John Holloway, Change the World Without Taking Power (London: Pluto Press, 2002). 
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The major obstacle to the dissemination of Blanqui’s thought, particularly in 
the Anglophone world, remains the unavailability of his writings.899 Anthologies of 
selected writings are imperative if Blanqui is to be seriously re-read and re-thought 
today. Of course this is not to speak of the volumes of unpublished manuscripts. One 
hopes a series of Blanqui’s collected works could eventually see the light of day, 
continuing the work began by Dominique Le Nuz over twenty years ago.  
Such primary work would enable and encourage further secondary studies. 
Historians would have no shortage of potential lines of inquiry. A new biography is 
long overdue. Blanqui’s quite extraordinary life, his role in and influence on the 
revolts and revolutions of the nineteenth century all warrant re-visiting and 
reappraisal. The dual lives of Auguste and his older brother, the liberal economist 
Adolphe, would likewise provide a great deal of interest. Beyond Blanqui’s own 
political experiences there also remains much more to uncover about Blanquism as 
both a movement taking the name, as seen in the France from the Second Empire until 
the end of the century, and as a wider political tendency that could be traced from the 
Narodniks to certain guerrilla struggles of the twentieth century. Blanqui’s thought 
likewise gives rise to numerous themes on which more sustained reflections should be 
granted. These may include, amongst others, the politics of education, the concept of 
history and conflict as an axiom of socio-political thought and practice.  
In this thesis where possible and appropriate I have suggested comparisons 
with other thinkers with whom I think Blanqui shares certain affinities and which 
have been hitherto largely overlooked in both studies of Blanqui himself and in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
899 A chicken and egg scenario may have been played out, of course: has the lack of interest in 
Blanqui’s thought resulted in the failure to publish his writings, or has the failure to publish his 
writings resulted in the lack of interest in his thought? Given the years that have passed since the 
appearance - from a widely read and respected publishing house, we might add - of Maintenant, il faut 
des armes and the continued lack of re-engagement with their content, one might be forced to side with 
the former hypothesis.  
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readings of his forerunners, contemporaries and descendents. More detailed 
comparative studies with Rousseau and Marx in particular would be instructive in the 
understanding of both sides. One might also add that Machiavelli (perhaps via 
Gramsci) as well as Lenin and Trotsky but also Benjamin, Bensaïd and Badiou would 
each in their own way provide stimulating interlocutors. The dual lives and projects of 
Blanqui and Che Guevara would provide an especially rich point of reflection. Both 
figures could be said respectively to represent the nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
embodiments of a rare breed of political engagement. Men of action, men of ideas, 
men of principles, the extent to which their political commitments were indivisible 
from every phase of their adult lives cannot fail to invite consideration of what it 
meant to be a militant revolutionary in their respective historical epochs and what one 
might infer from this today. It may in fact serve to reveal a major ‘missed encounter’, 
to borrow the phrase proposed by Balibar when undertaking a similar exercise,900 of 
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